



# **Contents of this file:**

- **Guidance and Intent**
- **Authorities**
  - **United States Code (U.S.C.) Quick Reference**
  - **Rules of Engagement (ROE) Considerations for the JTF Commander**
- **Operations in the Information Environment**
  - **Secretary of Defense Memorandum: Information as a Joint Function, September 15, 2017**
  - **Cognitive Biases Poster**
- **Sustainment**
- **HQ Organization and Process Insights**
- **“Apologetics,” Excerpts from “Defending the Record on US Nuclear Deterrence” by Gen Kevin P. Chilton (ret), Former Commander, US Strategic Command, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2018**

# Guidance and Intent



***Deployable Training Division  
Joint Staff J7***



***The overall classification of slides is***

**UNCLASSIFIED**

# *Challenges*

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- **Early and timely Commander involvement throughout design and planning**
- **Deciding if or when to reframe the problem**
- **Commander centrality in assessments that inform understanding and guidance**
- **Structuring the design, planning, and assessment process to inform Guidance and Intent**

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***Interview with  
General James Mattis, USMC (Ret)***


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***at***

***The Hoover Institution at Stanford University***

***March 6, 2015***


# Operational Art



## Insight

- *Leverage partners to better understand the environment*


# ***Design and Planning Continuum***



## **Insights**

- *Requires upfront time and dialogue to define the problem*
- *Commander's early engagement enhances and focuses efforts*
- *Senior leaders on the staff – manage the continuum...*

# Reframing the Problem





## Insights

- *Commander's decision to reframe and revisit design*
- *Operations don't stop during reframing – concurrent actions*
- *Consider who you leverage for problem framing and design*

# Assessment

- *Are we doing things right?*
- *Are we doing the right things?*
  
- *Are we accomplishing the Mission?*
- *Are we meeting Desired Endstate?*
- *Are we achieving Strategic Objectives?*




## Insights

- *Commander centric – key to developing guidance and intent*
- *Implement early and continuously with partners to deepen understanding*
- *Integrate assessment structure across echelons at the pace of operations*
- *Get to “What needs to be done”; do not stop at “What happened”*



# Structure and Process Implications



## Insights

- **Clear process integrates people and information to share understanding**
- **Structure enhances speed of translation from guidance to execution**
- **Timely engagements enable adaptability and flexibility in complex environments**
- **Clear terms of reference disciplines the process and sets expectations**

SAWG: Strategic Assessment Working Group

PDB: Plans Decision Board

CAB: Commander's Assessment Board

# ***Key Takeaways***

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- **Active and continuous Commander involvement promotes focus and flexibility**
- **Reframing is an art – decide when or if required**
- **Commander centric assessments maximize shared understanding**
- **Structure design, planning, and assessments around Commander's time and approach**

# *References*

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
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- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 1, “Joint Warfighting Reference Copy,” 29 Jun 2020**
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- **Joint Pub 5-0, “Joint Planning,” 1 Dec 2020**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Assessment and Risk Focus Paper, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, Mar 2020**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) Focus Paper, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, Jan 2020**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Design and Planning Focus Paper, 1<sup>st</sup> Edition, Jul 2013**

# ***Authorities***

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Joint Staff J7***

***The overall classification of slides is***

**UNCLASSIFIED**



# *Challenges*

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- **Deciding and acting within clear authority to promote the legitimacy of operations**
- **Understanding how the interaction of law, policy, and guidance defines authority and underwrites decision making**
- **Developing and delegating authorities in support of timely decision making**

# ***Authority and Legitimacy***

- Adhering to established authority promotes legitimacy
- Legitimacy promotes support and leverages capabilities
- Operating with legitimacy is part of an effective strategy
- Perception of legitimacy can be as important as reality
- Legitimacy can be a tug-of-war in competing narratives

## **2015 National Security Strategy**

“To succeed, we must draw upon the **power of our example**—that means viewing our commitment to **our values and the rule of law** as a strength, and not an inconvenience.”

## **2017 National Security Strategy**

“Around the world, nations and individuals admire **what America stands for**. We treat people equally and **value and uphold the rule of law**.”

## **2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance**

“[W]hen force is required, we will employ it alongside **international and local partners** wherever possible to bolster **effectiveness and legitimacy**, share burdens, and invest others in success.”

# Legitimacy Narrative



## Soleimani Strike



### Iran letter to UN (3 Jan 20)

- A terrorist attack and criminal assassination.
- “...the United States shall bear full responsibility for all consequences.”

### U.S. letter to UN (8 Jan 20)

- An exercise of our inherent right of self-defense (Article 51 of the UN Charter) in response to a series of escalating threats and armed attacks by Iran and its proxies.

#### Actions and Reactions:

19 Jun 19 – Iran shoots down UAS  
18 Jul 19 – Iranian UAS threatens USS BOXER  
27 Dec 19 – U.S. CTR killed in militia attack

29 Dec 19 – U.S. strikes 5 militia targets  
31 Dec 19 – Iran backed militias attack USEMB  
2 Jan 20 – U.S. strike kills Gen Soleimani  
7 Jan 20 – Iranian ballistic missile attack

### Contrast this with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine:

- Early intel and info sharing tipped Russia’s hand, informed the narrative, and caused news and media focus to pre-position in and around Ukraine
- Russia has been forced to try to counter US, NATO, and generally world-wide narrative on legitimacy of operations and actions
- Pervasive support to Ukraine and for sanctions against Russia being fueled by a clear line between good and evil

# Law, Policy, and Guidance

**Understand mission partner authority to leverage capability**

- U.S. Agency laws, regulations, and policies
- Partner Nation laws, national policies, regulations, and orders
- NGO host nation laws and NGO internal policies


**Authorities Challenges:**

- Rules of Engagement (ROE)
- Fiscal Authorities
- Non-Kinetic Activities
- Exquisite Capabilities
- Space Activities

**National policy decisions and documents**

- ✓ PPDs
- ✓ NSPMs

**DOD regulations and policies**



**International Law**

- ✓ Treaty
- ✓ Customary

**Domestic Law**

- ✓ Constitution
- ✓ Statutes



# Law, Policy, and Guidance

## CJTF-OIR Leaflet Drop (2015)



### Law of Armed Conflict

- Tankers are lawful military targets
- Deaths of drivers who could be civilian non-combatants would not be unlawful if the commander determined they were not excessive in light of the military advantage to be gained
- Duty to warn civilians if conditions permit, but need not be specific

### Policy

- Minimize civilian casualties
  - *Who are the drivers?*
- Maintain legitimacy

### **Operational Solution**

Warn drivers ahead of strikes

# ***Developing and Delegating Authorities***

## **Activities Drive Authorities**

- What do I need to do?
  - Do I have the right capability?
  - Do I have the right authorities?
  - Who has them and how do I get both?
    - Request for Forces
    - Request for Authority
- Design & Initial Planning**
- Detailed Planning**
- 


## **Appropriate delegation speeds decision making**

- Requires balancing risk
- Avoids centralized decision making
- Critical to Globally Integrated Operations
- Linked to Mission Command (Intent, Understanding, Trust)

**Specify operational requirements to support requests for authority**

**Identify risk and mitigation when requesting or delegating authorities**

# Developing and Requesting Authorities



- *Use of force is regulated by ROE, authorized by mission orders, and executed per guidance and intent*
- *National level decisions on use of force are heavily influenced by policy*
- *Commanders seek robust ROE delegation to support agile operations*

# ***Key Takeaways***

---

- **Reality and perception of legitimacy brings support and access to capabilities**
- **Law, policy, and guidance provide the framework for operational solutions**
- **Understanding the authorities of mission partners leverages additional capabilities**
- **Activities drive authorities**
- **Appropriate delegation of authorities speeds decision making**

# *References*

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- **DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 1, “Joint Warfighting Reference Copy,” 29 Jun 2020**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 2, “The Joint Force,” 19 Jun 2020**
- **Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, Mar 2021**
- **National Security Strategy 2017**
- **National Defense Strategy 2022**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Authorities Focus Paper, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Oct 2016**

# United States Code (U.S.C.)

| Title     | Short Title                           | Descriptive / Applicability  |
|-----------|---------------------------------------|--|
| <b>5</b>  | Government Organization and Employees | Agency organization and establishment of procedures for civilian workforce including functions and responsibilities as well as employment recruitment and retention.   |
| <b>6</b>  | Domestic Security                     | Establishes and organizes DHS, national emergency management requirements, and the national preparedness system. Includes applicable law on security and accountability for ports and borders as well as cybersecurity. (Homeland Security)  |
| <b>10</b> | Armed Forces                          | Organization of DOD and general military powers; establishes active and reserve command structure within DOD (OSD, JCS and the Services). Regulates DoD personnel to include manning authorizations, discipline, training and career progression (including Joint qualification) as well as regulations on procurement. Also includes designated excepted civilian service, e.g., Cyber. (Homeland Defense)  |
| <b>14</b> | Coast Guard                           | Establishes organization and powers, including law enforcement and other duties of the regular, reserve and auxiliary Coast Guard. Provides for military capability in support of DHS; capability also used under Title 10 when assigned in support of DoD.  |
| <b>18</b> | Crimes and Criminal Procedure         | Defines federal crimes, criminal procedure, prisons and prisoners and associated regulations. Includes the Posse Comitatus Act, forbidding federalized (T10) military conducting law enforcement. Department of Justice (DOJ) lead agency in accordance with Title 28 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure).  |
| <b>19</b> | Customs Duties                        | Foreign trade zones; tariffs, trade negotiation and agreements, and smuggling.   |
| <b>22</b> | Foreign Relations and Intercourse     | Provides authority for diplomatic and consular courts and service. Provides for preservation of friendly foreign relations including Mutual Defense and Security Assistance Programs; protection of vessels on international and territorial waters and protections of citizens abroad. It also provides for authorities relating to regulation of foreign missions. Significant legal basis for HA / DR / NEO. Assigns Department of State (DOS) as lead agency.  |
| <b>32</b> | National Guard (NG)                   | Provides authority for trained / equipped NG in support of federal mission requirements. Additionally provides authority for DOD domestic missions to be conducted by NG under C2 of respective Governors, exempt from Posse Comitatus Act; or mobilization of NG forces to active federal duty (Title 10). Grants authority for SecDef to also provide funds to Governors to employ NG units to conduct Homeland Defense activities, as SecDef determines to be necessary and appropriate for NG units. |
| <b>33</b> | Navigation and Navigable Waters       | International rules for navigation at sea. Authorizes Navy/USCG exemption from certain rules. Regulations for suppression of piracy. Collision prevention / responsibilities.  |
| <b>42</b> | Public Health / Welfare               | Provides authority for federal disaster preparedness and assistance. (Stafford Act as it relates to DSCA)  |
| <b>50</b> | War and National Defense              | Outlines the role of war and National Defense. Includes regulations on CIA, foreign intelligence and covert action.  |

## Rules of Engagement (ROE) Considerations for the JTF Commander

Staff ROE development and approval process:

- \_\_\_ Is ROE development an integrated part of crisis action planning (CAP)?
- \_\_\_ Is ROE development operator-led (J3 / J35 / J5), with the SJA in support?
- \_\_\_ Is there a formal staff process for ROE development (ROE Working Group)?
- \_\_\_ Does the ROE WG have the right subject-matter experts?
- \_\_\_ Is there a process for the Joint Operations Center (JOC) to interface with the ROE WG?
- \_\_\_ Is there dialogue on ROE between your staff and higher and lower headquarters' staffs?
- \_\_\_ Is there interagency and interorganizational liaison with your staff regarding ROE?
- \_\_\_ Are allied or coalition partners involved in ROE development?
- \_\_\_ Does the ROE, along with your intent and guidance, create clear use of force policy?
- \_\_\_ Does the ROE support higher headquarters' intent and guidance?
- \_\_\_ Did your staff thoroughly war game and crosswalk the operation plan or order (including any branches and sequels) and the ROE to ensure that subordinate commanders have the *authority* to take all appropriate action to deter, pre-empt, and/or counter the full range of possible threat reactions without having to request additional supplemental ROE?
- \_\_\_ Did your staff thoroughly war game and crosswalk the operation plan or order (including any branches and sequels) and the ROE to ensure that subordinate commanders have *all necessary means available* to accomplish their missions and to defend their units and other US forces in the vicinity?
- \_\_\_ Do your staff and subordinate commanders understand that nothing contained in the ROE limits a commander's inherent right and obligation to take all appropriate action to defend his or her unit and other US forces in the vicinity?
- \_\_\_ Do your staff and subordinate commanders understand the permissive nature of the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE)?
- \_\_\_ Do your staff's standing operating procedures assign responsibility and establish effective procedures for developing, requesting, authorizing, disseminating, training, monitoring, assessing, and modifying the ROE in a timely manner?
- \_\_\_ Are all ROE messages that contain numbered supplemental measures classified at least CONFIDENTIAL and numbered serially (e.g., serial 1, 2, 3 ..., as opposed to serial 1, change 1; serial 1, change 2 ....)?

- Are all ROE messages clear, concise, and easily understood in a single reading, with all key terms defined?
- Do ROE request messages contain a justification for each supplemental measure requested?
- Does each ROE authorization message contain all of the supplemental measures currently in effect, whether changed or not, so that subordinates need only keep the current message to have all of the ROE currently in effect?
- Do you, your staff, and your subordinate commanders fully understand the limitations of your allies' or coalition partners' national ROE? When your allies' or coalition partners' national ROE are incompatible, how do you plan to maintain unity of effort and avoid potential conflicts? Will forces or tasks be separated geographically and/or functionally?
- If you approve any supplemental measures that restrict the use of force, do your subordinate commanders have the means available to comply with those restrictions? (Example: If you approve a supplemental measure requiring your forces to "observe" indirect fire directed against targets in areas of civilian concentration, do your subordinate commanders have the means to "observe" those fires?)

Some key ROE issues:

- Designating and defining hostile forces.
- Clear guidance on what constitutes hostile intent in a given situation? (Example: If a military aircraft of country x were to do a, b, and c in the vicinity of a unit, the unit commander should consider the behavior as a demonstration of hostile intent and may engage the aircraft in defense of his or her unit.)
- Designating and defining collective self-defense (i.e., defense of designated forces as well as designated persons and property).
- Cross-border reconnaissance, direct action operations, and personnel recovery.
- Use of weapon systems subject to special restrictions, including riot control agents, anti-personnel land mines, and fires in areas of civilian concentration.
- Treatment of civilians, including the authority to stop, search, and detain them, and to seize their property.
- Allied or coalition ROE do not limit the inherent right and obligation of US commanders to execute unit self-defense.

Bottom line: Do the ROE give your subordinate commanders the flexibility they need to get the job done?




# *Operations in the Information Environment*



***Deployable Training Division  
Joint Staff J7***

***The overall classification of slides is***

**UNCLASSIFIED**



# *Challenges*

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- **Understanding the complexities of the Information Environment (IE) in order to operate effectively and decisively within the IE to achieve strategic objectives and enduring outcomes**
- **Using Operations in the IE as a proactive means of shaping relevant actor perception and behavior while operating across the continuum of conflict**
- **Developing organizations and processes that provide internal and external coordination, integration, and synchronization to affect outcomes that align with strategic objectives**
- **Determining who owns assessments and how to accurately assess lethal and nonlethal effects within the IE**

# ***Operational Environment***

## **Operational Environment (OE)**

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander

## **Information Environment (IE)**

Comprises and aggregates numerous social, cultural, cognitive, technical, and physical attributes that act upon and impact knowledge, understanding, beliefs, world views, and, ultimately, actions of an individual, group, system, community, or organization

**- JP 3-0**

**Information is such a powerful tool that it is recognized as an instrument of national power...[technologies] have dramatically impacted operations and changed the character of modern warfare.**

**- James N. Mattis, Secretary of Defense**

***Information as a Joint Function Memo, 15 September 2017***

# Complexity of the Information Environment




## Insights

- **The IE is global in nature—complexities are created by technological advances and access, the speed and range of information / mis-information, and deliberate operations to influence audiences**
- **Relevant actors are individuals, groups, populations, or automated systems whose capabilities or behaviors have the potential to affect the success of OAs**
- **Diffusion of information enables individuals and groups to enter into and affect the global forum**

# Organization

## Notional Combatant Command Operations in the Information Environment Coordination Cell






Modified from Figure V-2 in JP 3-13 to include Strategic Communications and Space

### Insights

- *In most organizations, the J39 is utilized for Military Information Support Operations (MISO) with Military Deception (MILDEC) and Deception in Support of OPSEC (DISO) as primary activities with specific authorities and mission sets—this may not be the best place to nest an Operations in the Information Environment Coordination Cell*
- *The Chief of an Operations in Information Environment Coordination Cell is a coordinator / integrator / synchronizer of all effects to support the Commander's objectives and should understand how to combine OAs*
- *Effective integration and global standardization with CCMDs, agencies, partners, and allies can guide the organization to create the most effective coordination, integration, and synchronization for actions and assessments*



# Coordination, Integration, and Synchronization



## Insights

- **Commanders employ operational art to connect tactical actions to strategic objectives—effective Operations in the IE requires a similar mindset**
- **Establish a methodology, such as a Joint Effects Cycle, to integrate processes, actions, and capabilities with allies and partners to achieve strategic objectives and enduring outcomes**
- **Effective coordination, integration, and synchronization of various OAs is critical for success—tools such as Command and Control of Operations in the Information Environment (C2IE) is a method of achieving this**
- **Understanding the flow of information in and out of the environment is paramount for success**

# Affecting Outcomes


## Proactive

- Operations in the IE to shape the OE
  - Future activities support the narrative
- Focused **FORWARD** (what it should be)

Affect  
through  
both

## Reactive


- Adversary driven
  - Narrative addresses activities after the fact
- Focused on **YESTERDAY** (what occurred)



## Insights

- *Plan and execute OAls that will affect relevant actor behavior (i.e., decision calculus)*
- *Operations can occur throughout the continuum of conflict to support strategic, operational, and tactical objectives*
- *Identify strategic opportunities to gain a positional advantage against adversaries*

# Assessments



## Insights

- **Communicate assessment guidance on desired behavioral change and enduring outcomes**
- **While most organizations successfully provide Battle Damage Assessments, operations in the information environment assessments (e.g., the human cognitive) are sometimes harder to obtain and visualize**
- **Assessment is a continuous process to identify, develop, and affect audiences to achieve desired enduring conditions**
- **Accurate assessment of behavioral change is a lengthy process; identify short-term and long-term assessments**
- **Assessments are coordinated and integrated internally and externally through whole-of-staff / government / coalition**



# ***Information is Commander's Business***

- **Provide guidance on how you want to operate in the IE**
- **Develop an operational approach that supports your command's narrative**
- **Understand how your command's intel production cycle supports your operations in the IE**
- **Plan and execute informational activities as part of command's campaign plans to achieve desired conditions**
- **Understand how to gain agility in the IE through proactive planning**
- **Build, exercise, and train relationships with your interagency partners and allies**



# ***Key Takeaways***

---

- **Understand the complexities of the Information Environment (IE) in order to operate effectively and decisively within the IE achieve objectives and enduring outcomes**
- **Utilize Operations in the IE as a proactive means of shaping relevant actor perception and behavior while operating across the continuum of conflict**
- **Develop organizations and processes that provide internal and external, planning, coordination, integration, and synchronization to affect outcomes that align with strategic objectives**
- **Determine who owns assessments and how to accurately assess lethal and nonlethal effects within the IE**
- **Operating in the Information Environment is the Commander's Business**

# *References*

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- **DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 1, “Joint Warfighting Reference Copy,” 29 Jun 2020**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 2, “The Joint Force,” 19 Jun 2020**
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- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Integration and Synchronization of Joint Fires Focus Paper, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, Jul 2018**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Communication Strategy and Synchronization Focus Paper, 1<sup>st</sup> Edition, May 2016**



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

SEP 15 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Information as a Joint Function

Information is such a powerful tool that it is recognized as an instrument of national power. The advent of the internet, the expansion of information technology, the widespread availability of wireless communications, and the far-reaching impact of social media have dramatically impacted operations and changed the character of modern warfare.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has issued an out-of-cycle change to Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States*, introducing *Information* as a new, seventh joint function. This change is consistent with the 2016 DoD Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment (SOIE) and the 2016 National Military Strategy. It signals a fundamental appreciation for the military role of information at the strategic, operational and tactical levels within today's complex operating environment.

The elevation of *Information* to a joint function impacts all operations and has implications across doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy that must be identified in the months ahead. These include the relationship with other joint functions, as well as the effects on planning and operations. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the CJCS, as co-chairs of the SOIE Executive Steering Group, will lead efforts to examine implications and implement appropriate changes. I fully endorse this effort and expect support from across the Department.



9-A-1



OSD011047-17/CMD014788-17





## anchoring

**The first thing you judge influences your judgment of all that follows.**

Human minds are associative in nature, so the order in which we receive information helps determine the course of our judgments and perceptions.

Be especially mindful of this bias during financial negotiations such as houses, cars, and salaries. The initial price offered is proven to have a significant effect.



## confirmation bias

**You look for ways to justify your existing beliefs.**

We can automatically find ways to make new information fit our existing narratives and preconceptions, and to dismiss information that does not.

Think of your ideas and beliefs as software you're actively trying to find problems with rather than things to be defended.

"The first principle is that you must not fool yourself – and you are the easiest person to fool." - Richard Feynman



## backfire effect

**When your core beliefs are challenged, it can cause you to believe even more strongly.**

We can experience being wrong about some ideas as an attack upon our very selves, or our tribal identity. This can lead to motivated reasoning which causes us to reinforce our beliefs even if we might accept particular facts and disconfirming evidence.

"It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so."

- Mark Twain



## declinism

**You see the past as better than it was, and expect the future to be worse than is likely.**

Despite living in the most peaceful and prosperous time in history, many people believe things are getting worse. The 24 hour news cycle, with its reporting of overtly negative and violent events, may account for some of this effect.

Instead of relying on nostalgic impressions of how great things used to be, use measurable metrics such as life expectancy, levels of crime and violence, and prosperity statistics.



## just world hypothesis

**Your preference for a just world makes you presume that it exists.**

A world in which people don't always get what they deserve, hard work doesn't always pay off, and injustice happens is an uncomfortable one that threatens our preferred narrative. However, it is also the reality.

A more just world requires understanding rather than blame. Remember that everyone has their own life story, we're all fallible, and bad things happen to good people.



## sunk cost fallacy

**You irrationally cling to things that have already cost you something.**

When we've invested our time, money, or emotion into something, it hurts us to let it go. This aversion to pain can distort our better judgment and cause us to make unwise investments.

To regain objectivity, ask yourself: had I not already invested something, would I still do so now? What would I counsel a friend to do if they were in the same situation?



## dunning-kruger effect

**The more you know, the less confident you're likely to be.**

Because experts know just how much they don't know, they tend to underestimate their ability, but it's easy to be over-confident when you have only a simple idea of how things are.

"The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are so certain of themselves, yet wiser people so full of doubts."

- Bertrand Russell



## barnum effect

**You see personal specifics in vague statements by filling in the gaps.**

Because our minds are given to making connections, it's easy for us to take nebulous statements and find ways to interpret them so that they seem specific and personal.

Psychics, astrologers and others use this bias to make it seem like they're telling you something relevant. Consider how things might be interpreted to apply to anyone, not just you.



## framing effect

**You allow yourself to be unduly influenced by context and delivery.**

We all like to think that we think independently, but the truth is that all of us are, in fact, influenced by delivery, framing and subtle cues. This is why the ad industry is a thing, despite almost everyone believing they're not affected by advertising messages.

Only when we have the intellectual humility to accept the fact that we can be manipulated, can we hope to limit how much we are. Try to be mindful of how things are being put to you.



## in-group bias

**You unfairly favor those who belong to your group.**

We presume that we're fair and impartial, but the truth is that we automatically favor those who are most like us, or belong to our groups.

Try to imagine yourself in the position of those in out-groups; whilst also attempting to be dispassionate when judging those who belong to your in-groups.



## fundamental attribution error

**You judge others on their character, but yourself on the situation.**

If you haven't had a good night's sleep, you know why you're being a bit slow; but if you observe someone else being slow you don't have such knowledge and so might presume them to just be a slow person.

It's not only kind to view others' situations with charity, it's more objective too. Be mindful to also err on the side of taking personal responsibility rather than justifying and blaming.



## placebo effect

**If you believe you're taking medicine it can sometimes 'work' even if it's fake.**

The placebo effect can work for stuff that our mind influences (such as pain) but not so much for things like viruses or broken bones.

Homeopathy, acupuncture, and many other forms of natural 'medicine' have been proven to be no more effective than placebo. Keep a healthy body and bank balance by using evidence-based medicine from a qualified doctor.



## halo effect

**How much you like someone, influences your other judgments of them.**

Our judgments are associative and automatic, and so if we want to be objective we need to consciously control for irrelevant influences. This is especially important in a professional setting.

We're all affected by cultural and personal prejudices. It's only through becoming aware of them that we can mitigate their effects.



## bystander effect

**You presume someone else is going to do something in an emergency situation.**

When something terrible is happening in a public setting we can experience a kind of shock and mental paralysis that distracts us from a sense of personal responsibility. The problem is that everyone can experience this sense of deindividuation in a crowd.

If there's an emergency situation, presume to be the one who will help or call for help. Be the change you want to see in the world.



## availability heuristic

**Your judgments are influenced by what springs most easily to mind.**

How recent, emotionally powerful, or unusual your memories are can make them seem more relevant. This, in turn, can cause you to apply them too readily.

Try to gain different perspectives and relevant statistical information rather than relying purely on first judgments and emotive influences.



## belief bias

**If a conclusion supports your existing beliefs, you'll rationalize anything that supports it.**

It's difficult for us to set aside our existing beliefs to consider the true merits of an argument. In practice this means that our ideas become impervious to criticism, and are perpetually reinforced.

A useful thing to ask is 'when and how did I get this belief?'

We tend to automatically defend our ideas without ever really questioning them.



## groupthink

**You let the social dynamics of a group situation override the best outcomes.**

Dissent can be uncomfortable and dangerous to one's social standing, and so often the most confident or first voice will determine group decisions.

Rather than openly contradicting others, seek to facilitate objective means of evaluation and critical thinking practices as a group activity.



## optimism bias

**You overestimate the likelihood of positive outcomes.**

There can be benefits to a positive attitude, but it's unwise to allow such an attitude to adversely affect our ability to make rational judgments (they're not mutually exclusive).

If you make rational, realistic judgments you'll have a lot more to feel positive about.



## reactance

**You'd rather do the opposite of what someone is trying to make you do.**

When we feel our liberty is being constrained, our inclination is to resist, however in doing so we can over-compensate.

Be careful not to lose objectivity when someone is being coercive/manipulative, or trying to force you do something. Wisdom springs from reflection, folly from reaction.



## curse of knowledge

**Once you understand something you presume it to be obvious to everyone.**

Things makes sense once they make sense, so it can be hard to remember why they didn't. We build complex networks of understanding and forget how intricate the path to our available knowledge really is.

When teaching someone something new, go slow and explain like they're ten years old (without being patronizing). Repeat key points and facilitate active practice to help embed knowledge.



## self-serving bias

**You believe your failures are due to external factors, yet you're personally responsible for your successes.**

Many of us enjoy unearned privileges, luck and advantages that others do not. It's easy to tell ourselves that we deserve these things, whilst blaming circumstance when things don't go our way.

When judging others, be mindful of how this bias interacts with the just-world hypothesis, fundamental attribution error, and the in-group bias.



## negativity bias

**You allow negative things to disproportionately influence your thinking.**

The pain of loss and hurt are felt more keenly and persistently than the fleeting gratification of pleasant things. We are primed for survival, and our aversion to pain can distort our judgment for a modern world.

Pro-and-con lists, as well as thinking in terms of probabilities, can help you evaluate things more objectively than relying on a cognitive impression.



## pessimism bias

**You overestimate the likelihood of negative outcomes.**

Pessimism is often a defense mechanism against disappointment, or it can be the result of depression and anxiety disorders.

Perhaps the worst aspect of pessimism is that even if something good happens, you'll probably feel pessimistic about it anyway.



## spotlight effect

**You overestimate how much people notice how you look and act.**

Most people are much more concerned about themselves than they are about you. Absent overt prejudices, people generally want to like and get along with you as it gives them validation too.

Instead of worrying about how you're being judged, consider how you make others feel. They'll remember this much more, and you'll make the world a better place.

# thou shalt not suffer cognitive biases

Cognitive biases make our judgments irrational. We have evolved to use shortcuts in our thinking, which are often useful, but a cognitive bias means there's a kind of misfiring going on causing us to lose objectivity. This poster has been designed to help you identify some of the most common biases and how to avoid falling victim to them. Help people become aware of their biases generally by sharing the website **yourbias.is** or more specifically e.g. **yourbias.is/confirmation-bias**

CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 This poster is published under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND license 2020 by Jesse Richardson. You are free to print and redistribute this artwork non-commercially with the binding proviso that you reproduce it in full so that others may share alike. To learn more about biases you should read the books 'Thinking, Fast and Slow' and 'You Are Not So Smart'.

The illustration above is a reference to Michaelangelo's 'Creation of Adam' which many believe depicted the human brain in God's surrounding decoration.

Download this poster at [www.yourbias.is](http://www.yourbias.is)




# ***Sustainment***

***Deployable Training Division  
Joint Staff J7***

***The overall classification of slides is***

**UNCLASSIFIED**




# *Challenges*

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- **Anticipating requirements in an uncertain, complex, rapidly changing and contested operating environment**
- **Leveraging Global Providers that are part of the Joint Logistics Enterprise to ensure rapid and precise response for the Joint Force Commander**
- **Integrating and synchronizing joint / combined capabilities to support the concept of operations**
- **Balancing global and theater-level considerations to set and sustain the theater**

# Global Strategic Environment



**“Globally Integrated Operations** is the concept for how the Joint Force should prepare for the security environment we will soon face....Globally integrated operations both enable and are **premised upon Global Agility.**”



# Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt)



**\*\*DISCLAIMER:** List not all inclusive

## Insights

- **Understand authorities, goals, and limitations of other JLEnt partners**
- **Establish relationships and build trust before a crisis occurs**
- **Capitalize on and leverage stakeholder capabilities and resources**
- **Be prepared to provide support to other JLEnt partners**

# Global Sustainment Considerations

## Competition for Resources



Strategic Lift




Critical Munitions



Forces



Medical



War Reserve  
Materiel



Overflight, Transit,  
Basing



Operational Contract  
Support

### Insights

- *Access requirements may extend beyond a given AOR*
- *Understand what critical resources other CCMDs will require and how that will impact your mission (e.g., OCS, Medical Assets, additional Forces)*
- *Engage the Joint Staff early to adjudicate limited global resources*

# *Key Takeaways*

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- Anticipating requirements (contested logistics)
- Leverage the Joint Logistics Enterprise to ensure rapid and precise response for the Joint Force Commander
- Integrate sustainment capabilities to support joint force requirements
- Balance global and theater level considerations to set and sustain the theater

*“You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.”*

*– General Dwight D. Eisenhower*


# *References*

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- **DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 1, “Joint Warfighting Reference Copy,” 29 Jun 2020**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 2, “The Joint Force,” 19 Jun 2020**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Sustainment Focus Paper, 6<sup>th</sup> Edition, May 2022**




# *HQ Organization and Process Insights*



## *Deployable Training Division Joint Staff J7*

*The overall classification is*  
**UNCLASSIFIED**




# *Challenges*

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- **Organizing to accomplish the joint mission**
- **Developing processes to operate with speed and agility**
- **Integrating joint, multinational, and interagency mission partners into the HQ structure and processes**

# Organizing - Roles and Responsibilities

## J-Code Structure Organization (Preferred organizational structure)



\* Above organization structure is greatly simplified for illustrative purposes only


## Considerations

- *Mission requirements drive HQ functions, organization, and processes*
- *Agility vs. size of HQ*
- *Terms of Reference for key personnel*
- *Liaison network*
- *Clear roles and responsibilities needed for:*
  - *Assessment*
  - *Design*
  - *Integration of lethal and nonlethal effects*
  - *Narrative and Engagement*
  - *Reports to Higher HQ*
  - *Knowledge Management*
  - *Interagency Coordination*

## Insights

- *Maintain Commander-centric vs. staff-centric focus*
- *Be able to respond to crisis while retaining agility to plan and execute other missions*
- *Account for the transregional and multi-domain nature of operations*


# Staff Integration



\* JP 3-33, *Joint Force Headquarters*, defines “cross functional organizations” that include Centers, Groups, Cells, Offices, Elements, Boards, Working Groups, and Operational Planning Teams (OPTs).



# Staff Interaction in Support of Decision Making




## Insights

- *Force cross-functional integration to improve staff support for the Commander*
- *Provide venues for Commander's "touch points" and command decisions*
- *COS is the staff synchronizer and manages the battle rhythm*

**UNCLASSIFIED**

## Commander assessment, guidance, and decision forums



- ***White space enables commander and staff processes that inform decision making***
- ***Battle Rhythm must be nested with HHQ, partners, and external stakeholders***

# *Integration with Mission Partners*



## *Insights*

- *Leverage CCDR to acquire formal support*
- *Early coordination / integration*

# *Key Takeaways*

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- **Clear roles and responsibilities are needed to operate at the speed of relevance**
- **Effective staff integration enables shared understanding that supports decision making**
- **Early integration of all partners into the HQ is critical to achieve a comprehensive approach**

# *References*

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- **DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 1, “Joint Warfighting Reference Copy,” 29 Jun 2020**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 2, “The Joint Force,” 19 Jun 2020**
- **Joint Pub 3-33, “Joint Task Force Headquarters,” 9 Jun 2022**

## **“Apologetics”**

**Excerpts from “Defending the Record on US Nuclear Deterrence” by Gen Kevin P. Chilton (ret),  
Former Commander, US Strategic Command, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2018**

Today, misinformation, falsehoods, and often deliberate distortions concerning nuclear deterrence continue to be repeated in public forums. Left unchallenged, these statements run the risk of becoming accepted as factual by the American public. [The following are] 11 of the more common fallacies.

### **“We Are Never Going to Use Nuclear Weapons”**

The argument presented is this: if we are never going to use nuclear weapons, why are we wasting so much money sustaining them? Our adversaries see our 24/7 alert postures and consequently assess an attack on the US or its allies to be an unthinkable choice.

### **“Prompt Conventional Global Strike Can Replace a Portion of the Nuclear Deterrent Force”**

Another fallacy is the notion that the deterrence mission can be adequately accomplished by substituting conventional warheads, because of their great accuracy, for nuclear warheads atop our ICBMs. This argument does not appreciate the “long, dark shadow” cast by the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the deterrent effect that “shadow” enables. A nuclear warhead is terribly frightening; a 2,000-pound conventional warhead is not.

### **“Conventional Weapon Overmatch Eliminates the Need for a Nuclear Deterrent”**

Another argument presented to reduce or eliminate the US nuclear deterrent is the notion that our conventional overmatch in quality and size is adequate for the deterrence mission. There is simply no conventional weapon equivalency to the power and deterrent effects of nuclear weapons. So where should the US spend its first dollar on defense? On the triad.

### **“We Do Not Need a Triad”**

The critical question to ask in response to the claim that we do not need a triad is, so which leg do you want to eliminate? The submarine leg provides the only stealth force we have—in essence, our assured response. The bombers are the flexible force that can signal our adversaries and assure our allies while encouraging them not to build their own nuclear deterrent. The ICBM is the most stabilizing leg of the triad. Stability, in this context, is defined as a state in which adversaries are never tempted to strike first. The value in the triad is that it complicates the adversary decision calculus. This is the definition of strategic stability: when an adversary understands that no day is a good day to go to war with the United States—nor is he ever tempted to launch first.

### **“Nuclear Forces Are on Hair-Trigger Alert”**

Critics of our ICBM alert posture use this terminology as a scare tactic. Nuclear forces are not on hair-trigger alert. They certainly are on alert and at the ready, and this is necessary to provide the strategic stability.

### **“LRSO Is Destabilizing”**

Another fallacious argument is that the long-range standoff weapon (LRSO), or cruise missile, is destabilizing. The fact is LRSO is not destabilizing in the sense of weakening strategic stability, as it does not invite a first strike—indeed it helps to prevent one. The United States and Russia have had these weapons for decades and employed them in regional conflicts, and neither country has considered striking first as a result. Today’s ALCM, which will age out in the next decade, must be replaced on schedule by the follow-on LRSO.

### **“We Cannot Afford Modernization”**

Arguing against recapitalizing the nuclear triad because of sustainment costs is patently unfair. In today’s world and for the foreseeable future the US will need a nuclear deterrent in the form of a triad. So, including sustainment costs when discussing the cost of recapitalization is simply another attempt to convince the public not to invest in something that remains necessary for national security. So if nuclear deterrence is the number-one priority and every other defense investment depends on it, the cost spread over the lifetime of the programs is most certainly affordable. We should be rebuilding and exercising the infrastructure necessary to

sustain our deterrent and, more importantly, developing the human capital required to design and build nuclear weapons for an uncertain future. The cost to do this is modest.

### **“If We Reduce, Others Will Reduce”**

We reduced our nuclear arsenal when we signed verifiable treaties with Russia. How effective has this leading by example been? How is showing constraint working? History does not support the proposition that if we reduce, others will follow our lead. The effectiveness of the leading-by-reducing approach to inspire others to show restraint is simply not supported by reality.

### **“Global Zero Is a Desirable Goal”**

Many talk about global zero as a desirable goal. After all, if we could “put the genie back in the bottle” wouldn’t it be better to have a world without nuclear weapons? Of course, the “genie,” that is, the knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons, cannot be unlearned and put back in the bottle of ignorance. Alternatively, some suggest we should continue to strive to get all nations to agree to reduce their inventories to zero, eliminate their weapon production capabilities, and submit to a near omniscient oversight authority that could compel compliance and ensure that no one was cheating. Human beings for centuries upon centuries, in war after war, found better and better ways to kill each other—more efficiently, more lethally. Do we want to go back to a world without nuclear weapons? There is a reason why great powers that own ever more lethal conventional weapons have elected not to fight each other: they have been deterred by nuclear weapons.

### **“Nuclear Deterrence is Cold War Think”**

Some argue the US nuclear deterrent should be eliminated because its existence represents Cold War think. The reality is nuclear deterrence underpins the national security of the United States and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. It remains relevant and necessary today to deter the existential threats to our nation. It also helps to deter nonnuclear attacks that could have catastrophic consequences, such as attacks involving biological weapons. The term Cold War think is a pejorative typically proffered by those who have never thought seriously about, let alone studied, deterrence theory or by those who have run out of ways to defend their position.

### **“No One Would Ever Use a Nuclear Weapon against the United States”**

Those who would use this argument seem willing to risk the very existence of the nation on the basis of their speculation and without forethought. The US military must ensure national survival through deterrence provided by a safe, secure, capable, reliable, flexible, and vigilant nuclear posture. It is our duty to assume the worst and then take steps to ensure it never happens. Additionally, we must deter attacks on our friends, allies, and fielded US military forces deployed abroad.

### **Summary**

These 11 statements are a few of the false arguments and positions directed toward the US nuclear deterrent, often by those who would wish to see this deterrent weakened or eliminated for purely ideological reasons. However, other serious scholars and students of deterrence theory present thoughtful and debatable positions that address issues pertaining to the size, capability, and posture requirements needed to provide the United States with a deterrent that will ensure no one would ever consider a nuclear attack on the United States, our military forces, or our friends or allies. It is the responsibility of members of the profession of arms to truthfully defend the record when false arguments are espoused and seriously consider those that are truly worthy of consideration. Only then can an informed debate begin on the subjects surrounding the US nuclear deterrent.

#### *Disclaimer*

*The views and opinions expressed or implied in SSQ are those of the authors and are not officially sanctioned by any agency or department of the US government. We encourage you to send comments to: [strategicstudiesquarterly@us.af.mil](mailto:strategicstudiesquarterly@us.af.mil)*

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*Links to Gen Chilton’s speech to The Heritage Foundation from January 18, 2018 titled, “The Importance of the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent”:*

- The Heritage Foundation website: <https://www.heritage.org/defense/event/the-importance-the-us-nuclear-deterrent>
- The Heritage Foundation on YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g1J4LGOgZIU>