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 - **Secretary of Defense Memorandum: Information as a Joint Function, September 15, 2017**
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 - **JP 3-04: Information in Joint Operations Information Sheet**
- **HQ Organization and Process Insights**
- **“Apologetics,” Excerpts from “Defending the Record on US Nuclear Deterrence” by Gen Kevin P. Chilton (ret), Former Commander, US Strategic Command, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2018**
- **Senior Leadership Library**

Welcome to the CAPSTONE Joint Operations Module (JOM)



Introduction and Course Overview

*Deployable Training Division
Joint Staff J7*

The overall classification of slides is

UNCLASSIFIED

- **JOM Overview**
- **Admin**
- **Group Assignments**
- **Senior Fellow Coordinator**

JOM History




Goldwater-Nichols Act made CAPSTONE mandatory

CAPSTONE pilot course



NDU-P requested USACOM (USJFCOM) expand instruction on "Joint Force Operations"



Expanded objective: Enhancing decision making capabilities and preparing Fellows for leadership positions in the Joint Force HQ

J7 role in CAPSTONE is further codified in CJCSI 1800.01F

Instructional Resources


- | | <u>Section</u> |
|--|-----------------------|
| • Participant Guide | |
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| – DTD Points of Contact | v |
| – Joint Staff J7 Leadership, Senior Fellow, and Guest Speaker Biographies | vii |
| – Unclassified JOM materials | 1-11 |
| – Abbreviations and Acronyms List | GLOSSARY |
| • Brochure: Schedule of events / Floor plan | |
| • Reference Library located in the Dining Facility | |
| • Unclassified Course Materials and Useful Links (https://capstone.ndu.edu/Class-Materials/End-of-Course-Info/) | |

A Comprehensive Approach to Unified Action

***Deployable Training Division
Joint Staff J7***

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Challenges

- **Strategic Alignment**
- **National Policy and the Interagency Process**
- **Unity of Effort with Allies and Partners**

Strategic Alignment




National Security Strategy



National Defense Strategy



National Military Strategy



Insights

- **Increased importance of allies, partners, interagency**
- **Alignment and nesting of documents; all illuminate the changing strategic environment**
- **Pursue global alignment across CCMDs, WOG, and Allies and Partners**

Strategic Alignment

Strategic Objectives → Operational Approach → Tactical Actions


Complex Operational Environment



Insights

- *Translate strategic dialogue into clear guidance and intent to subordinates*
- *Adapt to operating within the complexities of the strategic environment*
- *Retain alignment even under changing conditions*
- *Inform and be informed by continuous strategic dialogue and translation*

National Policy and the Interagency Process



US Embassy: Authority and Country Team Members

Chief of Mission


- Ambassador or Chargé
- Personal representative of President to host nation
- Lead for US foreign policy in-country
- Has authority over all US Government personnel in-country
 - Except those assigned to a combatant commander or international organization

The organizational chart shows the hierarchy: Chief of Mission at the top, followed by Deputy. Reporting to the Deputy are Public Diplomacy, Management, Consular, and Political. The Regional Security Office (RSO) reports to the Deputy and includes SDO/DATT (highlighted in red), Economic, and Other Agencies. Other Agencies include USAID, USDA, CIA, and FBI.

* Country teams are not all the same...

- ### Insights
- Operate as part of a whole-of-government effort
 - Be prepared to assume a supporting role to other interagency partners
 - Leverage the Country Team as the gateway to agencies in country

Unity of Effort with Allies and Partners



- Insights**
- ***Commander sets the tone for integration with partners***
 - ***Every nation operates in accordance with their national interests***
 - ***Strive toward unity of effort, not unity of command***
 - ***Integration with allies and partners occurs at all echelons***

Key Takeaways

In this age, I don't care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are, if you cannot create harmony – even vicious harmony – on the battlefield based on trust across service lines, across coalition and national lines, and across civilian / military lines, you really need to go home, because your leadership in today's age is obsolete. We have got to have officers who can create harmony across all those lines.

- General James N. Mattis, USMC June 2010

References

- **DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol. 1, “Joint Warfighting,” 27 Aug 2023**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 2, “The Joint Force,” 19 Jun 2020**
- **Joint Pub 3-0, “Joint Campaigns and Operations,” 18 Jun 2022**
- **National Defense Strategy 2022**
- **National Military Strategy 2022**
- **National Security Strategy 2022**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Interorganizational Cooperation Focus Paper, 5th Edition, Apr 2018**



Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy

On 28 March the Department of Defense transmitted to Congress the classified 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS).

For the first time, the Department conducted its strategic reviews in a fully integrated way – incorporating the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and Missile Defense Review (MDR) in the NDS – ensuring tight linkages between our strategy and our resources. The unclassified NDS will be forthcoming.

Consistent with the President’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, the classified NDS sets out how the Department of Defense will contribute to advancing and safeguarding vital U.S. national interests – protecting the American people, expanding America’s prosperity, and realizing and defending our democratic values.

The Defense priorities are:

1. Defending the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the PRC
2. Deterring strategic attacks against the United States, Allies, and partners
3. Deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary, prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific, then the Russia challenge in Europe
4. Building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.

The Department will act urgently to sustain and strengthen deterrence, with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as our most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge for the Department.

Russia poses acute threats, as illustrated by its brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. We will collaborate with our NATO Allies and partners to reinforce robust deterrence in the face of Russian aggression.

The Department will remain capable of managing other persistent threats, including those from North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations.

Changes in global climate and other dangerous transboundary threats, including pandemics, are transforming the context in which the Department operates. We will adapt to these challenges, which increasingly place pressure on the Joint Force and the systems that support it.

Recognizing growing kinetic and non-kinetic threats to the United States’ homeland from our strategic competitors, the Department will take necessary actions to increase resilience – our ability to withstand, fight through, and recover quickly from disruption.

Mutually-beneficial Alliances and partnerships are an enduring strength for the United States, and are critical to achieving our objectives, as the unified response to Russia's further invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated. Answering this "call to action," the Department will incorporate ally and partner perspectives, competencies, and advantages at every stage of defense planning.

The Department will advance our goals through three primary ways: integrated deterrence, campaigning, and actions that build enduring advantages.


- Integrated deterrence entails developing and combining our strengths to maximum effect, by working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, other instruments of U.S. national power, and our unmatched network of Alliances and partnerships. Integrated deterrence is enabled by combat-credible forces, backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
- Campaigning will strengthen deterrence and enable us to gain advantages against the full range of competitors' coercive actions. The United States will operate forces, synchronize broader Department efforts, and align Department activities with other instruments of national power, to undermine acute forms of competitor coercion, complicate competitors' military preparations, and develop our own warfighting capabilities together with Allies and partners.
- Building enduring advantages for the future Joint Force involves undertaking reforms to accelerate force development, getting the technology we need more quickly, and making investments in the extraordinary people of the Department, who remain our most valuable resource.

The Department will develop, design, and manage our forces – linking our operational concepts and capabilities to achieve strategic objectives. This requires a Joint Force that is lethal, resilient, sustainable, survivable, agile, and responsive.

Key Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Documents for Interagency Integration with State, Local, Private Sector in Emergency/Disaster Response

The **National Response Framework (NRF)** provides foundational emergency management doctrine for how the Nation responds to all types of incidents. The NRF is built on scalable, flexible, and adaptable concepts identified in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) to align key roles and responsibilities across the Nation. The structures, roles, and responsibilities described in the Framework can be partially or fully implemented in the context of a threat or hazard, in anticipation of a significant event, or in response to an incident. Implementation of the structures and procedures allows for a scaled response, delivery of specific resources and capabilities, and a level of coordination appropriate to each incident. The NRF is structured to help jurisdictions, citizens, nongovernmental organizations and businesses:

- Develop whole community plans
- Integrate continuity plans
- Build capabilities to respond to cascading failures among businesses, supply chains, and infrastructure sectors
- Collaborate to stabilize community lifelines and restore services



The **National Incident Management System (NIMS)** guides all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector to work together to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to and recover from incidents. NIMS provides stakeholders across the whole community with the shared vocabulary, systems and processes to successfully deliver the capabilities described in the National Preparedness System. NIMS defines operational systems, including the Incident Command System (ICS), Emergency Operations Center (EOC) structures, and Multiagency Coordination Groups (MAC Groups) that guide how personnel work together during incidents. NIMS applies to all incidents, from traffic accidents to major disasters.

National Response Framework website: <https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/national-preparedness/frameworks/response>

National Incident Management System website: <https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/nims>



NATIONAL GUARD

STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

96 PARTNERSHIPS WITH 106 PARTNER NATIONS

| SOUTHCOM (30 ¹) | | | |
|-----------------------------|-------|------|--|
| Argentina | GA | 2016 | |
| Belize | LA | 1996 | |
| Bolivia * | MS | 1999 | |
| Brazil | NY | 2018 | |
| Chile | TX | 2008 | |
| Colombia | SC | 2012 | |
| Costa Rica | NM | 2006 | |
| Dominican Republic | PR | 2003 | |
| Ecuador | KY | 1996 | |
| El Salvador | NH | 2000 | |
| Guatemala | AR | 2002 | |
| Guyana | FL | 2003 | |
| Haiti | LA | 2011 | |
| Honduras | PR | 1998 | |
| Jamaica | DC | 1999 | |
| Nicaragua * | WI | 2003 | |
| Panama | MO | 1996 | |
| Paraguay | MA | 2001 | |
| Peru | WV | 1996 | |
| Regional Security System | FL/VI | 2006 | |
| Suriname | SD | 2006 | |
| Trinidad and Tobago | DE | 2004 | |
| Uruguay | CT | 2000 | |
| Venezuela * | FL | 1998 | |

NOTES:

1. Regional Security System (RSS) listed as one partnership, but the RSS comprises seven member nations: 1) Antigua and Barbuda, 2) Barbados, 3) Dominica, 4) Grenada, 5) Saint Kitts and Nevis, 6) Saint Lucia, 7) Saint Vincent and Grenadines

*=dormant relationship

| NORTHCOM (1) | | | |
|--------------|----|------|--|
| Bahamas | RI | 2005 | |

| AFRICOM (21) | | | |
|---------------|-----|------|--|
| Benin | ND | 2014 | |
| Botswana | NC | 2008 | |
| Burkina Faso | DC | 2018 | |
| Cabo Verde | NH | 2021 | |
| Djibouti | KY | 2015 | |
| Gabon | WV | 2024 | |
| Ghana | ND | 2004 | |
| Kenya | MA | 2015 | |
| Liberia | MI | 2009 | |
| Malawi/Zambia | NC | 2023 | |
| Morocco | UT | 2003 | |
| Niger | IN | 2017 | |
| Nigeria | CA | 2006 | |
| Rwanda | NE | 2019 | |
| Senegal | VT | 2008 | |
| Sierra Leone | TBA | 2024 | |
| South Africa | NY | 2003 | |
| Tanzania | NE | 2024 | |
| Togo | ND | 2014 | |
| Tunisia | WY | 2004 | |

| CENTCOM (10) | | | |
|--------------|-----|------|--|
| Egypt | TX | 2020 | |
| Jordan | CO | 2004 | |
| Kazakhstan | AZ | 1993 | |
| Kyrgyzstan | MT | 1996 | |
| Oman | AZ | 2022 | |
| Qatar | WV | 2018 | |
| Saudi Arabia | TBA | 2024 | |
| Tajikistan | VA | 2003 | |
| Turkmenistan | MT | 2021 | |
| Uzbekistan | MS | 2012 | |

| INDOPACOM (17) | | | |
|----------------------|-------|----------------|--|
| Bangladesh | OR | 2008 | |
| Cambodia | ID | 2008 | |
| Indonesia | HI | 2006 | |
| Malaysia | WA | 2017 | |
| Mongolia | AK | 2003 | |
| Nepal* | | 2019 | |
| Palau | GU | 2024 | |
| Papua New Guinea | WI | 2020 | |
| Philippines | GU/HI | 2000 | |
| Sri Lanka / Maldives | MT | 2020 / 21 | |
| Thailand | WA | 2002 | |
| Timor-Leste | RI | 2020 | |
| Tonga / Fiji / Samoa | NV | 2014 / 18 / 23 | |
| Vietnam | OR | 2012 | |

| EUCOM (27) | | | |
|--------------------|-------|------|--|
| Albania | NJ | 2001 | |
| Armenia | KS | 2002 | |
| Austria | VT | 2021 | |
| Azerbaijan | OK | 2002 | |
| Bosnia Herzegovina | MD | 2003 | |
| Bulgaria | TN | 1993 | |
| Croatia | MN | 1996 | |
| Cyprus | NJ | 2022 | |
| Czech Republic | TX/NE | 1993 | |
| Estonia | MD | 1993 | |
| Finland | VA | 2024 | |
| Georgia | GA | 1994 | |
| Hungary | OH | 1993 | |
| Kosovo | IA | 2011 | |
| Latvia | MI | 1993 | |
| Lithuania | PA | 1993 | |
| Moldova | NC | 1996 | |
| Montenegro | ME | 2006 | |
| North Macedonia | VT | 1993 | |
| Norway | MN | 2023 | |
| Poland | IL | 1993 | |
| Romania | AL | 1993 | |
| Serbia | OH | 2005 | |
| Slovakia | IN | 1993 | |
| Slovenia | CO | 1993 | |
| Sweden | NY | 2024 | |
| Ukraine | CA | 1993 | |

Globally Integrated Operations

***Deployable Training Division
Joint Staff J7***

The overall classification of slides is

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Challenges

- Operating in the Global Environment -

- **Execute national strategy through globally integrated planning**
- **Command the Joint Force**
- **Identify and manage risk**
- **Achieve integrated deterrence**

The Changing Character of War

- Reframing the Problem / Adapting the Approach -

2022 National Military Strategy (NMS)

Central military problem NMS seeks to solve:

- How does the Joint Force rapidly develop future warfighting **advantage** while deterring effectively today, with the PRC as the pacing challenge?

- Russia Acute Threat
- Drain on Defense Capacity
- Nuclear Threat

- PRC Pacing Threat
- Eroding Competitive Advantage
- Transregional
- All Domain

- Afghanistan & Iraq
- Terrorists & VEOs

- Mid-East & Africa
- Rise of Terrorists & VEOs

- Korean War
- Cuban Missile Crisis
- Vietnam
- USSR Dissolved

- Europe
- Pacific
- Mobilization
- Homeland Defense

Strategic Landscape



2027

GEN Milley
Joint Force at an
"inflection point"
during what will be a
decisive decade

Gen Dunford
**Strategic Reframing
of the Problem**
"Global Integration"

Gen Dempsey
Mission Command
White Paper

| | |
|-------------------|------------------------|
| Global Agility | Sense of Urgency |
|-------------------|------------------------|


Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)

CJCS facilitates the arrangement of cohesive Joint Force actions in time, space, and purpose, executed to address trans-regional, all-domain, and multi-functional challenges. The objective of global integration is to integrate operations and resources globally, while evaluating tradeoffs to enable senior leader risk-informed decision making in support of *National Defense Strategy* (NDS) and NMS objectives.

- CJCSI 3100.01F 29 Jan 2024

Globally Integrated Planning

- Implementing National Strategy -



- 2023 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan, CJCSI 3110.01L, 5 Jan 2024 (Figure 1: Overview of the JSCP approach)

Joint Force Command and Control (C2)

- **Competition to Crisis: Coordinating Authority**

- Consultative authority to facilitate planning and assessment for a specific problem set
- JSPS CJCSI 3100.01F 29 Jan 2024


- **Crisis to Conflict:**

- Supported Commander for Planning

- **Multiple Supported / Supporting Commanders**


- **C2 organizational options**

- CCDR as JFC
- Component-led
- Joint Force Component
- JTF



- **Commander Focus**

- Prioritizing among competing demands
- Mission Command



Risk

- Risk to what?
- Risk from what?
- How long?
- Who owns the risk?

CJCSM 3105.01B (2023) establishes a joint risk analysis methodology and provides guidance for identifying, assessing, and managing risk.

Chairman provides assessment of both:

Military Strategic Risk
 Threats to US Interests
Military Risk


Threats to mission execution and support -- NSS, NDS, NMS

CCDRs provide:
Operational Risk

- Ability to:
- Execute missions
 - Mitigate risk to Assigned forces

Services provide:
Risk to Force

- Ability to:
- Generate the force
 - Sustain force health
 - Develop the force



Organizations and Risk

- Insights
- *Understand and over-communicate different perspectives on risk*
 - *Address assumptions and time dimension of risk*
 - *Risk informs mitigation options and priorities*
 - *Appraise military risk and military strategic risk in a global strategic context*

Deterrence

Deterrence Definition

- Prevention of an action by:
 - The existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or
 - The belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits

Deterrence in Practice

- Adversary state of mind brought about by the perception of:
 - Likelihood of being denied the expected benefits of the action
 - Likelihood of excessive costs suffered for taking the action
 - Acceptability of restraint as an alternative

Deep understanding and empathy of the adversary's decision calculus



Existence of a credible U.S., Allied, and Partner threat demonstrated by capability and will

- Confront malign activity
- Prepare for combat operations
- Message and assure Allies and Partners



Cognitive effect on the adversary's state of mind



Perception of the likelihood of cost to change behavior and prevent action

Integrated Deterrence

- **Combine strengths across domains, theaters, and spectrum of conflict**
- **Apply all instruments of national power and include allies and partners**

Key Takeaways

- **Synchronize Joint Force planning to develop globally integrated plans and to support decision making at the speed of relevance**
- **Focus on Joint Force Command and Control (C2) challenges up-front and preserve decision space**
- **Over-communicate perspectives on risk**
- **Effective deterrence is based on the adversary's perception of our actions**

References

- **National Security Strategy 2022**
- **National Defense Strategy 2022**
- **National Military Strategy 2022**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol. 1, Joint Warfighting, 27 Aug 2023**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 2, The Joint Force,” 19 Jun 2020**
- **Joint Pub 3-0, Joint Campaigns & Operations, 18 Jun 2022**
- **CJCSI 3030.01A, Implementing Joint Force Development and Design, 3 Oct 2022**
- **CJCSI 3100.01F, Joint Strategic Planning System, 29 Jan 2024**
- **CJCSM 3105.01B, Joint Risk Analysis Methodology, 22 Dec 2023**
- **CJCSI 3141.01F, Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans, 31 Jan 2019**
- **JSM 3051.01, Execution and Oversight of Global Integration, 14 APR 2023**

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(For use by Fellows in preparation for the Joint Operations Module in Suffolk, VA)

23 September 2024

Subject: Global Military Integration – Executive Summary for Fellows

1. **Purpose:** To provide an executive overview of global military integration
2. **Objective of Global Military Integration:** An integrated global perspective that provides strategic direction for Joint operations across all domains and regions to identify efficiencies and synergies and to champion integration with allies, partners, and the interagency at the national-strategic level. (CJCSI 3100.01F, *Joint Strategic Planning System*, 29 Jan 2024).
3. **Concept of Global Integration:** Global integration is achieved through the integration of planning, force management, force development, and force design—all undergirded by assessments—to enable senior leader decision making to translate strategy into outcomes.
4. **Role of the Chairman:** Section 153 of Title 10, U.S. Code, requires the Chairman to perform six primary functions to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense with planning, advice, and policy formulation: (1) provide strategic direction for the Armed Forces; (2) conduct strategic and contingency planning; (3) assess comprehensive joint readiness; (4) foster joint capability development; (5) manage Joint Force development; and (6) advise on global military integration.
 - a. Section 153(a)(3) directs the Chairman to provide advice to the President and the Secretary in “matters relating to global military strategic and operational integration.” Title 10 acknowledges the global “transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional threats” and directs the Chairman to provide the President and the Secretary advice on “ongoing military operations.” The Chairman also provides advice to the Secretary on “the allocation and transfer of forces” among the Combatant Commands.
 - b. Section 163(b) permits the Secretary to assign to the Chairman responsibility for overseeing the activities of the combatant commands, which does not confer any command authority. The Chairman executes these responsibilities by guiding coordination across geographic, functional, and Service seams to ensure the Joint Force expands its collective competitive advantages to overcome global challenges.
 - c. The Chairman develops military advice on global posture, readiness, and risk. CJCSM 3105.01B, *Joint Risk Analysis Methodology*, 22 December 2023, spells out the risk identification and assessment process established by the Chairman. The Chairman’s military advice represents apolitical (nonpartisan), professional military judgment on a wide range of Joint Force issues and topics.
5. **Role of the Joint Staff:** The Joint Staff assists the Chairman and, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman, the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out their responsibilities. (Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 155(a)).
 - a. JSM 3051.01, *Execution and Oversight of Global Integration*, 14 APR 2023, establishes the Joint Staff battle rhythm, global integration processes, and key events, e.g., Global Integration Meeting (GIM), J-3 Global Sync, Global Integration Working Group (GIWG) Level III and Level II, and Cross-Functional Teams (CFTs).
6. **POC:** Dave Wagner, JS J7, DDJT, DTD 757.203.7690, david.a.wagner1.ctr@mail.mil.



Strategic Inflection Point

The Most Historically Significant and Fundamental Change in the Character of War Is Happening Now—While the Future Is Clouded in Mist and Uncertainty

By General Mark A. Milley

Geostrategic competition and rapidly advancing technology are driving fundamental changes to the character of war. Our opportunity to ensure that we maintain an enduring competitive advantage is fleeting. We must modernize the Joint Force to deter our adversaries, defend the United States, ensure future military advantage, and, if necessary, prevail in conflict. The Joint Force has taken the first step by developing and publishing the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) and updating Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. The JWC is a joint, combined vision for how the U.S. military will operate across all domains. The next step is to create a leadership structure that turns concepts into capabilities. The Joint Force must make fundamental changes now to win the next war and, by doing so, we will deter the war from happening in the first place.

General Mark A. Milley is the 20th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.



U.S. Coast Guard–manned LCVP from USS *Samuel Chase* disembarks troops of Company A, 16th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, wading onto Fox Green section of Omaha Beach, early on June 6, 1944 (U.S. Coast Guard/Robert F. Sargent); *Der Wanderer über dem Nebelmeer*, by Caspar David Friedrich, oil on canvas, ca. 1817 (Hamburger Kunsthalle); Drone swarm (Shutterstock/Chesky); Army Futures Command IVAS Concept Art, circa 2019 (U.S. Army)

paratroopers and glider infantry drifted down to the coast of France. The continuous roar from the 88mm guns pierced the serenity of the night. The stream of lead from the German MG-42s raked the beaches of Normandy. For many American Soldiers, the taste of saltwater and the sharp smell of gunpowder were their first experiences of combat. These brave troops answered our nation’s call to defend freedom and democracy. The cost was tremendous. Twenty-six thousand Americans were killed in action from the storming of Normandy to the liberation of Paris. Between 1914 and 1945, 150 million people were slaughtered in the Great Power wars of World War I and World War II.

Since 1945, there have been several limited and regional wars, but there has not been another Great Power war. There are many reasons for this outcome. Two of the most important reasons are the rules-based international order enforced by a network of allies and partners and the dominant capability of the U.S. military. This order has held for almost eight consecutive decades. Unfortunately, we now see tears in the fabric of the rules-based international order as adversarial global powers continuously challenge the system. The time to act is now.

The U.S. military’s purpose is simple and contained in our oath to support and defend the Constitution against all enemies, both foreign and domestic, and to protect the American people and our interests. Since World War II, the strength of our nation and military, alongside that of our allies and partners, has deterred Great Power war. Freedom is not guaranteed. As Ronald Reagan warned, “Freedom is a fragile thing and it’s never more than one generation away from extinction. It is not ours by way of inheritance; it must be fought for and defended constantly by each generation.”²

In 2023, the rules-based international order is under intense stress.

Simultaneously, we are witnessing an unprecedented fundamental change in the character of war, and our window of opportunity to ensure that we maintain an enduring competitive advantage is closing. What we do in the next few years will set conditions for future victory or defeat. The U.S. military is the most effective fighting force the world has ever known, but maintaining this advantage is not a given. There are two critical areas where the Joint Force must adapt now:

- a conceptual roadmap—a unifying *joint* operational vision—that deliberately drives future force development and design
- a leadership structure to turn that vision into reality.

Changing Character of War

The rapid change in the character of war demands a corresponding fundamental shift in our Joint Force. As Carl von Clausewitz stated, the *nature* of war—a violent contest of wills to achieve political aims—is immutable. Humans will continue to impose their political will on opponents with violence. Clausewitz also tells us the nature of war involves fear, friction, uncertainty, and chance inherent in the dynamic interaction among the government, the people, and the military.

However, the *character* of war—how, where, with what weapons, and technologies wars are fought—is changing rapidly.³ For example, the last fundamental change in the character of war occurred between World War I and World War II. Technological advancements fundamentally transformed the character of warfare: mechanization and the use of wheeled and tracked vehicles; widespread employment of the aircraft, including development of bombers and fighters; and proliferation of radio to coordinate and synchronize dispersed units. The way militaries conducted warfare—the *character*—shifted drastically

When we look to the future, we can see broad outlines, but the details are clouded in fog and mist. Our path is rarely clear and never certain. Nevertheless, we must make choices for the future of the Joint Force. We know we will not get it right, but we must strive to get it less wrong than the enemy, paraphrasing the late historian Michael Howard.¹ The new Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) is our guide to that future. It will drive our doctrine, organizational design, training, and ultimately warfighting itself.

This is not the first time we have adapted to address an uncertain future. Seventy-nine years ago, on June 6, 1944, ordinary Americans came from all walks of life to enter the crucible of combat. Over 154,000 troops from eight Allied nations boarded 6,000 vessels to cross the choppy English Channel. As the moon illuminated the night sky, 24,000 Allied

and drove a change in organizational structure, training, and leadership development. The nations that capitalized on these changes created the greatest advantages in battle.

Almost all developed nations had access to these technologies—Great Britain, France, Germany, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States—but it was only the German Wehrmacht that initially optimized all three technological advancements, combining them into a way of war called Blitzkrieg that allowed them to overrun Europe in just 18 months.⁴ Germany eventually lost to the overwhelming industrial might of the United States, in conjunction with the Soviet Union and other Allies, but we may not get 18 months to react to a future enemy onslaught.

Today, we are witnessing another seismic change in the character of war, largely driven again by technology. The next conflict will be characterized by ubiquitous sensors with mass data collection and processing ability that minimize the opportunity for military forces to hide. Low-cost autonomous platforms, coupled with commercial imagery and behavior tracking data augmented by artificial intelligence (AI) and analysis tools, will accelerate the ability to sense and make sense of the environment. Inexpensive drones, loitering munitions, and precision-guided munitions with increasing speed, range, and accuracy will further reduce the time it takes to close the kill web. Robotics and additive manufacturing will change the way militaries supply and sustain their forces. Pervasive sensors, AI-driven weapon systems, and long-range precision fires will make the fastest platforms seem slow and leave the most hidden formations exposed.

Finally, the increasing development of space and cyber platforms and capabilities, both kinetic and nonkinetic, ensure the next war's decisive terrain will not be limited to the earth's surface. In short, the battlefield fundamentals of see, shoot, move, communicate, protect, and sustain are changing in fundamental ways. The attributes of organizations will—by necessity—be small, widely dispersed, nearly autonomous and self-sustaining,

capable of constant motion, and able to periodically mass effects for decisive action. This operational environment will place a premium on decentralized mission command. Centralized micromanaged leadership from the top will be ineffective. The American homeland has almost always been a sanctuary during conflict, but this will not be the case in a future war. Robust space and cyber capabilities allow adversaries to target critical national infrastructure. We cannot be sure that adversaries will ethically constrain emerging technologies or restrain their use of weapons of mass destruction.⁵

The Joint Force is actively harnessing these technologies, but as the Russian invasion of Ukraine has shown, technology alone does not guarantee success in the next war. The Joint Force must adopt innovative technology; modernize or divest older systems; train, organize, and equip the warfighter in new ways; update our doctrine to be effective in the operating environment; develop resilient leaders who can successfully conduct operations with little guidance and execute the true meaning of mission command; and work as a truly joint and combined team. But we are not adapting fast enough to optimize the force and keep pace with the changing character of war. We must adapt much faster than we are doing now.

Changing Global Order

The global geopolitical situation has also changed fundamentally. During the Cold War, there were two competing superpowers. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was a brief so-called unipolar moment. Now, it is clear we are in a multipolar world with at least three Great Powers—the United States, China, and Russia—with other countries rapidly emerging as regional and potential global Great Powers. We can say with reasonable certainty the future will be increasingly complex. Additionally, the rules-based international order established 80 years ago is currently under tremendous strain. The United States now faces two nuclear armed powers. Therefore, we must do everything in our power to deter conflict. We

may be in competition and confrontation, but we are not yet in conflict.

The 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) identifies the People's Republic of China (PRC) as “America's most consequential geopolitical challenge” and its “pacing challenge.”⁶ More specifically, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) states that the PRC is a revisionist power that employs state-controlled forces, cyber and space operations, and economic coercion against the United States and its allies and partners.⁷ In 2018, it was reported that China's President Xi Jinping stated to the 13th National People's Congress in Beijing, “We are resolved to fight the bloody battle against our enemies . . . with a strong determination to take our place in the world.”⁸ China seeks to fundamentally revise the system while still operating within it.

The world is also facing the greatest shift in economic power in well over 100 years. The PRC has leveraged economic growth to invest heavily in its military with the stated intention of exceeding the capability of the U.S. military in the Western Pacific in the next decade and globally by 2049.⁹ Through economic coercion, the PRC is expanding its global footprint and increasing its ability to project military power at range and scale. In addition, it is aggressively modernizing its military to develop nuclear, space, cyber, land, sea, and air capabilities to erode the competitive advantages that the United States and its allies have enjoyed for decades. The PRC's goal is to revise the global international order by mid-century and become the regional Asian hegemon in the next 10 years. The PRC is taking increasingly aggressive action toward those ends with a publicly unambiguous national aspiration and roadmap. This represents a real and growing national security challenge for the United States and its allies. While the PRC is an increasingly capable strategic competitor, history is not deterministic, and war is neither inevitable nor imminent. It is important that we keep our relationship with the PRC at the level of competition and not allow it to escalate into conflict.



British “Experimental Company” participates in Project Convergence 22, Fort Irwin, California, November 4, 2022 (Courtesy British Army/ Donald C. Todd)

While the PRC is the Joint Force’s pacing challenge, Russia poses an acute threat. The NSS warns that Russia “poses an immediate and ongoing threat to the regional security order in Europe.”¹⁰ Russia is a revanchist actor seeking to return to an era when it dominated the “Near Abroad” in a 19th- and 20th-century imperial system.¹¹ Furthermore, Russia employs disinformation, cyber, and space operations against the United States and irregular proxy forces in multiple countries.¹²

Russia’s unprovoked and illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has caused untold human suffering. Vladimir Putin’s war of choice not only threatens peace and stability on the European continent but is also a frontal assault on the basic rules of the post–World War II United Nations Charter. Ukraine has been an independent country since 1991. Russia’s war of aggression to redraw country borders is an existential threat to Ukraine and a direct threat to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the rules-based international order. The United States and many of its allies and partners are supporting Ukraine with

materiel and training to ensure that the international order is upheld.

Both China and Russia threaten Asian and European geopolitical stability and the international order.¹³ The challenge is likely to increase in the years ahead.

A Unifying Joint Vision: The Joint Warfighting Concept

The changing character of war and geopolitical landscape requires an interoperable, multidomain capable, joint and coalition force to demonstrate credible integrated deterrence. To remain the most lethal military in the world, the Joint Force needs a unifying concept and a faster process to field required capabilities. This means we also need authorities and a leadership model that drive deliberate Joint Force Development and Joint Force Design.

The most important thing we can do is to deter Great Power war from happening in the first place. We achieve deterrence by maintaining a highly ready, combat capable force in the present and modernizing the U.S. military to sustain dominant warfighting advantage in a

future operating environment. When rational adversaries view the United States as dominant, they realize they cannot and should not engage in conflict with the United States. Implementing a joint warfighting concept is the best preparatory action to deter adversarial actors from military aggression and preserve peace.

The JWC is our roadmap to the future. It is a threat-informed, operational concept that provides an overarching approach to how the Joint Force should fight in a future conflict. After 4 years of focused development, wargaming, and experimentation, the latest version of the JWC provides a unifying vision for the Department of Defense (DOD) to *guide* Joint Force Development and Joint Force Design, *drive* DOD investment, and *inform* how we work in concert with allies and partners. The JWC is nested directly under the NSS, NDS, and National Military Strategy (NMS), so it also describes *how* the Joint Force will address the top four DOD priorities: defend the homeland, deter strategic attacks against the United States and its allies and partners, deter



aggression while being prepared to prevail in conflict, and ensure our future military advantage. Most importantly, it challenges the warfighter to make a fundamental shift in the way we think about maneuvering through space and time in a fast-paced, high-tech, rapidly changing, and exceptionally challenging and lethal environment.

The JWC's lineage traces back to the AirLand Battle (ALB) concept and doctrine developed in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1970s, the U.S. Army and NATO Allies faced the threat of

a conventional war in Europe against a numerically superior Soviet Union and its alliances through the Warsaw Pact. After witnessing the modern high-intensity conflict of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War, Army planners recognized that NATO and U.S. forces in Europe required new ideas of force employment.¹⁴ The subsequent ALB concept reintroduced the operational level of war in its theory of winning decisive first battles on the ground and then conducting precision air interdiction of Soviet echelons.¹⁵

The Army introduced ALB in the 1982 edition of Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, and it dominated Army design, development, and education for the next decade.

ALB served as an example of successful bottom-up efforts; however, while ALB achieved collaborative force design and development between the Army and Air Force, it did not create necessary jointness to overcome conflicting visions of airpower and responsibility for long-range fires, nor did it incorporate significant roles for maritime forces.¹⁶



Air Force Technical Sergeant patrols with Ghost Robotics Vision 60 prototype at simulated austere base during Advanced Battle Management System exercise on Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, September 3, 2020 (U.S. Air Force/Cory D. Payne)

The JWC describes how the Joint Force will operate across not only the air and land domains but also multiple domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyber) and systems. The JWC also provides Joint Force Design with enough flexibility to drive experimentation, exercise, and training of the Joint Force, while leveraging Service iteration and innovation. This JWC is truly *joint*.

Evolution of Concepts

In 1996, *Joint Vision 2010* claimed technology trends would change the

character of war: “By 2010, we should change how we conduct the most intense operations. Instead of relying on massed forces and sequential operations, we will achieve massed effects in other ways.”¹⁷ Key terms included *dominant maneuver*, *precision engagement*, *full-dimensional protection*, and *focused logistics*.¹⁸ The main idea that emerged—effects-based operations—changed the way we think about warfare.

By 2005, the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) 2.0* recognized “dominance” may not be assured, so it

called for the Joint Force to think differently and act from multiple directions in multiple domains concurrently, conduct integrated and independent actions, project and sustain the force, act directly on perceived key elements and processes in the target system, control tempo, transition quickly and smoothly among the various actions, manage perceptions and expectations, and act discriminately.¹⁹ To accomplish this, the concept demanded certain traits of the future warfighter, including networked, interoperable, resilient, agile, and lethal.²⁰

In 2012, the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* recognized “the conventions by which wars are fought are no longer as settled as they once were. Notions of who is a combatant and what constitutes a battlefield in the digital age are rapidly shifting beyond previous norms.”²¹ In response, the concept proposed a new approach: globally integrated operations²² with eight elements: mission command; seize, retain and exploit the initiative; global agility; partnering; flexibility in establishing joint forces; cross-domain synergy; use of flexible, low-signature capabilities; and increasingly discriminate to minimize unintended consequences.²³ Similarly, the 2012 *Joint Operational Access Concept* called for cross-domain synergy with a “more flexible integration of space and cyberspace operations into the traditional air-sea-land battlespace than ever before.”²⁴ We knew over 10 years ago that a fully functioning Joint Force would need to outmaneuver, outthink, and outpace malign actors by remaining agile and working as a truly joint team.

Over the past 25 years, we have learned significant lessons. Whereas the 1996 *Joint Vision 2010* called for “full spectrum dominance,” we know now that we cannot assume dominance in any domain. Where the 2005 *CCJO* assumed the Joint Force could move in multiple directions in multiple domains, we now know the Joint Force should not expect freedom of movement. In 2012, the *CCJO: Joint Force 2020* called for mission command but lacked mention of joint all-domain command and control.

The JWC builds on these lessons learned. We now have a truly joint all-domain concept. Next month, we will release Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. This updated doctrine will guide the Joint Force in how to fight in the years ahead.

Key Tenets of JWC and JP 1

- *Integrated, Combined Joint Force:* The concept emphasizes the need for seamless integration of all mili-

tary Services across all warfighting domains, enabling them to function as a unified force. This type of integration involves synchronized planning, shared situational awareness, and effective communication across different Service components, fully aligned and interoperable with key allies and partners.

- *Expanded Maneuver:* The expanding operating environment means the Joint Force must also practice expanded maneuver. The JWC challenges the warfighter to think creatively about moving through space and time, including—but not limited to—maneuver through land, sea, air, space, cyber, the electromagnetic spectrum, information space, and the cognitive realm.²⁵
- *Pulsed Operations:* A type of joint all-domain operation characterized by the deliberate application of Joint Force strength to generate or exploit our advantages over an adversary.
- *Integrated Command, Agile Control:* Seamless command and control across all domains. Effective command and control aims to integrate sensors, platforms, and decisionmaking processes to achieve real-time battlespace awareness and enable rapid decisionmaking.
- *Global Fires:* Integration of lethal and nonlethal fires to deliver precise, synchronized global effects across all domains and multiple areas of responsibility.
- *Information Advantage:* Leveraging advanced technologies, such as AI, big data analytics, and cyber capabilities, to collect, analyze, and disseminate information rapidly, enabling decision superiority and action.
- *Resilient Logistics:* A system that allows for rapid movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies to places and times of our choosing.

In addition to the tenets, the JWC also highlights individual and organizational *attributes*. We need our warriors, through selection and training, to possess the traits of agility, rapid decisionmaking, creativity, dispersed

teamwork, and extreme resiliency in the face of intense hardship and continuous isolation. Future warfighting attributes must include speed, constant motion, relatively small size, lethality, and self-sustaining autonomous or nearly autonomous abilities. Warfighters must be masters of technological and physical camouflage, concealment, and deception.

Capability Development

While the Joint Force has naturally evolved over the years to identify and procure capabilities through processes and forums like the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), the Joint Force still lacks an organizational structure—or a coach with the right authorities—to hold the team accountable. The JWC, in and of itself, will not produce the objective Joint Force we need in the future. As aspects of the JWC are validated through rigorous experimentation and analysis, those pieces of the concept must be translated into military requirements, both materiel and nonmateriel. Moreover, they must be fully integrated across DOTMLPF-P before we achieve a true operational capability.²⁶ The JROC is where this happens. It validates these requirements and ensures we have the right people, equipment, training, leader development, and doctrine to deter and, if necessary, win in a future conflict.

Since its establishment in 1986, the JROC has primarily operated through a bottom-up process where combatant commands identified critical gaps in their operational employment concepts and the military Services sponsored requirements to fill those warfighter gaps. Over the last 4 years, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in collaboration with the Service vice chiefs, has focused the JROC on balancing nearer term combatant command needs with the pressing requirement to modernize the Joint Force. The JWC has been the North Star to this process, providing a list of Concept Required Capabilities—critical elements that enable concept execution. Moreover, in 2022, the JROC drove alignment of capability portfolio management with Office of



X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System demonstrator flies near aircraft carrier USS *George H.W. Bush*, May 14, 2013 (U.S. Navy/Erik Hildebrandt)

the Secretary of Defense integrated acquisition portfolios to further streamline procurement processes across DOD.

A Future-Focused Organization for Force Development and Design

The JWC and JP 1 have established a path to modernization. But these alone will not achieve the fundamental changes required to ensure the Joint Force outpaces any adversary and continues to deter aggression. In addition to these reforms, we need a future-focused organization that can drive change. In the 2022 NMS, we highlighted the need to balance both modernizing the Joint Force for future warfare and campaigning today in an era of Great Power competition.²⁷ The Joint Force can strike this balance by using strategic discipline—the ruthless prioritization of operations, activi-

ties, and investments to continuously calibrate Joint Force weight of effort between campaigning now and rapidly building warfighting advantage for the future.²⁸ It could seem like a struggle to balance “fight tonight” against “prepare to win tomorrow,” but it is a false choice between current readiness and future modernization—we must do both with the assistance of a Joint Futures organization.

Army Futures Command (AFC) is proof that a future-focused organization can spark the changes required. The AFC model can be replicated at the joint level. It achieved undeniable momentum in delivering advanced capabilities to the warfighter faster. The Army established a four-star operational commander as an authoritative senior advocate for the future—combining the characterization of the future operating environment, concept development, experimentation,

and requirements generation with clear priorities and direction. Unlike decades of failed programs like Comanche, Crusader, and Future Combat Systems, the Army is now putting the newest and most innovative technology in the hands of Soldiers. Like AFC, a Joint Futures organization would have the potential to align critical force design and development functions, integrate concepts with experimentation, and synchronize users to accelerate modernization and close capability gaps.

A Joint Futures organization would drive future Joint Force Design. It would be responsible for *characterizing* the future joint operating environment, looking beyond the current Future Years Defense Program. Building on the success of the JWC and JP 1, this organization would develop and iterate on future joint warfighting concepts. It would ensure capability development is threat informed



B-21 Raider is unveiled at public ceremony, December 2, 2022, in Palmdale, California (U.S. Air Force); Saildrone Explorer unmanned surface vessel and guided-missile destroyer USS *Delbert D. Black* operate in Arabian Gulf, January 8, 2023 (U.S. Navy/Jeremy Boan)

and concept driven. This organization would not monopolize joint concept development but rather serve as a lead agency that is responsible for collaborating with the Services and combatant commands to identify and help prioritize future operational problems while synchronizing development of warfighting solutions.

This future-focused organization would prioritize *joint experimentation* to ensure joint concepts are validated through rigorous wargaming, modeling, simulations, and other experimentation. This would strengthen Joint Force Design through competition of ideas, leveraging Service, industry, and academic innovation efforts. It would create experimentation venues to evaluate innovative tactical and operational solutions to inherently joint problems.

This organization would *integrate with allies and partners* from the very beginning of force design, looking to enhance not only the Joint Force but also the coalition force, through

synchronization and integration of coalition design and development. Allies and partners give the United States an asymmetric advantage over competitors. Thus, including them in force design and development allows us to integrate and inform capability development across nations in a way that reduces redundancies, leverages strategic competitive advantages, and strengthens the coalition force, enhancing our alliances and security partnerships and, ultimately, strengthening integrated deterrence.

Finally, and most importantly, we would designate the leader of this organization as the senior advocate solely dedicated to focus on the future joint operating environment, concepts, force design, requirements, and doctrine. He or she would represent the future joint warfighter in decision forums. This leader and organization would maintain a persistent focus on the fundamental evolution required for our future Joint Force.

Conclusion

Nearly 2,500 years ago, Thucydides warned, “It would be a mistake for you to think that because of your city’s present military might, or because of the gains you have made, luck will always go your way. Prudent men preserve their gains with a view to the uncertainty of the future and this makes them able to deal with disaster more intelligently when it comes.”²⁹ We do not want disaster; we want to deter war, but if it comes, this Joint Force must be prepared to prevail.

The Joint Force faces an uncertain future, and the challenges are multifaceted, complex, rapidly approaching, and unrelenting—demanding comprehensive modernization of our forces, concepts of employment, supporting technology, infrastructure, and training. We are undertaking several initiatives to transform, such as the JWC, JP 1, and JROC revitalization, and developing a joint organization focused solely on the



future, unencumbered by current crises and near-term constraints.

I leave my post as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff this fall, and after nearly 44 years of military service, I am confident that we will remain the most lethal, resilient, and capable force the world has ever seen, but we need to fundamentally change the way we do business, and we need to do it now. JFQ

Notes

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⁶ *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2022), 11, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf>.

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¹¹ Gerard Toal, *Near Abroad: Putin, the West, and the Contest Over Ukraine and the Caucasus* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

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¹⁴ Boyd L. Dastrup, *Modernizing the King of Battle: 1973–1991* (Fort Sill, OK: U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School, 2003), https://history.army.mil/html/books/069/69-5-1/cmhPub_69-5-1.pdf.

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¹⁷ *Joint Vision 2010* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 1996), 17, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA311168.pdf>.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Version 2.0* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, August 2005), 16–20, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA476464.pdf>.

²⁰ Ibid., 20.

²¹ *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, September 10, 2012), 3, https://www.ndu.edu/Portals/59/Documents/Incoming/ccjo_2012.pdf.

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²³ Ibid.

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²⁶ While the official definition of DOTM-LPF-P comes from the *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System Manual*, the Defense Acquisition University defines *DOTM-LPF-P* as Doctrine: the way we fight (for example, emphasizing maneuver warfare, combined air-ground campaigns); Organization: how we organize to fight (divisions, air wings, Marine Air-Ground Task Forces); Training: how we prepare to fight tactically (basic training to advanced individual training, unit training, joint exercises); Materiel: all the “stuff” necessary to equip our forces that *does not* require a new development effort (weapons, spares, test sets that are off the shelf both commercially and within the government); Leadership and education: how we prepare our leaders to lead the fight (squad leader to four-star officer, professional development); Personnel: availability of qualified people for peacetime, wartime, and various contingency operations; Facilities: real property, installations, and industrial facilities (government-owned ammunition production facilities); Policy: DOD, interagency, or international policy that impacts the other seven nonmateriel elements.” <https://www.dau.edu/acquipedia/pages/ArticleContent.aspx?itemid=457>.

²⁷ *National Military Strategy 2022*.

²⁸ Ibid.


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Authorities

*Deployable Training Division
Joint Staff J7*

The overall classification of slides is

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

Challenges

- **Understand how the interaction of law, policy, and guidance defines authority and underwrites decision making**
- **Decide and act within clear authority to promote the legitimacy of operations**
- **Develop and delegate authorities in support of timely decision making**


Law, Policy, and Guidance

Understand mission partner authority to leverage capability

- U.S. Agency laws, regulations, and policies
- Partner Nation laws, national policies, regulations, and orders
- NGO host nation laws and NGO internal policies

Authorities Challenges:

- Rules of Engagement (ROE)
- Fiscal Authorities
- Non-Kinetic Activities
- Exquisite Capabilities
- Space Activities



National policy decisions and documents

- ✓ PPDs
- ✓ NSPMs

DOD regulations and policies


International Law

- ✓ Treaty
- ✓ Customary

Domestic Law

- ✓ Constitution
- ✓ Statutes

Law, Policy, and Guidance



- Law of the Sea**
- Recognized boundaries and high seas freedoms (1982 UNCLOS – Customary International Law)
- U.S. Policy**
- Assert freedom of navigation to refute excessive claims but avoid escalation – maintain status quo
 - No position on sovereignty

Authority and Legitimacy

- **Adhering to established authority promotes legitimacy**
- **Legitimacy promotes support and leverages capabilities**
- **Operating with legitimacy is part of an effective strategy**
- **Perception of legitimacy can be as important as reality**
- **Legitimacy can be a tug-of-war in competing narratives**

2022 National Security Strategy

“[O]ur alliances and partnerships around the world are our most important strategic asset and an indispensable element contributing to international peace and stability.”

2022 National Defense Strategy

“We are a free people devoted to democracy and the rule of law...we are a member of an unparalleled and unprecedented network of alliances and partnerships.”

2022 National Military Strategy

“Synchronize action with allies, partners, and the interagency to address trans-regional, all-domain, and multi-functional challenges and continuously advance national security objectives.”

Legitimacy Narratives

Ukraine Invasion



Russia:

- “Special Military Operation” aimed at “De-Nazification”
- Russia threatened by NATO expansion



U.S. and NATO:

- Early intel sharing tipped Russia’s hand, framed the narrative, and caused news and media focus to pre-position in and around Ukraine
- Continue to highlight Russian Law of War violations

Conflict in Gaza



Hamas:

- Hamas’ actions are the result of decades of oppression
- Israel’s goal is to eliminate Palestinians through genocide, deliberately targeting civilians and denying humanitarian assistance



Israel:

- Israel has been attacked and we are justified under self-defense
- Actions are permissible and proportional under the Law of War

Developing and Delegating Authorities

Activities Drive Authorities

- What do I need to do?
- Do I have the right capability?
- Do I have the right authorities?
- Who has them and how do I get both?
 - Request for Forces
 - Request for Authority

Design & Initial Planning

Detailed Planning


Appropriate delegation speeds decision making

- Requires balancing risk
- Avoids centralized decision making
- Critical to Globally Integrated Operations
- Linked to Mission Command (Intent, Understanding, Trust)

Specify operational requirements to support requests for authority

Identify risk and mitigation when requesting or delegating authorities

Requesting and Delegating Authorities



Insights

- ***Use of force is regulated by ROE, authorized by mission orders, and executed per guidance and intent***
- ***Identify risk and mitigation when requesting or delegating authorities***
- ***National level decisions on use of force are heavily influenced by policy***
- ***Commanders seek robust ROE delegation to support agile operations***

Key Takeaways

- **Law, policy, and guidance provide the framework for operational solutions**
- **Understanding the authorities of mission partners leverages additional capabilities**
- **Reality and perception of legitimacy brings support and access to capabilities**
- **Activities drive authorities**
- **Appropriate delegation speeds decision making**

References

- **DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol. 1, “Joint Warfighting,” 27 Aug 2023**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 2, “The Joint Force,” 19 Jun 2020**
- **National Defense Strategy 2022**
- **National Military Strategy 2022**
- **National Security Strategy 2022**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Authorities Focus Paper, 2nd Edition, Oct 2016**

United States Code (U.S.C.)

| Title | Short Title | Descriptive / Applicability |
|-------|---------------------------------------|--|
| 5 | Government Organization and Employees | Agency organization and establishment of procedures for civilian workforce including functions and responsibilities as well as employment recruitment and retention. |
| 6 | Domestic Security | Establishes and organizes DHS, national emergency management requirements, and the national preparedness system. Includes applicable law on security and accountability for ports and borders as well as cybersecurity. (Homeland Security) |
| 10 | Armed Forces | Organization of DOD and general military powers; establishes active and reserve command structure within DOD (OSD, JCS and the Services). Regulates DoD personnel to include manning authorizations, discipline, training and career progression (including Joint qualification) as well as regulations on procurement. Also includes designated excepted civilian service, e.g., Cyber. (Homeland Defense) |
| 14 | Coast Guard | Establishes organization and powers, including law enforcement and other duties of the regular, reserve and auxiliary Coast Guard. Provides for military capability in support of DHS; capability also used under Title 10 when assigned in support of DoD. |
| 18 | Crimes and Criminal Procedure | Defines federal crimes, criminal procedure, prisons and prisoners and associated regulations. Includes the Posse Comitatus Act, forbidding federalized (T10) military conducting law enforcement. Department of Justice (DOJ) lead agency in accordance with Title 28 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure). |
| 19 | Customs Duties | Foreign trade zones; tariffs, trade negotiation and agreements, and smuggling. |
| 22 | Foreign Relations and Intercourse | Provides authority for diplomatic and consular courts and service. Provides for preservation of friendly foreign relations including Mutual Defense and Security Assistance Programs; protection of vessels on international and territorial waters and protections of citizens abroad. It also provides for authorities relating to regulation of foreign missions. Significant legal basis for HA / DR / NEO. Assigns Department of State (DOS) as lead agency. |
| 32 | National Guard (NG) | Provides authority for trained / equipped NG in support of federal mission requirements. Additionally provides authority for DOD domestic missions to be conducted by NG under C2 of respective Governors, exempt from Posse Comitatus Act; or mobilization of NG forces to active federal duty (Title 10). Grants authority for SecDef to also provide funds to Governors to employ NG units to conduct Homeland Defense activities, as SecDef determines to be necessary and appropriate for NG units. |
| 33 | Navigation and Navigable Waters | International rules for navigation at sea Authorizes Navy/USCG exemption from certain rules. Regulations for suppression of piracy. Collision prevention / responsibilities. |
| 42 | Public Health / Welfare | Provides authority for federal disaster preparedness and assistance. (Stafford Act as it relates to DSCA) |
| 50 | War and National Defense | Outlines the role of war and National Defense. Includes regulations on CIA, foreign intelligence and covert action. |

Rules of Engagement (ROE) Considerations for the JTF Commander

Staff ROE development and approval process:

- ___ Is ROE development an integrated part of crisis action planning (CAP)?
- ___ Is ROE development operator-led (J3 / J35 / J5), with the SJA in support?
- ___ Is there a formal staff process for ROE development (ROE Working Group)?
- ___ Does the ROE WG have the right subject-matter experts?
- ___ Is there a process for the Joint Operations Center (JOC) to interface with the ROE WG?
- ___ Is there dialogue on ROE between your staff and higher and lower headquarters' staffs?
- ___ Is there interagency and interorganizational liaison with your staff regarding ROE?
- ___ Does the ROE, along with your intent and guidance, create clear use of force policy?
- ___ Does the ROE support higher headquarters' intent and guidance?
- ___ Did your staff thoroughly war game and crosswalk the operation plan or order (including any branches and sequels) and the ROE to ensure that subordinate commanders have the *authority* to take all appropriate action to deter, pre-empt, and/or counter the full range of possible threat reactions without having to request additional supplemental ROE?
- ___ Did your staff thoroughly war game and crosswalk the operation plan or order (including any branches and sequels) and the ROE to ensure that subordinate commanders have *all necessary means available* to accomplish their missions and to defend their units and other US forces in the vicinity?
- ___ Do your staff and subordinate commanders understand that nothing contained in the ROE limits a commander's inherent right and obligation to take all appropriate action to defend his or her unit and other US forces in the vicinity?
- ___ Do your staff and subordinate commanders understand the permissive nature of the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE)?
- ___ Do your staff's standing operating procedures assign responsibility and establish effective procedures for developing, requesting, authorizing, disseminating, training, monitoring, assessing, and modifying the ROE in a timely manner?
- ___ Are all ROE messages that contain numbered supplemental measures classified at least CONFIDENTIAL and numbered serially (e.g., serial 1, 2, 3 ..., as opposed to serial 1, change 1; serial 1, change 2)?
- ___ Are all ROE messages clear, concise, and easily understood in a single reading, with all key terms defined?

- Do ROE request messages contain a justification for each supplemental measure requested?
- Does each ROE authorization message contain all of the supplemental measures currently in effect, whether changed or not, so that subordinates need only keep the current message to have all of the ROE currently in effect?
- Do you, your staff, and your subordinate commanders fully understand the limitations of your allies' or coalition partners' national ROE? When your allies' or coalition partners' national ROE are incompatible, how do you plan to maintain unity of effort and avoid potential conflicts? Will forces or tasks be separated geographically and/or functionally?
- If you approve any supplemental measures that restrict the use of force, do your subordinate commanders have the means available to comply with those restrictions? (Example: If you approve a supplemental measure requiring your forces to "observe" indirect fire directed against targets in areas of civilian concentration, do your subordinate commanders have the means to "observe" those fires?)

Some key ROE issues:

- Designating and defining hostile forces.
- Clear guidance on what constitutes hostile intent in a given situation? (Example: If a military aircraft of country x were to do a, b, and c in the vicinity of a unit, the unit commander should consider the behavior as a demonstration of hostile intent and may engage the aircraft in defense of his or her unit.)
- Designating and defining collective self-defense (i.e., defense of designated forces as well as designated persons and property).
- Cross-border reconnaissance, direct action operations, and personnel recovery.
- Use of weapon systems subject to special restrictions, including riot control agents, anti-personnel land mines, and fires in areas of civilian concentration.
- Treatment of civilians, including the authority to stop, search, and detain them, and to seize their property.
- Allied or coalition ROE do not limit the inherent right and obligation of US commanders to execute unit self-defense.

Bottom line: Do the ROE give your subordinate commanders the flexibility they need to get the job done?

**Civil-Military Relations Readings
on the NDU CAPSTONE website:**

[https://capstone.ndu.edu/Portals/83/Civil-
Military%20Relations_CAP_25-1_REDUCED.pdf](https://capstone.ndu.edu/Portals/83/Civil-Military%20Relations_CAP_25-1_REDUCED.pdf)

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

CAPSTONE Outline October 2024

- Bottom Line Up Front: Civil-military relations has always challenged American leaders, but the relationship has been, with rare exceptions, manageable. The difficulties today are distinctive but not altogether different from many in the past, and can be overcome, as has been true historically, by building trust relationships.
- Definitions: What are We Talking about?
- The Military and Society (The “Gap Issue”)
 - Paradox of the “gap:” Public support/confidence vs. “the 1% and 99%”
 - Public confidence, high but hollow and falling
 - The military in the cross-hairs of polarized partisan politics
 - Charges of “Woke” from the Opposition Party
 - Tuberville Holds
 - Does the military understand/embrace the non-partisan ethic?
 - Retired military...
 - ...and political campaigns
 - ...and policy disputes
 - A “contract”? The military budget and a civil-military balance “down range”
- At the top of Government in Strategy, Policy, Operations: Sources of Misunderstanding, Tension, Distrust, and Conflict
 - A paradox of recent history: “No coup, no problem”?
 - Different people, different worlds
 - Civilian control: The right to be wrong
 - What, if anything, is different now?
 - “Best Military Advice”
 - Congress
 - Resignation
- Wrap Up: So . . . Why Does the System Work, and How Can We Help it Work Better?
 - More cooperation than conflict
 - Military subordination (“leading from the middle”?)
 - Primacy of the Constitution, rule of law
 - Military professionalism
 - Trust: the universal solvent

(OVER)

SIX MYTHS ABOUT AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Richard H. Kohn
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Definition: civil-military relations is the entire set of relationships and interactions between the military and society: individually, group, and institutional.

For our purposes here, the most important portions are the relationships and interactions between topmost flag officers and political leaders in the White House, Congress, OSD/Service secretariats, and other executive branch organizations and agencies.

* * * * *

First myth: everything is, and always has been, fine in the relationship at the top between the most senior military and the most senior political officials in the government.

* * * * *

Second myth: civilian control of the military is safe, sound, and inviolate, i.e., “no coup (or open insubordination), no problem.”

* * * * *

Third myth: There exists a clear, bright line between military and civilian responsibilities, with the corollary that the military should push back against orders that promise huge disaster or needless deaths, or are professionally untenable, or are immoral or unethical in a senior officer’s view, even to the point of speaking out publicly or either threatening or actually “resigning” [asking to be reassigned or retired] rather than carrying out the orders.

* * * * *

Fourth myth (two versions): the military is non-partisan and a-political; the military is partisan and politicized.






* * * * *

Fifth myth: Americans “love” their military; and (corollary) there exists some “bargain,” “covenant,” or “contract” between the military and the American people.

* * * * *

Sixth myth: civilian control is understood by both sides in the relationship and by the American people.

Setting Conditions



**Deployable Training Division
Joint Staff J7**

The overall classification of slides is

UNCLASSIFIED

Challenges

- **Early and timely Commander involvement throughout design, planning, and assessing**
- **Commander centrality in assessments that inform understanding and guidance**
- **Incorporating risk in decision making**
- **Deciding if or when to reframe the problem**

Command and Control: The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.

- Joint Pub 1

***Interview with
General James Mattis, USMC (Ret)***


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at

The Hoover Institution at Stanford University

March 6, 2015

Setting Conditions for Success



Insights


“Do those things that only you can do as the commander...”

- *Build and maintain trust and inclusive relationships with partners*
- *Share visualization and intent, gain authorities and resources, assess, and plan / manage transitions*
- *Design C2 to accomplish the mission – and evolve as necessary*

Operational Art

Strategic Objectives → Operational Approach → Tactical Actions

Complex Operational Environment




Insights

- Requires Commander's upfront time and dialogue to define the problem
- Leverage mission partners to better understand the environment


Understanding Your HQ's Role

- **USG role** relative to the international (and host nation) response
- **US military role** relative to the broader USG whole of government approach
- **CCMD role** relative to other DOD organizations (e.g., other CCMDs and Combat Support Agencies)
- **Internal CCMD C2 options**



Considerations


- **Where do you fit?**
- **Who do you work with?**
- **How to organize?**
- **Where is risk?**



* Optional

Risk

CJCSM 3105.01B, 22 Dec 2023 establishes a joint risk analysis methodology and provides guidance for identifying, assessing, and managing risk.



The Joint Risk Framework

Insights

- **Risk is Commander's Business**
- **Frame the problem**
 - *Protecting national interests*
 - *Execute a strategy or plan*
 - *Maintain a viable, ready force*
- **Determine what to do about risk**
 - *Accept / Avoid / Mitigate / Transfer*
- **Risk communication**
 - *Appraise and manage risk*
 - *Reduces misunderstandings and surprises*

Fight today

CCMD Risk




Service Risk


Win Tomorrow

Assessment

- Are we doing things right?
- Are we doing the right things?
- Are we measuring the right variables?
- Is our information accurate?
- Are we accomplishing the Mission and End State?
- Are we achieving Strategic Objectives?



Source: Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practice Focus Paper: Assessment and Risk.




Source: Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning.

Insights

- **Commander centric – key to developing guidance and intent**
- **Implement early and continuously with partners to deepen understanding**
- **Integrate assessment structure across echelons at the pace of operations**
- **Get to “What else needs to be done”; do not stop at “What happened”**

Assessment and Planning Process



Insights

- **Clear process integrates people and information to share understanding**
- **Structure enhances speed of translation from guidance to execution**
- **Timely engagements enable adaptability and flexibility in complex environments**
- **Clear terms of reference disciplines the process and sets expectations**

SAWG: Strategic Assessment Working Group
 9 PDB: Plans Decision Board
 CAB: Commander's Assessment Board

Reframing the Problem


Design → Plan → Execute **Reframe** Design → Plan → Execute



Russian/Ukraine War



Change in environment
Change in strategic guidance
Change in the character and pace of war



“Iran launches retaliatory attack on Israel with hundreds of drones”

Insights

- ***Activities in All-Domains may drive change in the environment***
- ***Operations don't stop during reframing***
- ***It is the Commander's decision to reframe and revisit design***
- ***Commands must leverage Allies, Partners, and the Interagency during problem reframing and redesign***

Key Takeaways

- **Senior leaders set conditions by building trust and sharing understanding**
- **Active and continuous Commander involvement promotes focus and flexibility**
- **Structure, design, planning, and assessment around Commander's time and approach**
- **Understand the aspects of risk in decisions**
- **Establish an assessment framework to enable problem reframing when conditions change**

References

- **DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol. 1, “Joint Warfighting,” 27 Aug 2023**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 2, “The Joint Force,” 19 Jun 2020**
- **Joint Pub 3-0, “Joint Campaigns and Operations,” 18 Jun 2022**
- **Joint Pub 5-0, “Joint Planning,” 1 Dec 2020**
- **CJCSM 3105.01B, “Joint Risk Analysis Methodology,” 22 Dec 2023**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Mission Command, 2nd Edition, Jan 2020**
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
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- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Combatant Command (CCMD) Command and Control Organizational Options Focus Paper, 3rd Edition, May 2022**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Assessment and Risk Focus Paper, 3rd Edition, Mar 2020**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) Focus Paper, 4th Edition, Jan 2020**

Sustainment

*Deployable Training Division
Joint Staff J7*

The overall classification of slides is

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Challenges

- **Anticipating requirements in an uncertain, complex, rapidly changing, and contested operating environment**
- **Integrating and synchronizing capabilities from the Joint Logistics Enterprise to support the concept of operations**
- **Balancing global and theater-level considerations to set and sustain the theater**

“You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.”

– General Dwight D. Eisenhower

Global Strategic Environment



Anti Access / Area Denial



Cyber



Speed of Conflict



Regional Instability




Fiscal Environment



Rise of Peer Competitors



Pandemic



“Globally Integrated Operations is the concept for how the Joint Force should prepare for the security environment Globally integrated operations both enable and are premised upon Global Agility.”
- Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020, 10 Sep 2012

Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt)



- Insights**
- ***Understand authorities, goals, and limitations of other JLEnt partners***
 - ***Establish relationships and build trust before a crisis occurs***
 - ***Capitalize on and leverage stakeholder capabilities and resources***
 - ***Be prepared to provide support to other JLEnt partners***

Global Sustainment Considerations

Competition for Resources



Strategic Lift




Forces



Medical



Critical Munitions



War Reserve
Materiel



Overflight, Transit,
Basing



Operational Contract
Support

Insights

- Access requirements may extend beyond a given AOR
- Understand what critical resources other CCMDs will require and how that will impact your mission (e.g., OCS, Medical Assets, additional Forces)
- Engage the Joint Staff early to adjudicate limited global resources

Key Takeaways

- Anticipate requirements (contested logistics)
- Leverage and integrate the Joint Logistics Enterprise to ensure rapid and precise response for the Joint Force Commander
- Balance global and theater level considerations to set and sustain the theater


“You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.”

– General Dwight D. Eisenhower

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
Joint Force All-Domain Operations



**Deployable Training Division
Joint Staff J7**

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
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Challenges

- **Integrating space, cyber, and information into planning, targeting, and synchronizing all-domain operations**
- **Coordinating and synchronizing activities across domains to achieve unity of effort and gain positional and / or temporal advantage**
- **Assessing non-kinetic activities in the operational environment**
 - *JP 3-04 highlights information synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of activities to achieve unity of effort*


All-Domain Operations



Insights

- ***Speed of cyber and space activities and strategic effects demand rapid, proactive decision making***
- ***Joint all-domain C2 is progressing; CJADC2***
- ***Integrate space, cyber, and EMS authorities, capabilities, and expertise early in planning***

Complexity of the Information Environment



Insights

- *The IE is global in nature—complexities are created by technological advances, the speed and range of information / mis-information, and deliberate operations to influence audiences*
- *Relevant actors are individuals, groups, populations, or automated systems whose capabilities or behaviors have the potential to affect OAI success*
- *Diffusion of information enables individuals and groups to enter in and affect the global forum*

Considerations for All-Domain Operations

Intelligence

- Understanding Adversary's Decision Calculus, Beliefs, and Perceptions
- Sharing how Enemy fights and COG (CV, CR, CC)
- Understand the Enemy's use and Exploitation of Space, Cyber, and EMS
- Collection & Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED)



Decision and Execution

- Decision Quality Information
- Gaining Authorities
- Phase Transition

Planning and Targeting

- System of Systems Implications
- Targeting Systems Analysis – All-Domain
- Integrating Special Capabilities and Activities

Targeting Guidance

- Identification of Decisive Points
- Space and Cyber Requirements
- Communication Guidance (Messaging)
- Achieving Advantage – Priorities


- Chart derived from *All-Domain Operations Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper*, 7 April 2021

Insights

- **Understand the adversary through an all-domain lens**
- **Plan and leverage capabilities from all domains; Include information and EMS**
- **Consider lead time for authorities and devise alternate COAs and options to provide decision quality information to the commander**
- **Space, cyber, and information are difficult to assess – start early to develop MOEs**

Assessments

Operation Assessment Process



Fighter aircraft from the U.S., Japan, and the Republic of Korea conducting a trilateral escort flight of a U.S. B-52H Stratofortress Bomber (22 Oct 23)

Insights

- ***While most organizations successfully provide Battle Damage Assessments, operations in the information environment assessments (e.g., the human cognitive) are sometimes harder to obtain and visualize***
- ***Assessment is a continuous process to identify, develop, and affect audiences to achieve desired enduring conditions***
- ***Accurate assessment of behavioral change is a lengthy process; identify short-term and long-term assessments***
- ***Assessments are coordinated and integrated internally and externally through whole-of-staff / government / coalition efforts***

Key Takeaways

- **Create familiarity across domains by incorporating Space, Cyber, and Information effects early into planning, targeting, and the battle rhythm**
- **Continue to exercise unity of effort and leverage WoG, Allies and Partners, and industry to integrate actions and gain positional and / or temporal advantages**
- **Assessment of effects across all domains is complex and requires a robust assessment plan**

References

- **DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol. 1, “Joint Warfighting,” 27 Aug 2023**
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- **Joint Pub 3-04, Information in Joint Operations, 14 Sep 2022**
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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
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WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

SEP 15 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Information as a Joint Function

Information is such a powerful tool that it is recognized as an instrument of national power. The advent of the internet, the expansion of information technology, the widespread availability of wireless communications, and the far-reaching impact of social media have dramatically impacted operations and changed the character of modern warfare.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has issued an out-of-cycle change to Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States*, introducing *Information* as a new, seventh joint function. This change is consistent with the 2016 DoD Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment (SOIE) and the 2016 National Military Strategy. It signals a fundamental appreciation for the military role of information at the strategic, operational and tactical levels within today's complex operating environment.

The elevation of *Information* to a joint function impacts all operations and has implications across doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy that must be identified in the months ahead. These include the relationship with other joint functions, as well as the effects on planning and operations. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the CJCS, as co-chairs of the SOIE Executive Steering Group, will lead efforts to examine implications and implement appropriate changes. I fully endorse this effort and expect support from across the Department.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John Matis".



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


JP 3-04: Information in Joint Operations Information Sheet

| <p>JP 3-13 Information Operations, 20 NOV 14 CH1 (Canceled)</p> | <p>JP 3-04 Information in Joint Operations, 14 SEP 22</p> |
|---|--|
| <p>NDS 2018 – Laid out a world where great-power competition, rather than counterterrorism, drove the DoD’s decision-making and force structure. Inter-state strategic competition primarily from China and Russia became the primary concern in US national security. Shifting away from counterinsurgency stance and back to large-scale combat operations</p> | <p>NDS 2022 – DoD’s priorities: 1) Defending the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the PRC; 2) Deterring strategic attacks against the United States, Allies, and partners; 3) Deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary - prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific region, then the Russia challenge in Europe, and; 4) Building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem</p> |
| <p style="text-align: center;">Integrating Function</p> <p>Definition: “Integrated employment, during military operations, of IRCs in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making (leaders) of adversaries/potential adversaries while protecting our own”</p> <p>Focused on Red and Green if it affects Red</p> | <p style="text-align: center;">Joint Warfighting Capability</p> <p>Definition: “The joint force uses information to improve understanding, decision-making, and communication. Commanders use information to visualize and understand the OE and direct and coordinate actions. The joint force leverages information to affect the perceptions, attitudes, decision-making, and behavior of relevant actors.”</p> <p>It considers Red, Green , Blue and others relevant actors.</p> <p>Relevant actors = individuals, groups, populations, and automated systems whose capabilities/behaviors have the potential to affect the success of a particular campaign, operation, or tactical action</p> |
| <p style="text-align: center;">Information / Influence Relational Framework</p> <p>Information / influence relational framework applied to three dimensions of the IE (physical, informational, and cognitive)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “A JFC may establish an IO staff to provide command-level oversight and collaborate with all staff directorates.” • Focused primarily on affecting the decision-making of select target audiences (decision-makers). | <p>Three Tasks of the Information Joint Function:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Understand how IE impacts the OE 2. Support human and automated decision making 3. Leverage information <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “The information joint function stresses the requirement to incorporate information as a fundamental element during planning and conduct of all operations.” • Expanding the commander’s range of options for actions across the competition continuum |
| <p style="text-align: center;">Deleted Doctrinal Terms</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Information Operations (IO) and Information Operations Planner b. Information Operations Working Group (IOWG) c. Information-Related Capabilities (IRC) | <p style="text-align: center;">New Doctrinal Terms</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Information Planner b. Information Planning Cell c. Information Cross-Functional Team (I-CFT) “Not just Information Forces” d. Information Forces |
| <p>IRCs are force multipliers used to create desired effects</p> | <p>Information advantage is the operational advantage gained through the joint force’s use of information for decision-making and its ability to leverage information to generate effects on the IE.</p> <p>Informational power is the ability to exert one’s will through the projection, exploitation, denial, and preservation of information in pursuit of objectives.</p> |


JP 3-04: Information in Joint Operations Information Sheet
- continued -

| JP 3-13 Information Operations, 20 NOV 14 CH1 (Canceled) | JP 3-04 Information in Joint Operations, 14 SEP 22 |
|--|--|
| IE = physical, informational, and cognitive domains - Subset of OE | IE = Aggregate of the social, cultural, linguistic, psychological, technical, and physical factors - Subset of OE |
| Information is used to “ <i>gain an advantage</i> ” in the IE | Understand, support, and leverage information to <i>achieve unity of effort</i> |
| <p>“Strategic communication is a whole-of-government approach, driven by interagency processes and integration that are focused upon effectively communicating national strategy.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategic communication “owned” by DoS • JFC “amplifies” national strategy, policy, and objectives | <p>“Narratives are an integral part of campaigns, operations and missions. An effective and integrated narrative can mitigate, undermine, or otherwise render competing narratives ineffective if it is accompanied by complementary actions.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CCMDs are responsible for the strategic and operational mission narratives and to assure OAs are aligned to these narratives. |
| <p>JPP-focused, integrating function</p> <p>“The <u>IO cell chief is responsible</u> to the JFC for integrating Information Related Capabilities into the joint operations planning process.”</p> <p>Perceived as the job of Information Forces (former IRCs)</p> | <p>JPP-focused, joint warfighting capability</p> <p><u>“All members of the JFC’s staff are responsible</u> for accomplishing or contributing to tasks of the information joint function, to include understanding how information affects joint force operations, understanding how those respective activities impact or are impacted by the IE, and integrating that understanding into their respective portions of joint plans.”</p> <p>Broader view and everyone has a role in the Information fight</p> |
| <p>“Coordination and synchronization of IRCs” implied information was separate or merely additive to a scheme of maneuver</p> | <p>More closely aligns the information element as an instrument of national power / the joint function to the planning and execution of joint force operations</p> |
| <p>Eight-step assessment process focused on measures of performance / measurements of effectiveness</p> <p><i>“Information operations assessment is iterative, continuously repeating rounds of analysis within the operations cycle <u>in order to measure the progress of IRCs toward achieving objectives.</u>”</i></p> | <p>Six-step assessment process seeking to describe for the commander how the IE / OE changed in relation to the operational objective(s) and the resulting ramifications of that effect / those effects</p> <p><u>“Assessment of operations and activities is key to the commander’s decision cycle,</u> helping to determine the results of actions in the context of overall mission objectives and providing recommendations for refinement of future plans.”</p> |
| | <p><u>Updates required:</u> JP 3-0 Joint Operations, 18 JUN 2022 JP 3-09 Joint Fire Support Planning, 10 APR 19 JP 3-16 Multinational Operations, 12 FEB 21 Validated JP 3-33 JTF Headquarters, 9 JUN 22 JP 3-60 Joint Targeting, 31 JAN 2013 JP 5-0 Joint Planning, 1 DEC 20</p> |

HQ Organization and Process Insights



Deployable Training Division Joint Staff J7



The overall classification of slides is


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Challenges

- **Organizing to accomplish the joint mission**
- **Developing processes to operate with speed and agility**
- **Integrating joint, multinational, and interagency mission partners into the HQ structure and processes**

Organizing - Roles and Responsibilities

J-Code Structure Organization (Preferred organizational structure)



* Above organization structure is greatly simplified for illustrative purposes only


Considerations

- *Mission requirements drive HQ functions, organization, and processes*
- *Agility vs. size of HQ*
- *Terms of Reference for key personnel*
- *Liaison network*
- *Clear assignments of responsibilities for:*
 - *Assessment*
 - *Design*
 - *Integration of lethal and nonlethal effects*
 - *Narrative and Engagement*
 - *Reports to Higher HQ*
 - *Knowledge Management*
 - *Interagency Coordination*

Insights


- *Maintain Commander-centric vs. staff-centric focus*
- *Be able to respond to crisis while retaining agility to plan and execute other missions*
- *Account for the transregional and multi-domain nature of operations*

Staff Integration



* JP 3-33, *Joint Force Headquarters*, defines “cross functional organizations” that include Centers, Groups, Cells, Offices, Elements, Boards, Working Groups, and Operational Planning Teams (OPTs).


Staff Support to Decision Making



Insights

- Force cross-functional integration to improve staff support for the Commander
- Provide venues for Commander's "touch points" and command decisions
- COS is the staff synchronizer and manages the battle rhythm


Enabling Commander Decision Making



Simplified for example only.

Commander time for thinking, engagement, dialogue, battlefield circulation

Staff preparation and empowered senior leader steering




Commander assessment, guidance, and decision forums

Insights

- “White space” enables Commander and staff processes that inform decision making
- Battle Rhythm must be nested with HHQ, partners, and external stakeholders

Integration with Mission Partners



Insights

- *Leverage CDR to acquire formal support*
- *Early coordination / integration*

Key Takeaways

- **Clear roles and responsibilities are needed to operate at the speed of relevance**
- **Effective staff integration enables shared understanding that supports decision making**
- **Early integration of all partners into the HQ is critical to achieve a comprehensive approach**

References

- **DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol. 1, “Joint Warfighting,” 27 Aug 2023**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 2, “The Joint Force,” 19 Jun 2020**
- **Joint Pub 3-33, “Joint Force Headquarters,” 9 Jun 2022**

“Apologetics”

Excerpts from “Defending the Record on US Nuclear Deterrence” by Gen Kevin P. Chilton (ret), Former Commander, US Strategic Command, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2018

Today, misinformation, falsehoods, and often deliberate distortions concerning nuclear deterrence continue to be repeated in public forums. Left unchallenged, these statements run the risk of becoming accepted as factual by the American public. [The following are] 11 of the more common fallacies.

“We Are Never Going to Use Nuclear Weapons”

The argument presented is this: if we are never going to use nuclear weapons, why are we wasting so much money sustaining them? Our adversaries see our 24/7 alert postures and consequently assess an attack on the US or its allies to be an unthinkable choice.

“Prompt Conventional Global Strike Can Replace a Portion of the Nuclear Deterrent Force”

Another fallacy is the notion that the deterrence mission can be adequately accomplished by substituting conventional warheads, because of their great accuracy, for nuclear warheads atop our ICBMs. This argument does not appreciate the “long, dark shadow” cast by the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the deterrent effect that “shadow” enables. A nuclear warhead is terribly frightening; a 2,000-pound conventional warhead is not.

“Conventional Weapon Overmatch Eliminates the Need for a Nuclear Deterrent”

Another argument presented to reduce or eliminate the US nuclear deterrent is the notion that our conventional overmatch in quality and size is adequate for the deterrence mission. There is simply no conventional weapon equivalency to the power and deterrent effects of nuclear weapons. So where should the US spend its first dollar on defense? On the triad.

“We Do Not Need a Triad”

The critical question to ask in response to the claim that we do not need a triad is, so which leg do you want to eliminate? The submarine leg provides the only stealth force we have—in essence, our assured response. The bombers are the flexible force that can signal our adversaries and assure our allies while encouraging them not to build their own nuclear deterrent. The ICBM is the most stabilizing leg of the triad. Stability, in this context, is defined as a state in which adversaries are never tempted to strike first. The value in the triad is that it complicates the adversary decision calculus. This is the definition of strategic stability: when an adversary understands that no day is a good day to go to war with the United States—nor is he ever tempted to launch first.

“Nuclear Forces Are on Hair-Trigger Alert”

Critics of our ICBM alert posture use this terminology as a scare tactic. Nuclear forces are not on hair-trigger alert. They certainly are on alert and at the ready, and this is necessary to provide the strategic stability.

“LRSO Is Destabilizing”

Another fallacious argument is that the long-range standoff weapon (LRSO), or cruise missile, is destabilizing. The fact is LRSO is not destabilizing in the sense of weakening strategic stability, as it does not invite a first strike—indeed it helps to prevent one. The United States and Russia have had these weapons for decades and employed them in regional conflicts, and neither country has considered striking first as a result. Today’s ALCM, which will age out in the next decade, must be replaced on schedule by the follow-on LRSO.

“We Cannot Afford Modernization”

Arguing against recapitalizing the nuclear triad because of sustainment costs is patently unfair. In today’s world and for the foreseeable future the US will need a nuclear deterrent in the form of a triad. So, including sustainment costs when discussing the cost of recapitalization is simply another attempt to convince the public not to invest in something that remains necessary for national security. So if nuclear deterrence is the number-one priority and every other defense investment depends on it, the cost spread over the lifetime of the programs is most certainly affordable. We should be rebuilding and exercising the infrastructure necessary to

sustain our deterrent and, more importantly, developing the human capital required to design and build nuclear weapons for an uncertain future. The cost to do this is modest.

“If We Reduce, Others Will Reduce”

We reduced our nuclear arsenal when we signed verifiable treaties with Russia. How effective has this leading by example been? How is showing constraint working? History does not support the proposition that if we reduce, others will follow our lead. The effectiveness of the leading-by-reducing approach to inspire others to show restraint is simply not supported by reality.

“Global Zero Is a Desirable Goal”

Many talk about global zero as a desirable goal. After all, if we could “put the genie back in the bottle” wouldn’t it be better to have a world without nuclear weapons? Of course, the “genie,” that is, the knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons, cannot be unlearned and put back in the bottle of ignorance. Alternatively, some suggest we should continue to strive to get all nations to agree to reduce their inventories to zero, eliminate their weapon production capabilities, and submit to a near omniscient oversight authority that could compel compliance and ensure that no one was cheating. Human beings for centuries upon centuries, in war after war, found better and better ways to kill each other—more efficiently, more lethally. Do we want to go back to a world without nuclear weapons? There is a reason why great powers that own ever more lethal conventional weapons have elected not to fight each other: they have been deterred by nuclear weapons.

“Nuclear Deterrence is Cold War Think”

Some argue the US nuclear deterrent should be eliminated because its existence represents Cold War think. The reality is nuclear deterrence underpins the national security of the United States and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. It remains relevant and necessary today to deter the existential threats to our nation. It also helps to deter nonnuclear attacks that could have catastrophic consequences, such as attacks involving biological weapons. The term Cold War think is a pejorative typically proffered by those who have never thought seriously about, let alone studied, deterrence theory or by those who have run out of ways to defend their position.

“No One Would Ever Use a Nuclear Weapon against the United States”

Those who would use this argument seem willing to risk the very existence of the nation on the basis of their speculation and without forethought. The US military must ensure national survival through deterrence provided by a safe, secure, capable, reliable, flexible, and vigilant nuclear posture. It is our duty to assume the worst and then take steps to ensure it never happens. Additionally, we must deter attacks on our friends, allies, and fielded US military forces deployed abroad.

Summary

These 11 statements are a few of the false arguments and positions directed toward the US nuclear deterrent, often by those who would wish to see this deterrent weakened or eliminated for purely ideological reasons. However, other serious scholars and students of deterrence theory present thoughtful and debatable positions that address issues pertaining to the size, capability, and posture requirements needed to provide the United States with a deterrent that will ensure no one would ever consider a nuclear attack on the United States, our military forces, or our friends or allies. It is the responsibility of members of the profession of arms to truthfully defend the record when false arguments are espoused and seriously consider those that are truly worthy of consideration. Only then can an informed debate begin on the subjects surrounding the US nuclear deterrent.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in SSQ are those of the authors and are not officially sanctioned by any agency or department of the US government. We encourage you to send comments to: strategicstudiesquarterly@us.af.mil

Links to Gen Chilton’s speech to The Heritage Foundation from January 18, 2018 titled, “The Importance of the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent”:

- The Heritage Foundation website: <https://www.heritage.org/defense/event/the-importance-the-us-nuclear-deterrent>
- The Heritage Foundation on YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g1J4LGOgZIU>

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*From the Green Notebook (FTGN) podcast

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by Henry Kissinger