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Welcome to the **CAPSTONE** **Joint Operations Module (JOM)**




Introduction and Course Overview

Deployable Training Division
Joint Staff J7

The overall classification of slides is

UNCLASSIFIED

JOM History




A Comprehensive Approach to Unified Action

***Deployable Training Division
Joint Staff J7***

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UNCLASSIFIED



Challenges

- **Strategic Alignment**
- **National Policy and the Interagency Process**
- **Unity of Effort with Allies and Partners**

Strategic Alignment



National Security Strategy



National Defense Strategy




National Military Strategy

Insights

- *Consistent alignment and nesting of documents*
- *All illuminate the changing strategic environment*
- *Emphasize importance of allies, partners, interagency*


Strategic Alignment



Insights

- *Adapt to operating within the complexities of the strategic environment*
- *Retain alignment even under changing conditions*
- *Inform and be informed by continuous strategic dialogue and translation*
- *Translate strategic dialogue into clear guidance and intent to subordinates*

Unity of Effort with Allies and Partners



Insights

- **Leader / Commander sets the tone for integration with partners**
- **Every nation operates in accordance with their national interests**
- **Strive toward unity of effort, not unity of command**
- **Integration with allies and partners occurs at all echelons**

Key Takeaways

In this age, I don't care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are, if you cannot create harmony – even vicious harmony – on the battlefield based on trust across service lines, across coalition and national lines, and across civilian / military lines, you really need to go home, because your leadership in today's age is obsolete. We have got to have officers who can create harmony across all those lines.

- General James N. Mattis, USMC June 2010



Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy

On 28 March the Department of Defense transmitted to Congress the classified 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS).

For the first time, the Department conducted its strategic reviews in a fully integrated way – incorporating the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and Missile Defense Review (MDR) in the NDS – ensuring tight linkages between our strategy and our resources. The unclassified NDS will be forthcoming.

Consistent with the President’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, the classified NDS sets out how the Department of Defense will contribute to advancing and safeguarding vital U.S. national interests – protecting the American people, expanding America’s prosperity, and realizing and defending our democratic values.

The Defense priorities are:

1. Defending the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the PRC
2. Deterring strategic attacks against the United States, Allies, and partners
3. Deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary, prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific, then the Russia challenge in Europe
4. Building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.

The Department will act urgently to sustain and strengthen deterrence, with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as our most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge for the Department.

Russia poses acute threats, as illustrated by its brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. We will collaborate with our NATO Allies and partners to reinforce robust deterrence in the face of Russian aggression.

The Department will remain capable of managing other persistent threats, including those from North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations.

Changes in global climate and other dangerous transboundary threats, including pandemics, are transforming the context in which the Department operates. We will adapt to these challenges, which increasingly place pressure on the Joint Force and the systems that support it.

Recognizing growing kinetic and non-kinetic threats to the United States’ homeland from our strategic competitors, the Department will take necessary actions to increase resilience – our ability to withstand, fight through, and recover quickly from disruption.

Mutually-beneficial Alliances and partnerships are an enduring strength for the United States, and are critical to achieving our objectives, as the unified response to Russia's further invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated. Answering this "call to action," the Department will incorporate ally and partner perspectives, competencies, and advantages at every stage of defense planning.

The Department will advance our goals through three primary ways: integrated deterrence, campaigning, and actions that build enduring advantages.


- Integrated deterrence entails developing and combining our strengths to maximum effect, by working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, other instruments of U.S. national power, and our unmatched network of Alliances and partnerships. Integrated deterrence is enabled by combat-credible forces, backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
- Campaigning will strengthen deterrence and enable us to gain advantages against the full range of competitors' coercive actions. The United States will operate forces, synchronize broader Department efforts, and align Department activities with other instruments of national power, to undermine acute forms of competitor coercion, complicate competitors' military preparations, and develop our own warfighting capabilities together with Allies and partners.
- Building enduring advantages for the future Joint Force involves undertaking reforms to accelerate force development, getting the technology we need more quickly, and making investments in the extraordinary people of the Department, who remain our most valuable resource.

The Department will develop, design, and manage our forces – linking our operational concepts and capabilities to achieve strategic objectives. This requires a Joint Force that is lethal, resilient, sustainable, survivable, agile, and responsive.

Key Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Documents for Interagency Integration with State, Local, Private Sector in Emergency/Disaster Response

The **National Response Framework (NRF)** provides foundational emergency management doctrine for how the Nation responds to all types of incidents. The NRF is built on scalable, flexible, and adaptable concepts identified in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) to align key roles and responsibilities across the Nation. The structures, roles, and responsibilities described in the Framework can be partially or fully implemented in the context of a threat or hazard, in anticipation of a significant event, or in response to an incident. Implementation of the structures and procedures allows for a scaled response, delivery of specific resources and capabilities, and a level of coordination appropriate to each incident. The NRF is structured to help jurisdictions, citizens, nongovernmental organizations and businesses:

- Develop whole community plans
- Integrate continuity plans
- Build capabilities to respond to cascading failures among businesses, supply chains, and infrastructure sectors
- Collaborate to stabilize community lifelines and restore services



The **National Incident Management System (NIMS)** guides all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector to work together to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to and recover from incidents. NIMS provides stakeholders across the whole community with the shared vocabulary, systems and processes to successfully deliver the capabilities described in the National Preparedness System. NIMS defines operational systems, including the Incident Command System (ICS), Emergency Operations Center (EOC) structures, and Multiagency Coordination Groups (MAC Groups) that guide how personnel work together during incidents. NIMS applies to all incidents, from traffic accidents to major disasters.

National Response Framework website: <https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/national-preparedness/frameworks/response>

National Incident Management System website: <https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/nims>

USAID/BHA's Mandate

- Save lives
- Alleviate human suffering
- Reduce the physical, social and economic impact of disasters

USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) Quick Reference Guide

- USG Lead for HA/DR
- USG first responders after disasters
- Disaster risk reduction/mitigation before disasters

Current Activities

Focus is Preparedness, Early Warning, Disaster Relief, Early Recovery

- BHA responds to an average of 75 disasters in more than 70 countries every year (rapid and slow onset disasters, as well as complex emergencies).
- More than 600 staff worldwide; 49 Field Offices located around the world; Regional Offices in Costa Rica, Hungary, Kenya, Senegal, Thailand with humanitarian advisors in New York (USUN), Geneva (USUN), Rome (USUN), and Atlanta (CDC).
- BHA Humanitarian Assistance Advisors/Military (HAA/Ms) based at AFRICOM, EUCOM, CENTCOM, INDOPACOM, SOUTHCOM, NORTHCOM and SOCOM.
- Stockpiles of appropriate disaster relief commodities and emergency food pre-positioned in Djibouti, South Africa, Italy, UAE, Malaysia, Miami, FL and Houston, TX.
- Regional experts, technical experts, logistics cell, and surge capacity in Washington, D.C.
- Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) deployed in the field and Response Management Teams (RMTs) activated in Washington, D.C., stand up as needed.
- Grants awarded to implementing humanitarian partners such as the UN, International Organizations, and NGOs.
- USAID/BHA provided more than \$6 billion in humanitarian assistance in fiscal year 2019.

DOD-USAID Joint Ops

Not all USG HA/DR operations involve the Department of Defense (DOD), but when they do...

- Link-up with USAID ASAP. This may be at the Embassy, USAID Mission, or DART in the field
- Key DOD contact with DART will be one of USAID/BHA's Civ-Mil Affairs Advisors (CMACs)
- Start talking early: Decide who does what, when, and how communication will flow
- Exchange liaison officers - in DC, at the CCMDs, in the field
- Share information - Keep info unclassified as much as possible
- Work as one USG team: Joint operations and planning
- Policy direction comes from the U.S. Ambassador – Chief of Mission authority in-country
- Share capabilities between the JTF and the DART - *Remember* USAID is the lead federal agency for HA/DR
- Provide assistance on a needs-based "PULL" system, not "PUSH" system
- DOD can often help with airfield ops and short-haul transport (*wholesale* assistance not *retail*)
- BHA can help with UN and NGO information and coordination

	CENTCOM	EUCOM	INDOPACOM	SOUTHCOM	NORTHCOM	SOCOM
Elizabeth Blanchford eb Blanchford@usaid.gov 703-338-2475	Jake Childers jchilders@usaid.gov 571-236-3464	Elizabeth Brown ebrown@usaid.gov 571-225-0885	Kristin (Kij) Pettersen kpetersen@usaid.gov 571-228-0622	Veronika Martin vmartin@usaid.gov 571-338-3818	Steve Goodwin sgoodwin@usaid.gov 571-228-1774	Sharon McHale smchale@usaid.gov 571-216-2944
	Adam Tousley (Bahrain) atousley@usaid.gov (571)218-0145	David Bopp dbopp@usaid.gov 571-216-3747	Greg Ulma gulma@usaid.gov 571-214-6877	Kaitlyn Neuberger kneuberger@usaid.gov 571-216-7887		
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Jeff Miller BHA.CMD.EDD@usaid.gov		BHA.CMD.CME@usaid.gov		BHA.CMD.TECHOPS@usaid.gov		
Joint Humanitarian Operations Course		CMD Washington Staff		JHOC LMS Access		
(JHOC) jhoc@usaid.gov		BHA.CMDDC@usaid.gov		https://usaidjhoc.myabsorb.com		

Checklist for working with USAID/BHA on a disaster response

At the Strategic Level (OSD / JCS)

- ☐ Will USAID establish a Response Management Team (RMT) in Wash DC?
 - ☐ If yes, the phone# is _____ & main POC is _____
 - ☐ Will DOD send a Liaison Officer?
 - ☐ If yes, who: _____ Contact info: _____
- ☐ Has there been a request for DOD assistance? And, been approved by SecDef?
- ☐ Is USAID part of DOD's planning to include Planords and Exords?
- ☐ Is USAID/BHA vetting DOD assistance to the disaster area?

At the Operational Level(Combatant Command)

- ☐ Has the CCMD established a communication and coordination link with USAID?
 - ☐ Will there be a BHA Advisor stationed at the CCMD?
 - ☐ If yes, who: _____ Contact info: _____
- ☐ Is USAID/BHA part of CCMD's planning process, providing input on the OPT, at GO/FO briefings, and chopping on documents such as Planords and Exords?
- ☐ Is USAID/BHA vetting DOD HA supply deliveries and local purchases to the disaster area?
- ☐ Is USAID/BHA vetting requests for DOD assistance from non-DOD entities?
- ☐ Has CCMD received authorization to transport non-military and non-USG personnel and supplies on DOD assets?

At the Tactical Level ("JTF")

- ☐ Has the JTF established contact with Important Partners?
 - ☐ U.S. Embassy POC: _____ Contact: _____
 - ☐ USAID Mission POC: _____ Contact: _____
 - ☐ USAID/DART POC: _____ Contact: _____
 - ☐ Local Government POC: _____ Contact: _____
 - ☐ Other _____ POC: _____ Contact: _____
- ☐ Will the USAID/DART attach a Civ-Mil Advisor to the JTF?
 - ☐ If yes, who: _____ Contact info: _____
- ☐ Will the JTF attach a Liaison Officer to the USAID/DART?
 - ☐ If yes, who: _____ Contact info: _____
- ☐ Has the JTF Commander and the USAID/DART Team Leader linked up?
- ☐ Is the JTF sharing SITREPS and other info with the USAID/DART and visa versa?
- ☐ Has the JTF unclassified as much information as possible?
- ☐ Has the JTF established a system with the USAID/DART for:
 - ☐ Requests for Assistance (RFAs) and Mission Tasking Matrix (MITAM) process
 - ☐ Joint daily update briefs with CCMD and/or JS
 - ☐ DOD excess property deliveries vetted by the USAID/DART and visibility on what's coming
 - ☐ JTF assets moving non-DOD people and supplies
 - ☐ Joint operational planning to include the transition/exit plan
- ☐ Has the JTF planned for a joint press effort with the Embassy and USAID/DART?

Globally Integrated Operations

***Deployable Training Division
Joint Staff J7***

The overall classification of slides is

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Challenges

- **Implementing national strategy through globally integrated plans and actions**
- **C2 challenges in the global environment**
- **Identifying and managing risk**
- **Achieving integrated deterrence**

Changing Character of War

- Reframing the Problem / Adapting the Approach -

2022 National Military Strategy (NMS)

Central military problem NMS seeks to solve:

- How does the Joint Force rapidly develop future warfighting advantage while deterring effectively today, with the PRC as the pacing challenge?

Strategic Landscape



Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)


The challenging global operating environment requires the Chairman and the Joint Staff to employ an integrated global perspective; provide strategic direction for Joint operations across all domains and regions to identify efficiencies and synergies; and to champion integration with allies, partners, and the interagency at the national-strategic level.

- CJCSI 3100.01E 21 May 2021

Globally Integrated Military Operations


- Synchronizing Plans and Actions -

Implementing National Strategy through Synchronized Plans



Globally Integrated Decisions and Actions at the Speed of Relevance

“Arrangement of cohesive military actions in time, space, and purpose, executed as a whole to address trans-regional, all-domain, and multi-functional challenges.”
- CJCSI 3030.01A (2022)




C2 Considerations in the Global Environment

- Multiple Supported / Supporting Commanders in planning and executing operations
- Coordinating Authority: Consultative authority to facilitate planning and assessment for a specific problem set


- JSPS CJCSI 3100.01E 21 May 2021

- C2 organizational options

- CCDR as JFC
- Component-led
- Joint Force Component
- JTF



- Prioritizing Commander focus among competing demands
 - Mission Command



Risk



Insights

- *Understand and over-communicate different perspectives on risk*
- *Address assumptions and time dimension of risk*
- *Risk informs mitigation options and priorities*
- *Appraise military risk and military strategic risk in a global strategic context*

Deterrence

Deterrence Definition

- Prevention of an action by:
 - The existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or
 - The belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits

Deterrence in Practice

- Adversary state of mind brought about by the perception of:
 - Likelihood of being denied the expected benefits of the action
 - Likelihood of excessive costs suffered for taking the action
 - Acceptability of restraint as alternative

**Deep Understanding
and Empathy of the
Adversary's
Decision Calculus**



**Existence of Credible U.S.
& Partner Nation Threat
Demonstrated by
Capability and Will**

How:

- Confronting malign activity
- Preparing for Combat Operations
- Messaging and assuring Allies and Partners



**Cognitive Effect
“Adversary’s
State of Mind”**



***Perception of the
likelihood of cost
to Change Behavior
and Prevent Action***

Integrated Deterrence

- ***Combine strengths across domains, theaters, and spectrum of conflict***
- ***Apply all instruments of national power and include allies and partners***

Key Takeaways

- **Synchronize plans over time to support effective campaigning and refine global military integration to support decision making at the speed of relevance**
- **Focus on C2 challenges up-front and preserve decision space**
- **Over-communicate perspectives on risk**
- **Effective deterrence is based on adversary's perception of our actions**

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(For use by Fellows in preparation for the Joint Operations Module in Suffolk, VA)

09 January 2024


Subject: Global Military Integration – Executive Summary for Fellows

1. **Purpose:** To provide an executive overview of global military integration
2. **Objective of Global Military Integration:** An integrated global perspective that provides strategic direction for Joint operations across all domains and regions to identify efficiencies and synergies and to champion integration with allies, partners, and the interagency at the national-strategic level. (CJCSI 3100.01E, *Joint Strategic Planning System*, 21 May 2021).
3. **Concept of Global Integration:** Global integration is achieved through the integration of planning, force management, force development, and force design—all undergirded by assessments—to enable senior leader decision making to translate strategy into outcomes.
4. **Role of the Chairman:** Section 153 of Title 10, U.S. Code, requires the Chairman to perform six primary functions to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense with planning, advice, and policy formulation: (1) provide strategic direction for the Armed Forces; (2) conduct strategic and contingency planning; (3) assess comprehensive joint readiness; (4) foster joint capability development; (5) manage Joint Force development; and (6) advise on global military integration.
 - a. Section 153(a)(3) directs the Chairman to provide advice to the President and the Secretary in “matters relating to global military strategic and operational integration.” Title 10 acknowledges the global “transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional threats” and directs the Chairman to provide the President and the Secretary advice on “ongoing military operations.” The Chairman also provides advice to the Secretary on “the allocation and transfer of forces” among the Combatant Commands.
 - b. Section 163(b) permits the Secretary to assign to the Chairman responsibility for overseeing the activities of the combatant commands, which does not confer any command authority. The Chairman executes these responsibilities by guiding coordination across geographic, functional, and Service seams to ensure the Joint Force expands its collective competitive advantages to overcome global challenges.
 - c. The Chairman develops military advice on global posture, readiness, and risk. CJCSM 3105.01A, *Joint Risk Analysis Methodology*, 12 October 2021, spells out the risk identification and assessment process established by the Chairman. The Chairman’s military advice represents apolitical (nonpartisan), professional military judgment on a wide range of Joint Force issues and topics.
5. **Role of the Joint Staff:** The Joint Staff assists the Chairman and, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman, the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out their responsibilities. (Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 155(a)).
 - a. JSM 3051.01, *Execution and Oversight of Global Integration*, 14 APR 2023, establishes the Joint Staff battle rhythm, global integration processes, and key events, e.g., Global Integration Meeting (GIM), J-3 Global Sync, Global Integration Working Group (GIWG) Level III and Level II, and Cross-Functional Teams (CFTs).
6. **POC:** Dave Wagner, JS J7, DDJT, DTD 757.203.7690, david.a.wagner1.ctr@mail.mil.

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(For use by Fellows in preparation for the Joint Operations Module in Suffolk, VA)


Integrating Space, Cyber, and Information in Joint Operations



***Deployable Training Division
Joint Staff J7***

The overall classification of slides is

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Challenges

- **Integrating space, cyber, and information into traditional land, air, and sea planning and targeting**
- **Coordinating, synchronizing, and integrating information in a complex information environment to achieve unity of effort**
- **Assessing non-kinetic effects in operational environment**

– JP 3-04 highlights information synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of activities to achieve unity of effort


Integrating Non-Traditional Domains



Insights

- *Speed of cyber and space activities and strategic effects demand rapid, proactive decision making*
- *Cyber and space authorities require early planning and alternate COAs*
- *Joint all-domain C2 is progressing; CJADC2*
- *Integrate space, cyber, and EMS expertise early in planning*

Integrating Space, Cyber, and Information into Planning and Targeting




- Chart derived from All-Domain Operations Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper, 7 April 2021

Insights

- ***Understand the adversary through an all-domain lens***
- ***Plan and leverage capabilities from all domains, to include information and EMS use***
- ***Consider lead time for authorities and devise alternate COAs and options to provide decision quality information to the commander***
- ***Space, cyber, and information are difficult to assess – start early to develop MOEs***

Complexity of the Information Environment



Insights

- *The IE is global in nature—complexities are created by technological advances, the speed and range of information / mis-information, and deliberate operations to influence audiences*
- *Relevant actors are individuals, groups, populations, or automated systems whose capabilities or behaviors have the potential to affect the success of OAs*
- *Diffusion of information enables individuals and groups to enter in and affect the global forum*

Coordination, Integration, and Synchronization



U.S. Department of Defense

SPOTLIGHT

Support for Ukraine

The United States is working with Allies and partners to support Ukraine in their fight for sovereignty and freedom. The U.S. has provided Ukraine with billions of dollars in security assistance since the beginning of Russia's unprovoked assault on Feb. 24, 2022.

Ongoing U.S., Allies and partners support to the Ukraine began with a strong messaging campaign

Insights

- The Joint force must design all activities and operations from the outset to account for the use and impact of information on relevant actors, treating them as key terrain***
- An Information Cross-Functional Team (CFT) is the JFC's forum for the development of a shared understanding of the IE and for the organization, coordination, and synchronization of joint force activities in and through the IE***
- It is essential to all DOD initiatives to achieve unity of effort through unified action with interagency partners, the broader interorganizational community, and multinational partners to achieve enduring strategic objectives***

Assessments

Operation Assessment Process



- JP 3-04, *Information in Joint Operations*

Stealthiest U.S. submarine makes rare appearance in Arabian Sea

Is it a message aimed at China's congress, Russia's war or Iran drones?



Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine
USS West Virginia

Insights

- While most organizations successfully provide Battle Damage Assessments, operations in the information environment assessments (e.g., the human cognitive) are sometimes harder to obtain and visualize
- Assessment is a continuous process to identify, develop, and affect audiences to achieve desired enduring conditions
- Accurate assessment of behavioral change is a lengthy process; identify short-term and long-term assessments
- Assessments are coordinated and integrated internally and externally through whole-of-staff / government / coalition efforts

Key Takeaways

- **Incorporate space, cyber, and information expertise in planning, targeting, and the battle rhythm**
- **Continue to exercise unity of effort and continue to leverage WoG, Allies and partners, and industry to integrate actions to gain an information advantage**
- **Assessing non-kinetic effects is complex and requires a robust assessment plan to account for non-traditional domains and capabilities**



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

SEP 15 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Information as a Joint Function

Information is such a powerful tool that it is recognized as an instrument of national power. The advent of the internet, the expansion of information technology, the widespread availability of wireless communications, and the far-reaching impact of social media have dramatically impacted operations and changed the character of modern warfare.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has issued an out-of-cycle change to Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States*, introducing *Information* as a new, seventh joint function. This change is consistent with the 2016 DoD Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment (SOIE) and the 2016 National Military Strategy. It signals a fundamental appreciation for the military role of information at the strategic, operational and tactical levels within today's complex operating environment.

The elevation of *Information* to a joint function impacts all operations and has implications across doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy that must be identified in the months ahead. These include the relationship with other joint functions, as well as the effects on planning and operations. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the CJCS, as co-chairs of the SOIE Executive Steering Group, will lead efforts to examine implications and implement appropriate changes. I fully endorse this effort and expect support from across the Department.



OSD011047-17/CMD014788-17



anchoring

The first thing you judge influences your judgment of all that follows.

Human minds are associative in nature, so the order in which we receive information helps determine the course of our judgments and perceptions.

Be especially mindful of this bias during financial negotiations such as houses, cars, and salaries. The initial price offered is proven to have a significant effect.



confirmation bias

You look for ways to justify your existing beliefs.

We can experience being wrong about some ideas as an attack upon our very selves, or our tribal identity. This can lead to motivated reasoning which causes us to reinforce our beliefs even if we might accept particular facts and disconfirming evidence.

Think of your ideas and beliefs as software you're actively trying to find problems with rather than things to be defended.

"The first principle is that you must not fool yourself – and you are the easiest person to fool." - Richard Feynman



backfire effect

When your core beliefs are challenged, it can cause you to believe even more strongly.

We can experience being wrong about some ideas as an attack upon our very selves, or our tribal identity. This can lead to motivated reasoning which causes us to reinforce our beliefs even if we might accept particular facts and disconfirming evidence.

"It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so."

- Mark Twain



declinism

You see the past as better than it was, and expect the future to be worse than is likely.

Despite living in the most peaceful and prosperous time in history, many people believe things are getting worse. The 24 hour news cycle, with its reporting of overtly negative and violent events, may account for some of this effect.

Instead of relying on nostalgic impressions of how great things used to be, use measurable metrics such as life expectancy, levels of crime and violence, and prosperity statistics.



just world hypothesis

Your preference for a just world makes you presume that it exists.

A world in which people don't always get what they deserve, hard work doesn't always pay off, and injustice happens is an uncomfortable one that threatens our preferred narrative. However, it is also the reality.

A more just world requires understanding rather than blame. Remember that everyone has their own life story, we're all fallible, and bad things happen to good people.



sunk cost fallacy

You irrationally cling to things that have already cost you something.

When we've invested our time, money, or emotion into something, it hurts us to let it go. This aversion to pain can distort our better judgment and cause us to make unwise investments.

To regain objectivity, ask yourself: had I not already invested something, would I still do so now? What would I counsel a friend to do if they were in the same situation?



dunning-kruger effect

The more you know, the less confident you're likely to be.

Because experts know just how much they don't know, they tend to underestimate their ability, but it's easy to be over-confident when you have only a simple idea of how things are.

"The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are so certain of themselves, yet wiser people so full of doubts."

- Bertrand Russell



barnum effect

You see personal specifics in vague statements by filling in the gaps.

Because our minds are given to making connections, it's easy for us to take nebulous statements and find ways to interpret them so that they seem specific and personal.

Psychics, astrologers and others use this bias to make it seem like they're telling you something relevant. Consider how things might be interpreted to apply to anyone, not just you.



framing effect

You allow yourself to be unduly influenced by context and delivery.

We all like to think that we think independently, but the truth is that all of us are, in fact, influenced by delivery, framing and subtle cues. This is why the ad industry is a thing, despite almost everyone believing they're not affected by advertising messages.

Only when we have the intellectual humility to accept the fact that we can be manipulated, can we hope to limit how much we are. Try to be mindful of how things are being put to you.



in-group bias

You unfairly favor those who belong to your group.

We presume that we're fair and impartial, but the truth is that we automatically favor those who are most like us, or belong to our groups.

Try to imagine yourself in the position of those in out-groups; whilst also attempting to be dispassionate when judging those who belong to your in-groups.



availability heuristic

Your judgments are influenced by what springs most easily to mind.

How recent, emotionally powerful, or unusual your memories are can make them seem more relevant. This, in turn, can cause you to apply them too readily.

Try to gain different perspectives and relevant statistical information rather than relying purely on first judgments and emotive influences.



belief bias

If a conclusion supports your existing beliefs, you'll rationalize anything that supports it.

It's difficult for us to set aside our existing beliefs to consider the true merits of an argument. In practice this means that our ideas become impervious to criticism, and are perpetually reinforced.

A useful thing to ask is 'when and how did I get this belief?'

We tend to automatically defend our ideas without ever really questioning them.



groupthink

You let the social dynamics of a group situation override the best outcomes.

Dissent can be uncomfortable and dangerous to one's social standing, and so often the most confident or first voice will determine group decisions.

Rather than openly contradicting others, seek to facilitate objective means of evaluation and critical thinking practices as a group activity.



optimism bias

You overestimate the likelihood of positive outcomes.

There can be benefits to a positive attitude, but it's unwise to allow such an attitude to adversely affect our ability to make rational judgments (they're not mutually exclusive).

If you make rational, realistic judgments you'll have a lot more to feel positive about.



reactance

You'd rather do the opposite of what someone is trying to make you do.

When we feel our liberty is being constrained, our inclination is to resist, however in doing so we can over-compensate.

Be careful not to lose objectivity when someone is being coercive/manipulative, or trying to force you do something. Wisdom springs from reflection, folly from reaction.



curse of knowledge

Once you understand something you presume it to be obvious to everyone.

Things makes sense once they make sense, so it can be hard to remember why they didn't. We build complex networks of understanding and forget how intricate the path to our available knowledge really is.

When teaching someone something new, go slow and explain like they're ten years old (without being patronizing). Repeat key points and facilitate active practice to help embed knowledge.



self-serving bias

You believe your failures are due to external factors, yet you're personally responsible for your successes.

Many of us enjoy unearned privileges, luck and advantages that others do not. It's easy to tell ourselves that we deserve these things, whilst blaming circumstance when things don't go our way.

When judging others, be mindful of how this bias interacts with the just-world hypothesis, fundamental attribution error, and the in-group bias.



negativity bias

You allow negative things to disproportionately influence your thinking.

The pain of loss and hurt are felt more keenly and persistently than the fleeting gratification of pleasant things. We are primed for survival, and our aversion to pain can distort our judgment for a modern world.

Pro-and-con lists, as well as thinking in terms of probabilities, can help you evaluate things more objectively than relying on a cognitive impression.



pessimism bias

You overestimate the likelihood of negative outcomes.

Pessimism is often a defense mechanism against disappointment, or it can be the result of depression and anxiety disorders.

Perhaps the worst aspect of pessimism is that even if something good happens, you'll probably feel pessimistic about it anyway.



spotlight effect

You overestimate how much people notice how you look and act.

Most people are much more concerned about themselves than they are about you. Absent overt prejudices, people generally want to like and get along with you as it gives them validation too.

Instead of worrying about how you're being judged, consider how you make others feel. They'll remember this much more, and you'll make the world a better place.

thou shalt not suffer cognitive biases

Cognitive biases make our judgments irrational. We have evolved to use shortcuts in our thinking, which are often useful, but a cognitive bias means there's a kind of misfiring going on causing us to lose objectivity. This poster has been designed to help you identify some of the most common biases and how to avoid falling victim to them. Help people become aware of their biases generally by sharing the website **yourbias.is** or more specifically e.g. **yourbias.is/confirmation-bias**



This poster is published under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND license 2020 by Jesse Richardson. You are free to print and redistribute this artwork non-commercially with the binding proviso that you reproduce it in full so that others may share alike. To learn more about biases you should read the books 'Thinking, Fast and Slow' and 'You Are Not So Smart'.

The illustration above is a reference to Michaelangelo's 'Creation of Adam' which many believe depicted the human brain in God's surrounding decoration.

Download this poster at www.yourbias.is

JP 3-04: Information in Joint Operations Information Sheet

JP 3-13 Information Operations, 20 NOV 14 CH1 (Canceled)	JP 3-04 Information in Joint Operations, 14 SEP 22
<p>NDS 2018 – Laid out a world where great-power competition, rather than counterterrorism, drove the DoD’s decision-making and force structure. Inter-state strategic competition primarily from China and Russia became the primary concern in US national security. Shifting away from counterinsurgency stance and back to large-scale combat operations</p>	<p>NDS 2022 – DoD’s priorities: 1) Defending the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the PRC; 2) Deterring strategic attacks against the United States, Allies, and partners; 3) Deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary - prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific region, then the Russia challenge in Europe, and; 4) Building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Integrating Function</p> <p>Definition: “Integrated employment, during military operations, of IRCs in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making (leaders) of adversaries/potential adversaries while protecting our own”</p> <p>Focused on Red and Green if it affects Red</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Joint Warfighting Capability</p> <p>Definition: “The joint force uses information to improve understanding, decision-making, and communication. Commanders use information to visualize and understand the OE and direct and coordinate actions. The joint force leverages information to affect the perceptions, attitudes, decision-making, and behavior of relevant actors.”</p> <p>It considers Red, Green, Blue and others relevant actors.</p> <p>Relevant actors = individuals, groups, populations, and automated systems whose capabilities/behaviors have the potential to affect the success of a particular campaign, operation, or tactical action</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Information / Influence Relational Framework</p> <p>Information / influence relational framework applied to three dimensions of the IE (physical, informational, and cognitive)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> “A JFC may establish an IO staff to provide command-level oversight and collaborate with all staff directorates.” Focused primarily on affecting the decision-making of select target audiences (decision-makers). 	<p>Three Tasks of the Information Joint Function:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Understand how IE impacts the OE Support human and automated decision making Leverage information <ul style="list-style-type: none"> “The information joint function stresses the requirement to incorporate information as a fundamental element during planning and conduct of all operations.” Expanding the commander’s range of options for actions across the competition continuum
<p style="text-align: center;">Deleted Doctrinal Terms</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Information Operations (IO) and Information Operations Planner Information Operations Working Group (IOWG) Information-Related Capabilities (IRC) 	<p style="text-align: center;">New Doctrinal Terms</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Information Planner Information Planning Cell Information Cross-Functional Team (I-CFT) “Not just Information Forces” Information Forces
<p>IRCs are force multipliers used to create desired effects</p>	<p>Information advantage is the operational advantage gained through the joint force’s use of information for decision-making and its ability to leverage information to generate effects on the IE.</p> <p>Informational power is the ability to exert one’s will through the projection, exploitation, denial, and preservation of information in pursuit of objectives.</p>

JP 3-04: Information in Joint Operations Information Sheet

- continued -


JP 3-13 Information Operations, 20 NOV 14 CH1 (Canceled)	JP 3-04 Information in Joint Operations, 14 SEP 22
IE = physical, informational, and cognitive domains - Subset of OE	IE = Aggregate of the social, cultural, linguistic, psychological, technical, and physical factors - Subset of OE
Information is used to “ gain an advantage ” in the IE	Understand, support, and leverage information to achieve unity of effort
<p>“Strategic communication is a whole-of-government approach, driven by interagency processes and integration that are focused upon effectively communicating national strategy.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategic communication “owned” by DoS • JFC “amplifies” national strategy, policy, and objectives 	<p>“Narratives are an integral part of campaigns, operations and missions. An effective and integrated narrative can mitigate, undermine, or otherwise render competing narratives ineffective if it is accompanied by complementary actions.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CCMDs are responsible for the strategic and operational mission narratives and to assure OAs are aligned to these narratives.
<p>JPP-focused, integrating function</p> <p>“The <u>IO cell chief is responsible</u> to the JFC for integrating Information Related Capabilities into the joint operations planning process.”</p> <p>Perceived as the job of Information Forces (former IRCs)</p>	<p>JPP-focused, joint warfighting capability</p> <p><u>“All members of the JFC’s staff are responsible for accomplishing or contributing to tasks of the information joint function, to include understanding how information affects joint force operations, understanding how those respective activities impact or are impacted by the IE, and integrating that understanding into their respective portions of joint plans.”</u></p> <p>Broader view and everyone has a role in the Information fight</p>
“Coordination and synchronization of IRCs” implied information was separate or merely additive to a scheme of maneuver	More closely aligns the information element as an instrument of national power / the joint function to the planning and execution of joint force operations
<p>Eight-step assessment process focused on measures of performance / measurements of effectiveness</p> <p><i>“Information operations assessment is iterative, continuously repeating rounds of analysis within the operations cycle <u>in order to measure the progress of IRCs toward achieving objectives.</u>”</i></p>	<p>Six-step assessment process seeking to describe for the commander how the IE / OE changed in relation to the operational objective(s) and the resulting ramifications of that effect / those effects</p> <p><u>“Assessment of operations and activities is key to the commander’s decision cycle, helping to determine the results of actions in the context of overall mission objectives and providing recommendations for refinement of future plans.”</u></p>
	<p><u>Updates required:</u></p> <p>JP 3-0 Joint Operations, 18 JUN 2022</p> <p>JP 3-09 Joint Fire Support Planning, 10 APR 19</p> <p>JP 3-16 Multinational Operations, 12 FEB 21 Validated</p> <p>JP 3-33 JTF Headquarters, 9 JUN 22</p> <p>JP 3-60 Joint Targeting, 31 JAN 2013</p> <p>JP 5-0 Joint Planning, 1 DEC 20</p>

Authorities

***Deployable Training Division
Joint Staff J7***

The overall classification of slides is

UNCLASSIFIED



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Challenges

- **Deciding and acting within clear authority to promote the legitimacy of operations**
- **Understanding how the interaction of law, policy, and guidance defines authority and underwrites decision making**
- **Developing and delegating authorities in support of timely decision making**

Authority and Legitimacy

- **Adhering to established authority promotes legitimacy**
- **Legitimacy promotes support and leverages capabilities**
- **Operating with legitimacy is part of an effective strategy**
- **Perception of legitimacy can be as important as reality**
- **Legitimacy can be a tug-of-war in competing narratives**

2022 National Security Strategy

“[O]ur alliances and partnerships around the world are our most important strategic asset and an indispensable element contributing to international peace and stability.”

2022 National Defense Strategy

“We are a free people devoted to democracy and the rule of law...we are a member of an unparalleled and unprecedented network of alliances and partnerships.”

Legitimacy Narratives

Ukraine Invasion



Russian claims and narratives:

- “Special Military Operation” aimed at “De-Nazification”
- Russia threatened by NATO expansion



United States and NATO messaging:

- Early intel sharing tipped Russia’s hand, framed the narrative, and caused news and media focus to pre-position in and around Ukraine
- Continue to highlight Russian Law of War violations

South China Sea



PRC claims and narratives:

- 9-dash line and claim, spurious claims of sovereignty and territorial seas around disputed features
- U.S. exploiting disputes - backing PRC into a corner



U.S. messaging and activities:

- SecState Press Release (13 Jul 20) - Uphold freedom of seas recognized by international law, maintain flow of commerce, and oppose PRC coercion
- Freedom of Navigation Operations - Operate where international law allows

Law, Policy, and Guidance

Understand mission partner authority to leverage capability

- U.S. Agency laws, regulations, and policies
- Partner Nation laws, national policies, regulations, and orders
- NGO host nation laws and NGO internal policies


Authorities Challenges:

- Rules of Engagement (ROE)
- Fiscal Authorities
- Non-Kinetic Activities
- Exquisite Capabilities
- Space Activities

National policy decisions and documents

- ✓ PPDs
- ✓ NSPMs

DOD regulations and policies



What should I do?

What can I do?


International Law

- ✓ Treaty
- ✓ Customary

Domestic Law

- ✓ Constitution
- ✓ Statutes

Law, Policy, and Guidance



Law of the Sea

- Recognized boundaries and high seas freedoms (UNCLOS – Customary International Law)

U.S. Policy

- Assert freedom of navigation to refute excessive claims but avoid escalation – maintain status quo
- No position on sovereignty

Developing and Delegating Authorities

Activities Drive Authorities

-
- What do I need to do?
 - Do I have the right capability?
 - Do I have the right authorities?
 - Who has them and how do I get both?
 - Request for Forces
 - Request for Authority
- Design & Initial Planning**
- Detailed Planning**


Appropriate delegation speeds decision making

- Requires balancing risk
- Avoids centralized decision making
- Critical to Globally Integrated Operations
- Linked to Mission Command (Intent, Understanding, Trust)

Specify operational requirements to support requests for authority

Identify risk and mitigation when requesting or delegating authorities

Developing and Requesting Authorities



- *Use of force is regulated by ROE, authorized by mission orders, and executed per guidance and intent*
- *National level decisions on use of force are heavily influenced by policy*
- *Commanders seek robust ROE delegation to support agile operations*

Key Takeaways

- **Reality and perception of legitimacy brings support and access to capabilities**
- **Law, policy, and guidance provide the framework for operational solutions**
- **Understanding the authorities of mission partners leverages additional capabilities**
- **Activities drive authorities**
- **Appropriate delegation of authorities speeds decision making**

United States Code (U.S.C.)

Title	Short Title	Descriptive / Applicability
5	Government Organization and Employees	Agency organization and establishment of procedures for civilian workforce including functions and responsibilities as well as employment recruitment and retention.
6	Domestic Security	Establishes and organizes DHS, national emergency management requirements, and the national preparedness system. Includes applicable law on security and accountability for ports and borders as well as cybersecurity. (Homeland Security)
10	Armed Forces	Organization of DOD and general military powers; establishes active and reserve command structure within DOD (OSD, JCS and the Services). Regulates DoD personnel to include manning authorizations, discipline, training and career progression (including Joint qualification) as well as regulations on procurement. Also includes designated excepted civilian service, e.g., Cyber. (Homeland Defense)
14	Coast Guard	Establishes organization and powers, including law enforcement and other duties of the regular, reserve and auxiliary Coast Guard. Provides for military capability in support of DHS; capability also used under Title 10 when assigned in support of DoD.
18	Crimes and Criminal Procedure	Defines federal crimes, criminal procedure, prisons and prisoners and associated regulations. Includes the Posse Comitatus Act, forbidding federalized (T10) military conducting law enforcement. Department of Justice (DOJ) lead agency in accordance with Title 28 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure).
19	Customs Duties	Foreign trade zones; tariffs, trade negotiation and agreements, and smuggling.
22	Foreign Relations and Intercourse	Provides authority for diplomatic and consular courts and service. Provides for preservation of friendly foreign relations including Mutual Defense and Security Assistance Programs; protection of vessels on international and territorial waters and protections of citizens abroad. It also provides for authorities relating to regulation of foreign missions. Significant legal basis for HA / DR / NEO. Assigns Department of State (DOS) as lead agency.
32	National Guard (NG)	Provides authority for trained / equipped NG in support of federal mission requirements. Additionally provides authority for DOD domestic missions to be conducted by NG under C2 of respective Governors, exempt from Posse Comitatus Act; or mobilization of NG forces to active federal duty (Title 10). Grants authority for SecDef to also provide funds to Governors to employ NG units to conduct Homeland Defense activities, as SecDef determines to be necessary and appropriate for NG units.
33	Navigation and Navigable Waters	International rules for navigation at sea. Authorizes Navy/USCG exemption from certain rules. Regulations for suppression of piracy. Collision prevention / responsibilities.
42	Public Health / Welfare	Provides authority for federal disaster preparedness and assistance. (Stafford Act as it relates to DSCA)
50	War and National Defense	Outlines the role of war and National Defense. Includes regulations on CIA, foreign intelligence and covert action.

Rules of Engagement (ROE) Considerations for the JTF Commander

Staff ROE development and approval process:

- ___ Is ROE development an integrated part of crisis action planning (CAP)?
- ___ Is ROE development operator-led (J3 / J35 / J5), with the SJA in support?
- ___ Is there a formal staff process for ROE development (ROE Working Group)?
- ___ Does the ROE WG have the right subject-matter experts?
- ___ Is there a process for the Joint Operations Center (JOC) to interface with the ROE WG?
- ___ Is there dialogue on ROE between your staff and higher and lower headquarters' staffs?
- ___ Is there interagency and interorganizational liaison with your staff regarding ROE?
- ___ Are allied or coalition partners involved in ROE development?
- ___ Does the ROE, along with your intent and guidance, create clear use of force policy?
- ___ Does the ROE support higher headquarters' intent and guidance?
- ___ Did your staff thoroughly war game and crosswalk the operation plan or order (including any branches and sequels) and the ROE to ensure that subordinate commanders have the *authority* to take all appropriate action to deter, pre-empt, and/or counter the full range of possible threat reactions without having to request additional supplemental ROE?
- ___ Did your staff thoroughly war game and crosswalk the operation plan or order (including any branches and sequels) and the ROE to ensure that subordinate commanders have *all necessary means available* to accomplish their missions and to defend their units and other US forces in the vicinity?
- ___ Do your staff and subordinate commanders understand that nothing contained in the ROE limits a commander's inherent right and obligation to take all appropriate action to defend his or her unit and other US forces in the vicinity?
- ___ Do your staff and subordinate commanders understand the permissive nature of the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE)?
- ___ Do your staff's standing operating procedures assign responsibility and establish effective procedures for developing, requesting, authorizing, disseminating, training, monitoring, assessing, and modifying the ROE in a timely manner?
- ___ Are all ROE messages that contain numbered supplemental measures classified at least CONFIDENTIAL and numbered serially (e.g., serial 1, 2, 3 ..., as opposed to serial 1, change 1; serial 1, change 2)?

- Are all ROE messages clear, concise, and easily understood in a single reading, with all key terms defined?
- Do ROE request messages contain a justification for each supplemental measure requested?
- Does each ROE authorization message contain all of the supplemental measures currently in effect, whether changed or not, so that subordinates need only keep the current message to have all of the ROE currently in effect?
- Do you, your staff, and your subordinate commanders fully understand the limitations of your allies' or coalition partners' national ROE? When your allies' or coalition partners' national ROE are incompatible, how do you plan to maintain unity of effort and avoid potential conflicts? Will forces or tasks be separated geographically and/or functionally?
- If you approve any supplemental measures that restrict the use of force, do your subordinate commanders have the means available to comply with those restrictions? (Example: If you approve a supplemental measure requiring your forces to "observe" indirect fire directed against targets in areas of civilian concentration, do your subordinate commanders have the means to "observe" those fires?)

Some key ROE issues:

- Designating and defining hostile forces.
- Clear guidance on what constitutes hostile intent in a given situation? (Example: If a military aircraft of country x were to do a, b, and c in the vicinity of a unit, the unit commander should consider the behavior as a demonstration of hostile intent and may engage the aircraft in defense of his or her unit.)
- Designating and defining collective self-defense (i.e., defense of designated forces as well as designated persons and property).
- Cross-border reconnaissance, direct action operations, and personnel recovery.
- Use of weapon systems subject to special restrictions, including riot control agents, anti-personnel land mines, and fires in areas of civilian concentration.
- Treatment of civilians, including the authority to stop, search, and detain them, and to seize their property.
- Allied or coalition ROE do not limit the inherent right and obligation of US commanders to execute unit self-defense.


Bottom line: Do the ROE give your subordinate commanders the flexibility they need to get the job done?

Sustainment

***Deployable Training Division
Joint Staff J7***

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Challenges

- **Anticipating requirements in an uncertain, complex, rapidly changing, and contested operating environment**
- **Integrating and synchronizing capabilities from the Joint Logistics Enterprise to support the concept of operations**
- **Balancing global and theater-level considerations to set and sustain the theater**

Global Strategic Environment



“Globally Integrated Operations is the concept for how the Joint Force should prepare for the security environmentGlobally integrated operations both enable and are **premised upon Global Agility.**”

Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt)



Insights

- **Understand authorities, goals, and limitations of other JLEnt partners**
- **Establish relationships and build trust before a crisis occurs**
- **Capitalize on and leverage stakeholder capabilities and resources**
- **Be prepared to provide support to other JLEnt partners**

Global Sustainment Considerations

Competition for Resources



Strategic Lift



Critical Munitions



Forces



Medical



**War Reserve
Materiel**



**Overflight, Transit,
Basing**



**Operational Contract
Support**

Insights

- **Access requirements may extend beyond a given AOR**
- **Understand what critical resources other CCMDs will require and how that will impact your mission (e.g., OCS, Medical Assets, additional Forces)**
- **Engage the Joint Staff early to adjudicate limited global resources**







Key Takeaways

- Anticipating requirements (contested logistics)
- Leverage and integrate the Joint Logistics Enterprise to ensure rapid and precise response for the Joint Force Commander
- Balance global and theater level considerations to set and sustain the theater

“You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.”

– General Dwight D. Eisenhower

Setting Conditions



***Deployable Training Division
Joint Staff J7***

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Challenges

- **Setting conditions for success**
- **Early and timely Commander involvement throughout design, planning, and assessing**
- **Commander centrality in assessments that inform understanding and guidance**
- **Incorporating risk in decision making**
- **Deciding if or when to reframe the problem**

Command and Control: The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.

- Joint Pub 1

***Interview with
General James Mattis, USMC (Ret)***

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
at

The Hoover Institution at Stanford University

March 6, 2015

Setting Conditions for Success

Commanders




Insights

“Do those things that only you can do as the commander...”

- ***Build and maintain trust and inclusive relationships with partners***
- ***Share visualization and intent, gain authorities and resources, assess, and plan / manage transitions***
- ***Design C2 to accomplish the mission – and evolve as necessary***

Understanding Your HQ's Role

- **USG role** relative to the international (and host nation) response
- **US military role** relative to the broader USG whole of government approach
- **CCMD role** relative to other DOD organizations (e.g., other CCMDs and Combat Support Agencies)
- **Internal CCMD C2 options**




Considerations

- *Where do you fit?*
- *Who do you work with?*
- *How to organize?*
- *Where is risk?*

* Optional

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Operational Art



Insight

- Requires upfront time and dialogue to define the problem
- Leverage partners to better understand the environment

Design and Planning Continuum




- Conceptual – blank sheet
- Questions assumptions and methods
- Develops understanding of adversary, operational environment, mission partners
- Complements planning, preparation, execution, and assessment
- Commander-driven dialogue
- Physical and detailed
- Develops products
- Agile & flexible to account for adversary actions
- Supports reframing the problem
- Patterns and templates activity
- Commander-driven process

Insights

- *Commander's early engagement enhances and focuses efforts*
- *Emphasis on Design & Operational Art enhances detailed planning*
- *Comprehensive Design aids in reframing problem as conditions change*

Risk

CJCSM 3105.01B, 23 Dec 2023 establishes a joint risk analysis methodology and provides guidance for identifying, assessing, and managing risk.




The Joint Risk Framework

Insights


- **Risk is Commander's Business**
- **Frame the problem by identifying the item or idea which is "valued" and has the potential to be "harmed"**
 - Protecting national interests
 - Successfully executing a strategy or plan
 - Maintaining a viable, ready force
- **Determine what to do about risk**
 - Accept / Avoid / Mitigate / Transfer
- **Risk communication is at the core of any successful effort to appraise and manage risk → reduces misunderstandings and potential surprises**

Assessment

- *Are we doing things right?*
- *Are we doing the right things?*
- *Are we accomplishing the Mission?*
- *Are we meeting Desired Endstate?*
- *Are we achieving Strategic Objectives?*



Source: Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practice Focus Paper: *Assessment and Risk*.




Source: Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Planning*.

Insights

- *Commander centric – key to developing guidance and intent*
- *Implement early and continuously with partners **to deepen understanding***
- *Integrate assessment structure across echelons at the pace of operations*
- ***Get to “What else needs to be done”; do not stop at “What happened”***

Assessment and Planning Process




Insights

- ***Clear process integrates people and information to share understanding***
- ***Structure enhances speed of translation from guidance to execution***
- ***Timely engagements enable adaptability and flexibility in complex environments***
- ***Clear terms of reference disciplines the process and sets expectations***

SAWG: Strategic Assessment Working Group
PDB: Plans Decision Board
CAB: Commander's Assessment Board

Reframing the Problem




Insights

- *Commander's decision to reframe and revisit design*
- *Activities in Space and Cyberspace external to the CCMD will likely drive this change in the environment*
- *Operations don't stop during reframing – concurrent actions*
- *Consider who you leverage for problem framing and design*

Key Takeaways

- **Senior leaders set conditions by building trust and sharing understanding**
- **Active and continuous Commander involvement promotes focus and flexibility**
- **Structure, design, planning, and assessment around Commander's time and approach**
- **Understand the aspects of risk in decisions**
- **Establish an assessment framework to enable problem reframing when conditions change**


HQ Organization and Process Insights



Deployable Training Division Joint Staff J7

The overall classification of slides is

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


Challenges

- **Organizing to accomplish the joint mission**
- **Developing processes to operate with speed and agility**
- **Integrating joint, multinational, and interagency mission partners into the HQ structure and processes**

Organizing - Roles and Responsibilities

J-Code Structure Organization (Preferred organizational structure)



* Above organization structure is greatly simplified for illustrative purposes only


Considerations

- *Mission requirements drive HQ functions, organization, and processes*
- *Agility vs. size of HQ*
- *Terms of Reference for key personnel*
- *Liaison network*
- *Clear assignments of responsibilities for:*
 - *Assessment*
 - *Design*
 - *Integration of lethal and nonlethal effects*
 - *Narrative and Engagement*
 - *Reports to Higher HQ*
 - *Knowledge Management*
 - *Interagency Coordination*

Insights


- *Maintain Commander-centric vs. staff-centric focus*
- *Be able to respond to crisis while retaining agility to plan and execute other missions*
- *Account for the transregional and multi-domain nature of operations*

Staff Integration



* JP 3-33, *Joint Force Headquarters*, defines “cross functional organizations” that include Centers, Groups, Cells, Offices, Elements, Boards, Working Groups, and Operational Planning Teams (OPTs).


Staff Interaction in Support of Decision Making




Insights

- *Force cross-functional integration to improve staff support for the Commander*
- *Provide venues for Commander's "touch points" and command decisions*
- *COS is the staff synchronizer and manages the battle rhythm*

Enabling Commander Decision Making



Simplified for example only.



Commander time for engagement, dialogue, battlefield circulation

Staff preparation and empowered DCOM-level steering

Commander assessment, guidance, and decision forums

Insights

- “White space” enables commander and staff processes that inform decision making
- Battle rhythm must be nested with HHQ, partners, and external stakeholders

Integration with Mission Partners



Insights

- ***Leverage CCDR to acquire formal support***
- ***Early coordination / integration***

Key Takeaways

- **Clear roles and responsibilities are needed to operate at the speed of relevance**
- **Effective staff integration enables shared understanding that supports decision making**
- **Early integration of all partners into the HQ is critical to achieve a comprehensive approach**

“Apologetics”

**Excerpts from “Defending the Record on US Nuclear Deterrence” by Gen Kevin P. Chilton (ret),
Former Commander, US Strategic Command, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2018**

Today, misinformation, falsehoods, and often deliberate distortions concerning nuclear deterrence continue to be repeated in public forums. Left unchallenged, these statements run the risk of becoming accepted as factual by the American public. [The following are] 11 of the more common fallacies.

“We Are Never Going to Use Nuclear Weapons”

The argument presented is this: if we are never going to use nuclear weapons, why are we wasting so much money sustaining them? Our adversaries see our 24/7 alert postures and consequently assess an attack on the US or its allies to be an unthinkable choice.

“Prompt Conventional Global Strike Can Replace a Portion of the Nuclear Deterrent Force”

Another fallacy is the notion that the deterrence mission can be adequately accomplished by substituting conventional warheads, because of their great accuracy, for nuclear warheads atop our ICBMs. This argument does not appreciate the “long, dark shadow” cast by the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the deterrent effect that “shadow” enables. A nuclear warhead is terribly frightening; a 2,000-pound conventional warhead is not.

“Conventional Weapon Overmatch Eliminates the Need for a Nuclear Deterrent”

Another argument presented to reduce or eliminate the US nuclear deterrent is the notion that our conventional overmatch in quality and size is adequate for the deterrence mission. There is simply no conventional weapon equivalency to the power and deterrent effects of nuclear weapons. So where should the US spend its first dollar on defense? On the triad.

“We Do Not Need a Triad”

The critical question to ask in response to the claim that we do not need a triad is, so which leg do you want to eliminate? The submarine leg provides the only stealth force we have—in essence, our assured response. The bombers are the flexible force that can signal our adversaries and assure our allies while encouraging them not to build their own nuclear deterrent. The ICBM is the most stabilizing leg of the triad. Stability, in this context, is defined as a state in which adversaries are never tempted to strike first. The value in the triad is that it complicates the adversary decision calculus. This is the definition of strategic stability: when an adversary understands that no day is a good day to go to war with the United States—nor is he ever tempted to launch first.

“Nuclear Forces Are on Hair-Trigger Alert”

Critics of our ICBM alert posture use this terminology as a scare tactic. Nuclear forces are not on hair-trigger alert. They certainly are on alert and at the ready, and this is necessary to provide the strategic stability.

“LRSO Is Destabilizing”

Another fallacious argument is that the long-range standoff weapon (LRSO), or cruise missile, is destabilizing. The fact is LRSO is not destabilizing in the sense of weakening strategic stability, as it does not invite a first strike—indeed it helps to prevent one. The United States and Russia have had these weapons for decades and employed them in regional conflicts, and neither country has considered striking first as a result. Today’s ALCM, which will age out in the next decade, must be replaced on schedule by the follow-on LRSO.

“We Cannot Afford Modernization”

Arguing against recapitalizing the nuclear triad because of sustainment costs is patently unfair. In today’s world and for the foreseeable future the US will need a nuclear deterrent in the form of a triad. So, including sustainment costs when discussing the cost of recapitalization is simply another attempt to convince the public not to invest in something that remains necessary for national security. So if nuclear deterrence is the number-one priority and every other defense investment depends on it, the cost spread over the lifetime of the programs is most certainly affordable. We should be rebuilding and exercising the infrastructure necessary to

sustain our deterrent and, more importantly, developing the human capital required to design and build nuclear weapons for an uncertain future. The cost to do this is modest.

“If We Reduce, Others Will Reduce”

We reduced our nuclear arsenal when we signed verifiable treaties with Russia. How effective has this leading by example been? How is showing constraint working? History does not support the proposition that if we reduce, others will follow our lead. The effectiveness of the leading-by-reducing approach to inspire others to show restraint is simply not supported by reality.

“Global Zero Is a Desirable Goal”

Many talk about global zero as a desirable goal. After all, if we could “put the genie back in the bottle” wouldn’t it be better to have a world without nuclear weapons? Of course, the “genie,” that is, the knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons, cannot be unlearned and put back in the bottle of ignorance. Alternatively, some suggest we should continue to strive to get all nations to agree to reduce their inventories to zero, eliminate their weapon production capabilities, and submit to a near omniscient oversight authority that could compel compliance and ensure that no one was cheating. Human beings for centuries upon centuries, in war after war, found better and better ways to kill each other—more efficiently, more lethally. Do we want to go back to a world without nuclear weapons? There is a reason why great powers that own ever more lethal conventional weapons have elected not to fight each other: they have been deterred by nuclear weapons.

“Nuclear Deterrence is Cold War Think”

Some argue the US nuclear deterrent should be eliminated because its existence represents Cold War think. The reality is nuclear deterrence underpins the national security of the United States and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. It remains relevant and necessary today to deter the existential threats to our nation. It also helps to deter nonnuclear attacks that could have catastrophic consequences, such as attacks involving biological weapons. The term Cold War think is a pejorative typically proffered by those who have never thought seriously about, let alone studied, deterrence theory or by those who have run out of ways to defend their position.

“No One Would Ever Use a Nuclear Weapon against the United States”

Those who would use this argument seem willing to risk the very existence of the nation on the basis of their speculation and without forethought. The US military must ensure national survival through deterrence provided by a safe, secure, capable, reliable, flexible, and vigilant nuclear posture. It is our duty to assume the worst and then take steps to ensure it never happens. Additionally, we must deter attacks on our friends, allies, and fielded US military forces deployed abroad.

Summary

These 11 statements are a few of the false arguments and positions directed toward the US nuclear deterrent, often by those who would wish to see this deterrent weakened or eliminated for purely ideological reasons. However, other serious scholars and students of deterrence theory present thoughtful and debatable positions that address issues pertaining to the size, capability, and posture requirements needed to provide the United States with a deterrent that will ensure no one would ever consider a nuclear attack on the United States, our military forces, or our friends or allies. It is the responsibility of members of the profession of arms to truthfully defend the record when false arguments are espoused and seriously consider those that are truly worthy of consideration. Only then can an informed debate begin on the subjects surrounding the US nuclear deterrent.

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Links to Gen Chilton’s speech to The Heritage Foundation from January 18, 2018 titled, “The Importance of the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent”:

- The Heritage Foundation website: <https://www.heritage.org/defense/event/the-importance-the-us-nuclear-deterrent>
- The Heritage Foundation on YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g1J4LGOgZIU>