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- **Guidance and Intent**
 - **JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 January 2017, Incorporating Change 1, 22 October 2018 Quick Reference**

Welcome to the **CAPSTONE** **Joint Operations Module (JOM)**




Introduction and Course Overview

Col John Schaar, USMC
Chief, Deployable Training Division
Joint Staff J7

The overall classification is

UNCLASSIFIED

Agenda

- 
- **Who we are**
 - **CAPSTONE overview**
 - **Joint Operations Module Overview**
 - **Admin**
 - **Force Protection**
 - **Group Assignments**
 - **Senior Mentor**

The Deployable Training Division

Role: Provides joint training and education to improve the operational effectiveness of the Joint Force


Organizations

- ✓ Joint Staff
- ✓ All Combatant Commands
- ✓ Sub-unified Commands & JTFs
- ✓ National Defense University

Events

- ✓ Globally Integrated Exercises
- ✓ Combatant Command Tier I Exercises
- ✓ JTF Mission Rehearsal Exercises
- ✓ Senior Leader Seminars
- ✓ Staff Assist Visits
- ✓ Senior Leader JPME

Supports




76 events in FY 19 & 47 in FY 20

Support includes: Academic seminars, over-the-shoulder training, facilitated AARs, summary reports & Insights and Best Practices papers

DTD focus: Assisting joint commanders enhance readiness of the joint force

CAPSTONE Mission & Learning Areas



Mission: Ensure newly selected generals and flag officers understand the fundamentals of joint doctrine and the Operational art; how to integrate the elements of national power across the range of military operations in order to accomplish national security and national military strategies; and how joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational operations support national strategic goals and objectives.

Learning Areas:

- **National Security Strategy and Instruments of National Power**
- **Joint Operational Art**
- **Geo-Strategic Concepts**
- **Joint Strategic Leader Development**

Globally Integrated Operations

Insights and Considerations

Deployable Training Division
Joint Staff J7

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Challenges

- **Great power competition - a primary concern in U.S. national security**
- **Adapting to the central idea of “Expanding the Competitive Space”**
- **Operating across the “Continuum of Conflict” and associated transitions**
- **Understanding roles across the Joint Force to expand the competitive space**
- **Maintaining a global perspective in crisis**

The Global Environment

Strategic Landscape

- Great power competition
- Competitive advantage has eroded
- Demand exceeds supply
- Changing character of war (transregional & all-domain)

National Security Strategy: Four pillars: 1. Protect the homeland, the American people, and the American way of life. 2. Promote American prosperity. 3. Preserve peace through strength. 4. Advance American influence.

National Defense Strategy: Compete below the level of armed conflict. In wartime, defeat aggression; deter opportunistic aggression; and disrupt imminent terrorist and WMD threats. Deter strategic attacks and defend the homeland. To do this, gain and maintain information superiority.

National Military Strategy → **Global Integration:** “The arrangement of cohesive military actions in time, space, and purpose, *executed as a whole* to address transregional, all-domain, and multi-functional challenges.”

*The Adaptation
to Win*

Deterrence

Definition (JP 3-0)

Prevention of action by:

- The existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction
- And/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits

Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the adversary's perception of:

- Likelihood of being denied the expected benefits of his action
- Likelihood of having excessive costs imposed for taking the action
- Acceptability of restraint as an alternative




Challenges

- *Understanding the Adversary*
- *Development of options to deter*
- *Alignment as part of a broader approach*
- *Assessing success of deterrence*

Globally Integrated Operations

- Roles and Authorities -



Challenges

- *Clarifying roles during transition from competition to conflict*
- *Decision making at the speed of relevance*

Observation

- *Importance of senior leader dialogue in crisis*

- **Secretary of Defense:** Authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense
- **Chairman:** Synthesizes regional and functional perspectives on risk, options, and priorities. Principal military advisor to the SecDef and President
- **Combatant Commanders:**
 - ✓ **Supported/ing Commanders:** A Command authority. Multiple supported CDRs for the respective mission sets
 - ✓ **Coordinating Authority:** For planning - a delegated consultative authority for a problem set. In execution - assesses global campaign and recommends changes
- **Services:** Force Readiness and Generation

Maintaining a Global Perspective in Crisis

Vignette – COVID-19 Pandemic

- ***Support to White House Task Force***
- ***High information demands***
- ***Intense media activity***
- ***Global implications – continued great power competition***



- **Alignment and Support to a WOG Approach (*nesting*)**
- **Demand for Information in Crisis (*tools and processes*)**
- **Speed of Relevance (*in deciding and acting*)**
- **Retaining a Global Perspective (*vs sole focus on crisis*)**
- **Reflection on Roles (*SecDef, CJCS, JCS, JS, Services*)**

Key Takeaways

- **Long-term, strategic competition by revisionist powers remains our central challenge**
- **Expand the Competitive Space to generate the military advantage and capabilities to compete, deter, and win**
- **Global Campaign Plans and Globally Integrated Base Plans provide the framework to operate across the continuum of conflict**
- **Leverage the evolving roles across the Joint Force to address strategic risk and global prioritization, enhance synergy across the Combatant Commands, and decide and act at the speed of relevance**

References

- **DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**
- **Joint Pub 1, “Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,” 25 Mar 2013**
- **National Defense Strategy 2018**
- **National Military Strategy 2018**
- **National Security Strategy 2017**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Decision Making for Globally Integrated Operations in Crisis Insights and Considerations, 08 Jul 2019**

29 June 2020

Subject: Global integration – Executive Summary for Capstone Fellows

“From competition through armed conflict, adversaries are challenging our national security through combined conventional and irregular approaches, across all domains (ground, air, maritime, space, cyber, and the associated electromagnetic spectrum). In this rapidly evolving environment, we adaptively prepare for simultaneous threats and opportunities worldwide. Our missions are to defend the homeland, respond to contingencies, deter strategic and conventional attack, assure allies and partners, and compete below the level of armed conflict. Global integration is the Joint force’s strategic approach to retaining overmatch and expanding the competitive space through integrated multifunctional, all-domain, and transregional operations.

Excerpt from Draft Joint Publication 1, Volume 1 (Joint Warfighting)

1. **Purpose:** Provide summary of global integration with a focus on globally integrated operations. Incorporate unclassified portions of CJCSI 3050.01 (Implementing Global Integration), draft Joint Publication 1.0 Joint Warfighting, and a graphic on insights learned from the past four years of implementation (para 6). Note: CJCSI 3050.01 may be found on SIPRNET in the CJCS Directives Electronic Library (see para 5 below for other references).
2. **What is Global Integration?** Global integration is the arrangement of cohesive military actions in time, space, and purpose, executed as a whole to address transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional challenges. Pursuant to Title 10, U.S. Code, section 153, the Chairman is responsible for matters relating to global military strategic and operational integration. This includes providing advice to the President and Secretary of Defense on ongoing military operations and advising the Secretary on the allocation and transfer of forces to address transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional threats.
 - a. To accomplish global integration, the Joint Force employs a top-down, Chairman-led approach to integrate planning, prioritize resources, mitigate risk, and assess Joint Force progress toward strategic objectives for the Secretary. [Source: CJCSI 3050.01]
 - b. The Chairman is in a unique position to synthesize regional perspectives on risk, options, and priorities into a global perspective and provide military advice to the SecDef and POTUS that accounts for all domains, regions, and challenges without impinging on CCDRs legal and direct chain of command to SecDef and POTUS. [Source: Observation]
 - c. The Joint Force must meet three objectives to achieve global integration. [Source: CJCSI 3050.01]
 - i. First, **senior leaders must be able to make decisions in a complex environment at the speed of conflict.** This requires a common intelligence picture and a shared understanding of global force posture to see operations in real time, visualize opportunities to seize the initiative, and identify trade-offs, risk, and opportunity costs.
 - ii. Second, **operations must be strategically coordinated worldwide, nested within a whole of government approach, and include our allies and coalition partners.** In an environment where requested requirements exceed inventory, force posture must

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ensure strength, agility, and resilience across regions and domains. Once committed, the Joint Force must rapidly engage adversaries, understand tradeoffs across Combatant Commands (CCMDs), and communicate risk with a global perspective.

- iii. Finally, global integration enables the ***development of a lethal and agile future fighting force***. A balanced inventory of capabilities and capacities ensures the Joint Force's continuous competitive advantage, enabling the force to deter and defeat potential adversaries across the entire continuum of conflict. The Joint Force must also retain the capability to defend the homeland and project power against any other potential adversaries.
 - d. Globally integrated operations retain the proven strength of CCDR-led operations while leveraging the unique position of the Chairman to synthesize regional perspectives on risk, options, and priorities into a global perspective. The Chairman provides clear options for tolerable global risk in the form of military advice to the Secretary that prioritizes Joint Force missions, sourcing, and assessments. The Secretary gains a richer understanding of risk to the Joint Force and is better prepared to provide globally informed guidance. [Source: Observation]
 - e. KEY TAKE AWAY: Achieving global integration requires the combination of the institutional expertise of the Services and geographic and functional CCMDs to provide precise and timely global military solutions in support of national policy objectives. A comprehensive body of assessments provides a firm analytical foundation to this process. [Source: Observation]
3. **Why do we need global integration?** Strategic Environment. The regional approach the Joint Force long relied on is no longer appropriate to address the global threats that comprise the contemporary strategic environment. Great power competition that is global in scope and encompasses all domains has emerged as the central challenge to employment of Joint Force capabilities. State and non-state actors present increasingly complex challenges by operating across regions, domains, and functions in which the United States was once unchallenged. Factors such as accelerating adversary military modernization, global proliferation of commercial technology, and ease of entry to domains such as space and cyberspace, has led to a relative decline in relative U.S. military competitive advantage. This shift, along with potential adversaries' increasing willingness to employ coercive tools of statecraft that remain below the threshold for a traditional military response, illustrates the character of conflict has likewise changed. [Source: CJCSI 3050.01]
- a. Peace and war do not constitute a binary construct, but exist along a continuum of conflict. Both state and non-state actors are increasingly exerting influence across not only the military element of power, but also across the diplomatic, information, and economic elements. As stated in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) 2018, "Competitors and adversaries are competing across all dimensions of power, with increased efforts in areas short of armed conflict...violating principles of sovereignty, exploiting ambiguity, and deliberately blurring civil and military targets."
 - b. The Joint Force must be capable of anticipating adversary actions and leveraging transregional, all-domain, and multi-functional responses against multiple challenges in concert with partners. Advanced adversary technologies enable integrated activities across domains that enhance overall strategic effects and support layering of capabilities across

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numerous functions to create previously unseen problems for the United States. This increased threat complexity is apparent in potential adversaries' abilities to challenge power projection and freedom of maneuver.

- c. Global demand for forces will continue to exceed available inventory for the foreseeable future. The Joint Force requires ways to sustain now, and to develop and design in the years ahead, a balanced inventory of global, all-domain capabilities and capacity to operate against the Priority Challenge adversaries (Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs)) while remaining prepared for new actors that could threaten the United States and its allies and partners.
- d. A dynamic, unpredictable security environment with a range of emerging threats requires an innovative global defense posture that is fully integrated with allies and coalition partners. It is a key element in planning, decision making, force management, and force development and design and is adjustable as a result of continual assessments of current and future requirements. Appropriate posture enables the Joint Force to maintain a global reach and regional access to facilitate day-to-day campaigning and contingency response. Arrayed against our primary strategic challenges and adversaries, it ensures freedom of maneuver and access to the global commons for free trade and cooperative engagement. Including forward deployed forces and globally positioned war reserve materiel, an overseas network of bases and infrastructure as well as agreements with foreign governments, posture is often the most visible indicator of U.S. national interests and priorities abroad. Strategic direction informs posture.

4. Strategic Guidance

- a. The President and Secretary provide strategic policy guidance and direction to the Joint Force. The National Security Strategy (NSS), the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), and the Unified Command Plan (UCP)—all signed by the President—are the defining elements of national strategy. The NSS highlights the vital national interests and grand strategic approach, which the Joint Force frames its military strategy to support broader government efforts. The CPG provides policy guidance to focus contingency planning efforts across the Department of Defense. The UCP establishes the missions, responsibilities, and areas of responsibility for Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) to enable unity of command of the Armed Forces. This and other presidential policy guidance establish the framework for the Secretary to provide focused direction to the Department of Defense. [Source: CJCSI 3050.01]
- b. The NDS articulates how the Department will contribute to the vital national interests laid out in the NSS. The Defense Planning Guidance provides force development priorities. Together these documents guide the broad direction the Joint Force takes in its programming, planning, and execution of operations. [Source: CJCSI 3050.01]

5. References

- a. National Defense Strategy 2018 (Classified) (SIPRNET)
- b. CJCSI 3050.01 Implementing Global Integration (Classified) 31 Dec 2018 (SIPRNET)
- c. CJCSI.01K Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (Classified) 22 Mar 2019 (SIPRNET)
- d. CJCSI 3141.01F Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans (U) 31 Jan 2019 (JEL)
- e. CJCSM 3105.01 Joint Risk Analysis (U) 14 Oct 2016 (SIPRNET)

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
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f. CJCSM XXX.XX Execution and Oversight of Global Integration (U) (Draft Document)

g. JS J7 Decision making for GIO in Crisis (FOUO) 8 Jul 2019 (JEL+)

6. Learning opportunities in Globally integrated operations (Unclassified excerpt of graphic)



7. POC: Mike Findlay, JS J7, DDJT, 757.209.5939, Michael.L.Findlay.Civ@Mail.Mil

Enclosure – Provides informative slides on this topic.

Enclosure



2018 National Military Strategy Framework

Central Idea of the National Military Strategy: The Boxer's Stance

Because we cannot be certain when, where, or under what conditions the next fight will occur, the Joint Force must maintain a boxer's stance—with the strength, agility, endurance, resilience, flexibility, and awareness to fight and win against any potential adversary.

Strength to win against any adversary

Agility to adapt to any challenge

Endurance to sustain any campaign

Resilience to recover readiness quickly

Flexibility to address multiple challenges under different conditions

Awareness of the strategic environment

ENDS of the strategy are taken from the Defense Objectives in the NDS

Continuum of Strategic Direction

Force Employment

- fulfills the defense objectives of the NDS

Force Development

enables the Joint Force to
do what it does *better*

Force Design

enables the Joint Force to
do what it does *differently*

0-3 years

~2-7 years

~5-15 years

WAYS in force employment
(NMS Mission Areas)

WAYS in Force Development and Force Design

- Deter strategic attack
- Deter conventional attack
- Assure allies and partners
- Compete below armed conf
- Respond to threats

Military Strategic Approaches

People
Ideas
Equipment

implement

inform

MEANS of the strategy

Resources



Capabilities

Authorities

Activities

As the central strategy for the Joint Force, the NMS supports CJCS role as Global Integrator

How is Global Integration Achieved?



A Comprehensive Approach to Unified Action

***Deployable Training Division
Joint Staff J7***

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Challenges

- Developing and aligning Globally Integrated Operations in a complex environment
- Supporting comprehensive approach at both strategic and operational levels
- Creating and maintaining unity of effort among interorganizational stakeholders

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH is doctrinal, per JP-1 12 July 2017 p. II-11 and JP-3 17 Jan 2017 p. 12, 26, 30, 34, 85 (underlining added):

“Armed Forces of the United States are most effective when employed as a joint force. This “comprehensive approach,” involving all participating organizations both military and non-military within an operational area, requires the JFC to understand the capabilities, limitations, and mandates of those organizations involved and to effectively communicate joint force missions...”

A Comprehensive Approach to Global Integration



"We recognize the invaluable advantages that our strong relationships with allies and partners deliver."

"Allies and partners magnify our power."

- 2017 National Security Strategy



"Effectively expanding the competitive space requires combined actions with the U.S. interagency to employ all dimensions of national power."

"Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy, providing a durable, asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival can match."

- 2018 National Defense Strategy




"The 2018 NMS acknowledges the unique contributions of allies and partners, a strategic source of strength for the Joint Force."

- 2018 National Military Strategy


Insights

- **Global Integration involves operating in conjunction w/all instruments of national power**
- **Such integration provides an asymmetric advantage during competition and conflict**

Supporting a Comprehensive Approach




Supporting a Comprehensive Approach



Insights

- Understand DOD's complementary support of the other instruments of power (D-I-E)
- Developing a shared visualization of the operational environment requires interaction with external mission partners
- Situation is dynamic requiring continuous dialogue; guidance and intent evolve to adapt to changing conditions

Integrating with Partners



Insights

- *Operate as an integral, nested part of a whole-of-government and coalition effort*
- *Share awareness and implement a sustainable and effective global battle rhythm*
- *Be prepared to assume a supporting role to other interorganizational stakeholders*
- *Leader / Commander sets the tone for integration with partners*

Key Takeaways

- Comprehensive Approach promotes unity of effort among stakeholders
- Global Integration necessitates a comprehensive approach from the tactical to the strategic levels
- The military instrument of national power often supports diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments

“In this age, I don’t care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are, if you cannot create harmony – even vicious harmony – on the battlefield based on **trust** across service lines, across coalition and national lines, and across civilian / military lines, you really need to go home...

- General James N. Mattis, USMC June 2010

“I say you speak of having **plans** and power for war; but *they are* mere words. Now in whom do you **trust?**” (Assyrian commander during siege of Jerusalem to Hezekiah’s staffer)-- **Isaiah 36:5**

PRESIDENT TRUMP'S LETTER OF INSTRUCTION TO CHIEFS OF MISSION

1. The President's Letter of Instruction (PLOI) to Chiefs of Mission (COM) is the primary mechanism for communicating the President's foreign-policy priorities and defining COM authority and security responsibility. The PLOI has generally been revised by each new administration and sent to all Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed Chiefs of Mission. The letter also provides instructions regarding the security of U.S. government personnel and dependents. President Trump has approved the language for his PLOI (paragraph 7). Each Senate-confirmed COM will receive a personal letter signed by the President. The Office of Presidential Appointments (HR/PAS) is coordinating with the White House on the personal letters. After the President's signature of the letters, HR/PAS will facilitate the delivery to each COM. COMs should share the full text of the new letter with others in their mission, especially their country team.

Begin text:

Dear Mr. / Madam Ambassador:

I want to extend my personal best wishes and appreciation for your willingness to serve our country as the United States Government's representative to [country].

I know that you will undertake your responsibilities for representing the United States abroad with dedication. Our primary commitment is to the security and prosperity of all Americans. My National Security Strategy outlines four vital national interests that guide our foreign policy, and you will be at the front line of our efforts to: protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life; promote American prosperity; preserve peace through strength; and advance American influence.

Foremost, we must protect the security of Americans at home and around the world by confronting threats before they reach our border. You will play an integral part in our efforts to counter extremism and defeat terrorist groups, support conditions that strengthen stability and sovereignty, and protect basic human freedoms. Your leadership is vital to maintaining and enhancing the security and well-being of our diplomatic personnel, and supporting American citizens overseas.

National security and prosperity depend on a strong and growing American economy. You must work to promote free, fair, and reciprocal trade through bilateral trade and investment strategies, redress unfair trade practices, and support American businesses abroad. We must fight corruption and work to build fair and vibrant markets and a stable international economy. It is also imperative that we protect our intellectual property, a product of our Nation's innovative culture and a key advantage that we cannot afford to lose.

We will also preserve peace through strength. American strength, leadership, and confidence deter wars, promote peace, and protect our friends. The world is a competitive place. We face revisionist powers, rogue nations, and transnational actors that threaten our prosperity and security, and challenge our influence. Technology and information have accelerated these

competitions and generated new means of undermining our interests short of direct confrontation. America must compete through strategies that integrate all tools of national power, including diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, intelligence, and military.

Americans benefit from deep, sustained, and focused engagement with the rest of the world. We must lead with robust traditional and public diplomacy in bilateral, regional, multilateral, and public forums to advance American influence and shape the rules of the road. Allies and partners magnify our power and enhance our influence. We must strengthen these relationships based on the principle of cooperation with reciprocity, in which all partners contribute their fair share to advancing common goals. We will not impose our values, but we will encourage aspiring partners to strengthen their sovereignty and realize the benefits of free markets and individual liberty. We must use diplomatic and development tools to catalyze the mutually beneficial political, economic, and societal relationships that strengthen security partnerships and build trading partners. We will champion American values and stand with those who seek freedom.

In everything we do abroad, we are guided by our values and disciplined by our interests. By representing the United States and leading your Mission, you will help my Administration realize a bright vision for the future. A world that supports American interests and reflects our values makes America more secure and more prosperous.

This letter contains your detailed instructions as my personal representative and Chief of the United States Mission to [country]. As Chief of Mission, you have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all executive branch personnel, activities, and operations in [country]. This responsibility extends to all executive branch personnel, regardless of their employment categories or location, within your geographic area of responsibility. Unless United States law or guidance approved by me specifically provides otherwise, the only exceptions to your authority are personnel and elements in [country] under the command of a Geographic Combatant Commander; Voice of America (VOA) correspondents on official assignment; and United States Government executive branch employees officially on the staff of an international organization and performing the functions of that organization. [Where applicable, language will be added to address countries in which multiple COMs reside/operate such as countries with U.S. missions to international organizations and countries where a bilateral COM temporarily hosts another bilateral COM.]

You will report to me through the Secretary of State. Under my direction, the Secretary of State is, to the fullest extent of the law, responsible for the overall coordination of all United States Government activities and operations abroad. The only authorized channel for instruction to you is from the Secretary or from me, unless the Secretary or I personally direct otherwise. All executive branch agencies with employees in [country] must keep you fully informed at all times of their current and planned activities. You have the right to see all communications to or from executive branch agencies and their employees serving under your authority, however transmitted, except those specifically exempted by law or guidance approved by me.

You should work with the agencies of your host government, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, international organizations, and our military as appropriate to leverage initiatives as required by law or in support of the policies of my Administration.

To ensure the best possible coordination, I direct that you and the Geographic Combatant Commander keep each other fully and currently informed and that you routinely coordinate on all activities of mutual interest. Any disagreements that cannot be resolved with the Geographic Combatant Commander must be reported to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense for resolution.

You and the Geographic Combatant Commander must continually consult and coordinate responses to common threats against our personnel and facilities in [country] and assist one another, within allocated resources, to facilitate the secure implementation of my foreign policy priorities. Unless an agreement between the Secretary of State and the head of another agency provides otherwise, you are responsible for the security of all United States Government personnel on official duty in [country], except for personnel and elements in [country] under the command of a Geographic Combatant Commander, VOA correspondents on official assignment, United States Government executive branch employees officially on the staff of an international organization and performing functions of that organization, or the authorized accompanying dependents of any of these categories of United States Government personnel. Your security responsibilities also include the protection of authorized accompanying dependents of personnel under your security responsibility. I expect you to take direct and full responsibility for the security of your Mission and all the personnel for whom you are responsible, regardless of their location. I also expect you to support counterintelligence and counterterrorism activities that enhance the security of United States interests abroad and that have implications for the homeland.

You are responsible for ensuring the effective performance of the personnel and programs under your authority and for promoting the protection and appropriate handling of United States Government information. You should promote a culture of equal opportunity and ensure that any misconduct, including discrimination and harassment of any kind, and poor performance are addressed appropriately.

To maximize cost-effectiveness and minimize security risks to Americans, the number of United States Government personnel must be kept to the minimum necessary to implement my legal duties and foreign policy priorities. Unless a clear benefit to the United States Government justifies otherwise, all functions that can be performed effectively and efficiently by personnel based in the United States or at regional offices overseas should be performed in those locations. Similarly, you should ensure the greatest possible use of the expertise of host country citizens and outsource functions when it is effective and efficient to do so, consistent with any counterintelligence or other security concerns. Should you find the Mission's staffing to be either excessive or inadequate for the effective advancement of priority goals and objectives, you should initiate staffing changes in accordance with established procedures.

Every executive branch agency must obtain your approval before changing the size, composition, or mandate of their agency staff under your authority. In order to effectively account for personnel and resources, I have directed that agencies submit requests to you to abolish positions that have remained vacant for at least 2 years.

You retain the authority to approve or disapprove staffing requests based on my Administration's policy priorities and your consultations with the requesting agency. If a Department head disagrees with your decision on a staffing matter, that individual may appeal your decision to the Secretary of State. In the event the Secretary is unable to resolve the dispute, the Secretary and the respective Department head will present their differing views to me for decision.

All United States Government personnel other than those personnel and elements under the command of a Geographic Combatant Commander must obtain your approval before entering [country] on official business. To ensure accountability and security for personnel, country clearance must be obtained for temporary duty assignments in [country]. You may refuse country clearance or may place conditions or restrictions on visiting personnel as you determine necessary. While country clearance will generally be managed through automated country clearance systems provided by the Department of State and Department of Defense, you may, at your discretion, authorize use of other processes when necessary.

I am counting on your advice and leadership to help protect and advance America's interests. I expect you to discharge your responsibilities with professional excellence and in full conformance with the law and the highest standards of ethical conduct. Remember as you conduct your duties that you are representing not only me, but also the American people and America's values.

Sincerely,

Donald J. Trump

End text.

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GUIDELINES

for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments

On March 8, 2005, the heads of major U.S. humanitarian organizations and U.S. civilian and military leaders met at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) to launch a discussion on the challenges posed by operations in combat and other nonpermissive environments. The Working Group on Civil-Military Relations in Nonpermissive Environments, facilitated by USIP, was created as a result of this meeting.

InterAction, the umbrella organization for many U.S. NGOs, has coordinated the non-governmental delegation.¹ Representatives from the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, and the U.S. Agency for International Development have participated on behalf of the U.S. Government.

Recommended Guidelines

The following guidelines should facilitate interaction between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Organizations (see Key Terms) belonging to InterAction that are engaged in humanitarian relief efforts in hostile or potentially hostile environments. (For the purposes of these guidelines, such organizations will henceforth be referred to as Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations, or NGHOs.) While the guidelines were developed between the Department of Defense (DOD) and InterAction, DOD intends to observe these guidelines in its dealings with the broader humanitarian assistance community. These guidelines are not intended to constitute advance endorsement or approval by either party of particular missions of the other but are premised on a de facto recognition that U.S. Armed Forces and NGHOs have often occupied the same operational space in the past and will undoubtedly do so in the future. When this does occur, both sides will make best efforts to observe these guidelines, recognizing that operational necessity may require deviation from them. When breaks with the guidelines occur, every effort should be made to explain what prompted the deviation in order to promote transparency and avoid distraction from the critical task of providing essential relief to a population in need.

A. For the U.S. Armed Forces, the following guidelines should be observed consistent with military force protection, mission accomplishment, and operational requirements:

1. When conducting relief activities, military personnel should wear uniforms or other distinctive clothing to avoid being mistaken for NGHO representatives. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should not display NGHO logos on any military clothing, vehicles, or equipment. This does not preclude the appropriate use of symbols recognized under the law of war, such as a red cross, when appropriate. U.S. Armed Forces may use such symbols on military clothing, vehicles, and equipment in appropriate situations.
2. Visits by U.S. Armed Forces personnel to NGHO sites should be by prior arrangement.
3. U.S. Armed Forces should respect NGHO views on the bearing of arms within NGHO sites.
4. U.S. Armed Forces should give NGHOs the option of meeting with U.S. Armed Forces personnel outside military installations for information exchanges.
5. U.S. Armed Forces should not describe NGHOs as “force multipliers” or “partners” of the military, or in any other fashion

¹ The InterAction delegation includes CARE, Catholic Relief Services, the International Medical Corps, the International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps, Refugees International, Save the Children, and World Vision.

that could compromise their independence and their goal to be perceived by the population as independent.

6. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should avoid interfering with NGHO relief efforts directed toward segments of the civilian population that the military may regard as unfriendly.
7. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should respect the desire of NGHOs not to serve as implementing partners for the military in conducting relief activities. However, individual NGOs may seek to cooperate with the military, in which case such cooperation will be carried out with due regard to avoiding compromise of the security, safety, and independence of the NGHO community at large, NGHO representatives, or public perceptions of their independence.

B. For NGHOs, the following guidelines should be observed:

1. NGHO personnel should not wear military-style clothing. This is not meant to preclude NGHO personnel from wearing protective gear, such as helmets and protective vests, provided that such items are distinguishable in color/appearance from U.S. Armed Forces issue items.
2. NGHO travel in U.S. Armed Forces vehicles should be limited to liaison personnel to the extent practical.
3. NGHOs should not have facilities co-located with facilities inhabited by U.S. Armed Forces personnel.
4. NGHOs should use their own logos on clothing, vehicles, and buildings when security conditions permit.
5. NGHO personnel's visits to military facilities/sites should be by prior arrangement.
6. Except for liaison arrangements detailed in the sections that follow, NGHOs should minimize their activities at military bases and with U.S. Armed Forces personnel of a nature that might compromise their independence.
7. NGHOs may, as a last resort, request military protection for convoys delivering humanitarian assistance, take advantage of essential logistics support available only from the military, or accept evacuation assistance for medical treatment or to evacuate from a hostile environment. Provision of such military support to NGHOs rests solely within the discretion of the military forces and will not be undertaken if it interferes with higher priority military activities. Support generally will be provided on a reimbursable basis in accordance with applicable U.S. law.

C. Recommendations on forms of coordination, to the extent feasible, that will minimize the risk of confusion between military and NGHO roles in hostile or potentially hostile environments, subject to military force protection, mission accomplishment, and operational requirements are:

1. NGHO liaison officer participation in unclassified security briefings conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces.
2. Unclassified information sharing with the NGHO liaison officer on security conditions, operational sites, location of mines and unexploded ordnance, humanitarian activities, and population movements, insofar as such unclassified information sharing is for the purpose of facilitating humanitarian operations and the security of staff and local personnel engaged in these operations.
3. Liaison arrangements with military commands prior to and during military operations to deconflict military and relief activities, including for the purpose of protection of humanitarian installations and personnel and to inform military personnel of humanitarian relief objectives, modalities of operation,



and the extent of prospective or ongoing civilian humanitarian relief efforts.

4. Military provision of assistance to NHHOs for humanitarian relief activities *in extremis* when civilian providers are unavailable or unable to do so. Such assistance will not be provided if it interferes with higher priority military activities.

2 Recommended Processes

A. Procedures for NHHO/military dialogue during contingency planning for DOD relief operations in a hostile or potentially hostile environment:

1. NHHOs engaged in humanitarian relief send a small number of liaison officers to the relevant combatant command for discussions with the contingency planners responsible for designing relief operations.
2. NHHOs engaged in humanitarian relief assign a small number of liaison officers to the relevant combatant command (e.g., one liaison was stationed at U.S. CENTCOM for 6 of the first 12 months of the war in Afghanistan, and one was in Kuwait City before U.S. forces entered Iraq in 2003).
3. The relevant military planners, including but not limited to the Civil Affairs representatives of the relevant commander, meet with humanitarian relief NHHO liaison officers at a mutually agreed location.

B. Procedures for NHHOs and the military to access assessments of humanitarian needs. U.S. military and NHHO representatives should explore the following:

1. Access to NHHO and military assessments directly from a DOD or other U.S. Government Web site.
2. Access to NHHO and military assessments through an NHHO serving in a coordination role and identifying a common Web site.
3. Access to NHHO and military assessments through a U.S. Government or United Nations (UN) Web site.

C. Procedures for NHHO liaison relationships with combatant commands that are engaged in planning for military operations in hostile or potentially hostile environments. (NHHO liaison personnel are provided by the NHHO community):

1. The NHHO liaison officer should not be physically located within the military headquarters, but if feasible should be close to it in order to allow for daily contact.
2. The NHHO liaison officer should have appropriate access to senior-level officers within the combatant commands and be permitted to meet with them as necessary and feasible.
3. There should be a two-way information flow. The NHHO liaison officer should provide details on NHHO capabilities, infrastructure if any, plans, concerns, etc. The military should provide appropriate details regarding minefields, unexploded ordnance, other hazards to NHHOs, access to medical facilities, evacuation plans, etc.
4. The NHHO liaison officer should have the opportunity to brief military commanders on NHHO objectives, the Code of Conduct of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and NHHOs Engaged in Disaster Relief, the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Guidelines, country-specific guidelines based on the IASC Guidelines, and, if desired, The Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. U.S. Armed Forces personnel should have the opportunity to brief NHHOs, to the extent appropriate, on U.S. Government and coalition goals and policies, monitoring principles, applicable laws and rules of engagement, etc.

5. The NHHO liaison officer could continue as a liaison at higher headquarters even after a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) or similar mechanism is established in-country. Once this occurs, liaison officers of individual NHHOs could begin coordination in-country through the CMOC for civil-military liaison.

D. Possible organizations that could serve as a bridge between NHHOs and U.S. Armed Forces in the field², e.g., U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID's) Office of Military Affairs, State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and the UN's Humanitarian Coordinator:

1. If the U.S. Agency for International Development or the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization agree to serve a liaison function, they should be prepared to work with the broader NHHO community in addition to U.S. Government implementing partners.
2. The UN's Humanitarian Coordinator or his/her representative could be a strong candidate to serve as liaison because he/she normally would be responsible for working with all NHHOs and maintaining contact with the host government or a successor regime.

Key Terms

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs): In wider usage, the term NGO can be applied to any nonprofit organization that is independent from government. However, for the purposes of these guidelines, the term NGO refers to a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 3-08/JP 1-02)

Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations (NHHOs): For the purposes of these guidelines, NHHOs are organizations belonging to InterAction that are engaged in humanitarian relief efforts in hostile or potentially hostile environments. NHHOs are a subset of the broader NGO community.

Independence for NHHOs: Independence is defined in the same way as it is in the Code of Conduct of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and NHHOs Engaged in Disaster Relief: Independence is defined as not acting as an instrument of government foreign policy. NHHOs are agencies that act independently from governments. NHHOs therefore, formulate their own policies and implementation strategies and do not seek to implement the policy of any government, except insofar as it coincides with their own independent policies. To maintain independence, NHHOs will never knowingly—or through negligence—allow themselves, or their employees, to be used to gather information of a political, military, or economically sensitive nature for governments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those that are strictly humanitarian, nor will they act as instruments of foreign policy of donor governments.

InterAction: InterAction is the largest coalition of U.S.-based international development and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations. With over 165 members operating in every developing country, InterAction works to overcome poverty, exclusion, and suffering by advancing basic dignity for all.

² In situations in which there is no actor to serve as a bridge, a U.S. military Civil Affairs cell could serve as a temporary point-of-contact between NHHOs and other elements of the U.S. Armed Forces.

USAID/OFDA's Mandate		OFDA (Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance)			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Save Lives Alleviate Human Suffering Reduce the Economic and Social Impact of Disasters 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> USG Lead for HA/DR USG first responders after disasters Disaster risk reduction/mitigation before disasters 			
Current Activities		Focus is Preparedness, Early Warning, Disaster Relief, Early Recovery			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regional Offices in Costa Rica, Hungary, Kenya, Senegal, and Thailand, with humanitarian advisors in New York (USUN), Geneva (USUN), Rome (USUN), and Atlanta (CDC). OFDA Humanitarian Assistance Advisors at AFRICOM, EUCOM, CENTCOM, INDOPACOM, SOUTHCOM (covers NORTHCOM), and SOCOM. Stockpiles of appropriate disaster relief commodities in Miami, Italy, UAE, and Malaysia. Regional experts, technical experts, logistics cell, and surge capacity in Washington, D.C. OFDA responds to an average of 65 disasters in more than 50 countries every year (rapid and slow onset disasters as well as complex emergencies). Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) in the field and Response Management Teams (RMTs) in Washington, D.C., stand up as needed. Grants to implementing partners such as UN, International Organizations, and NGOs. More than 430 staff worldwide. Provided more than \$2 billion in humanitarian assistance in fiscal year 2017. 					
DOD-USAID Joint Ops		Not all USG HA/DR operations involve DOD, but when they do...			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Link-up with USAID ASAP. This may be at the Embassy, USAID Mission, or DART in the field Key contact with DART will be one of USAID/OFDA's Civ-Mil Advisors Start talking early: Decide who does what, when Exchange liaison officers - in DC, at the CCMDs, in the field Share information - Keep info unclassified as much as possible Work as one USG team: Joint operations and planning Policy direction comes from the U.S. Ambassador – Chief of Mission authority in country Share capabilities between the JTF and the DART Provide assistance on a "PULL" system, not "PUSH" system DOD can often help with airfield ops and short-haul transport (wholesale not retail) OFDA can help with UN and NGO information and coordination 					
AFRICOM	CENTCOM	EUCOM	INDOPACOM	SOUTHCOM & NORTHCOM	SOCOM
ofdaAFRICOMHAA@ofda.gov	Francine Uenuma fuenuma@ofda.gov 571-438-1591	Dana Chivers dchivers@ofda.gov 571-594-3937	Warren Acuncius wacuncius@ofda.gov 202-344-6358	Matt Lonquest mlonquest@ofda.gov 571-217-9067	Sharon McHale smchale@ofda.gov 571-216-2944
	Steve Petzold spetzold@ofda.gov 703-395-6807	Jeff Miller jemiller@ofda.gov 703-380-0918	Katherine Tice ktice@ofda.gov 571-214-3868	Steven Goodwin sgoodwin@ofda.gov 719-554-2272	
	Albert Gembara (Bahrain) agembara@ofda.gov 571-228-1083		Elizabeth Blanchford (Oki) eblanchford@ofda.gov 703-338-2475		
OFDAafricom@ofda.gov https://blogs.intelink.gov/blogs/africomofda/	OFDAcentcom@ofda.gov https://blogs.intelink.gov/blogs/centcomofda/	OFDAeucom@ofda.gov https://blogs.intelink.gov/blogs/eucomofda/	OFDApacom@ofda.gov https://blogs.intelink.gov/blogs/pacomofda/	OFDAsouthcom@ofda.gov OFDAnorthcom@ofda.gov https://blogs.intelink.gov/blogs/southcomofda/	OFDAsocom@ofda.gov https://blogs.intelink.gov/blogs/socomofda/
Education and Doctrine Development		Civil-Military Engagement		Technical Operations (CBRNE)	
Thierry Curtis MLTDC_EDD@usaid.gov		Sonia Biswas MLTDC_CME@usaid.gov		Veronika Martin MLTDC_TECHOPS@usaid.gov	
Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC) jhoc@usaid.gov		MLT Washington Staff MLTDC@usaid.gov		ePath Learning Access https://jhoc.epathlearning.com/requestAccess/	

At the Strategic Level (OSD / JCS)

- ☐ Will USAID establish a Response Management Team (RMT) in Wash DC?
 - ☐ If yes, the phone# is _____ & main POC is _____
 - ☐ Will DOD send a Liaison Officer?
 - ☐ If yes, who: _____ Contact info: _____
- ☐ Has there been a request for DOD assistance? And, been approved by SecDef?
- ☐ Is USAID part of DOD's planning to include Planords and Exords?
- ☐ Is USAID/OFDA vetting DOD assistance to the disaster area?

At the Operational Level (Combatant Command)

- ☐ Has the CCMD established a communication and coordination link with USAID?
 - ☐ Will there be an OFDA Advisor stationed at the CCMD?
 - ☐ If yes, who: _____ Contact info: _____
- ☐ Is USAID/OFDA part of CCMD's planning process, providing input on the OPT, at GO/FO briefings, and chopping on documents such as Planords and Exords?
- ☐ Is USAID/OFDA vetting DOD HA supply deliveries and local purchases to the disaster area?
- ☐ Is USAID/OFDA vetting requests for DOD assistance from non-DOD entities?
- ☐ Has CCMD received authorization to transport non-military and non-USG personnel and supplies on DOD assets?

At the Tactical Level ("JTF")

- ☐ Has the JTF established contact with Important Partners?
 - ☐ U.S. Embassy POC: _____ Contact: _____
 - ☐ USAID Mission POC: _____ Contact: _____
 - ☐ USAID/DART POC: _____ Contact: _____
 - ☐ Local Government POC: _____ Contact: _____
 - ☐ Other _____ POC: _____ Contact: _____
- ☐ Will the USAID/DART attach a Civ-Mil Advisor to the JTF?
 - ☐ If yes, who: _____ Contact info: _____
- ☐ Will the JTF attach a Liaison Officer to the USAID/DART?
 - ☐ If yes, who: _____ Contact info: _____
- ☐ Has the JTF Commander and the USAID/DART Team Leader linked up?
- ☐ Is the JTF sharing SITREPS and other info with the USAID/DART and visa versa?
- ☐ Has the JTF unclassified as much information as possible?
- ☐ Has the JTF established a system with the USAID/DART for:
 - ☐ Requests for Assistance (RFAs) and Mission Tasking Matrix (MITAM) process
 - ☐ Joint daily update briefs with CCMD and/or JS
 - ☐ DOD excess property deliveries vetted by the USAID/DART and visibility on what's coming
 - ☐ JTF assets moving non-DOD people and supplies
 - ☐ Joint operational planning to include the transition/exit plan
- ☐ Has the JTF planned for a joint press effort with the Embassy and USAID/DART?



National Response Framework Update (Fourth Edition)

Background

The [National Response Framework](#) (NRF), first released in 2008, is a guide for how our Nation responds to all types of disasters and emergencies. Built on the scalable, flexible, and adaptable concepts identified in the National Incident Management System, it is one of the five documents in the suite of National Planning Frameworks. Each covers one preparedness mission area: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, or Recovery.

Why Update the NRF?

When disaster strikes, everyone has a role to play. Government resources alone cannot meet all community needs. As part of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) renewed effort to build a national culture of preparedness, the NRF is being updated to incorporate lessons learned from the unprecedented 2017 hurricane and wildfire season.

The [2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action Report](#) specifically called for a revision of the NRF to emphasize stabilization of critical lifelines and coordination across the critical infrastructure sectors. As a Nation, closer partnerships with the private sector are crucial in providing commodities and support to disaster survivors.

What Will Change?

The fourth edition of the NRF will reflect the relationship between business, industry, and infrastructure and will better align the Protection and Response Frameworks. Likely updates include:

- Additional emphasis on non-governmental capabilities to include the role of individuals and private sector/industry partners in responding to disasters
- A new Emergency Support Function to leverage existing coordination mechanisms between the government and infrastructure owners/operators
- Focus on outcomes-based response through the prioritization of the rapid stabilization of life-saving and life sustaining lifelines

Community Lifelines

A lifelines construct, focused on outcomes-based stabilization efforts, will be included in the NRF update.

Lifelines definition

A lifeline provides indispensable service that enables the continuous operation of critical business and government functions, and is critical to human health and safety or economic security (i.e., safety and security; food, water, sheltering; health and medical; energy [power and fuel]; communications; transportation; and hazardous material).

Why a lifelines construct?

Decision-makers must rapidly determine the scope, complexity, and interdependent impacts of a disaster. Applying the lifelines construct will allow decision-makers to:

- Prioritize, sequence, and focus response efforts towards maintaining or restoring the most critical services and infrastructure
- Utilize a common lexicon across various stakeholders
- Promote a response that facilitates unity of purpose and better communication amongst the whole community
- Clarify which components of the disaster require cross-sector coordination

What Will Not Change?

The updated NRF will continue to focus on the capabilities necessary to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs during disasters. The NRF will continue to be scalable, flexible and adaptable, using the core capabilities identified in the [National Preparedness Goal](#).

For More Information


For the latest information on the update, please visit <http://www.fema.gov/national-planning-frameworks> and email NRF@fema.dhs.gov to be informed of opportunities to provide feedback.

Authorities

***Deployable Training Division
Joint Staff J7***

The overall classification is

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

Challenges

- **Identifying the relationship between authority and legitimacy**
- **Understanding how law and policy define authority**
- **Leveraging authorities and capabilities across mission partners**
- **Developing and delegating authorities**

Authority and Legitimacy

- Adhering to clear legal authority fosters legitimacy
- Perception of legitimacy brings support, access, and capabilities

Soleimani Strike



Iran letter to UN (3 Jan 20)

- A terrorist attack and criminal assassination.
- “...the United States shall bear full responsibility for all consequences.”



U.S. letter to UN (8 Jan 20)

- An exercise of our inherent right of self-defense (Article 51 of the UN Charter) in response to a series of escalating threats and armed attacks by Iran and its proxies.

19 Jun 19 – Iran shoots down UAS
18 Jul 19 – Iranian UAS threatens USS BOXER
27 Dec 19 – U.S. CTR killed in militia attack
29 Dec 19 – U.S. strikes 5 militia targets

31 Dec 19 – Iran backed militias attack USEMB
2 Jan 20 – U.S. strike kills Gen Soleimani
7 Jan 20 – Iranian ballistic missile attack

Defining Authorities - Law and Policy

CJTF-OIR Leaflet Drop (2015)



Law

- AUMF; Host Nation Consent; Art 51, UN Charter
- Law of Armed Conflict
 - Tankers are lawful military targets
 - Civilian drivers may be determined to be acceptable collateral damage
 - Duty to warn civilians if conditions permit, but need not be specific

Policy

- Minimize civilian casualties
 - *Who are the drivers?*
- Maintain legitimacy

Operational Solution

Warn drivers ahead of strikes

Leveraging Authorities and Capabilities

Whole-of-Government

Comprehensive Approach

United States Code

- Title 6 (Homeland Security)
- Title 10 (Armed Forces)
- Title 14 (US Coast Guard)
- Title 18 (Federal Offenses / DOJ / FBI)
- Title 22 (Foreign Relations / DOS)
- Title 32 (National Guard)
- Title 50 (War & National Defense)

International

- International Agreements / Treaties
- Customary International Law
- Partner / Host Nation Law and Policy
- United Nations Charter
- NATO Regulations
- Coalition Caveats and Red Cards
- NGO / IGO Policies

National Security Strategy 2017

"[Military] in combination with other elements of national power, is ready to protect Americans against sophisticated challenges to national security."

National Defense Strategy (Summary) 2018

"Our allies and partners provide complementary capabilities and forces along with unique perspectives, regional relationships, and information that improve our understanding of the environment and expand our options."

Whole of Government - JIATF South




“With so many agencies cooperating, JIATF-South has access to a potent package of legal authorities. What one component does not have authority to do, another has. For example, DOD cannot make arrests or conduct criminal investigations, but other partners can...these diverse authorities mean that JIATF-South does not have to ask ‘mother may I’ when chasing smugglers.”

- Christopher J. Lamb and Evan Munsing, “Strategic Perspectives 5, Joint Interagency Task Force-South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2011




Relationship Environment in Liberia



Developing and Delegating Authorities


- **Activities drive authorities**
 - What problem am I trying to solve?
 - What actions am I considering?
 - What authorities are required?
 - Who holds authorities currently?
 - Internal, HHQ, supporting org / nation
 - Even if I can, should I exercise authority?

- **Appropriate delegation speeds decision making**
 - Requires balancing risk
 - Tied to seminars:
 - Setting Conditions
 - Guidance and Intent



- **Linked to Mission Command**
 - Intent
 - Understanding
 - Trust

ROE Vignette



- *Use of force is regulated by ROE, authorized by mission orders, and executed per guidance and intent*
- *National level decisions on use of force are heavily influenced by policy*
- *Commanders seek robust ROE delegation to support agile operations*

Key Takeaways

- Perception of legitimacy brings support and access to capabilities
- Law and policy provides the framework for operational solutions
- Develop a common understanding of authorities across mission partners to increase capabilities
- Activities drive authorities
- Delegate authorities to the lowest appropriate level

References

- **DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**
- **Joint Pub 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 13**
- **National Security Strategy 2017**
- **Summary of the National Defense Strategy 2018**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Authorities Focus Paper, 2nd Edition, Oct 2016**

United States Code (U.S.C.)

Title	Short Title	Descriptive / Applicability
5	Government Organization and Employees	Agency organization and establishment of procedures for civilian workforce including functions and responsibilities as well as employment recruitment and retention.
6	Domestic Security	Establishes and organizes DHS, national emergency management requirements, and the national preparedness system. Includes applicable law on security and accountability for ports and borders as well as cybersecurity. (Homeland Security)
10	Armed Forces	Organization of DOD and general military powers; establishes active and reserve command structure within DOD (OSD, JCS and the Services). Regulates DoD personnel to include manning authorizations, discipline, training and career progression (including Joint qualification) as well as regulations on procurement. Also includes designated excepted civilian service, e.g., Cyber. (Homeland Defense)
14	Coast Guard	Establishes organization and powers, including law enforcement and other duties of the regular, reserve and auxiliary Coast Guard. Provides for military capability in support of DHS; capability also used under Title 10 when assigned in support of DoD.
18	Crimes and Criminal Procedure	Defines federal crimes, criminal procedure, prisons and prisoners and associated regulations. Includes the Posse Comitatus Act, forbidding federalized (T10) military conducting law enforcement. Department of Justice (DOJ) lead agency in accordance with Title 28 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure).
19	Customs Duties	Foreign trade zones; tariffs, trade negotiation and agreements, and smuggling
22	Foreign Relations and Intercourse	Provides authority for diplomatic and consular courts and service. Provides for preservation of friendly foreign relations including Mutual Defense and Security Assistance Programs; protection of vessels on international and territorial waters and protections of citizens abroad. It also provides for authorities relating to regulation of foreign missions. Significant legal basis for HA / DR / NEO. Assigns Department of State (DOS) as lead agency.
32	National Guard (NG)	Provides authority for trained / equipped NG in support of federal mission requirements. Additionally provides authority for DOD domestic missions to be conducted by NG under C2 of respective Governors, exempt from Posse Comitatus Act; or mobilization of NG forces to active federal duty (Title 10). Grants authority for SecDef to also provide funds to Governors to employ NG units to conduct Homeland Defense activities, as SecDef determines to be necessary and appropriate for NG units.
33	Navigation and Navigable Waters	International rules for navigation at sea Authorizes Navy/USCG exemption from certain rules. Regulations for suppression of piracy. Collision prevention / responsibilities.
42	Public Health / Welfare	Provides authority for federal disaster preparedness and assistance (Stafford Act as it relates to DSCA)
50	War and National Defense	Outlines the role of war and National Defense. Includes regulations on CIA, foreign intelligence and covert action.

Rules of Engagement (ROE) Considerations for the JTF Commander

Staff ROE development and approval process:

- ___ Is ROE development an integrated part of crisis action planning (CAP)?
- ___ Is ROE development operator-led (J3 / J35 / J5), with the SJA in support?
- ___ Is there a formal staff process for ROE development (ROE Working Group)?
- ___ Does the ROE WG have the right subject-matter experts?
- ___ Is there a process for the Joint Operations Center (JOC) to interface with the ROE WG?
- ___ Is there dialogue on ROE between your staff and higher and lower headquarters' staffs?
- ___ Is there interagency and interorganizational liaison with your staff regarding ROE?
- ___ Are allied or coalition partners involved in ROE development?
- ___ Does the ROE, along with your intent and guidance to create clear use of force policy?
- ___ Does the ROE support higher headquarters' intent and guidance?
- ___ Did your staff thoroughly war game and crosswalk the operation plan or order (including any branches and sequels) and the ROE to ensure that subordinate commanders have the *authority* to take all appropriate action to deter, pre-empt, and/or counter the full range of possible threat reactions without having to request additional supplemental ROE?
- ___ Did your staff thoroughly war game and crosswalk the operation plan or order (including any branches and sequels) and the ROE to ensure that subordinate commanders have *all necessary means available* to accomplish their missions and to defend their units and other US forces in the vicinity?
- ___ Do your staff and subordinate commanders understand that nothing contained in the ROE limits a commander's inherent right and obligation to take all appropriate action to defend his or her unit and other US forces in the vicinity?
- ___ Do your staff and subordinate commanders understand the permissive nature of the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE)?
- ___ Do your staff's standing operating procedures assign responsibility and establish effective procedures for developing, requesting, authorizing, disseminating, training, monitoring, assessing, and modifying the ROE in a timely manner?
- ___ Are all ROE messages that contain numbered supplemental measures classified at least CONFIDENTIAL and numbered serially (e.g., serial 1, 2, 3 ..., as opposed to serial 1, change 1; serial 1, change 2)?

- ___ Are all ROE messages clear, concise, and easily understood in a single reading, with all key terms defined?
- ___ Do ROE request messages contain a justification for each supplemental measure requested?
- ___ Does each ROE authorization message contain all of the supplemental measures currently in effect, whether changed or not, so that subordinates need only keep the current message to have all of the ROE currently in effect?
- ___ Do you, your staff, and your subordinate commanders fully understand the limitations of your allies' or coalition partners' national ROE? When your allies' or coalition partners' national ROE are incompatible, how do you plan to maintain unity of effort and avoid potential conflicts? Will forces or tasks be separated geographically and/or functionally?
- ___ If you approve any supplemental measures that restrict the use of force, do your subordinate commanders have the means available to comply with those restrictions? (Example: If you approve a supplemental measure requiring your forces to "observe" indirect fire directed against targets in areas of civilian concentration, do your subordinate commanders have the means to "observe" those fires?)

Some key ROE issues:

- ___ Designating and defining hostile forces.
- ___ Clear guidance on what constitutes hostile intent in a given situation? (Example: If a military aircraft of country x were to do a, b, and c in the vicinity of a unit, the unit commander should consider the behavior as a demonstration of hostile intent and may engage the aircraft in defense of his or her unit.)
- ___ Designating and defining collective self-defense (i.e., defense of designated forces as well as designated persons and property).
- ___ Cross-border reconnaissance, direct action operations, and personnel recovery.
- ___ Use of weapon systems subject to special restrictions, including riot control agents, anti-personnel land mines, and fires in areas of civilian concentration.
- ___ Treatment of civilians, including the authority to stop, search, and detain them, and to seize their property.
- ___ Allied or coalition ROE do not limit the inherent right and obligation of US commanders to execute unit self-defense.

Bottom line: Do the ROE give your subordinate commanders the flexibility they need to get the job done?

★ ★ ★

U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China Sea

PRESS STATEMENT

MICHAEL R. POMPEO, SECRETARY OF STATE

JULY 13, 2020

The United States champions a free and open Indo-Pacific. Today we are strengthening U.S. policy in a vital, contentious part of that region — the South China Sea. We are making clear: Beijing's claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are completely unlawful, as is its campaign of bullying to control them.

In the South China Sea, we seek to preserve peace and stability, uphold freedom of the seas in a manner consistent with international law, maintain the unimpeded flow of commerce, and oppose any attempt to use coercion or force to settle disputes. We share these deep and abiding interests with our many allies and partners who have long endorsed a rules-based international order.

These shared interests have come under unprecedented threat from the People's Republic of China (PRC). Beijing uses intimidation to undermine the sovereign rights of Southeast Asian coastal states in the South China Sea, bully them out of offshore resources, assert unilateral dominion, and replace international law with "might makes right." Beijing's approach has been clear for years. In 2010, then-PRC Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi told his ASEAN counterparts that "China is a big country and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact." The PRC's predatory world view has no place in the 21st century.



The PRC has no legal grounds to unilaterally impose its will on the region. Beijing has offered no coherent legal basis for its "Nine-Dashed Line" claim in the South China Sea since formally announcing it in 2009. In a unanimous decision on July 12, 2016, an Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention – to which the PRC is a state party – rejected the PRC's maritime claims as having no basis in international law. The Tribunal sided squarely with the Philippines, which brought the arbitration case, on almost all claims.

As the United States has previously stated, and as specifically provided in the Convention, the Arbitral Tribunal's decision is final and legally binding on both parties. Today we are aligning the U.S. position on the PRC's maritime claims in the SCS with the Tribunal's decision. Specifically:

- ◆ The PRC cannot lawfully assert a maritime claim – including any Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) claims derived from Scarborough Reef and the Spratly Islands – vis-a-vis the Philippines in areas that the Tribunal found to be in the Philippines’ EEZ or on its continental shelf. Beijing’s harassment of Philippine fisheries and offshore energy development within those areas is unlawful, as are any unilateral PRC actions to exploit those resources. In line with the Tribunal’s legally binding decision, the PRC has no lawful territorial or maritime claim to Mischief Reef or Second Thomas Shoal, both of which fall fully under the Philippines’ sovereign rights and jurisdiction, nor does Beijing have any territorial or maritime claims generated from these features.
- ◆ As Beijing has failed to put forth a lawful, coherent maritime claim in the South China Sea, the United States rejects any PRC claim to waters beyond a 12-nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands (without prejudice to other states’ sovereignty claims over such islands). As such, the United States rejects any PRC maritime claim in the waters surrounding Vanguard Bank (off Vietnam), Luconia Shoals (off Malaysia), waters in Brunei’s EEZ, and Natuna Besar (off Indonesia). Any PRC action to harass other states’ fishing or hydrocarbon development in these waters – or to carry out such activities unilaterally – is unlawful.
- ◆ The PRC has no lawful territorial or maritime claim to (or derived from) James Shoal, an entirely submerged feature only 50 nautical miles from Malaysia and some 1,000 nautical miles from China’s coast. James Shoal is often cited in PRC propaganda as the “southernmost territory of China.” International law is clear: An underwater feature like James Shoal cannot be claimed by any state and is incapable of generating maritime zones. James Shoal (roughly 20 meters below the surface) is not and never was PRC territory, nor can Beijing assert any lawful maritime rights from it.

The world will not allow Beijing to treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire. America stands with our Southeast Asian allies and partners in protecting their sovereign rights to offshore resources, consistent with their rights and obligations under international law. We stand with the international community in defense of freedom of the seas and respect for sovereignty and reject any push to impose “might makes right” in the South China Sea or the wider region.


Guidance and Intent



***Deployable Training Division
Joint Staff J7***

The overall classification is


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
Challenges

- **Leveraging JSCP-driven planning to inform Globally Integrated Operations (GIO)**
- **Dedicating enough time to understand the operational environment and identify the problem**
- **Leveraging assessment and CClRs to deepen understanding and to inform decision making**

Operational Art




Design and Planning Continuum



Insights

- *Need to spend time up front on determining the problem. Requires understanding and dialogue. Commander-centric*
- *Framing of the problem informs subsequent planning*
- *Commanders guide both design and planning*
- *Senior leaders on the staff – manage the continuum...*


Reframing the Problem



Insights

- *Assessment identifies **change** in operational environment*
- *Commander identifies **change** in strategic guidance*
- *Either **change** may drive requirement for reframing*
- *Operations don't stop during reframing – concurrent actions*
- *Consider who you leverage for problem framing and design*

Assessment



Key Takeaways

- **Commander's touchpoints are vital to reframe the problem and guide the planning effort**
- **Consideration of the problem in operational design ensures effective planning**
- **Revisit design in order to reframe the problem in light of the current OE**
- **A robust assessment process is essential to reframe the problem and support ongoing planning efforts**

References

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- **Joint Pub 5-0, “Joint Planning,” 16 Jun 2017**
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- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) Focus Paper, 4th Edition, Jan 2020**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Design and Planning Focus Paper, 1st Edition, Jul 2013**

JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 January 2017, Incorporating Change 1, 22 October 2018


Quick Reference

What is Operational Art?

"Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. It is a thought process to mitigate the ambiguity and uncertainty of a complex OE and develop insight into the problems at hand. Operational art also promotes unified action by enabling JFCs and staffs to consider the capabilities, actions, goals, priorities, and operating processes of interagency partners and other interorganizational participants, when they determine objectives, establish priorities, and assign tasks to subordinate forces. It facilitates the coordination, synchronization, and, where appropriate, the integration of military operations with activities of other participants, thereby promoting unity of effort."

- JP 3-0 (Chap II)

Levels of Warfare



12 Principles of Joint Operations

- ♦ Objective ♦ Offensive ♦ Mass ♦ Maneuver
- ♦ Economy of Force ♦ Unity of Command
- ♦ Security ♦ Surprise ♦ Simplicity
- ♦ Restraint ♦ Perseverance ♦ Legitimacy

Restraint – Prudent application of force IAW acceptable ROE

Perseverance – Prepared for measured, protracted application of capability

Legitimacy – Perception that authority is genuine; willing acceptance

- JP 3-0 (Appendix A)

Elements of Operational Design

Objective: clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation should be directed.

Centers of Gravity: source of power that provides moral or physical strength or will to act.

Lines of Operation/Effort: physical and logical; linkage of actions and decisive pts/objectives.

Termination: specified conditions that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded.

Military End State: set of conditions beyond which the President does not require the military.

Effects: physical or behavioral states that result from an action or actions.

Decisive Points: place, event, factor of marked advantage; keys to attacking COGs.

Direct and Indirect Approach: ways to attack the COG; balance both, seek seams.

Anticipation: situational awareness. Looking to bring possible events to pass.

Operational Reach: lines of ops over distance and duration.

Culmination: point in time/space which operation no longer has momentum.

Arranging Operations: combine simultaneous and sequential ops.

Forces and Functions: focus attacks on forces, functions, or combination.

-JP 3-0 (Chap II) / JP 5-0 (Chap III)

Organizing Operational Areas (OAs)

- Area of Responsibility (AOR)
- Theater of War
- Theater of Operations
- Joint Operations Area (JOA)
- Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA)
- Joint Security Area (JSA)
- Amphibious Operations Area (AOA)
- Area of Operations (AO)
- Contiguous and Noncontiguous OAs

- JP 3-0 (Chap IV)

Notional OPLAN Phases

- Phase 0 - Shape
- Phase 1 - Deter
- Phase 2 - Seize Initiative
- Phase 3 - Dominate
- Phase 4 - Stabilize
- Phase 5 - Enable Civil Authority

S-D-S-D-S-E

- JP 3-0 (Chap V)

Joint Functions

- Command and Control
- Intelligence
- Fires
- Movement and Maneuver
- Protection
- Sustainment
- Information

- JP 3-0 (Chap III)

Campaign – a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a military strategic or operational objective within a given time and space.

Major Operation – a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area.

Campaigns and Major Operations include varying combinations of **Offensive**, **Defensive**, and **Stability** Operations.


- JP 3-0 (Chap V)

Organizing the Joint Force

1. **Joint Force Options:** Combatant Commands (Unified; Specified); Subordinate Unified Command; Joint Task Force.
2. **Component Options:** Service Components (e.g., ARFOR); Functional Components (e.g., JFACC); Combination.
3. **Coalition Option (JP 3-16):** Parallel Command, Lead Nation Command, and Integrated Command (e.g., NATO).

- JP 3-0 (Chap IV)

Unified Action




- JP 3-0 (Chap I)

Examples of Military Operations and Activities

- Stability Activities
- Defense Support of Civil Authorities
- Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
- Recovery
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
- Peace Operations
- Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
- CBRNE Response
- Foreign Internal Defense
- Counterdrug Operations
- Combating Terrorism
- Counterinsurgency
- Homeland Defense
- Mass Atrocity Response
- Security Cooperation
- Military Engagement

- JP 3-0 (Chap V)

Range of Military Operations



- JP 3-0 (Chap V)