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 - Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments
 - OFDA (Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance) Quick Reference Guide
 - National Response Framework Information Sheet
- Globally Integrated Operations Insights and Considerations
 - Global Military Integration Executive Summary for Capstone Fellows
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- Setting Conditions
- Guidance and Intent
 - JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 January 2017, Incorporating Change 1, 22 October 2018 Quick Reference

1

Welcome to the CAPSTONE Joint Operations Module (JOM)



Introduction and Course Overview

Col John Schaar, USMC Chief, Deployable Training Division Joint Staff J7

The overall classification is




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- Who we are
- CAPSTONE / Joint Operations Module
 Overview
- Admin
- Force Health Protection
- Group Assignments
- Senior Mentor

Deployable Training Division



CAPSTONE Joint Operations Module (JOM)

CAPSTONE Learning Areas:

- National Security Strategy & Instruments of National Power
- Joint Operational Art
- Geo-Strategic Concepts
- Joint Strategic Leader Development

JOM Premise

- Discuss challenges you may likely face in the future
 - Captured from Combatant Commands & JTF Headquarters worldwide
- Draw out your ideas / discussion
- Move discussion toward experience-based solutions <u>leveraging Senior</u> <u>Fellow experience</u> (*in a non-attribution environment*)
- Emphasis on peer-to-peer learning
- Sharing Insights and Best Practices culled from headquarters worldwide

Seminar construct

• Challenges slide (initial focus) - define the problem...

A Comprehensive Approach to Unified Action



The overall classification is

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Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper

Interorganizational Cooperation

Fifth Edition

Deployable Training Division Joint Staff J7

> April 2018 Approved for public release

> > UNCLASSIFIED

Challenges

- Developing and aligning <u>Globally</u> <u>Integrated Operations</u> in a complex environment
- Supporting comprehensive approach <u>at</u> <u>both strategic and operational levels</u>
- Achieving <u>unity of effort</u> among interorganizational mission partners

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH <u>doctrinal</u>, <u>JP-1</u> 12 July 2017, <u>JP-3</u> 17 Jan 2017:

"Armed Forces of the United States are <u>most effective</u> when employed as a joint force. This <u>'comprehensive approach</u>,' involving <u>all participating organizations</u> both military and non-military within an operational area, requires the JFC to <u>understand the capabilities</u>, <u>limitations</u>, and <u>mandates of those organizations</u> involved and to effectively <u>communicate joint force</u> missions..." UNCLASSIFIED

A Comprehensive Approach to Global Integration



"We recognize the invaluable advantages that our strong relationships with allies and partners deliver.....Allies and partners magnify our power."

- 2017 Nat'l Security Strategy



"At its root, ensuring our national security requires us to ... lead and sustain a stable and open international system underwritten by strong democratic alliances, partnerships, multilateral institutions and rules."

- Interim Nat'l Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021

"Effectively expanding the competitive space requires combined actions with the U.S. interagency to employ all dimensions of national power." "Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy, providing a durable, asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival can match."

- 2018 National Defense Strategy




"The 2018 NMS acknowledges the unique contributions of allies and partners, a strategic source of strength for the Joint Force."

- 2018 National Military Strategy

Insights

- Global Integration not purely military; means integrating all instruments of national • power (DIME: diplomatic, informational, military, economic – PRC planners call this "comprehensive national power")
- Such integration, and US-led global narrative of shared values, generates partnership • and unity of effort -- provides US asymmetric advantage in competition and conflict


Supporting a Comprehensive Approach



<u>Insights</u>

- Understand DOD's complementary <u>support of the other instruments</u> of power (D-I-E)
- Developing a <u>shared visualization</u> of the operational environment requires <u>interaction</u> <u>with external mission partners</u>
- Situation is dynamic requiring <u>continuous dialogue</u>; guidance and intent evolve to adapt to changing conditions

Integrating with Partners



<u>Insights</u>

- Operate as an integral, nested part of a <u>whole-of-government and coalition</u> effort
- <u>Share awareness</u> and implement a sustainable and effective global battle rhythm
- Be prepared to assume a <u>supporting role</u> to other interorganizational stakeholders
- Leader / <u>Commander sets the tone for integration</u> with partners

Key Takeaways

- Comprehensive Approach <u>promotes unity of effort</u> among stakeholders
- Global Integration necessitates a <u>comprehensive</u> approach <u>from the tactical to the strategic levels</u>
- The <u>military</u> instrument of national power <u>often supports</u> diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments

"In this age, I don't care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are, if you cannot create harmony – even vicious harmony – on the battlefield based on <u>trust</u> across service lines, across coalition and national lines, and across civilian / military lines, you really need to go home... - General James N. Mattis, USMC, June 2010

"I say you speak of having **plans** and power for war; but *they are* mere words. Now in whom do you **trust?**" (Assyrian commander during siege of Jerusalem to Hezekiah's staffer)

- Isaiah 36:5

PRESIDENT TRUMP'S LETTER OF INSTRUCTION TO CHIEFS OF MISSION

1. The President's Letter of Instruction (PLOI) to Chiefs of Mission (COM) is the primary mechanism for communicating the President's foreign-policy priorities and defining COM authority and security responsibility. The PLOI has generally been revised by each new administration and sent to all Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed Chiefs of Mission. The letter also provides instructions regarding the security of U.S. government personnel and dependents. President Trump has approved the language for his PLOI (paragraph 7). Each Senate-confirmed COM will receive a personal letter signed by the President. The Office of Presidential Appointments (HR/PAS) is coordinating with the White House on the personal letters. After the President's signature of the letters, HR/PAS will facilitate the delivery to each COM. COMs should share the full text of the new letter with others in their mission, especially their country team.

Begin text:

Dear Mr. / Madam Ambassador:

I want to extend my personal best wishes and appreciation for your willingness to serve our country as the United States Government's representative to [country].

I know that you will undertake your responsibilities for representing the United States abroad with dedication. Our primary commitment is to the security and prosperity of all Americans. My National Security Strategy outlines four vital national interests that guide our foreign policy, and you will be at the front line of our efforts to: protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life; promote American prosperity; preserve peace through strength; and advance American influence.

Foremost, we must protect the security of Americans at home and around the world by confronting threats before they reach our border. You will play an integral part in our efforts to counter extremism and defeat terrorist groups, support conditions that strengthen stability and sovereignty, and protect basic human freedoms. Your leadership is vital to maintaining and enhancing the security and well-being of our diplomatic personnel, and supporting American citizens overseas.

National security and prosperity depend on a strong and growing American economy. You must work to promote free, fair, and reciprocal trade through bilateral trade and investment strategies, redress unfair trade practices, and support American businesses abroad. We must fight corruption and work to build fair and vibrant markets and a stable international economy. It is also imperative that we protect our intellectual property, a product of our Nation's innovative culture and a key advantage that we cannot afford to lose.

We will also preserve peace through strength. American strength, leadership, and confidence deter wars, promote peace, and protect our friends. The world is a competitive place. We face revisionist powers, rogue nations, and transnational actors that threaten our prosperity and security, and challenge our influence. Technology and information have accelerated these

competitions and generated new means of undermining our interests short of direct confrontation. America must compete through strategies that integrate all tools of national power, including diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, intelligence, and military.

Americans benefit from deep, sustained, and focused engagement with the rest of the world. We must lead with robust traditional and public diplomacy in bilateral, regional, multilateral, and public forums to advance American influence and shape the rules of the road. Allies and partners magnify our power and enhance our influence. We must strengthen these relationships based on the principle of cooperation with reciprocity, in which all partners contribute their fair share to advancing common goals. We will not impose our values, but we will encourage aspiring partners to strengthen their sovereignty and realize the benefits of free markets and individual liberty. We must use diplomatic and development tools to catalyze the mutually beneficial political, economic, and societal relationships that strengthen security partnerships and build trading partners. We will champion American values and stand with those who seek freedom.

In everything we do abroad, we are guided by our values and disciplined by our interests. By representing the United States and leading your Mission, you will help my Administration realize a bright vision for the future. A world that supports American interests and reflects our values makes America more secure and more prosperous.

This letter contains your detailed instructions as my personal representative and Chief of the United States Mission to [country]. As Chief of Mission, you have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all executive branch personnel, activities, and operations in [country]. This responsibility extends to all executive branch personnel, regardless of their employment categories or location, within your geographic area of responsibility. Unless United States law or guidance approved by me specifically provides otherwise, the only exceptions to your authority are personnel and elements in [country] under the command of a Geographic Combatant Commander; Voice of America (VOA) correspondents on official assignment; and United States Government executive branch employees officially on the staff of an international organization and performing the functions of that organization. [Where applicable, language will be added to address countries in which multiple COMs reside/operate such as countries with U.S. missions to international organizations and countries where a bilateral COM temporarily hosts another bilateral COM.]

You will report to me through the Secretary of State. Under my direction, the Secretary of State is, to the fullest extent of the law, responsible for the overall coordination of all United States Government activities and operations abroad. The only authorized channel for instruction to you is from the Secretary or from me, unless the Secretary or I personally direct otherwise. All executive branch agencies with employees in [country] must keep you fully informed at all times of their current and planned activities. You have the right to see all communications to or from executive branch agencies and their employees serving under your authority, however transmitted, except those specifically exempted by law or guidance approved by me.

You should work with the agencies of your host government, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, international organizations, and our military as appropriate to leverage initiatives as required by law or in support of the policies of my Administration.

To ensure the best possible coordination, I direct that you and the Geographic Combatant Commander keep each other fully and currently informed and that you routinely coordinate on all activities of mutual interest. Any disagreements that cannot be resolved with the Geographic Combatant Commander must be reported to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense for resolution.

You and the Geographic Combatant Commander must continually consult and coordinate responses to common threats against our personnel and facilities in [country] and assist one another, within allocated resources, to facilitate the secure implementation of my foreign policy priorities. Unless an agreement between the Secretary of State and the head of another agency provides otherwise, you are responsible for the security of all United States Government personnel on official duty in [country], except for personnel and elements in [country] under the command of a Geographic Combatant Commander, VOA correspondents on official assignment, United States Government executive branch employees officially on the staff of an international organization and performing functions of that organization, or the authorized accompanying dependents of any of these categories of United States Government personnel. Your security responsibilities also include the protection of authorized accompanying dependents of personnel under your security responsibility. I expect you to take direct and full responsibility for the security of your Mission and all the personnel for whom you are responsible, regardless of their location. I also expect you to support counterintelligence and counterterrorism activities that enhance the security of United States interests abroad and that have implications for the homeland.

You are responsible for ensuring the effective performance of the personnel and programs under your authority and for promoting the protection and appropriate handling of United States Government information. You should promote a culture of equal opportunity and ensure that any misconduct, including discrimination and harassment of any kind, and poor performance are addressed appropriately.

To maximize cost-effectiveness and minimize security risks to Americans, the number of United States Government personnel must be kept to the minimum necessary to implement my legal duties and foreign policy priorities. Unless a clear benefit to the United States Government justifies otherwise, all functions that can be performed effectively and efficiently by personnel based in the United States or at regional offices overseas should be performed in those locations. Similarly, you should ensure the greatest possible use of the expertise of host country citizens and outsource functions when it is effective and efficient to do so, consistent with any counterintelligence or other security concerns. Should you find the Mission's staffing to be either excessive or inadequate for the effective advancement of priority goals and objectives, you should initiate staffing changes in accordance with established procedures.

Every executive branch agency must obtain your approval before changing the size, composition, or mandate of their agency staff under your authority. In order to effectively account for personnel and resources, I have directed that agencies submit requests to you to abolish positions that have remained vacant for at least 2 years.

You retain the authority to approve or disapprove staffing requests based on my Administration's policy priorities and your consultations with the requesting agency. If a Department head disagrees with your decision on a staffing matter, that individual may appeal your decision to the Secretary of State. In the event the Secretary is unable to resolve the dispute, the Secretary and the respective Department head will present their differing views to me for decision.

All United States Government personnel other than those personnel and elements under the command of a Geographic Combatant Commander must obtain your approval before entering [country] on official business. To ensure accountability and security for personnel, country clearance must be obtained for temporary duty assignments in [country]. You may refuse country clearance or may place conditions or restrictions on visiting personnel as you determine necessary. While country clearance will generally be managed through automated country clearance systems provided by the Department of State and Department of Defense, you may, at your discretion, authorize use of other processes when necessary.

I am counting on your advice and leadership to help protect and advance America's interests. I expect you to discharge your responsibilities with professional excellence and in full conformance with the law and the highest standards of ethical conduct. Remember as you conduct your duties that you are representing not only me, but also the American people and America's values.

Sincerely,

Donald J. Trump

End text.

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MRN:19 STATE 27839Date/DTG:Jun 14, 2019 / 141949Z JUN 19From:SECSTATE WASHDCAction:ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATEE.O.:13526TAGS:AODE, AMGT, ABUD, ABLD, ASECSubject:PRESIDENT TRUMP'S LETTER OF INSTRUCTION TO CHIEFS OF
MISSION

1. The President's Letter of Instruction (PLOI) to Chiefs of Mission (COM) is the primary mechanism for communicating the President's foreign-policy priorities and defining COM authority and security responsibility. The PLOI has generally been revised by each new administration and sent to all Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed Chiefs of Mission. The letter also provides instructions regarding the security of U.S. government personnel and dependents. President Trump has approved the language for his PLOI (paragraph 7). Each Senate-confirmed COM will receive a personal letter signed by the President. The Office of Presidential Appointments (HR/PAS) is coordinating with the White House on the personal letters. After the President's signature of the letters, HR/PAS will facilitate the delivery to each COM. COMs should share the full text of the new letter with others in their mission, especially their country team.

2. Changes from the previous PLOI ensure consistency with relevant U.S. law and existing presidential directives and clarify points that were past sources of confusion. Those changes are addressed in paragraphs 3-6.

3. Updated Terminology related to Department of Defense (DoD)

Commanders: The new PLOI replaces the term "U.S. area military commander" with the term "Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC)." "Area military commander" is not currently part of DoD's lexicon. This change is consistent with the historical intent of the exception provided for DoD elements performing military missions that the President and U.S. law have determined not to be under COM authority. GCC replaces the previous term in sections of the letter that address authority, security responsibility, and country clearance. Regional responsibilities are currently divided among six GCCs (AFRICOM, CENTCOM,

EUCOM, INDO-PACOM, NORTHCOM, and SOUTHCOM).

4. Voice of America (VOA) Correspondents: Previous PLOIs did not include the exception of VOA correspondents on official assignment abroad from COM authority and the Secretary of State's security responsibility contained within statute (22 U.S.C. \$3927(a); 22 U.S.C. \$4802(a)(1)(A)). The new PLOI includes these exceptions to COM authority and security responsibility to be consistent with those statutory provisions.

5. Country Clearance Requirement for Executive Branch Personnel on the Staff of International Organizations (IO): The President now requires that agencies obtain country clearance for executive-branch personnel on the staff of IOs on permanent or temporary assignments to foreign locations. This change does not place these personnel under COM authority; however, it does provide a mechanism for the Department and post to account for personnel who are the security responsibility of the Secretary of State.

6. Long-Term Vacant Positions: To enhance accountability and efficiency, the President now requires all agencies to submit requests to the COM to abolish positions that have been vacant for at least two years. These requests must be submitted in accordance with existing procedures outlined in National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 38. The COM must decide to approve or disapprove the request based on the President's priorities and consultations with the requesting agency.

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Sincerely,

Donald J. Trump

End text.

8. A modified version of the PLOI containing the same basic text will be sent to missions where multiple COMs are present in a single country. These customized letters will apply to countries with bilateral and multilateral missions and countries where a host bilateral mission is supporting a second bilateral mission.

9. If you have any questions, please contact M/PRI at <u>M_COMAuthority@groups.state.gov</u>.

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On March 8, 2005, the heads of major U.S. humanitarian organizations and U.S. civilian and military leaders met at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) to launch a discussion on the challenges posed by operations in combat and other nonpermissive environments. The Working Group on Civil-Military Relations in Nonpermissive Environments, facilitated by USIP, was created as a result of this meeting.

InterAction, the umbrella organization for many U.S. NGOs, has coordinated the non-governmental delegation.¹ Representatives from the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, and the U.S. Agency for International Development have participated on behalf of the U.S. Government.

Recommended Guidelines

The following guidelines should facilitate interaction between **U.S.** Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Organizations (see Key Terms) belonging to InterAction that are engaged in humanitarian relief efforts in hostile or potentially hostile environments. (For the purposes of these guidelines, such organizations will henceforth be referred to as Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations, or NGHOs.) While the guidelines were developed between the Department of Defense (DOD) and InterAction, DOD intends to observe these guidelines in its dealings with the broader humanitarian assistance community. These guidelines are not intended to constitute advance endorsement or approval by either party of particular missions of the other but are premised on a de facto recognition that U.S. Armed Forces and NGHOs have often occupied the same operational space in the past and will undoubtedly do so in the future. When this does occur, both sides will make best efforts to observe these guidelines, recognizing that operational necessity may require deviation from them. When breaks with the guidelines occur, every effort should be made to explain what prompted the deviation in order to promote transparency and avoid distraction from the critical task of providing essential relief to a population in need.

A. For the U.S. Armed Forces, the following guidelines should be observed consistent with military force protection, mission accomplishment, and operational requirements:

- 1. When conducting relief activities, military personnel should wear uniforms or other distinctive clothing to avoid being mistaken for NGHO representatives. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should not display NGHO logos on any military clothing, vehicles, or equipment. This does not preclude the appropriate use of symbols recognized under the law of war, such as a red cross, when appropriate. U.S. Armed Forces may use such symbols on military clothing, vehicles, and equipment in appropriate situations.
- 2. Visits by U.S. Armed Forces personnel to NGHO sites should be by prior arrangement.
- 3. U.S. Armed Forces should respect NGHO views on the bearing of arms within NGHO sites.
- 4. U.S. Armed Forces should give NGHOs the option of meeting with U.S. Armed Forces personnel outside military installations for information exchanges.
- U.S. Armed Forces should not describe NGHOs as "force multipliers" or "partners" of the military, or in any other fashion

that could compromise their independence and their goal to be perceived by the population as independent.

- 6. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should avoid interfering with NGHO relief efforts directed toward segments of the civilian population that the military may regard as unfriendly.
- 7. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should respect the desire of NGHOs not to serve as implementing partners for the military in conducting relief activities. However, individual NGOs may seek to cooperate with the military, in which case such cooperation will be carried out with due regard to avoiding compromise of the security, safety, and independence of the NGHO community at large, NGHO representatives, or public perceptions of their independence.

B. For NGHOs, the following guidelines should be observed:

- 1. NGHO personnel should not wear military-style clothing. This is not meant to preclude NGHO personnel from wearing protective gear, such as helmets and protective vests, provided that such items are distinguishable in color/appearance from U.S. Armed Forces issue items.
- 2. NGHO travel in U.S. Armed Forces vehicles should be limited to liaison personnel to the extent practical.
- NGHOs should not have facilities co-located with facilities inhabited by U.S. Armed Forces personnel.
- 4. NGHOs should use their own logos on clothing, vehicles, and buildings when security conditions permit.
- 5. NGHO personnel's visits to military facilities/sites should be by prior arrangement.
- 6. Except for liaison arrangements detailed in the sections that follow, NGHOs should minimize their activities at military bases and with U.S. Armed Forces personnel of a nature that might compromise their independence.
- 7. NGHOs may, as a last resort, request military protection for convoys delivering humanitarian assistance, take advantage of essential logistics support available only from the military, or accept evacuation assistance for medical treatment or to evacuate from a hostile environment. Provision of such military support to NGHOs rests solely within the discretion of the military forces and will not be undertaken if it interferes with higher priority military activities. Support generally will be provided on a reimbursable basis in accordance with applicable U.S. law.

C. Recommendations on forms of coordination, to the extent feasible, that will minimize the risk of confusion between military and NGHO roles in hostile or potentially hostile environments, subject to military force protection, mission accomplishment, and operational requirements are:

- 1. NGHO liaison officer participation in unclassified security briefings conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces.
- 2. Unclassified information sharing with the NGHO liaison officer on security conditions, operational sites, location of mines and unexploded ordnance, humanitarian activities, and population movements, insofar as such unclassified information sharing is for the purpose of facilitating humanitarian operations and the security of staff and local personnel engaged in these operations.
- 3. Liaison arrangements with military commands prior to and during military operations to deconflict military and relief activities, including for the purpose of protection of humanitarian installations and personnel and to inform military personnel of humanitarian relief objectives, modalities of operation,







¹ The InterAction delegation includes CARE, Catholic Relief Services, the International Medical Corps, the International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps, Refugees International, Save the Children, and World Vision.

and the extent of prospective or ongoing civilian humanitarian relief efforts.

4. Military provision of assistance to NGHOs for humanitarian relief activities *in extremis* when civilian providers are unavailable or unable to do so. Such assistance will not be provided if it interferes with higher priority military activities.

Recommended Processes

A. Procedures for NGHO/military dialogue during contingency planning for DOD relief operations in a hostile or potentially hostile environment:

- NGHOs engaged in humanitarian relief send a small number of liaison officers to the relevant combatant command for discussions with the contingency planners responsible for designing relief operations.
- NGHOs engaged in humanitarian relief assign a small number of liaison officers to the relevant combatant command (e.g., one liaison was stationed at U.S. CENTCOM for 6 of the first 12 months of the war in Afghanistan, and one was in Kuwait City before U.S. forces entered Iraq in 2003).
- 3. The relevant military planners, including but not limited to the Civil Affairs representatives of the relevant commander, meet with humanitarian relief NGHO liaison officers at a mutually agreed location.

B. Procedures for NGHOs and the military to access assessments of humanitarian needs. U.S. military and NGHO representatives should explore the following:

- 1. Access to NGHO and military assessments directly from a DOD or other U.S. Government Web site.
- Access to NGHO and military assessments through an NGO serving in a coordination role and identifying a common Web site.
- 3. Access to NGHO and military assessments through a U.S. Government or United Nations (UN) Web site.

C. Procedures for NGHO liaison relationships with combatant commands that are engaged in planning for military operations in hostile or potentially hostile environments. (NGHO liaison personnel are provided by the NGHO community):

- The NGHO liaison officer should not be physically located within the military headquarters, but if feasible should be close to it in order to allow for daily contact.
- 2. The NGHO liaison officer should have appropriate access to senior-level officers within the combatant commands and be permitted to meet with them as necessary and feasible.
- 3. There should be a two-way information flow. The NGHO liaison officer should provide details on NGHO capabilities, infrastructure if any, plans, concerns, etc. The military should provide appropriate details regarding minefields, unexploded ordnance, other hazards to NGHOs, access to medical facilities, evacuation plans, etc.
- 4. The NGHO liaison officer should have the opportunity to brief military commanders on NGHO objectives, the Code of Conduct of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and NGOS Engaged in Disaster Relief, the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Guidelines, country-specific guidelines based on the IASC Guidelines, and, if desired, The Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. U.S. Armed Forces personnel should have the opportunity to brief NGHOs, to the extent appropriate, on U.S. Government and coalition goals and policies, monitoring principles, applicable laws and rules of engagement, etc.

5. The NGHO liaison officer could continue as a liaison at higher headquarters even after a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) or similar mechanism is established in-country. Once this occurs, liaison officers of individual NGHOs could begin coordination in-country through the CMOC for civil-military liaison.

D. Possible organizations that could serve as a bridge between NGHOs and U.S. Armed Forces in the field², e.g., U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID's) Office of Military Affairs, State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and the UN's Humanitarian Coordinator:

- 1. If the U.S. Agency for International Development or the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization agree to serve a liaison function, they should be prepared to work with the broader NGHO community in addition to U.S. Government implementing partners.
- 2. The UN's Humanitarian Coordinator or his/her representative could be a strong candidate to serve as liaison because he/she normally would be responsible for working with all NG-HOs and maintaining contact with the host government or a successor regime.

Key Terms

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs): In wider usage, the term NGO can be applied to any nonprofit organization that is independent from government. However, for the purposes of these guidelines, the term NGO refers to a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/ or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 3-08/JP 1-02)

Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations (NGHOs): For the purposes of these guidelines, NGHOs are organizations belonging to InterAction that are engaged in humanitarian relief efforts in hostile or potentially hostile environments. NGHOs are a subset of the broader NGO community.

Independence for NGHOs: Independence is defined in the same way as it is in the Code of Conduct of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and NGOS Engaged in Disaster Relief: Independence is defined as not acting as an instrument of government foreign policy. NGHOs are agencies that act independently from governments. NGHOs therefore, formulate their own policies and implementation strategies and do not seek to implement the policy of any government, except insofar as it co-incides with their own independent policies. To maintain independence, NGHOs will never knowingly—or through negligence—allow themselves, or their employees, to be used to gather information of a political, military, or economically sensitive nature for governments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those that are strictly humanitarian, nor will they act as instruments of foreign policy of donor governments.

InterAction: InterAction is the largest coalition of U.S.-based international development and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations. With over 165 members operating in every developing country, InterAction works to overcome poverty, exclusion, and suffering by advancing basic dignity for all.

² In situations in which there is no actor to serve as a bridge, a U.S. military Civil Affairs cell could serve as a temporary point-of-contact between NGHOs and other elements of the U.S. Armed Forces.



Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC) 2-C-1 jhoc@usaid.gov

jhoc@usaid.gov

Quick Reference Guide

ePath Learning Access

https://jhoc.epathlearning.com/requestAccess/

USAID/OFDA's	Mandate	OFDA (Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance)				
 Save Lives Alleviate Human Suffering Reduce the Economic and Social Imparof Disasters 			 USG Lead for HA/DR USG first responders after disasters Disaster risk reduction/mitigation before disasters 			
Current Activit	ies	Focus is Preparedness, Early Warning, Disaster Relief, Early Recovery				
 Regional Offices in Costa Rica, Hungary, Kenya, Senegal, and Thailand, with humanitarian advisors in New York (USUN), Geneva (USUN), Rome (USUN), and Atlanta (CDC). OFDA Humanitarian Assistance Advisors at AFRICOM, EUCOM, CENTCOM, INDOPACOM, SOUTHCOM (covers NORTHCOM), and SOCOM. Stockpiles of appropriate disaster relief commodities in Miami, Italy, UAE, and Malaysia. Regional experts, technical experts, logistics cell, and surge capacity in Washington, D.C. OFDA responds to an average of 65 disasters in more than 50 countries every year (rapid and slow onset disasters as well as complex emergencies). Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) in the field and Response Management Teams (RMTs) in Washington, D.C., stand up asneeded. Grants to implementing partners such as UN, International Organizations, and NGOs. More than 430 staff worldwide. 						
 Provided more than \$2 billion in humanitarian assistance in fiscal year 2017. DOD-USAID Joint Ops Not all USG HA/DR operations involve DOD, but when they do 						
 Link-up with USAID ASAP. This may be at the Embassy, USAID Mission, or DART in the field Key contact with DART will be one of USAID/OFDA's Civ-Mil Advisors Start talking early: Decide who does what, when Exchange liaison officers - in DC, at the CCMDs, in the field Share information - Keep info unclassified as much as possible Work as one USG team: Joint operations and planning Policy direction comes from the U.S. Ambassador – Chief of Mission authority in country Share capabilities between the JTF and the DART Provide assistance on a "PULL" system, not "PUSH"system DOD can often help with airfield ops and short-haul transport (wholesale not retail) OFDA can help with UN and NGO information and coordination 						
AFRICOM	CENTCOM	EUCOM	INDOPACOM	SOUTHCOM & NORTHCOM	SOCOM	
ofdaAFRICOMHAA M@ofda.gov	Francine Uenuma fuenuma@ofda.gov 571-438-1591 Steve Petzold spetzold@ofda.gov 703-395-6807	Dana Chivers dchivers@ofda.gov 571-594-3937 Jeff Miller jemiller@ofda.gov 703-380-0918	Warren Acuncius wacuncius@ofda.gov 202-344-6358 Katherine Tice ktice@ofda.gov 571-214-3868	Matt Lonnquest mlonnquest@ofda.gov 571-217-9067 Steven Goodwin sgoodwin@ofda.gov 719-554-2272	Sharon McHale smchale@ofda.gov 571-216-2944	
	Albert Gembara (Bahrain agembara@ofda.gov 571-228-1083		Elizabeth Blanchford (Oki) eblanchford@ofda.gov 703-338-2475			
OFDAafricom@ofda.gov https://blogs.intelink.gov/ blogs/africomofda/	OFDAcentcom@ofda.gov https://blogs.intelink.gov/ blogs/centcomofda/	<u>OFDAeucom@ofda.go</u> <u>https://blogs.intelink.gov/</u> <u>blogs/eucomofda/</u>		OFDAsouthcom@ofda.gov OFDAnorthcom@ofda.gov https://blogs.intelink.gov/ blogs/southcomofda/	OFDAsocom@ofda.gov https://blogs.intelink.gov/ blogs/socomofda/	
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MLT Washington Staff

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At the Strategic Level (OSD / JCS)

- Will USAID establish a Response Management Team (RMT) in Wash DC?
 - □ If yes, the phone # is _____& main POC is _____
 - □ Will DOD send a LiaisonOfficer?
 - □ If yes, who:_____Contactinfo:____
- Has there been a request for DOD assistance? And, been approved by SecDef?
- Is USAID part of DOD's planning to include Planords and Exords?
- □ Is USAID/OFDA vetting DOD assistance to the disaster area?

At the Operational Level(Combatant Command)

- Has the CCMD established a communication and coordination link with USAID?
 - Will there be an OFDA Advisor stationed at the CCMD?
 If yes, who: Contactinfo:
- □ Is USAID/OFDA part of CCMD's planning process, providing input on the OPT, at GO/FO briefings, and chopping on documents such as Planords and Exords?
- □ Is USAID/OFDA vetting DOD HA supply deliveries and local purchases to the disaster area?
- Is USAID/OFDA vetting requests for DOD assistance from non-DOD entities?
- □ Has CCMD received authorization to transport non-military and non-USG personnel and supplies on DOD assets?

At the Tactical Level ("JTF")

- □ Has the JTF established contact with ImportantPartners?
 - U.S. Embassy POC:_____Contact:____
 - USAID Mission
 POC: ______Contact: _____
 - USAID/DART POC: _____Contact:_____
 - Local Government POC:_____Contact:_____
 - Other_____POC:_____Contact:_____
- □ Will the USAID/DART attach a Civ-Mil Advisor to theJTF?
 - If yes, who:_____Contactinfo:_____
- Will the JTF attach a Liaison Officer to the USAID/DART?
 - □ If yes, who:_____Contactinfo:___
- □ Has the JTF Commander and the USAID/DART Team Leader linked up?
- □ Is the JTF sharing SITREPS and other info with the USAID/DART and visa versa?
- □ Has the JTF unclassified as much information as possible?
- □ Has the JTF established a system with the USAID/DART for:
 - Requests for Assistance (RFAs) and Mission Tasking Matrix (MITAM) process
 - Joint daily update briefs with CCMD and/or JS
 - DOD excess property deliveries vetted by the USAID/DART and visibility on what's coming
 - □ JTF assets moving non-DOD people and supplies
 - Joint operational planning to include the transition/exit plan
 - Has the JTF planned for a joint press effort with the Embassy and USAID/DART?



Homeland Security

National Response Framework Update (Fourth Edition)

Background

The National Response Framework (NRF), first released in 2008, is a guide for how our Nation responds to all types of disasters and emergencies. Built on the scalable, flexible, and adaptable concepts identified in the National Incident Management System, it is one of the five documents in the suite of National Planning Frameworks. Each covers one preparedness mission area: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, or Recovery.

Why Update the NRF?

When disaster strikes, everyone has a role to play. Government resources alone cannot meet all community needs. As part of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) renewed effort to build a national culture of preparedness, the NRF is being updated to incorporate lessons learned from the unprecedented 2017 hurricane and wildfire season.

The 2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action

<u>Report</u> specifically called for a revision of the NRF to emphasize stabilization of critical lifelines and coordination across the critical infrastructure sectors. As a Nation, closer partnerships with the private sector are crucial in providing commodities and support to disaster survivors.

What Will Change?

The fourth edition of the NRF will reflect the relationship between business, industry, and infrastructure and will better align the Protection and Response Frameworks. Likely updates include:

- Additional emphasis on non-governmental capabilities to include the role of individuals and private sector/industry partners in responding to disasters
- A new Emergency Support Function to leverage existing coordination mechanisms between the government and infrastructure owners/operators
- Focus on outcomes-based response through the prioritization of the rapid stabilization of life-saving and life sustaining lifelines

Community Lifelines

A lifelines construct, focused on outcomes-based stabilization efforts, will be included in the NRF update.

Lifelines definition

A lifeline provides indispensable service that enables the continuous operation of critical business and government functions, and is critical to human health and safety or economic security (i.e., safety and security; food, water, sheltering; health and medical; energy [power and fuel]; communications; transportation; and hazardous material).

Why a lifelines construct?

Decision-makers must rapidly determine the scope, complexity, and interdependent impacts of a disaster. Applying the lifelines construct will allow decision-makers to:

- Prioritize, sequence, and focus response efforts towards maintaining or restoring the most critical services and infrastructure
- Utilize a common lexicon across various stakeholders
- Promote a response that facilitates unity of purpose and better communication amongst the whole community
- Clarify which components of the disaster require cross-sector coordination

What Will Not Change?

The updated NRF will continue to focus on the capabilities necessary to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs during disasters. The NRF will continue to be scalable, flexible and adaptable, using the core capabilities identified in the <u>National Preparedness</u> <u>Goal</u>.

For More Information

For the latest information on the update, please visit <u>http://www.fema.gov/national-planning-frameworks</u> and email <u>NRF@fema.dhs.gov</u> to be informed of opportunities to provide feedback.

Globally Integrated Operations Insights and Considerations


Deployable Training Division Joint Staff J7

The overall classification of slides is

UNCLASSIFIED


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- Adapting to the changing character of war
- Operating across the "Continuum of Conflict" and associated transitions
- Understanding deterrence and risk
- Understanding roles across the Joint Force in today's global environment



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Continuum of Conflict - Plans and Transitions -



Observations


- Global Campaign Plans (GCPs) inform day-to-day campaigning during competition
- Global Integration Framework (GIF) provides a framework for risk-informed strategic decisions at the speed of relevance to adapt to a changing strategic environment
- Global Crisis Options provide ways to deter, confront, and respond (return to competition)

Deterrence

Definition (JP 3-0) **Prevention of action by:**

- The existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction
- And/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits

Deep Understanding / Empathy of Adversary's Decision Calculus



How:

- Confronting malign activity
- Preparedness for Combat Operations
- Assuring Allies and Partners
- Messaging



- Likelihood of being denied the expected benefits of his action
- Likelihood of having excessive costs imposed for taking the action
- Acceptability of restraint as an alternative



Cognitive Effect "Adversary's State of Mind"


> Perception of likelihood to

- Change Behavior
- To Prevent Action


Challenges

- Understanding the Adversary
- Development of options to deter
- Alignment as part of "Integrated Deterrence"
- Assessing success of deterrence

Risk



Globally Integrated Operations - Roles and Authorities -



Challenges

- Understanding roles in the global environment
- Sharing understanding and visualization
- Prioritization
 Observation
- Importance of senior leader dialogue in crisis

- Secretary of Defense: Authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense
- Chairman: Synthesizes regional and functional perspectives on risk, options, and priorities. Principal military advisor to the SecDef and President
- Combatant Commanders:
 - Supported/ing Commanders: A Command authority. Multiple supported CCDRs for the respective mission sets
 - Coordinating Authority: For planning a delegated <u>consultative</u> authority for a problem set. In execution - assesses global campaign and recommends changes
- Services: Force Readiness and Generation

Key Takeaways

- Our central challenge is long-term, strategic competition by revisionist powers
- Leverage Global Campaign Plans, Global Integration Frameworks, and CCMD OPLANs to operate across the continuum of conflict
- Gain a deep understanding of the adversary to inform deterrence and understand risk to force and mission
- Understand the evolving roles across the Joint Force that enable decision making at the speed of relevance

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23 June 2021

Subject: Global Military Integration – Executive Summary for Capstone Fellows

- Purpose: Provide summary of global military integration with a focus on globally integrated operations. Incorporate unclassified portions of CJCSI 3050.01 (Implementing Global Integration and a graphic on insights learned from the past four years of implementation (para 6). Note: CJCSI 3050.01 may be found on SIPRNET in the CJCS Directives Electronic Library (see para 5 below for other references).
- 2. What is Global Integration? Global integration is the arrangement of cohesive military actions in time, space, and purpose, executed as a whole to address transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional challenges. Pursuant to Title 10, U.S. Code, section 153, the Chairman is responsible for matters relating to global military strategic and operational integration. This includes providing advice to the President and Secretary of Defense on ongoing military operations and advising the Secretary on the allocation and transfer of forces to address transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional threats.
 - a. To accomplish global integration, the Joint Force employs a top-down, Chairman-led approach to integrate planning, prioritize resources, mitigate risk, and assess Joint Force progress toward strategic objectives for the Secretary. [Source: CJCSI 3050.01]
 - b. The Chairman is in a unique position to synthesize regional perspectives on risk, options, and priorities into a global perspective and provide military advice to the SecDef and POTUS that accounts for all domains, regions, and challenges without impinging on CCDRs legal and direct chain of command to SecDef and POTUS. [Source: Observation]
 - c. The Joint Force must meet three objectives to achieve global integration. [Source: CJCSI 3050.01]
 - i. First, *senior leaders must be able to make decisions in a complex environment at the speed of conflict*. This requires a common intelligence picture and a shared understanding of global force posture to see operations in real time, visualize opportunities to seize the initiative, and identify trade-offs, risk, and opportunity costs.
 - ii. Second, *operations must be strategically coordinated worldwide, nested within a whole of government approach, and include our allies and coalition partners.* In an environment where requested requirements exceed inventory, force posture must ensure strength, agility, and resilience across regions and domains. Once committed, the Joint Force must rapidly engage adversaries, understand tradeoffs across Combatant Commands (CCMDs), and communicate risk with a global perspective.
 - iii. Finally, global integration enables the *development of a lethal and agile future fighting force.* A balanced inventory of capabilities and capacities ensures the Joint Force's continuous competitive advantage, enabling the force to deter and defeat potential adversaries across the entire continuum of conflict. The Joint Force must also retain the capability to defend the homeland and project power against any other potential adversaries.
 - d. Globally integrated operations retain the proven strength of CCDR-led operations while leveraging the unique position of the Chairman to synthesize regional perspectives on risk,

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options, and priorities into a global perspective. The Chairman provides clear options for tolerable global risk in the form of military advice to the Secretary that prioritizes Joint Force missions, sourcing, and assessments. The Secretary gains a richer understanding of risk to the Joint Force and is better prepared to provide globally informed guidance. [Source: Observation]

- e. KEY TAKE AWAY: Achieving global integration requires the combination of the institutional expertise of the Services and geographic and functional CCMDs to provide precise and timely global military solutions in support of national policy objectives. A comprehensive body of assessments provides a firm analytical foundation to this process. [Source: Observation]
- 3. Why do we need global integration? Strategic Environment. The regional approach the Joint Force long relied on is no longer appropriate to address the global threats that comprise the contemporary strategic environment. <u>Great power competition</u> that is global in scope and encompasses all domains has emerged as the central challenge to employment of Joint Force capabilities. State and non-state actors present increasingly complex challenges by operating across regions, domains, and functions in which the United States was once unchallenged. Factors such as accelerating adversary military modernization, global proliferation of commercial technology, and ease of entry to domains such as space and cyberspace, has led to a relative decline in relative U.S. military competitive advantage. This shift, along with potential adversaries' increasing willingness to employ coercive tools of statecraft that remain below the threshold for a traditional military response, illustrates the character of conflict has likewise changed. [Source: CJCSI 3050.01]
 - a. Peace and war do not constitute a binary construct, but exist along a continuum of conflict. Both state and non-state actors are increasingly exerting influence across not only the military element of power, but also across the diplomatic, information, and economic elements. As stated in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) 2018, "Competitors and adversaries are competing across all dimensions of power, with increased efforts in areas short of armed conflict...violating principles of sovereignty, exploiting ambiguity, and deliberately blurring civil and military targets."
 - b. The Joint Force must be capable of anticipating adversary actions and leveraging transregional, all-domain, and multi-functional responses against multiple challenges in concert with partners. Advanced adversary technologies enable integrated activities across domains that enhance overall strategic effects and support layering of capabilities across numerous functions to create previously unseen problems for the United States. This increased threat complexity is apparent in potential adversaries' abilities to challenge power projection and freedom of maneuver.
 - c. Global demand for forces will continue to exceed available inventory for the foreseeable future. The Joint Force requires ways to sustain now, and to develop and design in the years ahead, a balanced inventory of global, all-domain capabilities and capacity to operate against the Priority Challenge adversaries (Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs)) while remaining prepared for new actors that could threaten the United States and its allies and partners.
 - d. A dynamic, unpredictable security environment with a range of emerging threats requires an innovative global defense posture that is fully integrated with allies and coalition partners. It is a key element in planning, decision making, force management, and force

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development and design and is adjustable as a result of continual assessments of current and future requirements. Appropriate posture enables the Joint Force to maintain a global reach and regional access to facilitate day-to-day campaigning and contingency response. Arrayed against our primary strategic challenges and adversaries, it ensures freedom of maneuver and access to the global commons for free trade and cooperative engagement. Including forward deployed forces and globally positioned war reserve materiel, an overseas network of bases and infrastructure as well as agreements with foreign governments, posture is often the most visible indicator of U.S. national interests and priorities abroad. Strategic direction informs posture.

4. Strategic Guidance

- a. The President and Secretary provide strategic policy guidance and direction to the Joint Force. The National Security Strategy (NSS), the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), and the Unified Command Plan (UCP are the defining elements of national strategy. The NSS highlights the vital national interests and grand strategic approach, which the Joint Force frames its military strategy to support broader government efforts. The CPG provides policy guidance to focus contingency planning efforts across the Department of Defense. The UCP establishes the missions, responsibilities, and areas of responsibility for Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) to enable unity of command of the Armed Forces. This and other presidential policy guidance establish the framework for the Secretary to provide focused direction to the Department of Defense. [Source: CJCSI 3050.01]
- b. The NDS articulates how the Department will contribute to the vital national interests laid out in the NSS. The Defense Planning Guidance provides force development priorities. Together these documents guide the broad direction the Joint Force takes in its programming, planning, and execution of operations. [Source: CJCSI 3050.01]

5. References

- a. National Defense Strategy 2018 (Classified) (SIPRNET)
- b. CJCSI 3050.01 Implementing Global Integration (Classified) 31 Dec 2018 (SIPRNET)
- c. CJCSI.01K Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (Classified) 22 Mar 2019 (SIPRNET)
- d. CJCSI 3141.01F <u>Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans</u> (U) 31 Jan 2019 (JEL)
- e. CJCSM 3105.01 Joint Risk Analysis (U) 14 Oct 2016 (SIPRNET)
- f. CJCSM XXX.XX Execution and Oversight of Global Integration (U) (Draft Document)
- g. JS J7 Decision making for GIO in Crisis (FOUO) 8 Jul 2019 (JEL+)


6. Learning opportunities in Globally integrated operations (Unclassified excerpt of graphic)

7. POC: Mike Findlay, JS J7, DDJT, 757.209.5939, Michael.L.Findlay.Civ@Mail.Mil


Enclosure – Provides informative slides on this topic.

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Enclosure




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INFORMATION PAPER

SUBJECT: Global Integration Frameworks (GIF) Overview

1. <u>Problem</u>. The Joint Force (JF) will have to execute multiple contingency plans simultaneously, spanning various Combatant Command (CCMD) areas of responsibility, in response to a crisis pertaining to any one priority challenge. Resource constraints will prevent fully resourcing multiple plans simultaneously. Within the Department, only the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) has the authority to make cross-CCMD resourcing decisions and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is the military leader best positioned to see across all regions, domains, and functions. The SecDef, with CJCS support, requires a mechanism that enables Global Military Integration to best address global challenges across the spectrum of conflict.

2. <u>**GIFs in Concept</u>**. A GIF is a mechanism to enable Global Military Integration. GIFs facilitate the transitions from day-to-day campaigning, planning, and preparation to JF execution of multi-AOR crisis response by integrating activities across multiple domains, CCMDs, Services, and DoD agencies. GIFs lay the groundwork for global integration from early indications of a crisis to post-crisis recovery and transitioning to a new, post-crisis baseline for day-to-day operational Plan (OPLAN) by providing a point of departure for addressing a potential contingency. The GIF process is comparable to the Joint planning process because it provides a series of analytical steps and an established methodology to guide subsequent planning and execution. Through both product and process, GIFs integrate strategic guidance, relevant contingency plans, and other campaign plans into a global framework that enables senior-leader decision-making through requisite forethought about how to understand and manage risk in regards to anticipated crisis scenarios.</u>

3. <u>GIF Products</u>. Global Integration Frameworks provide several products that aid senior leaders in directing the JF's rapid and effective transition from day-to-day competition to an emerging crisis or contingency, while providing a foundation for risk-informed decision making throughout the crisis. The Strategic Architecture, Strategic Decision Framework (SDF), and Global Crisis Options (GCO) are GIF products that staffs can quickly refine based on the current situation and policy guidance to aid decision-makers. Global Situational Awareness and the JF Risk Assessment are GIF products that are re-generated at time of need, again based upon the situation.

- Strategic Architecture. The Strategic Architecture articulates the JF's operational approach to crisis and conflict. It fosters unity of effort across the JF by creating a common understanding of the Department's objectives and outcomes. The Strategic Architecture accomplishes this by nesting JF-developed strategic objectives with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-provided policy guidance. It then further groups these objectives into lines of operations and efforts.
- Strategic Decision Framework (SDF). The SDF is a product the JF collectively develops

in advance of crisis to anticipate potential strategic decisions and considerations in execution of multiple simultaneous contingency plans pertaining to any one priority challenge. It acts as a cognitive bridge between day-to-day operations and actions necessary to ensure success in crisis or conflict. The SDF is designed to be course-of-action agnostic. It identifies key strategic decisions across a range of domains, sequenced appropriately to forecast potential considerations and requirements throughout a contingency. Each SDF decision is supported by relevant associated information requirements. The SecDef and the CJCS, assisted by their respective staffs, review and update the SDF based on the current situation and policy directives.

- **Global Crisis Options (GCO)**. GCOs serve as a ready-reference that depicts potential JF combinations of operations and actions designed to achieve a desired effect at a specified level of risk. This provides decision makers with alternative approaches to advance objectives and manage risk in a given situation. GCOs include actions to deter in order to reset competition and/or ensure JF preparation for executing a contingency plan. Whether they are deterring or preparing, all GCOs are intended to manage escalation and create decision space for senior leaders. At the time of need, the JF will adapt GCOs to current U.S. priorities, the strategic environment, and the readiness and disposition of the force.
- **Global Situational Awareness.** Requisite situational awareness is a product developed out of an intelligence appreciation of the strategic environment and JF readiness assessment.
 - **Appreciation of the Strategic Environment**. Appreciation of the Strategic Environment consists of an evaluation of current adversary, partner, and third-party intentions, capabilities, and expected reactions. The intelligence community already conducts this appreciation daily and can generate a crisis-specific version in short order.
 - **JF Readiness Assessment**. The JF Readiness Assessment provides decision-makers with a real-time understanding of force laydown, the ability of the JF to meet prioritized global obligations, and any critical force element shortfalls/trade-offs.
- JF Risk Assessment. The JF Risk Assessment is comprised of CCMD and Service risk statements based upon shortfalls risk drivers identified in the JF Readiness Assessment. It also includes potential mitigation options for the risk drivers.


4. <u>**GIF Process</u>**. The GIF review process consists of both templates and repeatable methodologies that result in the development and refinement of GIFs. The JF utilizes the same review process whether during deliberate planning (i.e., routine GIF updates) or crisis planning (i.e., response to an emerging situation). However, the pace of the planning process shifts based on the time available and the degree of similarity between the developing situation and the assumptions made during deliberate planning and crisis.</u>

• **Deliberate Review.** The Joint Staff J5 leads a deliberate and robust DoD-wide process to develop and review GIFs, which typically spans six months. This deliberate process yields the core set of existing products ready for use in crisis. Each GIF is updated on a two-year cycle, or as directed by the CJCS.

- **Crisis Review.** During an emerging crisis, the Joint Staff J3, assisted by Joint Staff J5, leads a rapid and focused DoD-wide process that refines existing GIF products to account for the current situation. J3-updated products provide the SecDef, the CJCS, and other senior leaders with global situational awareness of the environment, an updated assessment of JF readiness to respond, and military options guided by national strategic objectives and policy guidelines. The GIF crisis review enables risk-informed senior-leader decisions that improve JF unity of effort and execution.
- **Process Methodology**. The standardized GIF review process ensures a repeatable system of logical steps for JF application. It informs the development or update of the Strategic Architecture, GCOs, and SDF, while guiding development of global situational awareness and JF risk assessment.
 - **Operational Planning Team (OPT) Process.** The J5-led OPT includes OSD, Joint Staff, Service, and CCMD representatives who collaborate during a deliberate review to create or examine the existing Strategic Architecture, GCOs, and SDF. In crisis, the J3-led OPT adapts these products as required to address the emerging crisis situation.
 - **Development of Global Situational Awareness**. The GIF review begins by improving global situational awareness through two primary contributing activities: a threat assessment and JF prioritization and reallocation analysis. This methodology enables a global assessment of adversary and friendly disposition during both deliberate and crisis planning.
 - **Threat Assessment**. The Defense Intelligence Support Enterprise leads an effort to provide a comprehensive threat and capability estimate, resulting in appreciation of the strategic environment.
 - **Prioritization and Reallocation Analysis**. This process consists of a Joint Staff J3-led analysis of the available resources and readiness of the JF. This includes reviewing force posture, logistics availability, and prioritized force requirements for appropriate contingency and global campaign plans, articulated in current Execution Orders (EXORDs). The GIF includes a standardized methodology for prioritizing tasks and contingency plans for a rapid assessment in crisis, centered around JF ability to fulfill global obligations defined by the National Defense Strategy.
- **Risk Assessment Methodology**. Global situational awareness provides CCMDs and Services with a basis for producing specific risk assessments in accordance with the Joint Risk Analysis Manual (CJCSM 3105.01). The JF articulates specific risks to inform senior leader decisions, such as executing various GCOs, contingency plans, or force reallocation for other missions. The GIF includes a template for describing specific risks, which includes 1) what is threatened (risk to force/mission/objectives), 2) risk drivers (risk from what), and 3) mitigation measures. During a crisis, this process provides information necessary to support senior leader decisions that are conveyed on the SDF.

5. <u>Conclusion</u>. The nature of today's threats demand that the JF execute a globally integrated cross-domain response. This response requires an understanding of available resources while remaining cognizant of risk trade-offs. It must be flexible to the rapidly evolving circumstances. GIFs are designed to meet this demand; effective application of their products and processes will optimize the JF response to emerging crises and enhance senior leader ability to manage the situation.

1



Deployable Training Division Joint Staff J7

The overall classification is




Challenges

- Setting conditions for success
- Understanding roles in Globally Integrated Operations
- Incorporating risk in decision making
- Implementing Mission Command

<u>Command and Control</u>: The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. - Joint Pub 1

Setting Conditions for Success



"Do those things that only you can do as the commander..."


- Build and maintain trust and inclusive relationships with partners
- Share visualization and intent, gain authorities and resources, assess, and plan / manage transitions
- Design C2 to accomplish the mission and evolve as necessary

Understanding Your HQ's Role


- USG role relative to the international (and host nation) response
- US military role relative to the broader USG whole of government approach
- CCMD role relative to other DOD organizations (e.g., other CCMDs and Combat Support Agencies)
- Internal CCMD C2 options



- Where do you fit?
- Who do you work with?
- How to organize?
- Where is risk?




Risk



Support Command Relationship


- Authorities and Responsibilities -



<u>Insights</u>

- Emphasis on "access to" vs "ownership of" capabilities
- Establishing authority states desired effects, and clarifies authorities and priorities
- Empower and promote crosstalk. Will increase resilience, flexibility, and agility

Globally Integrated Operations - Supported / Supporting CCMDs



- Secretary of Defense: Authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense
- Chairman: Synthesizes regional and functional perspectives on risk, options, and priorities. Principal military advisor to the SecDef and President
- Combatant Commanders:
 - Supported/ing Commanders: A Command authority. Multiple supported CCDRs for the respective mission sets
 - Coordinating Authority: For planning a delegated <u>consultative</u> authority for a problem set. In execution - assesses global campaign and recommends changes
- Services: Force Readiness and Generation

Mission Command

"Operating on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding" - CJCS

Definition

The conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission-type orders. - Joint Pub 3-0 <u>Attributes</u>

✓ Intent
✓ Understanding
✓ Trust

"Mission Command is essential at the operational and strategic level."

"Enables speed, agility, and decisiveness at the tactical level while providing the necessary decision space at the higher level for the up and out engagement to anticipate and set conditions."

- Senior Flag Officer

Mission Command

- Challenges and Opportunities -

- In the broader Joint, Interagency, Multinational Environment -

Intent

- Clarity in visualization / intent to subordinates
- Decentralization often decreases risk

Understanding

- Sharing with a diverse group of partners
- Sharing with higher headquarters
- Sharing with subordinates

<u>Trust</u>

- Gaining trust up, down, and across
- Maintaining trust through transitions and change

Key Takeaways

- <u>Senior leaders set conditions</u> by building trust and sharing understanding
- Gain clarity and share understanding of your HQ's role and that of your partners
- Understand the aspects of <u>risk</u> in decisions
- <u>Relationships</u> between commanders are often more important than command relationships
- Set command relationships up front ... then flex

References

- CJCSM 3105.01, "Joint Risk Analysis," 14 Oct 2016
- DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
- Joint Pub 1, "Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States," 25 Mar 2013
- Joint Pub 3-0, "Joint Operations," 17 Jan 2017, Incorporating Change 1, 22 Oct 2018
- Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Mission Command, 2nd Edition, Jan 2020

- Continued -


- Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, JTF C2 and Organization Focus Paper, 2nd Edition, Jan 2020
- Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) Command and Control Organizational Options Focus Paper, 2nd Edition, Aug 2016

Guidance and Intent




Deployable Training Division Joint Staff J7

The overall classification is



- Leveraging Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP)-driven planning to inform Globally Integrated Operations (GIO)
- Dedicating enough time to understand the operational environment and identify the problem
- Leveraging assessment and CCIRs to deepen understanding and to inform decision making

Continuum of Conflict - Plans and Transitions -



Observations

- Global Campaign Plans (GCPs) inform day-to-day campaigning during competition
- Global Integration Framework (GIF) provides a framework for risk-informed strategic decisions at the speed of relevance to adapt to a changing strategic environment
- Global Crisis Options provide ways to deter, confront, and respond (return to competition)


Interview with General James Mattis, USMC (Ret)

at


The Hoover Institution at Stanford University March 6, 2015



Operational Art




Design and Planning Continuum




- Framing of the problem informs subsequent planning
- Commanders guide both design and planning
- Senior leaders on the staff manage the continuum...

Reframing the Problem



7

Assessment



- Be inclusive gain other perspectives up, down, and across. Leverage CCIRs
- Balance quantitative and qualitative means leaders and staff both have roles
- Get beyond "What happened?" to "Why?" / "So what?" / "What needs to be adone?" Leaders must drive this orientation...

Key Takeaways

- Commander's touchpoints are vital to reframe the problem and guide the planning effort
- Consideration of the problem in operational design ensures effective planning
- Revisit design in order to reframe the problem in light of the current OE
- A robust assessment process is essential to reframe the problem and support ongoing planning efforts

JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 January 2017, Incorporating Change 1, 22 October 2018 Quick Reference

