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- **Sustainment**
- **HQ Organization and Process Insights**
- **“Apologetics,” Excerpts from “Defending the Record on US Nuclear Deterrence” by Gen Kevin P. Chilton (ret), Former Commander, US Strategic Command, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2018**

# ***Welcome to the*** **CAPSTONE** **Joint Operations Module (JOM)**



## ***Introduction and Course Overview***


***CAPT Jiwan Mack, USN***  
***Chief, Deployable Training Division***  
***Joint Staff J7***

***The overall classification of slides is***

**UNCLASSIFIED**

- **JOM Overview**
- **Admin**
- **Group Assignments**
- **Senior Fellow Coordinator**

# JOM History



# Instructional Resources

	<u>Section</u>
• <b>Participant Guide</b>	
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– Joint Staff J7 Leadership, Senior Fellow, and Guest Speaker Biographies	vii
– Unclassified JOM materials	1-13
– Abbreviations and Acronyms List	GLOSSARY
• <b>Brochure: Schedule of events / Floor plan</b>	
• <b>Reference Library located in the Dining Facility</b>	
• <b>Unclassified Course Materials and Useful Links</b> ( <a href="https://capstone.ndu.edu/Class-Materials/End-of-Course-Info/">https://capstone.ndu.edu/Class-Materials/End-of-Course-Info/</a> )	

# ***A Comprehensive Approach to Unified Action***

***Deployable Training Division  
Joint Staff J7***

***The overall classification of slides is***

**UNCLASSIFIED**



# *Challenges*

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- **Alignment with Strategic Direction**
- **National Policy and the Interagency Process**
- **Unity of Effort with Allies and Partners**

# Scene Setter: Strategic Direction

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## *National Security Strategy*



## *National Defense Strategy*



## *National Military Strategy*

### *Insights*


- *Consistent alignment and nesting of documents*
- *All illuminate the changing strategic environment*
- *Emphasize importance of allies, partners, interagency*



# Alignment with Strategic Direction

Strategic Objectives → Operational Approach → Tactical Actions



Complex Operational Environment



## Insights

- Adapt to operating within the complexities of the strategic environment
- Retain alignment with strategic direction even under changing conditions
- Inform and be informed by continuous strategic dialogue and translation
- Translate strategic dialogue into clear guidance and intent to subordinates


# National Policy and the Interagency Process



**Insights**

- Operate as part of a whole-of-government effort
- Be prepared to assume a supporting role to other interagency partners
- Leverage the Country Team as the gateway to agencies in country

# Unity of Effort with Allies and Partners



## Insights

- **Leader / Commander sets the tone for integration with partners**
- **Every nation operates in accordance with their national interests**
- **Strive toward unity of effort, not unity of command**
- **Integration with allies and partners occurs at all echelons**



# *Key Takeaways*

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**In this age, I don't care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are, if you cannot create harmony – even vicious harmony – on the battlefield based on trust across service lines, across coalition and national lines, and across civilian / military lines, you really need to go home, because your leadership in today's age is obsolete. We have got to have officers who can create harmony across all those lines.**

***- General James N. Mattis, USMC June 2010***

# *References*

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- **DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 2, “The Joint Force,” 19 Jun 2020**
- **Joint Pub 3-0, “Joint Campaigns and Operations,” 18 Jun 2022**
- **National Defense Strategy 2022**
- **National Military Strategy 2022**
- **National Security Strategy 2022**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Interorganizational Cooperation Focus Paper, 5<sup>th</sup> Edition, Apr 2018**



## Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy

On 28 March the Department of Defense transmitted to Congress the classified 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS).

For the first time, the Department conducted its strategic reviews in a fully integrated way – incorporating the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and Missile Defense Review (MDR) in the NDS – ensuring tight linkages between our strategy and our resources. The unclassified NDS will be forthcoming.

Consistent with the President’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, the classified NDS sets out how the Department of Defense will contribute to advancing and safeguarding vital U.S. national interests – protecting the American people, expanding America’s prosperity, and realizing and defending our democratic values.

The Defense priorities are:

1. Defending the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the PRC
2. Deterring strategic attacks against the United States, Allies, and partners
3. Deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary, prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific, then the Russia challenge in Europe
4. Building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.

The Department will act urgently to sustain and strengthen deterrence, with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as our most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge for the Department.

Russia poses acute threats, as illustrated by its brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. We will collaborate with our NATO Allies and partners to reinforce robust deterrence in the face of Russian aggression.

The Department will remain capable of managing other persistent threats, including those from North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations.

Changes in global climate and other dangerous transboundary threats, including pandemics, are transforming the context in which the Department operates. We will adapt to these challenges, which increasingly place pressure on the Joint Force and the systems that support it.

Recognizing growing kinetic and non-kinetic threats to the United States’ homeland from our strategic competitors, the Department will take necessary actions to increase resilience – our ability to withstand, fight through, and recover quickly from disruption.

Mutually-beneficial Alliances and partnerships are an enduring strength for the United States, and are critical to achieving our objectives, as the unified response to Russia's further invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated. Answering this "call to action," the Department will incorporate ally and partner perspectives, competencies, and advantages at every stage of defense planning.

The Department will advance our goals through three primary ways: integrated deterrence, campaigning, and actions that build enduring advantages.


- Integrated deterrence entails developing and combining our strengths to maximum effect, by working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, other instruments of U.S. national power, and our unmatched network of Alliances and partnerships. Integrated deterrence is enabled by combat-credible forces, backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
- Campaigning will strengthen deterrence and enable us to gain advantages against the full range of competitors' coercive actions. The United States will operate forces, synchronize broader Department efforts, and align Department activities with other instruments of national power, to undermine acute forms of competitor coercion, complicate competitors' military preparations, and develop our own warfighting capabilities together with Allies and partners.
- Building enduring advantages for the future Joint Force involves undertaking reforms to accelerate force development, getting the technology we need more quickly, and making investments in the extraordinary people of the Department, who remain our most valuable resource.

The Department will develop, design, and manage our forces – linking our operational concepts and capabilities to achieve strategic objectives. This requires a Joint Force that is lethal, resilient, sustainable, survivable, agile, and responsive.

## Key Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Documents for Interagency Integration with State, Local, Private Sector in Emergency/Disaster Response

The **National Response Framework (NRF)** provides foundational emergency management doctrine for how the Nation responds to all types of incidents. The NRF is built on scalable, flexible, and adaptable concepts identified in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) to align key roles and responsibilities across the Nation. The structures, roles, and responsibilities described in the Framework can be partially or fully implemented in the context of a threat or hazard, in anticipation of a significant event, or in response to an incident. Implementation of the structures and procedures allows for a scaled response, delivery of specific resources and capabilities, and a level of coordination appropriate to each incident. The NRF is structured to help jurisdictions, citizens, nongovernmental organizations and businesses:

- Develop whole community plans
- Integrate continuity plans
- Build capabilities to respond to cascading failures among businesses, supply chains, and infrastructure sectors
- Collaborate to stabilize community lifelines and restore services



The **National Incident Management System (NIMS)** guides all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector to work together to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to and recover from incidents. NIMS provides stakeholders across the whole community with the shared vocabulary, systems and processes to successfully deliver the capabilities described in the National Preparedness System. NIMS defines operational systems, including the Incident Command System (ICS), Emergency Operations Center (EOC) structures, and Multiagency Coordination Groups (MAC Groups) that guide how personnel work together during incidents. NIMS applies to all incidents, from traffic accidents to major disasters.

National Response Framework website: <https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/national-preparedness/frameworks/response>

National Incident Management System website: <https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/nims>



USAID/BHA's Mandate		USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) Quick Reference Guide				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Save lives</li><li>• Alleviate human suffering</li><li>• Reduce the physical, social and economic impact of disasters</li></ul>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• USG Lead for HA/DR</li><li>• USG first responders after disasters</li><li>• Disaster risk reduction/mitigation before disasters</li></ul>			
Current Activities		Focus is Preparedness, Early Warning, Disaster Relief, Early Recovery				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• BHA responds to an average of 75 disasters in more than 70 countries every year (rapid and slow onset disasters, as well as complex emergencies).</li><li>• More than 600 staff worldwide; 49 Field Offices located around the world; Regional Offices in Costa Rica, Hungary, Kenya, Senegal, Thailand with humanitarian advisors in New York (USUN), Geneva (USUN), Rome (USUN), and Atlanta (CDC).</li><li>• BHA Humanitarian Assistance Advisors/Military (HAA/Ms) based at AFRICOM, EUCOM, CENTCOM, INDOPACOM, SOUTHCOM, NORTHCOM and SOCOM.</li><li>• Stockpiles of appropriate disaster relief commodities and emergency food pre-positioned in Djibouti, South Africa, Italy, UAE, Malaysia, Miami, FL and Houston, TX.</li><li>• Regional experts, technical experts, logistics cell, and surge capacity in Washington, D.C.</li><li>• Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) deployed in the field and Response Management Teams (RMTs) activated in Washington, D.C., stand up as needed.</li><li>• Grants awarded to implementing humanitarian partners such as the UN, International Organizations, and NGOs.</li><li>• USAID/BHA provided more than \$6 billion in humanitarian assistance in fiscal year 2019.</li></ul>						
DOD-USAID Joint Ops		Not all USG HA/DR operations involve the Department of Defense (DOD), but when they do...				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Link-up with USAID ASAP. This may be at the Embassy, USAID Mission, or DART in the field</li><li>• Key DOD contact with DART will be one of USAID/BHA's Civ-Mil Affairs Advisors (CMACs)</li><li>• Start talking early: Decide who does what, when, and how communication will flow</li><li>• Exchange liaison officers - in DC, at the CCMDs, in the field</li><li>• Share information - Keep info unclassified as much as possible</li><li>• Work as one USG team: Joint operations and planning</li><li>• Policy direction comes from the U.S. Ambassador – Chief of Mission authority in-country</li><li>• Share capabilities between the JTF and the DART - Remember USAID is the lead federal agency for HA/DR</li><li>• Provide assistance on a needs-based "PULL" system, not "PUSH" system</li><li>• DOD can often help with airfield ops and short-haul transport (wholesale assistance not retail)</li><li>• BHA can help with UN and NGO information and coordination</li></ul>						
	CENTCOM	EUCOM	INDOPACOM	SOUTHCOM	NORTHCOM	SOCOM
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Education & Doctrine Development		Civil-Military Engagement		Technical Operations (CBRNE)		
Jeff Miller <a href="mailto:BHA.CMD.EDD@usaid.gov">BHA.CMD.EDD@usaid.gov</a>		<a href="mailto:BHA.CMD.CME@usaid.gov">BHA.CMD.CME@usaid.gov</a>		<a href="mailto:BHA.CMD.TECHOPS@usaid.gov">BHA.CMD.TECHOPS@usaid.gov</a>		
Joint Humanitarian Operations Course		CMD Washington Staff		JHOC LMS Access		
(JHOC) <a href="mailto:jhoc@usaid.gov">jhoc@usaid.gov</a>		<a href="mailto:BHA.CMDDC@usaid.gov">BHA.CMDDC@usaid.gov</a>		<a href="https://usaidjhoc.myabsorb.com">https://usaidjhoc.myabsorb.com</a>		

## Checklist for working with USAID/BHA on a disaster response

### **At the Strategic Level (OSD / JCS)**

- ☐ Will USAID establish a Response Management Team (RMT) in Wash DC?
  - ☐ If yes, the phone# is \_\_\_\_\_ & main POC is \_\_\_\_\_
  - ☐ Will DOD send a Liaison Officer?
    - ☐ If yes, who: \_\_\_\_\_ Contact info: \_\_\_\_\_
- ☐ Has there been a request for DOD assistance? And, been approved by SecDef?
- ☐ Is USAID part of DOD's planning to include Planords and Exords?
- ☐ Is USAID/BHA vetting DOD assistance to the disaster area?

### **At the Operational Level(Combatant Command)**

- ☐ Has the CCMD established a communication and coordination link with USAID?
  - ☐ Will there be a BHA Advisor stationed at the CCMD?
    - ☐ If yes, who: \_\_\_\_\_ Contact info: \_\_\_\_\_
- ☐ Is USAID/BHA part of CCMD's planning process, providing input on the OPT, at GO/FO briefings, and chopping on documents such as Planords and Exords?
- ☐ Is USAID/BHA vetting DOD HA supply deliveries and local purchases to the disaster area?
- ☐ Is USAID/BHA vetting requests for DOD assistance from non-DOD entities?
- ☐ Has CCMD received authorization to transport non-military and non-USG personnel and supplies on DOD assets?

### **At the Tactical Level ("JTF")**

- ☐ Has the JTF established contact with Important Partners?
  - ☐ U.S. Embassy POC: \_\_\_\_\_ Contact: \_\_\_\_\_
  - ☐ USAID Mission POC: \_\_\_\_\_ Contact: \_\_\_\_\_
  - ☐ USAID/DART POC: \_\_\_\_\_ Contact: \_\_\_\_\_
  - ☐ Local Government POC: \_\_\_\_\_ Contact: \_\_\_\_\_
  - ☐ Other \_\_\_\_\_ POC: \_\_\_\_\_ Contact: \_\_\_\_\_
- ☐ Will the USAID/DART attach a Civ-Mil Advisor to the JTF?
  - ☐ If yes, who: \_\_\_\_\_ Contact info: \_\_\_\_\_
- ☐ Will the JTF attach a Liaison Officer to the USAID/DART?
  - ☐ If yes, who: \_\_\_\_\_ Contact info: \_\_\_\_\_
- ☐ Has the JTF Commander and the USAID/DART Team Leader linked up?
- ☐ Is the JTF sharing SITREPS and other info with the USAID/DART and visa versa?
- ☐ Has the JTF unclassified as much information as possible?
- ☐ Has the JTF established a system with the USAID/DART for:
  - ☐ Requests for Assistance (RFAs) and Mission Tasking Matrix (MITAM) process
  - ☐ Joint daily update briefs with CCMD and/or JS
  - ☐ DOD excess property deliveries vetted by the USAID/DART and visibility on what's coming
  - ☐ JTF assets moving non-DOD people and supplies
  - ☐ Joint operational planning to include the transition/exit plan
- ☐ Has the JTF planned for a joint press effort with the Embassy and USAID/DART?

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# ***Globally Integrated Operations***

## ***Insights and Considerations***

***Deployable Training Division***  
***Joint Staff J7***

***The overall classification of slides is***


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# *Challenges*

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
- **Adapting to the changing character of war**
- **Operating across the “Continuum of Conflict” and associated transitions**
- **Understanding deterrence and risk**
- **Understanding roles across the Joint Force in today’s global environment**

# Perspective on Global Military Integration



# Continuum of Conflict

## - Plans and Transitions -



**Armed conflict**  
Use of violence to satisfy interests or react to provocation

**Competition below armed conflict**  
Incompatible interests and the intention to engage in behavior detrimental to other strategic actor's interests

**Cooperation**  
Mutually beneficial relationships between strategic actors with similar or compatible interests

**Legend**

GCP - Global Campaign Plan  
GIBP - Globally Integrated Base Plan  
CCP - Combatant Command Campaign Plan  
FCP - Functional Campaign Plan  
ICP - Integrated Contingency Plan  
\*GCP-X requires substantial change post conflict

### Observations

- **Global Campaign Plans (GCPs) inform day-to-day campaigning during competition**
- **Globally Integrated Base Plan (GIBP) provides a framework for risk-informed strategic decisions at the speed of relevance to adapt to a changing strategic environment**
- **Global Crisis Options provide ways to deter, confront, and respond (return to competition)**

# Deterrence


## Deterrence Definition

- Prevention of an action by:
  - The existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or
  - The belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits

- (JP 3-0)

## Deterrence in Practice

- Adversary state of mind brought about by the perception of:
  - Likelihood of being denied the expected benefits of the action
  - Likelihood of excessive costs suffered for taking the action
  - Acceptability of restraint as alternative



## Challenges

- *Deep, accurate understanding the Adversary*
- *Development of credible options to deter*
- *Alignment as part of "Integrated Deterrence"*
- *Assessing success of deterrence*



# Risk


CJCSM 3105.01A 12 Oct 2021 establishes a joint risk analysis methodology and provides guidance for identifying, assessing, and managing risk.



- Considerations:
- Risk to what?
  - Risk from what?
  - How long?
  - Who owns the risk?

- Insights
- *Understand and over-communicate the different perspectives on risk*
  - *Address assumptions and time dimension of risk*
  - *Risk informs mitigation options and priorities*
  - *Appraise military risk and military strategic risk in a global strategic context*





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# ***Key Takeaways***

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- **Our central challenge is long-term, strategic competition by revisionist powers**
- **Leverage Global Campaign Plans, Globally Integrated Base Plans, and CCMD OPLANs to operate across the continuum of conflict**
- **Gain a deep understanding of the adversary to inform deterrence and understand risk to force and mission**
- **Understand the evolving roles across the Joint Force that enable decision making at the speed of relevance**

# *References*

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- **DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 2, “The Joint Force,” 19 Jun 2020**
- **Joint Pub 3-0, “Joint Campaigns and Operations,” 18 Jun 2022**
- **National Defense Strategy 2022**
- **National Military Strategy 2022**
- **National Security Strategy 2022**
- **CJCSI 3100.01E, “Joint Strategic Planning System,” 21 May 2021**
- **CJCSM 3105.01A, “Joint Risk Analysis Methodology,” 12 Oct 2021**
- **CJCSI 3030.01A, “Implementing Joint Development and Design,” 3 Oct 2022**

10 April 2023

**Subject: Global Military Integration – Executive Summary for Fellows**

1. **Purpose:** Provide summary of global military integration with a focus on globally integrated operations. Incorporate CJCSI 3100.01E (Joint Strategic Planning System) dated 21 May 2021.
2. **Objective of Global Integration:** Integrate operations and resources globally and highlight force planning capabilities and tradeoffs to enable senior leader decision making in support of National Defense Strategy (NDS) objectives.
3. **Concept of Global Integration:** Global integration is achieved through the integration of planning, force management, force development, and force design—all undergirded by assessments—to enable senior leader decision making to translate strategy to outcomes.
4. **Definition of Global Integration:** Global integration is the arrangement of cohesive military actions in time, space, and purpose, executed as a whole to address transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional challenges.
5. **Role of the Chairman:** Title 10, U.S. Code requires the Chairman to perform six primary functions to assist the President and the SecDef with planning, advice, and policy formulation: (1) provide strategic direction for the Armed Forces; (2) conduct strategic and contingency planning; (3) assess comprehensive joint readiness; (4) foster joint capability development; (5) manage Joint Force development; and (6) advise on global military integration. Section 153(a)(3) of Title 10, U.S. Code directs the Chairman to provide advice to the President and the SecDef “in matters relating to global military strategic and operational integration.” Title 10 explicitly acknowledges the global “transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional threats” facing the Joint Force, and directs the Chairman to provide the President and the SecDef advice on “ongoing military operations.” The Chairman also provides advice to the SecDef on “the allocation and transfer of forces” among CCMDs.
6. **Strategic Environment:** CJCSI 3050.01 (Implementing Global Integration) notes that the regional approach the Joint Force long relied on is no longer appropriate to address the global threats that comprise the contemporary strategic environment. Great power competition that is global in scope and encompasses all domains has emerged as the central challenge to employment of Joint Force capabilities. State and non-state actors present increasingly complex challenges by operating across regions, domains, and functions in which the United States was once unchallenged. Factors such as accelerating adversary military modernization, global proliferation of commercial technology, and ease of entry to domains such as space and cyberspace, has led to a relative decline in relative U.S. military competitive advantage. This shift, along with potential adversaries' increasing willingness to employ coercive tools of statecraft that remain below the threshold for a traditional military response, illustrates the character of conflict has likewise changed.
7. **Global Operating Environment:** The challenging global operating environment requires the Chairman and the Joint Staff to employ an integrated global perspective and provide strategic direction for Joint operations across all domains and regions to identify efficiencies and synergies, and to champion integration with allies, partners, and the interagency at the national-strategic level. The Chairman, through these global military integration responsibilities, guides coordination across geographic, functional, and Service seams to ensure the Joint Force collectively expands its competitive advantages across a range of global challenges. To this end, the Chairman develops military advice on global posture, readiness, and risk. The Chairman is in a unique position to synthesize regional perspectives on risk, options, and priorities into a global perspective and provide military advice to the SecDef and POTUS that accounts for all domains, regions, and challenges without impinging on CCDRs legal and direct chain of command to SecDef and POTUS. The Chairman's military advice represents apolitical (nonpartisan), professional military judgment on a

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**(For use by Fellows in preparation for the Joint Operations Module in Suffolk, VA)**

wide range of Joint Force issues and topics. The Chairman and the Joint Staff shall solicit and receive Service and NGB perspectives on all plans through approved processes within the JSPS, consistent with the Title 10, U.S. Code responsibilities of the Service secretaries and Service chiefs to review, assess, and advise the SecDef. Globally integrated operations retain the proven strength of CCDR-led operations while leveraging the unique position of the Chairman to synthesize regional perspectives on risk, options, and priorities into a global perspective. The Chairman provides clear options for tolerable global risk in the form of military advice to the Secretary that prioritizes Joint Force missions, sourcing, and assessments. The Secretary gains a richer understanding of risk to the Joint Force and is better prepared to provide globally informed guidance.

8. **Joint Force Objectives:** The Joint Force must be capable of anticipating adversary actions and leveraging transregional, all-domain, and multi-functional responses against multiple challenges in concert with partners. Advanced adversary technologies enable integrated activities across domains that enhance overall strategic effects and support layering of capabilities across numerous functions to create previously unseen problems for the United States. This increased threat complexity is apparent in potential adversaries' abilities to challenge power projection and freedom of maneuver. CJCSI 3050.1 states that the Joint Force must meet three objectives to achieve global integration:
  - a. First, senior leaders must be able to make decisions in a complex environment at the speed of conflict. This requires a common intelligence picture and a shared understanding of global force posture to see operations in real time, visualize opportunities to seize the initiative, and identify trade-offs, risk, and opportunity costs.
  - b. Second, operations must be strategically coordinated worldwide, nested within a whole of government approach, and include our allies and coalition partners. In an environment where requested requirements exceed inventory, force posture must ensure strength, agility, and resilience across regions and domains. Once committed, the Joint Force must rapidly engage adversaries, understand tradeoffs across Combatant Commands (CCMDs), and communicate risk with a global perspective.
  - c. Finally, global integration enables the development of a lethal and agile future fighting force. A balanced inventory of capabilities and capacities ensures the Joint Force's continuous competitive advantage, enabling the force to deter and defeat potential adversaries across the entire continuum of conflict. The Joint Force must also retain the capability to defend the homeland and project power against any other potential adversaries.
9. **Key Take Away:** Achieving global integration requires the combination of the institutional expertise of the Services and geographic and functional CCMDs to provide precise and timely global military solutions in support of national policy objectives. A comprehensive body of assessments provides a firm analytical foundation to this process.
10. **References**
  - a. CJCSI 3100.01E, Joint Strategic Planning System, 21 May 2021.
  - b. CJCSM 3105.01A, Joint Risk Analysis Methodology, 12 October 2021.
  - c. CJCSI 3050.01 Implementing Global Integration (Classified) 31 Dec 2018 (SIPRNET)
11. **POC:** Dave Wagner, JS J7, DDJT, 757.203.7690, [david.a.wagner1.ctr@mail.mil](mailto:david.a.wagner1.ctr@mail.mil).

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# ***All-Domain Operations Insights and Considerations***

***Deployable Training Division  
Joint Staff J7***

***The overall classification of slides is***

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# *Challenges*


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- **Changing strategic landscape associated with strategic competition**
- **Key operational problems and risks**
- **Assessment and convergence of activities across domains to understand and gain advantage**
- **Elevating visibility and integrating cyber, space, and EMS within HQs**

**Are we ready to operate across all domains?**



# Current Strategic Landscape



**Where will the next war start:**  
Air, Land, Sea or Cyber and Space?

The Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) supports operations in all domains



# Decisive Fires in an All-Domain Environment




## Insights

- *Understand the adversary through an all-domain lens*
- *Space and cyber add a complexity associated with assessments*
- *Plan and leverage capabilities from all domains to gain synergy and achieve objectives*
- *Consider lead time for authorities and devise alternate COAs and options to provide decision quality information to the commander*

# Operating in an All-Domain Environment


- Leverage the ability to integrate and effectively operate across all domains to gain key advantages
- Joint Warfighting Concepts frame an approach via “CONEMPS”
- All-domain C2 is in the nascent phase; we are still learning
- Build on our expertise on air, land, and sea integration



## Insights

- *Increase agility and coordination across Functional-Geographic CCMDs*

# Integrate Expertise to Gain Synergy



## Inside the HQs

- J2
  - J3: J35, J36, J39, STO...
  - J4
  - J5
  - J6
  - Joint Cyber Center
  - CO-IPE (Cyber)
  - JIST (Space)
  - Liaison
- B2C2WGs  
OPTs, JTWG, I-CFT...)

## Insights

- *Elevate visibility and access*
- *Leverage staff integration venues (B2C2WGs)*
- *Gain speed in OODA loop (requires practice)*
- *Make conscious decisions on where space, cyber, and EMS synchronization occurs*
- *Align C2 to integrate capability at echelon*

B2C2WG: Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, Working Groups  
CO-IPE: Cyber Operations – Integrated Planning Element  
JIST: Joint Integrated Space Team  
OPT: Operational Planning Team  
STO: Special Technical Operations  
I-CFT: Information-Cross Functional Team

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# *Key Takeaways*

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- **All-domain operations is Commander's business. Has strategic to tactical implications**
- **Assessment across domains can illuminate vulnerabilities and opportunities central to planning**
- **Plan and leverage capabilities from all domains to gain synergy and achieve objectives; understand and exercise how to achieve objectives in a degraded environment**
- **Bring space, cyber, and EMS Op Design and internal processes to inform the Commander's decision calculus**

# *References*

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- **DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol. 2, “The Joint Force,” 19 Jun 2020**




## ALL DOMAIN SEMINAR – SIPR Website Information Paper

**PURPOSE:** The ALL DOMAIN SEMINAR (ADS) SIPR Website is a learning capability that provides an introduction to key challenges facing the Joint Force in a globally integrated data-driven fight. The ADS website frames the All Domain problem through three lenses: Fight Tonight, Near Fight, Deep Fight. The ADS Website supports a continuum-of-learning process across senior leader education, joint training and exercises, and concept development and war-gaming. Lastly, the ADS Website sustains retention via a cycle of updates, insights and best practices for operating in an All Domain environment.

### **BACKGROUND:**

The ADS Website was originally developed as a learning capability to support the introduction of a new All Domain seminar in the September CAPSTONE curricula. Feedback from student Fellows indicated a desire for a broader and deeper perspective of the AD challenge. While plenary discussions ranged from the “now and future,” the focus was aimed through a “fight tonight” lens. The ADS Website expands that perspective to include “Near” and “Deep” perspectives. It also contextualizes integration across globally integrated operations of cyber, space and the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS). The ADS thesis is the Joint Force must train anew to operate effectively across all domains to gain positional or temporal advantages across the globe.

The [ADS SIPR Website](#) is also a continuum of learning hub that enables a cyclic learning pattern. It is for CAPSTONE, KEYSTONE and PINNACLE Fellows; CCMD staffs and Joint Force Commands; and PME/JPME institutions, particularly Service and Joint advanced warfighting schools with ready SIPR access (JAWS, SAMS, MAWS, etc.). Recorded interviews of experts in the field are posted and organized for easy access in the Dashboard menu. An ADS introductory video (“30 Good Minutes”) describing the essential features of a data-driven fight and how to understand it will help set the conditions for focused self-study. Readings, briefings, studies, links to authors’ interviews are included (C-SPAN, BOOK TALK, FRONTLINE, etc.).






[Steps to access All Domain Seminar in JKO VCLASS](#) (see back)

## Steps to access All Domain Seminar in JKO VCLASS:

1. Enter URL <https://ikolms.jten.smil.mil> in Chrome and press enter. Click the "OK" button at the bottom of the page to continue to the JKO Login page.
2. On the JKO Login page, select the "Login" button to login with your SIPR token.
3. Select your certificate, if asked, and click the "OK" button. Enter your PIN in the pop-up form that displays and click the "OK" button. You will be logged into JKO and see the "My Training" page displayed.
4. Click on the "VCLASS" tab at the top, right side of the page. On the "VCLASS" tab, click the "Enter Classroom" button. VCLASS will open in a new browser tab and the VCLASS "Home" page will be displayed.
5. If an "All Domain Seminar" button is displayed in the banner at the top of the VCLASS "Home" page, click this button to access the "All Domain Seminar" course. If "All Domain Seminar" is NOT displayed in the banner, find the "Membership" tool in the left side-bar menu and select.
6. In the "Membership" tool page, click on the "Joinable Sites" tab and you will see the "All Domain Seminar" in the sites list as a link. Click the link to access the "All Domain Seminar" course.



# Setting Conditions



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# Challenges


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- **Setting conditions for success**
- **Understanding roles in Globally Integrated Operations**
- **Incorporating risk in decision making**
- **Implementing Mission Command**

**Command and Control**: The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.

*- Joint Pub 1*

# Setting Conditions for Success




## Insights

*“Do those things that only you can do as the commander...”*

- *Build and maintain trust and inclusive relationships with partners*
- *Share visualization and intent, gain authorities and resources, assess, and plan / manage transitions*
- *Design C2 to accomplish the mission – and evolve as necessary*

# Understanding Your HQ's Role

- **USG role** relative to the international (and host nation) response
- **US military role** relative to the broader USG whole of government approach
- **CCMD role** relative to other DOD organizations (e.g., other CCMDs and Combat Support Agencies)
- **Internal CCMD C2 options**




## Considerations

- **Where do you fit?**
- **Who do you work with?**
- **How to organize?**
- **Where is risk?**

\* Optional

# Risk

**CJCSM 3105.01A, 12 Oct 2021** establishes a joint risk analysis methodology and provides guidance for identifying, assessing, and managing risk.




**The Joint Risk Framework**

## Insights

- **Risk is Commander's Business**
- **Frame the problem by identifying the item or idea which is "valued" and has the potential to be "harmed"**
  - Protecting national interests
  - Successfully executing a strategy or plan
  - Maintaining a viable, ready force
- **Determine what to do about risk**
  - Accept / Avoid / Mitigate / Transfer
- **Risk communication is at the core of any successful effort to appraise and manage risk → reduces misunderstandings and potential surprises**


# ***Support Command Relationship***

## ***- Authorities and Responsibilities -***



### **Insights**

- Emphasis on “access to” vs “ownership of” capabilities***
- Establishing authority states desired effects, and clarifies authorities and priorities***
- Empower and promote crosstalk. Will increase resilience, flexibility, and agility***





# Mission Command

**“Operating on intent through trust,  
empowerment, and understanding”**  
- CJCS

## Definition

The conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission-type orders.  
- Joint Pub 3-0

## Attributes

- ✓ Intent
- ✓ Understanding
- ✓ Trust

***“Mission Command is essential at the operational and strategic level.”***  
***“Enables speed, agility, and decisiveness at the tactical level while providing the necessary decision space at the higher level for the up and out engagement to anticipate and set conditions.”***

- Senior Flag Officer

# ***Mission Command***

## ***- Challenges and Opportunities -***

---

***– In the broader Joint, Interagency, Multinational Environment –***

### **Intent**

- ***Clarity in visualization / intent to subordinates***
- ***Decentralization often decreases risk***

### **Understanding**

- ***Sharing with a diverse group of partners***
- ***Sharing with higher headquarters***
- ***Sharing with subordinates***

### **Trust**

- ***Gaining trust up, down, and across***
- ***Maintaining trust through transitions and change***

# *Key Takeaways*

---

- **Senior leaders set conditions by building trust and sharing understanding**
- **Gain clarity and share understanding of your HQ's role and that of your partners**
- **Understand the aspects of risk in decisions**
- **Relationships between commanders are often more important than command relationships**
- **Set command relationships up front ... then flex**

# *References*

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- **CJCSM 3105.01A, “Joint Risk Analysis Methodology,” 12 Oct 2021**
- **DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 2, “The Joint Force,” 19 Jun 2020**
- **Joint Pub 3-0, “Joint Campaigns and Operations,” 18 Jun 2022**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Mission Command, 2nd Edition, Jan 2020**


# ***References***

*- Continued -*


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- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, JTF C2 and Organization Focus Paper, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Jan 2020**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Combatant Command (CCMD) Command and Control Organizational Options Focus Paper, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, May 2022**

# *Guidance and Intent*



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# *Challenges*

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- **Early and timely Commander involvement throughout design and planning**
- **Deciding if or when to reframe the problem**
- **Commander centrality in assessments that inform understanding and guidance**
- **Structuring the design, planning, and assessment process to inform guidance and intent**

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***Interview with  
General James Mattis, USMC (Ret)***


***- - -***

***at***

***The Hoover Institution at Stanford University***

***March 6, 2015***


# Operational Art



## Insight

- *Leverage partners to better understand the environment*


# ***Design and Planning Continuum***



## **Insights**

- *Requires upfront time and dialogue to define the problem*
- *Commander's early engagement enhances and focuses efforts*
- *Senior leaders on the staff – manage the continuum...*

# Reframing the Problem




## Insights

- *Commander's decision to reframe and revisit design*
- *Activities in Space and Cyberspace external to the CCMD will likely drive this change in the environment*
- *Operations don't stop during reframing – concurrent actions*
- *Consider who you leverage for problem framing and design*

# Assessment

- *Are we doing things right?*
- *Are we doing the right things?*
  
- *Are we accomplishing the Mission?*
- *Are we meeting Desired Endstate?*
- *Are we achieving Strategic Objectives?*




## Insights

- *Commander centric – key to developing guidance and intent*
- *Implement early and continuously with partners to deepen understanding*
- *Integrate assessment structure across echelons at the pace of operations*
- *Get to “What needs to be done”; do not stop at “What happened”*



# Structure and Process Implications



## Insights

- **Clear process integrates people and information to share understanding**
- **Structure enhances speed of translation from guidance to execution**
- **Timely engagements enable adaptability and flexibility in complex environments**
- **Clear terms of reference disciplines the process and sets expectations**

SAWG: Strategic Assessment Working Group  
8 PDB: Plans Decision Board  
CAB: Commander's Assessment Board

# ***Key Takeaways***

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- **Active and continuous Commander involvement promotes focus and flexibility**
- **Reframing is an art – decide when or if required**
- **Commander centric assessments maximize shared understanding**
- **Structure design, planning, and assessments around Commander's time and approach**

# *References*

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
- **DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 2, “The Joint Force,” 19 Jun 2020**
- **Joint Pub 5-0, “Joint Planning,” 1 Dec 2020**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Assessment and Risk Focus Paper, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, Mar 2020**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) Focus Paper, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, Jan 2020**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Design and Planning Focus Paper, 1<sup>st</sup> Edition, Jul 2013**

# ***Authorities***

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# *Challenges*

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- **Deciding and acting within clear authority to promote the legitimacy of operations**
- **Understanding how the interaction of law, policy, and guidance defines authority and underwrites decision making**
- **Developing and delegating authorities in support of timely decision making**

# ***Authority and Legitimacy***

---

- **Adhering to established authority promotes legitimacy**
- **Legitimacy promotes support and leverages capabilities**
- **Operating with legitimacy is part of an effective strategy**
- **Perception of legitimacy can be as important as reality**
- **Legitimacy can be a tug-of-war in competing narratives**

## **2022 National Security Strategy**

“[O]ur alliances and partnerships around the world are our most important strategic asset and an indispensable element contributing to international peace and stability.”

## **2022 National Defense Strategy**

“We are a free people devoted to democracy and the rule of law...we are a member of an unparalleled and unprecedented network of alliances and partnerships.”



# ***Legitimacy Narratives***

## **Ukraine Invasion**



### **Russian claims and narratives:**

- “Special Military Operation” aimed at “De-Nazification”
- Russia threatened by NATO expansion



### **United States and NATO messaging:**

- Early intel sharing tipped Russia’s hand, framed the narrative, and caused news and media focus to pre-position in and around Ukraine
- Continue to highlight Russian Law of War violations

## **South China Sea**



### **PRC claims and narratives:**

- 9-dash line and claim, spurious claims of sovereignty and territorial seas around disputed features
- U.S. exploiting disputes - backing PRC into a corner



### **U.S. messaging and activities:**

- SecState Press Release (13 Jul 20) - Uphold freedom of seas recognized by international law, maintain flow of commerce, and oppose PRC coercion
- Freedom of Navigation Operations - Operate where international law allows

# Law, Policy, and Guidance

**Understand mission partner authority to leverage capability**

- U.S. Agency laws, regulations, and policies
- Partner Nation laws, national policies, regulations, and orders
- NGO host nation laws and NGO internal policies


**Authorities Challenges:**

- Rules of Engagement (ROE)
- Fiscal Authorities
- Non-Kinetic Activities
- Exquisite Capabilities
- Space Activities

**National policy decisions and documents**

- ✓ PPDs
- ✓ NSPMs

**DOD regulations and policies**



**International Law**

- ✓ Treaty
- ✓ Customary

**Domestic Law**

- ✓ Constitution
- ✓ Statutes

# ***Law, Policy, and Guidance***

## **Counter Terrorism / COIN**



## **Conflict with PRC / Russia**

### **Character:**

- Dominance across domains
- CIVCAS: no tolerance
- Comms: unrestricted
- Risk of strategic escalation: low

### **Policies:**

- ROE: restrictive
- Delegations: withheld to highest levels
- Collateral damage policy: restrictive
- CONOP driven
- Troop training: defensive, non-lethal, influence local population

### **Character:**


- Peer adversary
- CIVCAS: likely catastrophic
- Comms: restricted
- Risk of strategic escalation: significant

### **Policies:**

- ROE: permissive? First Mover Advantage?
- Delegations: manage escalation/seize initiative?
- Collateral damage policy: large civilian toll?
- CONOP driven or bundled authorities?
- Troop training: how to refocus on major combat ops?

**Law of War Obligations Remain Constant**

# Law, Policy, and Guidance



## Maritime boundaries

- Territorial baseline
- Territorial seas – baseline to 12 NM
- Contiguous zone – 12 to 24 NM

## Law of the Sea


- Water beyond territorial seas of China and Taiwan is “international water”
- Ships and aircraft enjoy high seas freedoms within this corridor
- Innocent passage applies to ships within territorial seas

## Policy and Guidance

- One China policy vs U.S. opposition to unification by force
- PRC asserts sovereignty over the strait, contrary to international law
- PRC conducts provocative air/maritime patrols and exercises to assert sovereignty
- U.S. asserts freedom of navigation through Strait - conducts FONOPs and overflight

# ***Developing and Delegating Authorities***

## **Activities Drive Authorities**

- What do I need to do?
  - Do I have the right capability?
  - Do I have the right authorities?
  - Who has them and how do I get both?
    - Request for Forces
    - Request for Authority
- Design & Initial Planning**
- Detailed Planning**
- 


## **Appropriate delegation speeds decision making**

- Requires balancing risk
- Avoids centralized decision making
- Critical to Globally Integrated Operations
- Linked to Mission Command (Intent, Understanding, Trust)

**Specify operational requirements to support requests for authority**

**Identify risk and mitigation when requesting or delegating authorities**

# Developing and Requesting Authorities



- *Use of force is regulated by ROE, authorized by mission orders, and executed per guidance and intent*
- *National level decisions on use of force are heavily influenced by policy*
- *Commanders seek robust ROE delegation to support agile operations*



# *Key Takeaways*

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- **Reality and perception of legitimacy brings support and access to capabilities**
- **Law, policy, and guidance provide the framework for operational solutions**
- **Understanding the authorities of mission partners leverages additional capabilities**
- **Activities drive authorities**
- **Appropriate delegation of authorities speeds decision making**

# *References*

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- **DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 2, “The Joint Force,” 19 Jun 2020**
- **National Defense Strategy 2022**
- **National Military Strategy, 2022**
- **National Security Strategy, 2022**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Authorities Focus Paper, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Oct 2016**

# United States Code (U.S.C.)

Title	Short Title	Descriptive / Applicability
<b>5</b>	Government Organization and Employees	Agency organization and establishment of procedures for civilian workforce including functions and responsibilities as well as employment recruitment and retention.
<b>6</b>	Domestic Security	Establishes and organizes DHS, national emergency management requirements, and the national preparedness system. Includes applicable law on security and accountability for ports and borders as well as cybersecurity. (Homeland Security)
<b>10</b>	Armed Forces	Organization of DOD and general military powers; establishes active and reserve command structure within DOD (OSD, JCS and the Services). Regulates DoD personnel to include manning authorizations, discipline, training and career progression (including Joint qualification) as well as regulations on procurement. Also includes designated excepted civilian service, e.g., Cyber. (Homeland Defense)
<b>14</b>	Coast Guard	Establishes organization and powers, including law enforcement and other duties of the regular, reserve and auxiliary Coast Guard. Provides for military capability in support of DHS; capability also used under Title 10 when assigned in support of DoD.
<b>18</b>	Crimes and Criminal Procedure	Defines federal crimes, criminal procedure, prisons and prisoners and associated regulations. Includes the Posse Comitatus Act, forbidding federalized (T10) military conducting law enforcement. Department of Justice (DOJ) lead agency in accordance with Title 28 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure).
<b>19</b>	Customs Duties	Foreign trade zones; tariffs, trade negotiation and agreements, and smuggling.
<b>22</b>	Foreign Relations and Intercourse	Provides authority for diplomatic and consular courts and service. Provides for preservation of friendly foreign relations including Mutual Defense and Security Assistance Programs; protection of vessels on international and territorial waters and protections of citizens abroad. It also provides for authorities relating to regulation of foreign missions. Significant legal basis for HA / DR / NEO. Assigns Department of State (DOS) as lead agency.
<b>32</b>	National Guard (NG)	Provides authority for trained / equipped NG in support of federal mission requirements. Additionally provides authority for DOD domestic missions to be conducted by NG under C2 of respective Governors, exempt from Posse Comitatus Act; or mobilization of NG forces to active federal duty (Title 10). Grants authority for SecDef to also provide funds to Governors to employ NG units to conduct Homeland Defense activities, as SecDef determines to be necessary and appropriate for NG units.
<b>33</b>	Navigation and Navigable Waters	International rules for navigation at sea. Authorizes Navy/USCG exemption from certain rules. Regulations for suppression of piracy. Collision prevention / responsibilities.
<b>42</b>	Public Health / Welfare	Provides authority for federal disaster preparedness and assistance. (Stafford Act as it relates to DSCA)
<b>50</b>	War and National Defense	Outlines the role of war and National Defense. Includes regulations on CIA, foreign intelligence and covert action.

## Rules of Engagement (ROE) Considerations for the JTF Commander

Staff ROE development and approval process:

- \_\_\_ Is ROE development an integrated part of crisis action planning (CAP)?
- \_\_\_ Is ROE development operator-led (J3 / J35 / J5), with the SJA in support?
- \_\_\_ Is there a formal staff process for ROE development (ROE Working Group)?
- \_\_\_ Does the ROE WG have the right subject-matter experts?
- \_\_\_ Is there a process for the Joint Operations Center (JOC) to interface with the ROE WG?
- \_\_\_ Is there dialogue on ROE between your staff and higher and lower headquarters' staffs?
- \_\_\_ Is there interagency and interorganizational liaison with your staff regarding ROE?
- \_\_\_ Are allied or coalition partners involved in ROE development?
- \_\_\_ Does the ROE, along with your intent and guidance, create clear use of force policy?
- \_\_\_ Does the ROE support higher headquarters' intent and guidance?
- \_\_\_ Did your staff thoroughly war game and crosswalk the operation plan or order (including any branches and sequels) and the ROE to ensure that subordinate commanders have the *authority* to take all appropriate action to deter, pre-empt, and/or counter the full range of possible threat reactions without having to request additional supplemental ROE?
- \_\_\_ Did your staff thoroughly war game and crosswalk the operation plan or order (including any branches and sequels) and the ROE to ensure that subordinate commanders have *all necessary means available* to accomplish their missions and to defend their units and other US forces in the vicinity?
- \_\_\_ Do your staff and subordinate commanders understand that nothing contained in the ROE limits a commander's inherent right and obligation to take all appropriate action to defend his or her unit and other US forces in the vicinity?
- \_\_\_ Do your staff and subordinate commanders understand the permissive nature of the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE)?
- \_\_\_ Do your staff's standing operating procedures assign responsibility and establish effective procedures for developing, requesting, authorizing, disseminating, training, monitoring, assessing, and modifying the ROE in a timely manner?
- \_\_\_ Are all ROE messages that contain numbered supplemental measures classified at least CONFIDENTIAL and numbered serially (e.g., serial 1, 2, 3 ..., as opposed to serial 1, change 1; serial 1, change 2 ....)?


- Are all ROE messages clear, concise, and easily understood in a single reading, with all key terms defined?
- Do ROE request messages contain a justification for each supplemental measure requested?
- Does each ROE authorization message contain all of the supplemental measures currently in effect, whether changed or not, so that subordinates need only keep the current message to have all of the ROE currently in effect?
- Do you, your staff, and your subordinate commanders fully understand the limitations of your allies' or coalition partners' national ROE? When your allies' or coalition partners' national ROE are incompatible, how do you plan to maintain unity of effort and avoid potential conflicts? Will forces or tasks be separated geographically and/or functionally?
- If you approve any supplemental measures that restrict the use of force, do your subordinate commanders have the means available to comply with those restrictions? (Example: If you approve a supplemental measure requiring your forces to "observe" indirect fire directed against targets in areas of civilian concentration, do your subordinate commanders have the means to "observe" those fires?)

Some key ROE issues:

- Designating and defining hostile forces.
- Clear guidance on what constitutes hostile intent in a given situation? (Example: If a military aircraft of country x were to do a, b, and c in the vicinity of a unit, the unit commander should consider the behavior as a demonstration of hostile intent and may engage the aircraft in defense of his or her unit.)
- Designating and defining collective self-defense (i.e., defense of designated forces as well as designated persons and property).
- Cross-border reconnaissance, direct action operations, and personnel recovery.
- Use of weapon systems subject to special restrictions, including riot control agents, anti-personnel land mines, and fires in areas of civilian concentration.
- Treatment of civilians, including the authority to stop, search, and detain them, and to seize their property.
- Allied or coalition ROE do not limit the inherent right and obligation of US commanders to execute unit self-defense.

Bottom line: Do the ROE give your subordinate commanders the flexibility they need to get the job done?



# *Information in Joint Operations*



***Deployable Training Division  
Joint Staff J7***

***The overall classification of slides is***

**UNCLASSIFIED**



# *Challenges*

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- **Understanding the complexities of the Information Environment (IE) in order to operate effectively and decisively to achieve strategic objectives**
- **Developing organizations and processes that provide coordination, integration, and synchronization of information activities**
- **Accurately assess the effects of information in joint operations to achieve Commander's objectives**



# *Information is Commander's Business*

- Provide guidance on how you want to operate in the IE
- Be an active participant in the development of your command's narrative
- Provide guidance and direction for your OIE organizations and processes
- Plan and execute informational activities as part of your command's campaign plans to achieve desired conditions
- Understand how to gain agility in the IE through proactive planning
- Build, exercise, and train relationships with your interagency partners and allies




# ***Complexity of the Information Environment***

***Linguistic factors***

***Social factors***

***Technical factors***



***Psychological factors***

***Cultural factors***

***Physical factors***

## **Insights**

- The IE is global in nature – complexities are created by technological advances, the speed and range of information / misinformation, and deliberate operations to influence audiences***
- Relevant actors are individuals, groups, populations, or automated systems whose capabilities or behaviors have the potential to affect the success of OAs***
- Diffusion of information enables individuals and groups to enter in and affect the global forum***

# Coordination, Integration, and Synchronization



House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) reiterated US support for Taiwan touching down in Taipei on Aug. 3, 2022

## Insights

- *The Joint force must design all activities and operations from the outset to account for the use and impact of information on relevant actors, treating them as key terrain*
- *An Information Cross-Functional Team (CFT) is the JFC's forum for the development of a shared understanding of the IE and for the organization, coordination, and synchronization of joint force activities in and through the IE*
- *It is essential to all DOD initiatives to achieve unity of effort through unified action with interagency partners, the broader interorganizational community, and multinational partners to achieve enduring strategic objectives*



# The Narrative

## Narrative Hierarchy

From JP 3-04 Information in Joint Operations

Narrative Type	Primary Audiences	Sources
National	Global Domestic	President National Security Council
Strategic Mission	Global Theater Domestic	Secretary of Defense Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Combatant Commanders
Operational Mission	Theater Regional Domestic	Combatant Commands Joint Force Commanders Component Commanders
Tactical Mission	Local Area	Joint Force Commanders

Figure IV-2. Narrative Hierarchy



C-17 outbound from HKIA after civilians breach perimeter during the Afghanistan withdrawal


### Insights

- A command narrative is a story. It creates a framework that anchors all command activities – everything from messaging to exercises. It covers operations, activities, and investments undertaken by the command to help synchronize the command’s words and deeds*
- An effectively planned, executed, and supported command narrative can demonstrate resolve, bolstering the confidence of allies and partners, contribute to deterrence, and provide focus to staff and subordinate units*
- Deterrence occurs at the cognitive realm and is in essence an Operation in the Information Environment directed at the adversary’s decision making*

# Assessments



Ukrainian troops using US supplied HIMARS



## Insights

- While most organizations successfully provide Battle Damage Assessments, operations in the information environment assessments (e.g., the human cognitive) are sometimes harder to obtain and visualize
- Assessment is a continuous process to identify, develop, and affect audiences to achieve desired enduring conditions
- Accurate assessment of behavioral change is a lengthy process; identify short-term and long-term assessments
- Assessments are coordinated and integrated internally and externally through whole-of-staff / government / coalition efforts

# ***Key Takeaways***

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- **Understand the complexities of the IE in order to operate effectively and decisively to achieve objectives**
- **Provide guidance to organizations and processes for internal and external planning, coordination, integration, and synchronization to affect outcomes aligning with objectives**
- **Develop coherent command narratives that account for all audiences and leverage agencies, allies and partners, and industry to integrate actions and gain an information advantage**
- **Assessing effects in the IE is a whole-of-government effort, enabling simple and in-depth understanding**

# *References*

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- **DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 2, “The Joint Force,” 19 Jun 2020**
- **Joint Pub 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, 18 Jun 2022**
- **Joint Pub 3-04, Information in Joint Operations, 14 Sep 2022**
- **Joint Pub 3-60, Joint Targeting, 28 Sep 2018**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Integration and Synchronization of Joint Fires Focus Paper, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, Jul 2018**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Communication Strategy and Synchronization Focus Paper, 1<sup>st</sup> Edition, May 2016**





SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

SEP 15 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Information as a Joint Function

Information is such a powerful tool that it is recognized as an instrument of national power. The advent of the internet, the expansion of information technology, the widespread availability of wireless communications, and the far-reaching impact of social media have dramatically impacted operations and changed the character of modern warfare.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has issued an out-of-cycle change to Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States*, introducing *Information* as a new, seventh joint function. This change is consistent with the 2016 DoD Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment (SOIE) and the 2016 National Military Strategy. It signals a fundamental appreciation for the military role of information at the strategic, operational and tactical levels within today's complex operating environment.

The elevation of *Information* to a joint function impacts all operations and has implications across doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy that must be identified in the months ahead. These include the relationship with other joint functions, as well as the effects on planning and operations. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the CJCS, as co-chairs of the SOIE Executive Steering Group, will lead efforts to examine implications and implement appropriate changes. I fully endorse this effort and expect support from across the Department.

*John M. Mattis*



OSD011047-17/CMD014788-17





## anchoring

**The first thing you judge influences your judgment of all that follows.**

Human minds are associative in nature, so the order in which we receive information helps determine the course of our judgments and perceptions.

Be especially mindful of this bias during financial negotiations such as houses, cars, and salaries. The initial price offered is proven to have a significant effect.



## confirmation bias

**You look for ways to justify your existing beliefs.**

We can automatically find ways to make new information fit our existing narratives and preconceptions, and to dismiss information that does not.

Think of your ideas and beliefs as software you're actively trying to find problems with rather than things to be defended.

"The first principle is that you must not fool yourself – and you are the easiest person to fool." - Richard Feynman



## backfire effect

**When your core beliefs are challenged, it can cause you to believe even more strongly.**

We can experience being wrong about some ideas as an attack upon our very selves, or our tribal identity. This can lead to motivated reasoning which causes us to reinforce our beliefs even if we might accept particular facts and disconfirming evidence.

"It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so."

- Mark Twain



## declinism

**You see the past as better than it was, and expect the future to be worse than is likely.**

Despite living in the most peaceful and prosperous time in history, many people believe things are getting worse. The 24 hour news cycle, with its reporting of overtly negative and violent events, may account for some of this effect.

Instead of relying on nostalgic impressions of how great things used to be, use measurable metrics such as life expectancy, levels of crime and violence, and prosperity statistics.



## just world hypothesis

**Your preference for a just world makes you presume that it exists.**

A world in which people don't always get what they deserve, hard work doesn't always pay off, and injustice happens is an uncomfortable one that threatens our preferred narrative. However, it is also the reality.

A more just world requires understanding rather than blame. Remember that everyone has their own life story, we're all fallible, and bad things happen to good people.



## sunk cost fallacy

**You irrationally cling to things that have already cost you something.**

When we've invested our time, money, or emotion into something, it hurts us to let it go. This aversion to pain can distort our better judgment and cause us to make unwise investments.

To regain objectivity, ask yourself: had I not already invested something, would I still do so now? What would I counsel a friend to do if they were in the same situation?



## dunning-kruger effect

**The more you know, the less confident you're likely to be.**

Because experts know just how much they don't know, they tend to underestimate their ability, but it's easy to be over-confident when you have only a simple idea of how things are.

"The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are so certain of themselves, yet wiser people so full of doubts."

- Bertrand Russell



## barnum effect

**You see personal specifics in vague statements by filling in the gaps.**

Because our minds are given to making connections, it's easy for us to take nebulous statements and find ways to interpret them so that they seem specific and personal.

Psychics, astrologers and others use this bias to make it seem like they're telling you something relevant. Consider how things might be interpreted to apply to anyone, not just you.



## framing effect

**You allow yourself to be unduly influenced by context and delivery.**

We all like to think that we think independently, but the truth is that all of us are, in fact, influenced by delivery, framing and subtle cues. This is why the ad industry is a thing, despite almost everyone believing they're not affected by advertising messages.

Only when we have the intellectual humility to accept the fact that we can be manipulated, can we hope to limit how much we are. Try to be mindful of how things are being put to you.



## in-group bias

**You unfairly favor those who belong to your group.**

We presume that we're fair and impartial, but the truth is that we automatically favor those who are most like us, or belong to our groups.

Try to imagine yourself in the position of those in out-groups; whilst also attempting to be dispassionate when judging those who belong to your in-groups.



## availability heuristic

**Your judgments are influenced by what springs most easily to mind.**

How recent, emotionally powerful, or unusual your memories are can make them seem more relevant. This, in turn, can cause you to apply them too readily.

Try to gain different perspectives and relevant statistical information rather than relying purely on first judgments and emotive influences.



## belief bias

**If a conclusion supports your existing beliefs, you'll rationalize anything that supports it.**

It's difficult for us to set aside our existing beliefs to consider the true merits of an argument. In practice this means that our ideas become impervious to criticism, and are perpetually reinforced.

A useful thing to ask is 'when and how did I get this belief?'

We tend to automatically defend our ideas without ever really questioning them.



## groupthink

**You let the social dynamics of a group situation override the best outcomes.**

Dissent can be uncomfortable and dangerous to one's social standing, and so often the most confident or first voice will determine group decisions.

Rather than openly contradicting others, seek to facilitate objective means of evaluation and critical thinking practices as a group activity.



## optimism bias

**You overestimate the likelihood of positive outcomes.**

There can be benefits to a positive attitude, but it's unwise to allow such an attitude to adversely affect our ability to make rational judgments (they're not mutually exclusive).

If you make rational, realistic judgments you'll have a lot more to feel positive about.



## reactance

**You'd rather do the opposite of what someone is trying to make you do.**

When we feel our liberty is being constrained, our inclination is to resist, however in doing so we can over-compensate.

Be careful not to lose objectivity when someone is being coercive/manipulative, or trying to force you do something. Wisdom springs from reflection, folly from reaction.



## curse of knowledge

**Once you understand something you presume it to be obvious to everyone.**

Things makes sense once they make sense, so it can be hard to remember why they didn't. We build complex networks of understanding and forget how intricate the path to our available knowledge really is.

When teaching someone something new, go slow and explain like they're ten years old (without being patronizing). Repeat key points and facilitate active practice to help embed knowledge.



## self-serving bias

**You believe your failures are due to external factors, yet you're personally responsible for your successes.**

Many of us enjoy unearned privileges, luck and advantages that others do not. It's easy to tell ourselves that we deserve these things, whilst blaming circumstance when things don't go our way.

When judging others, be mindful of how this bias interacts with the just-world hypothesis, fundamental attribution error, and the in-group bias.



## negativity bias

**You allow negative things to disproportionately influence your thinking.**

The pain of loss and hurt are felt more keenly and persistently than the fleeting gratification of pleasant things. We are primed for survival, and our aversion to pain can distort our judgment for a modern world.

Pro-and-con lists, as well as thinking in terms of probabilities, can help you evaluate things more objectively than relying on a cognitive impression.



## pessimism bias

**You overestimate the likelihood of negative outcomes.**

Pessimism is often a defense mechanism against disappointment, or it can be the result of depression and anxiety disorders.

Perhaps the worst aspect of pessimism is that even if something good happens, you'll probably feel pessimistic about it anyway.



## spotlight effect

**You overestimate how much people notice how you look and act.**

Most people are much more concerned about themselves than they are about you. Absent overt prejudices, people generally want to like and get along with you as it gives them validation too.

Instead of worrying about how you're being judged, consider how you make others feel. They'll remember this much more, and you'll make the world a better place.

# thou shalt not suffer cognitive biases

Cognitive biases make our judgments irrational. We have evolved to use shortcuts in our thinking, which are often useful, but a cognitive bias means there's a kind of misfiring going on causing us to lose objectivity. This poster has been designed to help you identify some of the most common biases and how to avoid falling victim to them. Help people become aware of their biases generally by sharing the website **yourbias.is** or more specifically e.g. **yourbias.is/confirmation-bias**



This poster is published under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND license 2020 by Jesse Richardson. You are free to print and redistribute this artwork non-commercially with the binding proviso that you reproduce it in full so that others may share alike. To learn more about biases you should read the books 'Thinking, Fast and Slow' and 'You Are Not So Smart'.

The illustration above is a reference to Michaelangelo's 'Creation of Adam' which many believe depicted the human brain in God's surrounding decoration.

**Download this poster at [www.yourbias.is](http://www.yourbias.is)**



## JP 3-04: Information in Joint Operations Information Sheet

JP 3-13 Information Operations, 20 NOV 14 CH1 (Canceled)	JP 3-04 Information in Joint Operations, 14 SEP 22
<p><b>NDS 2018</b> – Laid out a world where great-power competition, rather than counterterrorism, drove the DoD’s decision-making and force structure. Inter-state strategic competition primarily from China and Russia became the primary concern in US national security. Shifting away from counterinsurgency stance and back to large-scale combat operations</p>	<p><b>NDS 2022</b> – DoD’s priorities: 1) Defending the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the PRC; 2) Deterring strategic attacks against the United States, Allies, and partners; 3) Deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary - prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific region, then the Russia challenge in Europe, and; 4) Building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Integrating Function</b></p> <p><b>Definition:</b> “Integrated employment, during military operations, of IRCs in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the <b>decision-making (leaders)</b> of <b>adversaries/potential adversaries</b> while protecting our own”</p> <p>Focused on <b>Red</b> and <b>Green</b> if it affects <b>Red</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Joint Warfighting Capability</b></p> <p><b>Definition:</b> “The joint force uses information to improve understanding, decision-making, and communication. Commanders use information to visualize and understand the OE and direct and coordinate actions. The joint force leverages information to affect the perceptions, attitudes, decision-making, and behavior of <b>relevant actors</b>.”</p> <p>It considers <b>Red, Green, Blue</b> and others relevant actors.</p> <p><b>Relevant actors</b> = individuals, groups, populations, and automated systems whose capabilities/behaviors have the potential to affect the success of a particular campaign, operation, or tactical action</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Information / Influence Relational Framework</b></p> <p>Information / influence relational framework applied to three dimensions of the IE (physical, informational, and cognitive)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>“A JFC <b>may</b> establish an IO staff to provide command-level oversight and collaborate with all staff directorates.”</li> <li>Focused primarily on affecting the decision-making of <b>select target audiences (decision-makers)</b>.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Three Tasks of the Information Joint Function:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Understand how IE impacts the OE</li> <li>Support human and automated decision making</li> <li>Leverage information</li> </ol> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>“The information joint function stresses the <b>requirement to incorporate information as a fundamental element</b> during planning and conduct of all operations.”</li> <li>Expanding the commander’s range of options for actions across the competition continuum</li> </ul>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Deleted Doctrinal Terms</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Information Operations (IO) and Information Operations Planner</li> <li>Information Operations Working Group (IOWG)</li> <li>Information-Related Capabilities (IRC)</li> </ol>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>New Doctrinal Terms</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Information Planner</li> <li>Information Planning Cell</li> <li><b>Information Cross-Functional Team (I-CFT) “Not just Information Forces”</b></li> <li>Information Forces</li> </ol>
<p>IRCs are <b>force multipliers</b> used to create desired effects</p>	<p><b>Information advantage</b> is the operational advantage gained through the joint force’s use of information for decision-making and its ability to leverage information to generate effects on the IE.</p> <p><b>Informational power</b> is the ability to exert one’s will through the projection, exploitation, denial, and preservation of information in pursuit of objectives.</p>

## JP 3-04: Information in Joint Operations Information Sheet

- continued -


JP 3-13 Information Operations, 20 NOV 14 CH1 (Canceled)	JP 3-04 Information in Joint Operations, 14 SEP 22
IE = physical, informational, and cognitive domains - Subset of OE	IE = Aggregate of the social, cultural, linguistic, psychological, technical, and physical factors - Subset of OE
Information is used to “ <b>gain an advantage</b> ” in the IE	Understand, support, and leverage information to <b>achieve unity of effort</b>
<p>“Strategic communication is a whole-of-government approach, driven by interagency processes and integration that are focused upon effectively communicating national strategy.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strategic communication “owned” by DoS</li> <li>• JFC “amplifies” national strategy, policy, and objectives</li> </ul>	<p>“Narratives are an integral part of campaigns, operations and missions. An effective and integrated narrative can mitigate, undermine, or otherwise render competing narratives ineffective if it is accompanied by complementary actions.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CCMDs are responsible for the strategic and operational mission narratives and to assure OAs are aligned to these narratives.</li> </ul>
<p>JPP-focused, <b>integrating function</b></p> <p>“The <b><u>IO cell chief is responsible</u></b> to the JFC for integrating Information Related Capabilities into the joint operations planning process.”</p> <p><b>Perceived as the job of Information Forces (former IRCs)</b></p>	<p>JPP-focused, <b>joint warfighting capability</b></p> <p><b><u>“All members of the JFC’s staff are responsible for accomplishing or contributing to tasks of the information joint function, to include understanding how information affects joint force operations, understanding how those respective activities impact or are impacted by the IE, and integrating that understanding into their respective portions of joint plans.”</u></b></p> <p><b>Broader view and everyone has a role in the Information fight</b></p>
<p>“Coordination and synchronization of IRCs” implied information was separate or merely additive to a scheme of maneuver</p>	<p>More closely aligns the information element as an instrument of national power / the joint function to the planning and execution of joint force operations</p>
<p>Eight-step assessment process focused on measures of performance / measurements of effectiveness</p> <p><b><u>“Information operations assessment is iterative, continuously repeating rounds of analysis within the operations cycle in order to measure the progress of IRCs toward achieving objectives.”</u></b></p>	<p>Six-step assessment process seeking to describe for the commander how the IE / OE changed in relation to the operational objective(s) and the resulting ramifications of that effect / those effects</p> <p><b><u>“Assessment of operations and activities is key to the commander’s decision cycle, helping to determine the results of actions in the context of overall mission objectives and providing recommendations for refinement of future plans.”</u></b></p>
	<p><u>Updates required:</u>            JP 3-0 Joint Operations, 18 JUN 2022            JP 3-09 Joint Fire Support Planning, 10 APR 19            JP 3-16 Multinational Operations, 12 FEB 21 Validated            JP 3-33 JTF Headquarters, 9 JUN 22            JP 3-60 Joint Targeting, 31 JAN 2013            JP 5-0 Joint Planning, 1 DEC 20</p>

# ***Sustainment***

***Deployable Training Division  
Joint Staff J7***

***The overall classification of slides is***

**UNCLASSIFIED**




# *Challenges*

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- **Anticipating requirements in an uncertain, complex, rapidly changing and contested operating environment**
- **Leveraging Global Providers that are part of the Joint Logistics Enterprise to ensure rapid and precise response for the Joint Force Commander**
- **Integrating and synchronizing joint / combined capabilities to support the concept of operations**
- **Balancing global and theater-level considerations to set and sustain the theater**


# Global Strategic Environment



**“Globally Integrated Operations** is the concept for how the Joint Force should prepare for the security environment we will soon face....Globally integrated operations both enable and are **premised upon Global Agility.**”



# Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt)



**\*\*DISCLAIMER:** List not all inclusive

## Insights

- **Understand authorities, goals, and limitations of other JLEnt partners**
- **Establish relationships and build trust before a crisis occurs**
- **Capitalize on and leverage stakeholder capabilities and resources**
- **Be prepared to provide support to other JLEnt partners**

# Global Sustainment Considerations



**Strategic Lift**



**Critical Munitions**


## Competition for Resources



**Forces**



**Medical**



**War Reserve  
Materiel**



**Overflight, Transit,  
Basing**



**Operational Contract  
Support**

### Insights

- **Access requirements may extend beyond a given AOR**
- **Understand what critical resources other CCMDs will require and how that will impact your mission (e.g., OCS, Medical Assets, additional Forces)**
- **Engage the Joint Staff early to adjudicate limited global resources**

# *Key Takeaways*

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- Anticipating requirements (contested logistics)
- Leverage the Joint Logistics Enterprise to ensure rapid and precise response for the Joint Force Commander
- Integrate sustainment capabilities to support joint force requirements
- Balance global and theater level considerations to set and sustain the theater

*“You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.”*

*– General Dwight D. Eisenhower*


# *References*

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- **DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 2, “The Joint Force,” 19 Jun 2020**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Sustainment Focus Paper, 6<sup>th</sup> Edition, May 2022**



# HQ Organization and Process Insights



## Deployable Training Division Joint Staff J7

*The overall classification of slides is*

**UNCLASSIFIED**




# *Challenges*

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- **Organizing to accomplish the joint mission**
- **Developing processes to operate with speed and agility**
- **Integrating joint, multinational, and interagency mission partners into the HQ structure and processes**

# Organizing - Roles and Responsibilities

## J-Code Structure Organization (Preferred organizational structure)



\* Above organization structure is greatly simplified for illustrative purposes only

## Considerations


- *Mission requirements drive HQ functions, organization, and processes*
- *Agility vs. size of HQ*
- *Terms of Reference for key personnel*
- *Liaison network*
- *Clear roles and responsibilities needed for:*
  - *Assessment*
  - *Design*
  - *Integration of lethal and nonlethal effects*
  - *Narrative and Engagement*
  - *Reports to Higher HQ*
  - *Knowledge Management*
  - *Interagency Coordination*

## Insights

- *Maintain Commander-centric vs. staff-centric focus*
- *Be able to respond to crisis while retaining agility to plan and execute other missions*
- *Account for the transregional and multi-domain nature of operations*




# Staff Integration



\* JP 3-33, *Joint Force Headquarters*, defines “cross functional organizations” that include Centers, Groups, Cells, Offices, Elements, Boards, Working Groups, and Operational Planning Teams (OPTs).

# Staff Interaction in Support of Decision Making



## Insights



- *Force cross-functional integration to improve staff support for the Commander*
- *Provide venues for Commander's "touch points" and command decisions*
- *COS is the staff synchronizer and manages the battle rhythm*

# Enabling Commander Decision Making

Commander time for  
engagement, dialogue,  
battlefield circulation

Staff preparation and  
empowered DCOM-  
level steering

Commander  
assessment, guidance,  
and decision forums



Simplified for example only.

## Insights

- *White space enables commander and staff processes that inform decision making*
- *Battle Rhythm must be nested with HHQ, partners, and external stakeholders*

# *Integration with Mission Partners*



## *Insights*

- *Leverage CCDR to acquire formal support*
- *Early coordination / integration*

# ***Key Takeaways***

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- **Clear roles and responsibilities are needed to operate at the speed of relevance**
- **Effective staff integration enables shared understanding that supports decision making**
- **Early integration of all partners into the HQ is critical to achieve a comprehensive approach**

# *References*

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- **DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 2, “The Joint Force,” 19 Jun 2020**
- **Joint Pub 3-33, “Joint Force Headquarters,” 9 Jun 2022**

## **“Apologetics”**

**Excerpts from “Defending the Record on US Nuclear Deterrence” by Gen Kevin P. Chilton (ret),  
Former Commander, US Strategic Command, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2018**

Today, misinformation, falsehoods, and often deliberate distortions concerning nuclear deterrence continue to be repeated in public forums. Left unchallenged, these statements run the risk of becoming accepted as factual by the American public. [The following are] 11 of the more common fallacies.

### **“We Are Never Going to Use Nuclear Weapons”**

The argument presented is this: if we are never going to use nuclear weapons, why are we wasting so much money sustaining them? Our adversaries see our 24/7 alert postures and consequently assess an attack on the US or its allies to be an unthinkable choice.

### **“Prompt Conventional Global Strike Can Replace a Portion of the Nuclear Deterrent Force”**

Another fallacy is the notion that the deterrence mission can be adequately accomplished by substituting conventional warheads, because of their great accuracy, for nuclear warheads atop our ICBMs. This argument does not appreciate the “long, dark shadow” cast by the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the deterrent effect that “shadow” enables. A nuclear warhead is terribly frightening; a 2,000-pound conventional warhead is not.

### **“Conventional Weapon Overmatch Eliminates the Need for a Nuclear Deterrent”**

Another argument presented to reduce or eliminate the US nuclear deterrent is the notion that our conventional overmatch in quality and size is adequate for the deterrence mission. There is simply no conventional weapon equivalency to the power and deterrent effects of nuclear weapons. So where should the US spend its first dollar on defense? On the triad.

### **“We Do Not Need a Triad”**

The critical question to ask in response to the claim that we do not need a triad is, so which leg do you want to eliminate? The submarine leg provides the only stealth force we have—in essence, our assured response. The bombers are the flexible force that can signal our adversaries and assure our allies while encouraging them not to build their own nuclear deterrent. The ICBM is the most stabilizing leg of the triad. Stability, in this context, is defined as a state in which adversaries are never tempted to strike first. The value in the triad is that it complicates the adversary decision calculus. This is the definition of strategic stability: when an adversary understands that no day is a good day to go to war with the United States—nor is he ever tempted to launch first.

### **“Nuclear Forces Are on Hair-Trigger Alert”**

Critics of our ICBM alert posture use this terminology as a scare tactic. Nuclear forces are not on hair-trigger alert. They certainly are on alert and at the ready, and this is necessary to provide the strategic stability.

### **“LRSO Is Destabilizing”**

Another fallacious argument is that the long-range standoff weapon (LRSO), or cruise missile, is destabilizing. The fact is LRSO is not destabilizing in the sense of weakening strategic stability, as it does not invite a first strike—indeed it helps to prevent one. The United States and Russia have had these weapons for decades and employed them in regional conflicts, and neither country has considered striking first as a result. Today’s ALCM, which will age out in the next decade, must be replaced on schedule by the follow-on LRSO.

### **“We Cannot Afford Modernization”**

Arguing against recapitalizing the nuclear triad because of sustainment costs is patently unfair. In today’s world and for the foreseeable future the US will need a nuclear deterrent in the form of a triad. So, including sustainment costs when discussing the cost of recapitalization is simply another attempt to convince the public not to invest in something that remains necessary for national security. So if nuclear deterrence is the number-one priority and every other defense investment depends on it, the cost spread over the lifetime of the programs is most certainly affordable. We should be rebuilding and exercising the infrastructure necessary to



sustain our deterrent and, more importantly, developing the human capital required to design and build nuclear weapons for an uncertain future. The cost to do this is modest.

### **“If We Reduce, Others Will Reduce”**

We reduced our nuclear arsenal when we signed verifiable treaties with Russia. How effective has this leading by example been? How is showing constraint working? History does not support the proposition that if we reduce, others will follow our lead. The effectiveness of the leading-by-reducing approach to inspire others to show restraint is simply not supported by reality.

### **“Global Zero Is a Desirable Goal”**

Many talk about global zero as a desirable goal. After all, if we could “put the genie back in the bottle” wouldn’t it be better to have a world without nuclear weapons? Of course, the “genie,” that is, the knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons, cannot be unlearned and put back in the bottle of ignorance. Alternatively, some suggest we should continue to strive to get all nations to agree to reduce their inventories to zero, eliminate their weapon production capabilities, and submit to a near omniscient oversight authority that could compel compliance and ensure that no one was cheating. Human beings for centuries upon centuries, in war after war, found better and better ways to kill each other—more efficiently, more lethally. Do we want to go back to a world without nuclear weapons? There is a reason why great powers that own ever more lethal conventional weapons have elected not to fight each other: they have been deterred by nuclear weapons.

### **“Nuclear Deterrence is Cold War Think”**

Some argue the US nuclear deterrent should be eliminated because its existence represents Cold War think. The reality is nuclear deterrence underpins the national security of the United States and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. It remains relevant and necessary today to deter the existential threats to our nation. It also helps to deter nonnuclear attacks that could have catastrophic consequences, such as attacks involving biological weapons. The term Cold War think is a pejorative typically proffered by those who have never thought seriously about, let alone studied, deterrence theory or by those who have run out of ways to defend their position.

### **“No One Would Ever Use a Nuclear Weapon against the United States”**

Those who would use this argument seem willing to risk the very existence of the nation on the basis of their speculation and without forethought. The US military must ensure national survival through deterrence provided by a safe, secure, capable, reliable, flexible, and vigilant nuclear posture. It is our duty to assume the worst and then take steps to ensure it never happens. Additionally, we must deter attacks on our friends, allies, and fielded US military forces deployed abroad.

### **Summary**

These 11 statements are a few of the false arguments and positions directed toward the US nuclear deterrent, often by those who would wish to see this deterrent weakened or eliminated for purely ideological reasons. However, other serious scholars and students of deterrence theory present thoughtful and debatable positions that address issues pertaining to the size, capability, and posture requirements needed to provide the United States with a deterrent that will ensure no one would ever consider a nuclear attack on the United States, our military forces, or our friends or allies. It is the responsibility of members of the profession of arms to truthfully defend the record when false arguments are espoused and seriously consider those that are truly worthy of consideration. Only then can an informed debate begin on the subjects surrounding the US nuclear deterrent.

#### *Disclaimer*

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*Links to Gen Chilton’s speech to The Heritage Foundation from January 18, 2018 titled, “The Importance of the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent”:*

- The Heritage Foundation website: <https://www.heritage.org/defense/event/the-importance-the-us-nuclear-deterrent>
- The Heritage Foundation on YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g1J4LGOgZIU>