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Welcome to the Capstone Joint Operations Module (JOM)



Introduction and Course Overview

*Deployable Training and Lessons Division
Joint Staff J7*

The overall classification of slides is

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
Agenda

- **Who we are**
- **JOM Overview**
- **Admin**
- **Group Assignments**
- **Senior Fellow Coordinator**

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JOM History



Instructional Resources

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• Brochure: Schedule of events / Floor plan	
• Reference Library located in the ECC Lobby	
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Reference Library List

The following documents are available in our Reference Library. You are welcome to take them with you. The Insights and Best Practices Focus Papers (19 Papers) are available on the web at http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/focus_papers.aspx# or by typing “JEL Focus Papers” in any search engine:

National Security Strategy, November 2025

National Defense Strategy, January 2026

Joint Risk Analysis Methodology (JRAM), CJCSM 3105.01B, 22 Dec 2023

Insights and Best Practices Functional Focus Papers (19 Papers):

- Assessment and Risk, 3rd Ed., March 2020
- Authorities, 2nd Ed., October 2016
- Chief of Staff Roles and Functions at Joint Headquarters, 2nd Ed., January 2020
- Combatant Command (CCMD) Command and Control Organizational Options, 3rd Ed. May 2022
- Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs), 4th Ed., January 2020
- Communication Strategy and Synchronization, 1st Ed., May 2016
- Design and Planning, 1st Ed., July 2013
- Forming a JTF HQ, 1st Ed., September 2015
- Integration and Synchronization of Joint Fires, 4th Ed., July 2018
- Intelligence Operations, 3rd Ed., September 2019
- Interorganizational Cooperation, 5th Ed., April 2018
- The Joint Command Senior Enlisted Leader, 4th Ed., August 2021
- Joint Headquarters Organization, Staff Integration, and Battle Rhythm, 3rd. Ed., September 2019
- Joint HQ Terms of Reference (TOR), 1st Ed., February 2019
- Joint Operations, 5th Ed., November 2017
- JTF C2 and Organization, 2nd Ed., January 2020
- Knowledge and Information Management, 3rd Ed., May 2018
- Mission Command, 2nd Ed., January 2020
- Sustainment, 6th Ed., May 2022



Post-course Unclassified Course Materials and Useful Links

(<https://capstone.ndu.edu/Class-Materials/End-of-Course-Info/>)



Capstone Joint Operations Module (JOM) Useful Links:

Useful Websites

[Joint Chiefs of Staff Website](#) (Publically Accessible)

[Joint Lessons Learned Information System \(JLLIS\)](#) (CAC Required) - facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development/readiness of the Joint Force.

[Joint Knowledge Online \(JKO\)](#)

[The Noncommissioned Officer and Petty Officer: Backbone of the Armed Forces](#)

Deployable Training and Lessons Division's Insights and Best Practices Papers

[Insights and Best Practices Focus Papers Library on the Joint Electronic Library Website](#) (Publicly Accessible) - The DTLTD gains insights on operational matters through regular contact and dialogue with combatant and joint task force commanders, collecting and comparing practices. The DTLTD draws out and refines "insights" and "best practices," publishing them, and sharing them across the operational, training, lessons learned, doctrine, and joint development communities.

Reference Library

[CJCS Directives Library](#) – Instructions, Manuals, Notices, and Guides

[DOW Directives Division](#) – DOW Issuances, DOD Forms.

[Joint Doctrine Publications](#) (Publicly Accessible)

[Joint Electronic Library Plus \(JEL+\)](#) (CAC Required) – Joint doctrine, training, lessons learned, and concepts.

[DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms](#)

Strategic Policy and Guidance/U.S. National Policies

[National Security Strategy](#)

[National Defense Strategy](#)

[National Response Framework](#)


[National Incident Management System](#)

Links to Gen Chilton's speech to The Heritage Foundation from January 18, 2018 titled, "The Importance of the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent":

- The Heritage Foundation website: <https://www.heritage.org/defense/event/the-importance-the-us-nuclear-deterrent>
- The Heritage Foundation on YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g1J4LGOqZIU>

Also provided on the NDU Capstone website (<https://capstone.ndu.edu/Class-Materials/End-of-Course-Info/>): Unclassified JOM slides, Civil-Military Relations Readings, and supplemental materials provided in the Participant Guide

A Comprehensive Approach to Unified Action



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Challenges

- **Strategic Alignment**
- **National Policy and the Interagency Process**
- **Unity of Effort with Allies and Partners**

Strategic Guidance



National Security Strategy



National Defense Strategy




National Military Strategy

Insights

- Focus on importance and role of allies, partners, interagency
- Illuminate complex strategic environment via nested, aligned documents
- Pursue global alignment across CCMDs, whole-of-government, and Allies and Partners

Strategic Alignment



Insights


- Retain alignment even under changing conditions
- Translate strategic dialogue into clear guidance and intent to subordinates
- Account for and adjust to complex and changing strategic environment
- Inform and be informed by continuous strategic dialogue

National Policy and the Interagency Process



- Insights**
- Operate as part of a whole-of-government effort
 - Be prepared to operate in support to other USG interagency partners
 - Leverage the Country Team as the gateway to in-country partners

Unity of Effort with Allies and Partners



- Insights**
- Commander sets the tone for integration with partners
 - Nations operate in accordance with their own national interests
 - Strive toward unity of effort, not unity of command
 - Integration with allies and partners occurs at all echelons

Key Takeaways

“We must build world class civ-mil teams. This extends to our relationships with the interagency here in Washington and with our key allies and partners. Build strong, mutually supportive, and trusting relationships... always.”

- Guidance to the Joint Staff #1, 24 July 2025

J. Daniel Caine

General U.S. Air Force

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff


References

- **DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol. 1, “Joint Warfighting,” 27 Aug 2023**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 2, “The Joint Force,” 19 Jun 2020**
- **Joint Pub 3-0, “Joint Campaigns and Operations,” 18 Jun 2022**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Interorganizational Cooperation Focus Paper, 5th Edition, Apr 2018**

Key Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Documents for Interagency Integration with State, Local, Private Sector in Emergency/Disaster Response

The **National Response Framework (NRF)** provides foundational emergency management doctrine for how the Nation responds to all types of incidents. The NRF is built on scalable, flexible, and adaptable concepts identified in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) to align key roles and responsibilities across the Nation. The structures, roles, and responsibilities described in the Framework can be partially or fully implemented in the context of a threat or hazard, in anticipation of a significant event, or in response to an incident. Implementation of the structures and procedures allows for a scaled response, delivery of specific resources and capabilities, and a level of coordination appropriate to each incident. The NRF is structured to help jurisdictions, citizens, nongovernmental organizations and businesses:

- Develop whole community plans
- Integrate continuity plans
- Build capabilities to respond to cascading failures among businesses, supply chains, and infrastructure sectors
- Collaborate to stabilize community lifelines and restore services



The **National Incident Management System (NIMS)** guides all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector to work together to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to and recover from incidents. NIMS provides stakeholders across the whole community with the shared vocabulary, systems and processes to successfully deliver the capabilities described in the National Preparedness System. NIMS defines operational systems, including the Incident Command System (ICS), Emergency Operations Center (EOC) structures, and Multiagency Coordination Groups (MAC Groups) that guide how personnel work together during incidents. NIMS applies to all incidents, from traffic accidents to major disasters.

National Response Framework website: <https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/national-preparedness/frameworks/response>

National Incident Management System website: <https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/nims>

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

www.state.gov

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February 18, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIES

SUBJECT: Interim Guidance to Chiefs of Mission

The President's Letter of Instruction (PLOI) to Chiefs of Mission is the primary mechanism for communicating the President's foreign policy priorities and defining Chief of Mission (COM) authority and security responsibility. In accordance with E.O. 14145, 14167, 14171, Secretary Rubio has issued interim guidance that immediately rescinds and supersedes the previous administration's Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of Mission. This guidance reminds Chiefs of Mission and Executive branch agencies of their responsibilities until President Trump issues his Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of Mission outlining his priorities.

All questions should be directed to the Office of Management Strategy and Solutions (M/SS/PGP) at MSS-COM@state.gov.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Lisa D. Kenna', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Lisa D. Kenna
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Message from Secretary Rubio to Chiefs of Mission

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MRN: [25 STATE 13056](#)
Date/DTG: Feb 13, 2025 / 131403Z FEB 25
From: SECSTATE WASHDC
Action: ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE *Routine*
E.O: 13526
TAGS: AMGT, ASEC, KCOM
Reference: A) [25 STATE 6078](#)
 B) [22 STATE 131238](#)
 C) [25 STATE 5156](#)
Pass Line: FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION
Subject: Message from Secretary Rubio to Chiefs of Mission

1. The President's Letter of Instruction (PLOI) to Chiefs of Mission (COMs) is the primary mechanism for communicating the President's foreign policy priorities and further defining Chief of Mission authority and security responsibility consistent with U.S. law. In accordance with guidance in ref A, this cable immediately rescinds and supersedes ref B and will serve as interim guidance to COMs until President Trump issues his Letter of Instruction to COMs outlining his priorities.

2. Our foreign policy must champion core American interests and put America and its citizens first. As outlined in ref C, President Trump has articulated a strong, optimistic, and forward-looking agenda for our country and for America's relations with the rest of the world. Our Department will take the lead in revitalizing alliances, strengthening ties with other partners and allies, and countering the malign activities of our adversaries. We will refocus American foreign policy on the realities of today's reemerging great power rivalry. We will explore and creatively exploit the many new and unexpected opportunities that this changing world affords our nation. As I said in my Senate confirmation hearing, "Every dollar we spend, every program we fund, and every policy we pursue must be justified with the

answer to three simple questions: Does it make America safer? Does it make America stronger? Does it make America more prosperous?"

3. **COM Authority:** This guidance reminds all COMs of their full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all USG Executive branch activities, operations, and employees in their country or area of assignment, regardless of employment category or location. Unless U.S. law or presidentially approved guidance directs otherwise, the only exceptions are activities, operations, and employees under the command of a U.S. combatant commander; Voice of America (VOA) correspondents on official assignment; and employees officially on the staff of an international organization and performing the functions of that organization.

4. **Direction and Coordination:** COMs report to the President through me. The only authorized channel for instruction to a COM is from the President or from me, unless the President or I direct otherwise. Executive branch agencies with employees under the authority of the COM must keep the COM fully informed of all current and planned activities. Unless prohibited by U.S. law or presidentially approved guidance, the COM has the right to see all communications to or from agencies and their employees under his or her authority.

5. **Policies and Directives:** All agencies with employees under COM authority must ensure those employees comply fully with all applicable policies and directives pertaining to the operations of the mission. COMs must implement clear policies and directives that are consistent with U.S. law and apply consistently across all agencies with employees under COM authority.

6. **Security Responsibility:** COMs must develop and implement policies and programs for the protection of all USG personnel on official duty abroad and their accompanying dependents. Unless an agreement between me and the head of another agency provides otherwise, the only exceptions to this security responsibility are personnel under the command of a U.S. combatant commander who has been designated with a physical area of

responsibility; VOA correspondents on official assignment; personnel officially on the staff of an international organization and performing the functions of that organization; and the authorized accompanying dependents of these excepted personnel.

7. Overseas Staffing: The COM leads interagency teams to implement USG objectives. Each agency must obtain approval from the COM before changing the size, composition, or mandate of their staff under the COM's authority. When considering staffing requests, the COM must ensure the number of personnel at the mission is kept to the minimum necessary to implement the President's foreign policy priorities. Agencies must submit requests to abolish positions that have been vacant for at least two years. The COM retains the authority to approve or disapprove staffing requests based on the President's policy priorities and his or her consultations with the requesting agency. Unless a clear benefit to the USG justifies otherwise, all functions that can be performed effectively and efficiently by personnel domestically or at regional offices overseas should be performed in those locations.

8. DoD Coordination: Unless U.S. law or presidentially approved guidance directs otherwise, COMs and U.S. combatant commanders must keep each other fully informed and coordinate on any matters that affect one another's interests in the country or area of assignment, including initiatives regional in scope and impact. Unless presidentially approved guidance directs otherwise, any disagreements that the COM cannot resolve with a U.S. combatant commander must be reported to me and the Secretary of Defense for resolution.

9. Country Clearance: All USG personnel, including travelers on temporary duty, must obtain approval from the COM before entering the country or area of assignment on official business. A COM may grant, withhold, or limit country clearance as he or she deems necessary. While all agencies will generally submit country clearance requests using automated systems provided by the Department and DoD, the COM may authorize use of other processes when warranted.

10. For any questions on this guidance, please contact M/SS/PGP at MSS-COM@state.gov.

Signature: RUBIO

XMT: BASRAH, AMCONSUL; CARACAS, AMEMBASSY; CHENGDU, AMCONSUL; KABUL, AMEMBASSY; MINSK, AMEMBASSY; SANAA, AMEMBASSY; ST PETERSBURG, AMCONSUL; VLADIVOSTOK, AMCONSUL; YEKATERINBURG, AMCONSUL

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NATIONAL GUARD

STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

116 PARTNER NATIONS



SOUTHCOM (30 ⁴)		
Argentina	GA	2016
Belize	LA	1996
Bolivia	MS	1999
Brazil	NY	2018
Chile	TX	2008
Colombia	SC	2012
Costa Rica	NM	2006
Dominican Republic	PR	2003
Ecuador	KY	1996
El Salvador	NH	2000
Guatemala	AR	2002
Guyana	FL	2003
Haiti	LA	2011
Honduras	PR	1998
Jamaica	DC	1999
Nicaragua	WI	2003
Panama	MO	1996
Paraguay	MA	2001
Peru	WV	1996
Regional Security System	FL/VI	2006
Suriname	SD	2006
Trinidad and Tobago	DE	2004
Uruguay	CT	2000
Venezuela *	FL	1998

NOTES:

1. Regional Security System (RSS) listed as one partnership, but the RSS comprises seven member nations: 1) Antigua and Barbuda, 2) Barbados, 3) Dominica, 4) Grenada, 5) Saint Kitts and Nevis, 6) Saint Lucia, 7) Saint Vincent and Grenadines
2. Partner Nations are paired with the 50 states, District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands

*=domant relationship

NORTHCOM (2)		
Bahamas	RI	2005
Mexico	CA	2025

AFRICOM (25)		
Angola	OH	2024
Benin	ND	2014
Botswana	NC	2008
Burkina Faso	DC	2018
Cabo Verde	NH	2021
Côte d'Ivoire	PA	2025
Djibouti	KY	2015
Gabon	WV	2024
Ghana	ND	2004
Kenya	MA	2015
Liberia	MI	2009
Malawi/Zambia	NC	2023
Mauritius	TBD	2025
Morocco	UT	2003
Niger	IN	2017
Nigeria	CA	2006
Rwanda	NE	2019
Senegal	VT	2008
Seychelles	TBD	2025
Sierra Leone	MI	2024
South Africa	NY	2003
Tanzania	NE	2024
Togo	ND	2014
Tunisia	WY	2004

CENTCOM (11)		
Egypt	TX	2020
Jordan	CO	2004
Kazakhstan	AZ	1993
Kyrgyzstan	MT	1996
Oman	AZ	2022
Qatar	WV	2018
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	IN/OK	2024
Tajikistan	VA	2003
Turkmenistan	MT	2021
United Arab Emirates	TX	2025
Uzbekistan	MS	2012

INDOPACOM (18)		
Bangladesh	OR	2008
Cambodia	ID	2008
Indonesia	HI	2006
Malaysia	WA	2017
Marshall Islands	NE/GU	2025
Mongolia	AK	2003
Nepal*		2019
Palau	GU	2024
Papua New Guinea	WI	2020
Philippines	GUI/HI	2000
Sri Lanka / Maldives	MT	2020 / 21
Thailand	WA	2002
Timor-Leste	RI	2020
Tonga / Fiji / Samoa	NV	2014 / 18 / 23
Vietnam	OR	2012

EUCOM (30)		
Albania	NJ	2001
Armenia	KS	2002
Austria	VT	2021
Azerbaijan	OK	2002
Bosnia Herzegovina	MD	2003
Bulgaria	TN	1993
Croatia	MN	1996
Cyprus	NJ	2022
Czech Republic	TX/NE	1993
Estonia	MD	1993
Finland	VA	2024
Georgia	GA	1994
Greece	TBD	2026
Hungary	OH	1993
Kosovo	IA	2011
Latvia	MI	1993
Lithuania	PA	1993
Moldova	NC	1996
Montenegro	ME	2006
North Macedonia	VT	1993
Norway	MN	2023
Poland	IL	1993
Portugal	IL	2025
Romania	AL	1993
Serbia	OH	2005
Slovakia	IN	1993
Slovenia	CO	1993
Sweden	NY	2024
Switzerland	CO	2025
Ukraine	CA	1993

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Globally Integrated Operations

***Deployable Training and Lessons Division
Joint Staff J7***

The overall classification of slides is

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
Challenges

- **Execute national strategy through globally integrated planning**
- **Command and Control of the Joint Force**
- **Identify and manage risk**
- **Achieve integrated deterrence**

Joint Force Command and Control (C2)

• C2 Organization

- CCDR as Joint Force Commander
- Lead Service Component
- Lead Joint Force Component
- Joint Task Force (JTF)




• Planning Authority

- **Competition to Crisis: Coordinating Authority**
 - Consultative authority to facilitate planning and assessment for a specific problem set - *JSPS CJCSI 3100.01F, 29 Jan 2024*
- **Crisis to Conflict: Supported Commander for Planning**

• Focus

- Prioritizing time
- Mission Command / Delegation
- Decision quality information



Risk

- Risk to what?
- Risk from what?
- How long?
- Who owns the risk?

Chairman provides assessment of both:

CCDRs provide: **Operational Risk**
 Ability to:

- Execute missions
- Mitigate risk to assigned forces

Military Strategic Risk
 Threats to US Interests
Military Risk
 Threats to mission execution and support -- NSS, NDS, NMS

Informs

Organizations and Risk

Services provide: **Risk to Force**
 Ability to:

- Generate the force
- Sustain force health
- Develop the force

CJCSM 3105.01B (2023) establishes a joint risk analysis methodology and provides guidance for identifying, assessing, and managing risk.

Insights

- Understand and over-communicate different perspectives on risk
- Address assumptions and time dimension of risk
- Risk informs mitigation options and priorities
- Appraise military risk and military strategic risk in a global strategic context


Deterrence

Deterrence Definition

- Prevention of an action by:
 - The existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or
 - The belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits

Deterrence in Practice

- Adversary state of mind brought about by the perception of:
 - Likelihood of being denied the expected benefits of the action
 - Likelihood of excessive costs suffered for taking the action
 - Acceptability of restraint as an alternative



Integrated Deterrence

- *Combine strengths across domains, theaters, and spectrum of conflict*
- *Apply all instruments of national power and include allies and partners*

Key Takeaways

- Synchronize Joint Force planning to develop globally integrated plans and to support decision making at the speed of relevance
- Focus on Joint Force Command and Control (C2) challenges up-front and preserve decision space
- Over-communicate perspectives on risk
- US strategic discipline and our ability to assess adversaries' perception of actions remain key element to achieve deterrence

References

- **Joint Pub 1, Vol. 1, Joint Warfighting, 27 Aug 2023**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 2, The Joint Force,” 19 Jun 2020**
- **Joint Pub 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, 18 Jun 2022**
- **CJCSI 3030.01B, Implementing Joint Force Development and Design, 1 Jul 2025**
- **CJCSI 3100.01F, Joint Strategic Planning System, 29 Jan 2024**
- **CJCSI 3141.01F, Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans, 31 Jan 2019**
- **CJCSM 3105.01B, Joint Risk Analysis Methodology, 22 Dec 2023**
- **JSM 3051.01, Execution and Oversight of Global Integration, 14 Apr 2023**

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(For use by Fellows in preparation for the Joint Operations Module in Suffolk, VA)

23 September 2024

Subject: Global Military Integration – Executive Summary for Fellows

1. **Purpose:** To provide an executive overview of global military integration
2. **Objective of Global Military Integration:** An integrated global perspective that provides strategic direction for Joint operations across all domains and regions to identify efficiencies and synergies and to champion integration with allies, partners, and the interagency at the national-strategic level. (CJCSI 3100.01F, *Joint Strategic Planning System*, 29 Jan 2024).
3. **Concept of Global Integration:** Global integration is achieved through the integration of planning, force management, force development, and force design—all undergirded by assessments—to enable senior leader decision making to translate strategy into outcomes.
4. **Role of the Chairman:** Section 153 of Title 10, U.S. Code, requires the Chairman to perform six primary functions to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense with planning, advice, and policy formulation: (1) provide strategic direction for the Armed Forces; (2) conduct strategic and contingency planning; (3) assess comprehensive joint readiness; (4) foster joint capability development; (5) manage Joint Force development; and (6) advise on global military integration.
 - a. Section 153(a)(3) directs the Chairman to provide advice to the President and the Secretary in “matters relating to global military strategic and operational integration.” Title 10 acknowledges the global “transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional threats” and directs the Chairman to provide the President and the Secretary advice on “ongoing military operations.” The Chairman also provides advice to the Secretary on “the allocation and transfer of forces” among the Combatant Commands.
 - b. Section 163(b) permits the Secretary to assign to the Chairman responsibility for overseeing the activities of the combatant commands, which does not confer any command authority. The Chairman executes these responsibilities by guiding coordination across geographic, functional, and Service seams to ensure the Joint Force expands its collective competitive advantages to overcome global challenges.
 - c. The Chairman develops military advice on global posture, readiness, and risk. CJCSM 3105.01B, *Joint Risk Analysis Methodology*, 22 December 2023, spells out the risk identification and assessment process established by the Chairman. The Chairman’s military advice represents apolitical (nonpartisan), professional military judgment on a wide range of Joint Force issues and topics.
5. **Role of the Joint Staff:** The Joint Staff assists the Chairman and, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman, the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out their responsibilities. (Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 155(a)).
 - a. JSM 3051.01, *Execution and Oversight of Global Integration*, 14 APR 2023, establishes the Joint Staff battle rhythm, global integration processes, and key events, e.g., Global Integration Meeting (GIM), J-3 Global Sync, Global Integration Working Group (GIWG) Level III and Level II, and Cross-Functional Teams (CFTs).
6. **POC:** Dave Wagner, JS J7, DDJTE, DTLD 757.203.7690, david.a.wagner1.ctr@mail.mil.

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Inflection Point: How to Reverse the Erosion of U.S. and Allied Military Power and Influence

DAVID OCHMANEK AND ANDREW HOEHN

November 3, 2023



As diplomatic efforts in Europe and Asia intensify, so too should U.S. military planning and preparations for a world that is drastically different and more dangerous than it was just a decade ago.

For the past decade and a half, wargaming and analysis have pointed to the conclusion that the U.S. defense strategy and posture have become insolvent. The tasks that the U.S. government and its citizens expect their military forces and other elements of national power to do internationally greatly exceed the means available to accomplish those tasks. We address this problem in our new report, *Inflection Point: How to Reverse the Erosion of U.S. and Allied Military Power and Influence*. As we wrote, the causes of this are many and varied but the fact is that U.S. military forces no longer enjoy the kind of comprehensive superiority that was the foundation of victories over adversary states such as Iraq and Serbia in the post-Cold War era. As a result, in realistic wargames that we have been a part of, when current and programmed U.S. forces face those of China — America’s most capable state adversary — “Blue” teams playing the United States often fail in their assigned mission to prevent “Red” from overrunning Taiwan’s defense forces. And U.S. forces pay a high price for that failure, losing scores of modern aircraft and ships and incurring thousands of casualties in the opening days of the war. The forces of adversaries less capable than China, including Russia, North Korea, and Iran, are also fielding capabilities that can significantly increase the costs and risks of military intervention, compared to the operations undertaken by U.S. forces since the end of the Cold War.

This does not necessarily mean that the United States will lose the wars that it may have to fight in the future, but it does mean that the ability to deter those wars has seriously eroded. If the essence of deterrence is confronting one’s adversaries with the real prospect of failure, there is a great deal to be done to restore the credibility of America’s deterrent.

Re-establishing a credible posture against aggression by highly capable adversaries will call for sustained, coordinated efforts by the United States, its allies, and its key partners to rethink their approaches to defeating aggression and to recast important elements of their military forces and postures. Fortunately, wargames testing the viability of new operational concepts, postures, and capabilities show a way ahead that can support robust defenses against aggression even when U.S. and allied forces lack superiority in key domains.

Projecting Military Power Without Dominance

It is time for the United States to recast the basic approach to projecting military power that has been in place since the end of the Cold War. That strategy, which we characterize as decisive expeditionary force, held that, when confronted with a major aggressor somewhere in the world threatening U.S. interests, the United States would marshal overwhelming conventional force; project that power to the region and,

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perhaps, the homeland of the enemy; and impose its will on that country, producing decisive victory. The strategy was predicated on U.S. military forces that were superior in all domains to those of any adversary — land, air, sea, space, and cyber.

Much of that superiority is gone — surely with respect to China but in significant ways with respect to the forces of other, less powerful adversaries as well — and it is not coming back. At its root, the problem is that the United States and its allies no longer have a virtual monopoly on the technologies and capabilities that made them so dominant against the forces of nations like Iraq, Serbia, Libya, and Afghanistan — near-real-time sensing, high-capacity communications links, precision guidance via miniaturized electronics, and advanced software being primary among these.

The good news is that U.S. and allied forces do not require superiority to defeat aggression by even their most powerful foes. If these forces are properly postured and equipped and if they learn to fight in new ways, they can impose robust obstacles to any adversary's invasion force and, having thwarted the attack, degrade and destroy other elements of the enemy's national power, providing strong incentives to end the conflict. The new approach to large-scale military operations that we advocate calls for major changes in three dimensions of U.S. and allied military planning and operations: force posture, sensing and targeting, and strike capabilities.

First, the posture of U.S. forces based in Europe and, especially, in the Western Pacific today is inadequate in two ways. Those forces lack sufficient combat power to seize the initiative from China or a reconstituted Russia. And U.S. and allied bases are too vulnerable to attacks by salvos of accurate ballistic and cruise missiles. Planners should find ways to bring combat power to bear in highly contested battlespaces much more quickly than was the case in the post-Cold War era — that is, without a lengthy period of mobilization and reinforcement. They should also reduce the exposure of forward-based forces to precision attacks.

Secondly, sensing and targeting — the ability to locate the enemy, understand the broader military situation, and orchestrate operations accordingly remains central to success on the battlefield. Understanding this, America's most capable adversaries have fielded a welter of capabilities, including multilayered air defenses, counterspace weapons, cyber warfare, and electronic jamming, intended to deny these abilities to U.S. forces. Too many of the systems that U.S. forces currently rely on to build a picture of the dynamic battlespace will be unable to function effectively in this new environment. New approaches are therefore needed to enable defending forces to reach into highly contested battlespaces and observe, identify, and track enemy forces from the very outset of hostilities to enable effective attacks on the enemy.

Thirdly, strike capabilities — for Operation Desert Storm, the coalition deployed on the order of 2,000 combat aircraft at land and sea bases within 1,000 kilometers of enemy territory. That worked because Iraq's air force was no match for America's, and Iraq at that time had only a few hundred short- and medium-range missiles, all of which were highly inaccurate. Doing that in a conflict against an adversary like China, which fields thousands of highly accurate missiles, would be a recipe for disaster, yet U.S. forces have made little progress in developing and fielding viable alternatives. Ways should be found to generate and deliver combat power against the enemy's invasion force from the outset of hostilities without risking the loss of excessive numbers of forces.

If U.S. and allied forces can perform these functions effectively, even in the highly contested environments that advanced adversaries will create, the prospects for deterrence and a successful initial defense will be greatly enhanced. But while being able to prevent enemy forces from achieving their

principal territorial objectives is necessary for a successful campaign, it may not be sufficient to compel a termination of hostilities. U.S. and allied forces should, therefore, also be able to defend their homelands and, over time, to hunt down and destroy enemy forces that were not attrited during the counter-invasion phase of the war, and do so at manageable cost and risk.

This emerging approach is quite different from the operations undertaken by U.S. forces since the end of the Cold War, but something akin to it will be necessary to defeat aggression by powerful states that have the ability in a conflict to seize the initiative and move quickly to secure their principal objectives. U.S. and coalition forces simply cannot count on having the time they would need to deploy to the theater and fight to gain dominance in key domains before attacking the enemy's invasion force at scale. And herein lies the nub of the problem: Neither today's force nor forces currently programmed by the U.S.

Department of Defense appear to have the capabilities needed to execute this new approach. Significant changes to the U.S. defense program and to the forces of key allies and partners will be needed to ensure that those forces can, in combination, respond promptly to threats of an invasion, establish robust means for finding and targeting the enemy invasion force, rapidly damage and contain that force, and conduct sustained follow-on operations.

Especially in the case of China, speed is of the essence. It is not known whether China's military and political leaders yet have confidence in the ability of their forces to prevail in a major conflict with Taiwan and the United States, but the U.S. defense establishment has surely not done enough to deny them that confidence. U.S. forces, posture, and operational concepts over the past two decades have remained an essentially static and predictable target against which China has developed increasingly potent threats.

Decisive action is needed to solidify a new operational concept for joint and combined forces; select key investment priorities; produce game-changing systems at scale; and field these in new, resilient postures in both the Indo-Pacific and European regions.

Priorities for Force Modernization

Fortunately, numerous opportunities exist that can allow U.S. and allied force planners to field forces that can execute all four elements of the new approach.

First, with regard to posture, the United States should deploy additional forces and support assets in the Western Pacific and in Europe, ensuring that they can be operated during wartime in ways that make them difficult for the enemy to locate, track, and attack. When possible, priority should be accorded to systems that can be deployed in large numbers and that are less reliant than current systems on elaborate base infrastructures and logistics tails. Promising candidates include unmanned undersea vehicles; runway-independent unmanned aerial vehicles; and, in Europe, mobile artillery, rocket, and missile systems. For forces, such as manned aircraft, that need runways and other fixed infrastructure, cost-effective passive measures, such as expedient aircraft shelters, fuel bladders, runway repair assets, and force dispersal, can significantly increase survivability.

Second, the United States, its allies, and its partners should jointly develop and deploy systems that can be used to create robust sensing and targeting grids in contested battlespaces. New technologies for sensors, autonomy, and automatic target recognition make it possible for small air, space, land, and maritime platforms to collect and share data and to process those data onboard, generating the information that joint and combined forces need to target moving enemy forces. Key attributes of these sensing grids should be affordability and mass. The sensors and the platforms carrying them should be inexpensive enough that the defending force can feed them into the battlespace in large numbers and do so quickly

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enough to overwhelm or exhaust enemy defenses. Promising candidates for this include maritime drones; unattended ground sensors; small unmanned aerial vehicles; and small satellites, including civil-sector constellations. Examples of all of these exist today, albeit at varying levels of maturity.

Third, in order to be confident of defeating invasions by China or a reconstituted Russia, American, allied, and partner forces need much larger quantities of specialized weapons and munitions than they have heretofore fielded. Weapons that can engage moving forces — ships, armored columns, and aircraft — from stand-off deserve special emphasis because they can enable effective attacks on the invasion force without requiring that the enemy’s air defenses first be suppressed or dismantled. Promising candidates include stand-off antiship cruise missiles and antiarmor weapons that can be delivered by long-range bombers, mobile missile launchers, and large-displacement unmanned underwater vehicles. Hypersonic weapons, although not a panacea, can make important contributions to denying a fait accompli by destroying the invader’s surface-to-air missile systems, thus increasing the survivability of subsonic weapons. The war in Ukraine is also highlighting the value of small, “killer” drones, also known as loitering munitions, for locating and attacking moving vehicles, even in the face of conventional air defenses.

The table below summarizes the sorts of capabilities that wargaming and associated analysis show are called for in order to enable the new approach to power projection described here.

Summary of Priority Enhancements for U.S. and Allied Joint and Combined Forces

Scenario	Posture	Sense and Target	Strike
Versus China	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create designs for prepositioning large numbers of autonomous UAVs, PGMs, and support assets in Guam, the Marianas, and Japan. • Procure and deploy fuel bladders and expeditionary aircraft shelters to air bases in the Western Pacific. • Assist Taiwan in acquiring sea mines, small UAVs for targeting short-range anti-ship and antiarmor missiles, MLRS, and SHORADS. 	—	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accelerate production of anti-ship PGMs that are capable of disabling large amphibious transports—e.g., a mix of LRASM, MS-TACTOM, SM-6, and NSM. • Accelerate development of LDUUVs for weapons delivery.
Versus China and Russia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue to expand the number of potential operating locations and support capacity to enable distributed operations by forward-based aircraft. • Provide logistics infrastructure and assets to sustain joint operations by forward forces. • Continue to invest in capabilities to speed runway recovery. • Field mobile SHORADS systems (e.g., IFPC-2 or NASAMS) at key bases in the Western Pacific and in Central Europe. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accelerate development of small, autonomous, runway-independent UAVs for sensing. • Experiment at scale with autonomous integration and interpretation of sensor data. • Develop and test systems and TTPs to ensure rapid connectivity between the sensing grid and joint and combined fires platforms and weapons. • Pursue options that exploit civil-sector sensing and communications satellite constellations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accelerate development of autonomous, runway-independent UAVs for weapons delivery (air-to-surface and air-to-air). • Accelerate production of PGMs for air superiority (e.g., AARGM-ER, HACM, AIM-260). • Field palletized munitions packages for U.S. and allied cargo aircraft.
Versus Russia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Station V Corps headquarters and support elements in Poland. • Station a U.S.-armored division in Poland. • Build out the European-led Enhanced Forward Presence Battalions into full brigades in the Baltic states. • Coordinate with Sweden to prepare logistics supplies and support to allow NATO combat aircraft to operate from Swedish bases during wartime. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • With allies, field thousands of unattended ground sensors; preposition these in eastern-flank nations. • Fix sensor-to-shooter data links so that airborne sensors can send targeting data to U.S. Army rocket artillery units. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accelerate production of antiarmor weapons (e.g., SDB II, area munitions for GMLRS and PrSM; JSOW-X with SFW).

NOTES: AARGM-ER = Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile—Extended Range; AIM-260 = Air Intercept Missile-260; GMLRS = Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System; HACM = Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile; IFPC-2 = Indirect Fire Protection Capability Increment 2; JSOW-X = Joint Standoff Weapon-X; LDUUV = large-diameter unmanned underwater vehicle; LRASM = Long Range Anti-Ship Missile; MLRS = Multiple Launch Rocket System; MS-TACTOM = Maritime Strike Tactical Tomahawk; NASAMS = National [or, in some cases, Norwegian] Advanced Surface to Air Missile System; NSM = Naval Strike Missile; PGM = precision-guided munition; PrSM = Precision Strike

Conclusion

WAR ON THE ROCKS

The United States cannot and should not on its own attempt to develop the requisite operational concepts, postures, and capabilities required to realize this new approach to defeating aggression. The imperative for allied and partner participation is about more than just generating the resources needed for a credible combined defense. Because deterrence is about more than raw military power, solidarity among the leading democratically governed nations is required in diplomatic and economic dimensions as well. And closer cooperation and interdependence in the defense arena will have beneficial spillover effects in other areas, helping facilitate coordinated action to meet common challenges.

To decision-makers with already-full plates, this may seem like a rather daunting to-do list. Accomplishing it will require sustained focus and the commitment of substantial resources. But the changes in strategy, posture, and operational concepts advocated here do not require wholesale changes to military force structures and platforms. The innovations that are called for are focused mainly on what the Department of Defense calls enablers — sensors, software, munitions, base infrastructure, pre-positioning, and sustainment assets. Many of the needed types of munitions are already in production, albeit in insufficient quantities. To the extent that new platforms, such as unmanned underwater vehicles and runway-independent drones, are part of the answer, they can be built using mature technologies and should be engineered for affordability rather than for high levels of survivability. Aggressively pursuing innovations along these lines does not seem like a high price to pay to meet the challenges posed by states that seek to upend the international order that has served the causes of peace and prosperity for more than 70 years.

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
Andrew Hoehn is senior vice president and director of research and analysis at RAND Corporation. He is the former deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy where he was responsible for developing and implementing U.S. force planning and assessments in addition to long-range policy planning.

Image: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Matthew J. Bragg

Source: <https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/inflection-point-how-to-reverse-the-erosion-of-u-s-and-allied-military-power-and-influence/>

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Authorities



*Deployable Training and Lessons Division
Joint Staff J7*

The overall classification of slides is

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1

Challenges

- **Understand how the interaction of law, policy, and guidance defines authority and underwrites decision making**
- **Decide and act within clear authority to promote the legitimacy of operations**
- **Develop and delegate authorities in support of timely decision making**


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UNCLASSIFIED

Authority: Law, Policy, and Guidance

- Insights**
- Ability to act requires both authority and capability
 - Understand mission partner authority to integrate capabilities

- Authorities Challenges:**
- Rules of Engagement (ROE)
 - Fiscal Authorities
 - Non-Kinetic Activities
 - Exquisite Capabilities
 - Space Activities



Law, Policy, and Guidance



- Law of the Sea**
- 1982 UNCLOS – (Customary Int'l Law) Recognized boundaries and high seas freedoms
 - Territorial Sea - 12 nm
 - > innocent passage
 - Contiguous Zone - 12-24 nm
 - > customs, taxes, immigration, pollution
 - EEZ - 200 nm
 - > natural resources
 - High Seas – beyond 200 nm
 - > high seas freedoms
- U.S. Policy**
- Assert freedom of navigation to refute excessive claims but avoid escalation – maintain status quo
 - The United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows

Authority and Legitimacy

- Adhering to authority promotes legitimacy, reinforces support both domestically and internationally, and is part of an effective strategy
- Perception of legitimacy can be as important as reality


Legitimacy Narratives	
<p style="text-align: center;"> Ukraine Invasion</p> <p> Russia:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Special Military Operation” aimed at “De-Nazification” • Russia threatened by NATO expansion <p> U.S. and NATO:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Early intel sharing tipped Russia’s hand, framed the narrative, and caused news and media focus to pre-position in and around Ukraine • Continue to highlight Russian Law of War violations 	<p style="text-align: center;"> Iran Conflict</p> <p> U.S. Message and Narratives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stated goals of eliminating ballistic missile capabilities, UAV capabilities, navy, and defense industrial base • Anticipatory self-defense based on cumulative effect of decades of malign conduct <p> Iran Messaging and Narratives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stated it is responding to unlawful aggression • Gulf States violate neutrality by hosting states launching strikes against it • Energy infrastructure is valid military objective

Insights

- 2025 NSS: The U.S. will “[ensure] that burdens are shared and that all efforts benefit from broader legitimacy”
- 2026 NDS: The U.S. “will revamp our network of allies and partners to meet the threats we face”

Requesting and Delegating Authorities

<p>Activities</p> <p>Drive</p> <p>Authorities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What do I need to do? • Do I have the right capability? • Do I have the right authorities? <p style="text-align: right;">} Design & Initial Planning</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who has them and how do I get both? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Request for Forces - Request for Authority <p style="text-align: right;">} Detailed Planning</p>
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Insights

- Commanders seek robust delegation to support agility – proper delegation speeds decision making
- Identify risk and mitigation when requesting or delegating authorities – link to Mission Command
- National level decisions on the use of force are heavily influenced by policy
- Use of force is regulated by ROE, authorized by mission orders, and applied per guidance and intent

Key Takeaways

- **Law, policy, and guidance provide the framework for operational solutions**
- **Understanding the authorities of mission partners leverages additional capabilities**
- **Reality and perception of legitimacy brings support and access to capabilities**
- **Activities drive authorities**
- **Appropriate delegation speeds decision making**

References

- **DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol. 1, “Joint Warfighting,” 27 Aug 2023**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 2, “The Joint Force,” 19 Jun 2020**
- **Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practices, Authorities Focus Paper, 2nd Edition, Oct 2016**

United States Code (U.S.C.)

Title	Short Title	Descriptive / Applicability
5	Government Organization and Employees	Agency organization and establishment of procedures for civilian workforce including functions and responsibilities as well as employment recruitment and retention.
6	Domestic Security	Establishes and organizes DHS, national emergency management requirements, and the national preparedness system. Includes applicable law on security and accountability for ports and borders as well as cybersecurity. (Homeland Security)
10	Armed Forces	Organization of DOD and general military powers; establishes active and reserve command structure within DOD (OSD, JCS and the Services). Regulates DoD personnel to include manning authorizations, discipline, training and career progression (including Joint qualification) as well as regulations on procurement. Also includes designated excepted civilian service, e.g., Cyber. (Homeland Defense)
14	Coast Guard	Establishes organization and powers, including law enforcement and other duties of the regular, reserve and auxiliary Coast Guard. Provides for military capability in support of DHS; capability also used under Title 10 when assigned in support of DoD.
18	Crimes and Criminal Procedure	Defines federal crimes, criminal procedure, prisons and prisoners and associated regulations. Includes the Posse Comitatus Act, forbidding federalized (T10) military conducting law enforcement. Department of Justice (DOJ) lead agency in accordance with Title 28 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure).
19	Customs Duties	Foreign trade zones; tariffs, trade negotiation and agreements, and smuggling.
22	Foreign Relations and Intercourse	Provides authority for diplomatic and consular courts and service. Provides for preservation of friendly foreign relations including Mutual Defense and Security Assistance Programs; protection of vessels on international and territorial waters and protections of citizens abroad. It also provides for authorities relating to regulation of foreign missions. Significant legal basis for HA / DR / NEO. Assigns Department of State (DOS) as lead agency.
32	National Guard (NG)	Provides authority for trained / equipped NG in support of federal mission requirements. Additionally provides authority for DOD domestic missions to be conducted by NG under C2 of respective Governors, exempt from Posse Comitatus Act; or mobilization of NG forces to active federal duty (Title 10). Grants authority for SecDef to also provide funds to Governors to employ NG units to conduct Homeland Defense activities, as SecDef determines to be necessary and appropriate for NG units.
33	Navigation and Navigable Waters	International rules for navigation at sea Authorizes Navy/USCG exemption from certain rules. Regulations for suppression of piracy. Collision prevention / responsibilities.
42	Public Health / Welfare	Provides authority for federal disaster preparedness and assistance. (Stafford Act as it relates to DSCA)
50	War and National Defense	Outlines the role of war and National Defense. Includes regulations on CIA, foreign intelligence and covert action.

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Rules of Engagement (ROE) Considerations for the JTF Commander

Staff ROE development and approval process:

- ___ Is ROE development an integrated part of crisis action planning (CAP)?
- ___ Is ROE development operator-led (J3 / J35 / J5), with the SJA in support?
- ___ Is there a formal staff process for ROE development (ROE Working Group)?
- ___ Does the ROE WG have the right subject-matter experts?
- ___ Is there a process for the Joint Operations Center (JOC) to interface with the ROE WG?
- ___ Is there dialogue on ROE between your staff and higher and lower headquarters' staffs?
- ___ Is there interagency and interorganizational liaison with your staff regarding ROE?
- ___ Does the ROE, along with your intent and guidance, create clear use of force policy?
- ___ Does the ROE support higher headquarters' intent and guidance?
- ___ Did your staff thoroughly war game and crosswalk the operation plan or order (including any branches and sequels) and the ROE to ensure that subordinate commanders have the *authority* to take all appropriate action to deter, pre-empt, and/or counter the full range of possible threat reactions without having to request additional supplemental ROE?
- ___ Did your staff thoroughly war game and crosswalk the operation plan or order (including any branches and sequels) and the ROE to ensure that subordinate commanders have *all necessary means available* to accomplish their missions and to defend their units and other US forces in the vicinity?
- ___ Do your staff and subordinate commanders understand that nothing contained in the ROE limits a commander's inherent right and obligation to take all appropriate action to defend his or her unit and other US forces in the vicinity?
- ___ Do your staff and subordinate commanders understand the permissive nature of the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE)?
- ___ Do your staff's standing operating procedures assign responsibility and establish effective procedures for developing, requesting, authorizing, disseminating, training, monitoring, assessing, and modifying the ROE in a timely manner?
- ___ Are all ROE messages that contain numbered supplemental measures classified at least CONFIDENTIAL and numbered serially (e.g., serial 1, 2, 3 ..., as opposed to serial 1, change 1; serial 1, change 2)?
- ___ Are all ROE messages clear, concise, and easily understood in a single reading, with all key terms defined?

- ___ Do ROE request messages contain a justification for each supplemental measure requested?
- ___ Does each ROE authorization message contain all of the supplemental measures currently in effect, whether changed or not, so that subordinates need only keep the current message to have all of the ROE currently in effect?
- ___ Do you, your staff, and your subordinate commanders fully understand the limitations of your allies' or coalition partners' national ROE? When your allies' or coalition partners' national ROE are incompatible, how do you plan to maintain unity of effort and avoid potential conflicts? Will forces or tasks be separated geographically and/or functionally?
- ___ If you approve any supplemental measures that restrict the use of force, do your subordinate commanders have the means available to comply with those restrictions? (Example: If you approve a supplemental measure requiring your forces to "observe" indirect fire directed against targets in areas of civilian concentration, do your subordinate commanders have the means to "observe" those fires?)

Some key ROE issues:

- ___ Designating and defining hostile forces.
- ___ Clear guidance on what constitutes hostile intent in a given situation? (Example: If a military aircraft of country x were to do a, b, and c in the vicinity of a unit, the unit commander should consider the behavior as a demonstration of hostile intent and may engage the aircraft in defense of his or her unit.)
- ___ Designating and defining collective self-defense (i.e., defense of designated forces as well as designated persons and property).
- ___ Cross-border reconnaissance, direct action operations, and personnel recovery.
- ___ Use of weapon systems subject to special restrictions, including riot control agents, anti-personnel land mines, and fires in areas of civilian concentration.
- ___ Treatment of civilians, including the authority to stop, search, and detain them, and to seize their property.
- ___ Allied or coalition ROE do not limit the inherent right and obligation of US commanders to execute unit self-defense.

Bottom line: Do the ROE give your subordinate commanders the flexibility they need to get the job done?

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS READINGS

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Making Civilian Control Work

“Open Letter from Former Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff” on “Principles of Civilian Control and Best Practices of Civil-Military Relations,” *War on the Rocks*, September 6, 2022, <https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/to-support-and-defend-principles-of-civilian-control-and-best-practices-of-civil-military-relations/> 5-B

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Civil-Military Module Discussion Questions

1. Your oath of loyalty and fealty is to the Constitution, and does not, like the oath of enlisted members, include language about obeying orders. Yet the Constitution clearly establishes the President as Commander-in-Chief and with that goes the presumption of obedience by everyone junior in the chain of command. The system has clear guidance on how to respond to illegal orders. What about “unwise” orders? In dealing with civilian leaders, can your oath to support the Constitution override requests, hints, directions, directives, or even orders that you deem unwise? Under what circumstances and with what processes can senior military people deal with orders they find problematic?
2. Leaving the question of legality, what do you do as a senior leader about orders that you find immoral or unethical? Do you have any recourse, e.g., resign? Quietly or in protest? Can you ask to be relieved or retired in these, or any other, circumstances? What other circumstances?
3. Is it possible to be caught between the executive, legislative, and/or judicial branches of government in a situation or situations in which legal and constitutional authorities over the military are in conflict? Think of some situations; what would you do?
4. Thinking about the so-called civil-military gap, how can we celebrate the distinctiveness of military culture without appearing to disparage civilian culture? Are there aspects of military culture today that need to be adjusted to better track with civilian society? What are they? Are there aspects of military culture today that need to be protected from pressures to conform to civilian society? What are they?
5. How do we go about lessening the suspicion, distrust, tension, and even outright conflict between senior military leaders and the top political leaders, elected and appointed--and still fulfill our responsibilities under various laws pertaining to positions we might hold, to provide advice and execute orders? What avenues are appropriate/inappropriate in circumstances when senior military leaders believe that the civilian leadership is preventing them from providing their professional advice candidly and privately?
6. What responsibilities do senior leaders have to mentor officers under their command on civil-military relations? What venues could be used for that? How could senior leaders go about it?
7. A bedrock of civil-military relations is an a-political, or non-partisan, military. How does that square with retired flag officers endorsing political candidates? Are such endorsements proper for some ranks and not for others? Is there a distinction between endorsing in local elections, and getting involved in local community service--like school boards--that some might consider "political" if not partisan? How about running themselves for office or speaking out/sharing expertise and perspectives on national defense and security? Would that be permissible? Why or why not?

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Making Civilian Control Work

What are the essential principles that govern the relationship between the most senior officers and the leadership of the national government? What issues cause tension, disagreement, and misunderstanding? How should each behave in the interaction, and treat the other? What might the future bring in this relationship, so crucial to the nation's security and overall well-being? This article addresses the relationship: signed by the most recent Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it enunciates the principles of civilian control and how they operate.

WAR ON ROCKS

TO SUPPORT AND DEFEND: PRINCIPLES OF CIVILIAN CONTROL AND BEST PRACTICES OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

OPEN LETTER

SEPTEMBER 6, 2022

COMMENTARY



We are in an exceptionally challenging civil-military environment. Many of the factors that shape civil-military relations have undergone extreme strain in recent years. Geopolitically, the winding down of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the ramping up of great power conflict mean the U.S. military must simultaneously come to terms with wars that ended without all the goals satisfactorily accomplished while preparing for more daunting competition with near-peer rivals. Socially, the pandemic and the economic dislocations have disrupted societal patterns and put enormous strain on individuals and families. Politically, military professionals confront an extremely adverse environment characterized by the divisiveness of affective polarization that culminated in the first election in over a century when the peaceful transfer of political power was disrupted and in doubt. Looking ahead, all of these factors could well get worse before they get better. In such an environment, it is helpful to review the core principles and best practices by which civilian and military professionals have conducted healthy American civil-military relations in the past — and can continue to do so, if vigilant and mindful.

1. Civilian control of the military is part of the bedrock foundation of American democracy. The democratic project is not threatened by the existence of a powerful standing military so long as civilian and military leaders — and the rank-and-file they lead — embrace and implement effective civilian control.
2. Civilian control operates within a constitutional framework under the rule of law. Military officers swear an oath to support and defend the Constitution, not an oath of fealty to an individual or to an office. All civilians, whether they swear an oath or not, are likewise obligated to support and defend the Constitution as their highest duty.
3. Under the U.S. Constitution, civilian control of the military is shared across all three branches of government. Ultimately, civilian control is wielded by the will of the American people as expressed through elections.
4. Civilian control is exercised within the executive branch for operational orders by the chain of command, which runs from the president to the civilian secretary of defense to the combatant commanders. Civilian control is also exercised within the executive branch for policy development and implementation by the interagency process, which empowers civilian political appointees who serve at the pleasure of the president and career officials in the civil service to shape the development of plans and options, with the advice of the military, for decision by the president. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not in the formal chain of command, but best practice has the chairman in the chain of communication for orders and policy development.
5. Civilian control is exercised within the legislative branch through the extensive powers enumerated in Article I of the Constitution, beginning with the power to declare war, to raise and support armies, and to provide and maintain a navy. Congress determines the authorization and appropriation of funds without which military activity is impossible. The Senate advises and consents on the promotion of officers to the pay grade of O-4 and above. The Senate is also charged with advising and consenting to certain senior-level civilian political appointees. Congress conducts oversight of military activity and can compel testimony from military or civilian officials, subject to narrow exceptions such as executive privilege. Members of Congress empower personal and

committee staff to shape the development of policies for decision by the committees and Congress as a whole and thereby play an important role in civilian oversight of policy.

6. In certain cases or controversies, civilian control is exercised within the judicial branch through judicial review of policies, orders, and actions involving the military. In practice, the power to declare a policy/order/action illegal or unconstitutional is decisive because the military is obligated (by law and by professional ethics) to refuse to carry out an illegal or unconstitutional policy/order/action.

7. Civilian control is enhanced by effective civil-military relations. Civil-military relations are comprised of a dynamic and iterative process that adjusts to suit the styles of civilian leaders. Under best practices, civil-military relations follow the regular order of the development of policy and laws, which protects both the military and civilian control. Under regular order, proposed law, policies, and orders are reviewed extensively by multiple offices to ensure their legality, appropriateness, and likely effectiveness. However, regardless of the process, it is the responsibility of senior military and civilian leaders to ensure that any order they receive from the president is legal.

8. The military has an obligation to assist civilian leaders in both the executive and legislative branches in the development of wise and ethical directives but must implement them *provided that the directives are legal*. It is the responsibility of senior military and civilian leaders to provide the president with their views and advice that includes the implications of an order.

9. While the civil-military system (as described above) can respond quickly to defend the nation in times of crisis, it is designed to be deliberative to ensure that the destructive and coercive power wielded by the U.S. armed forces is not misused.

10. Elected (and appointed) civilians have the right to be wrong, meaning they have the right to insist on a policy or direction that proves, in hindsight, to have been a mistake. This right obtains even if other voices warn in advance that the proposed action is a mistake.

11. Military officials are required to carry out legal orders the wisdom of which they doubt. Civilian officials should provide the military ample opportunity to express their doubts in appropriate venues. Civilian and military officials should also take care to properly characterize military advice in public. Civilian leaders must take responsibility for the consequences of the actions they direct.

12. The military reinforces effective civilian control when it seeks clarification, raises questions about second- and third-order effects, and proposes alternatives that may not have been considered.

13. Mutual trust — trust upward that civilian leaders will rigorously explore alternatives that are best for the country regardless of the implications for partisan politics and trust downward that the military will faithfully implement directives that run counter to their professional military preference — helps overcome the friction built into this process.

Civil-military teams build up that reservoir of trust in their day-to-day interactions and draw upon it during times of crisis.

14. The military — active-duty, reserve, and National Guard — have carefully delimited roles in law enforcement. Those roles must be taken only insofar as they are consistent with the Constitution and relevant statutes. The military has an obligation to advise on the wisdom of proposed action and civilians should create the opportunity for such deliberation. The military is required ultimately to carry out legal directives that result. In most cases, the military should play a supporting rather than a leading role to law enforcement.

15. There are significant limits on the public role of military personnel in partisan politics, as outlined in longstanding Defense Department policy and regulations. Members of the military accept limits on the public expression of their private views — limits that would be unconstitutional if imposed on other citizens. Military and civilian leaders must be diligent about keeping the military separate from partisan political activity.

16. During presidential elections, the military has a dual obligation. First, because the Constitution provides for only one commander-in-chief at a time, the military must assist the current commander-in-chief in the exercise of his or her constitutional duty to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States. Second, because the voters (not the military) decide who will be commander-in-chief, they must prepare for whomever the voters pick — whether a reelected incumbent or someone new. This dual obligation reinforces the importance of the principles and best practices described above.

Signatories:


Former Secretaries of Defense

Dr. Ashton Baldwin Carter
William Sebastian Cohen
Dr. Mark Thomas Esper
Dr. Robert Michael Gates
Charles Timothy Hagel
James Norman Mattis
Leon Edward Panetta
Dr. William James Perry

Former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Gen. (ret.) Martin Edward Dempsey
Gen. (ret.) Joseph Francis Dunford Jr.
Adm. (ret.) Michael Glenn Mullen
Gen. (ret.) Richard Bowman Myers
Gen. (ret.) Peter Pace

Setting Conditions



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Challenges

- **Early and timely Commander involvement throughout design, planning, and assessing**
- **Incorporating risk in decision making**
- **Leveraging Commander involvement in assessments informs understanding and guidance**
- **Deciding if or when to reframe the problem**

Command and Control: The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.

- Joint Pub 1

2

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
Interview with General James Mattis, USMC (Ret)

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at
The Hoover Institution at Stanford University
March 6, 2015

Setting Conditions for Success


Commander Focus



Insights

- “Do those things that only you can do as the commander...”**
- Build and maintain trust and inclusive relationships with partners
 - Share visualization and intent, gain authorities and resources, assess, and plan / manage transitions
 - Design C2 to accomplish the mission – and evolve as necessary

Operational Art




Insights

- Requires Commander's upfront time and dialogue to define the problem
- Integrate with mission partners to gain better understanding of the environment

Understanding Your HQ's Role


- **USG role** relative to the international (and host nation) response
- **US military role** relative to the broader USG whole of government approach
- **CCMD role** relative to other DOW organizations (e.g., other CCMDs and Combat Support Agencies)
- **Internal CCMD C2 options**



Considerations

- Where do you fit?
- Who do you work with?
- How to organize?
- Where is risk?

Risk



The Joint Risk Framework

CJCSM 3105.01B, 22 Dec 2023 establishes a joint risk analysis methodology and provides guidance for identifying, assessing, & managing risk.

Fight today

CCMD Risk



Service Risk

Win Tomorrow

Insights

- **Risk is Commander's Business**
- **Frame the problem – risk to what?**
 - The Nation and national interests?
 - Strategy, plan, campaign, mission?
 - Current and future forces?
- **Appraise military risk and military strategic risk in a global context**
- **Determine what to do about risk**
 - Accept / Avoid / Mitigate / Transfer / Defer
 - Will that accumulate risk unnecessarily?
- **Risk communication**
 - Over-communicate different perspectives
 - Reduces misunderstandings and surprises

Assessment

- Are we doing things right?
- Are we doing the right things?
- Are we measuring the right variables?
- Is our information accurate?
- Are we accomplishing the Mission and End State?
- Are we achieving Strategic Objectives?

Source: Joint Staff J7 Insights and Best Practice Focus Paper: Assessment and Risk.




- Guidance and Intent
- **Decision to reframe?**
- Design and Planning

Source: Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning.

Insights

- **Commander centric – key to developing guidance and intent**
- **Implement early and continuously with partners to deepen understanding**
- **Integrate assessment structure across echelons at the pace of operations**
- **Get to “What else needs to be done”; do not stop at “What happened”**

Planning and Assessment




Insights

- Clear process integrates people and information to share understanding
- Structure enhances speed of translation from guidance to execution
- Timely engagements enable adaptability and flexibility in complex environments
- Clear terms of reference disciplines the process and sets expectations

SAWG: Strategic Assessment Working Group
 PDB: Plans Decision Board
 CAB: Commander's Assessment Board

Reframing the Problem



Insights

- Activities in one domain may drive change in others and across the operational environment
- Operations don't stop during reframing
- It is the Commander's decision to reframe and revisit design
- Commands must include Allies, Partners, and the Interagency during problem reframing and redesign

Key Takeaways

- **Senior leaders set conditions by building trust and sharing understanding via their visualization and intent**
- **Active and continuous Commander involvement promotes focus and flexibility**
- **Structure, design, planning, and assessment around Commander's time and approach**
- **Understand the aspects of risk in decisions**
- **Establish an assessment framework to enable problem reframing when conditions change**

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***Placeholder for
Operationalizing JWC***

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Joint Force Development (J7) Talking Points

Joint Warfighting Concept 3.0

(current as of 25 Apr 2023)

Background

- In 2019, the Secretary of Defense tasked the Chairman to develop a threat-informed Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) to address great power conflict.
- In 2021, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman approved JWC 1.0.
- In 2022, the Chairman approved JWC 2.0, and Secretary of the Defense endorsed implementation across the Joint Force.
- ***JWC 3.0 is the culmination of a four-year effort to develop the first joint concept commensurate with AirLand Battle in the 1970s.*** It was designed to be feasible within a force development timeline and will undergo rigorous testing through analysis, experimentation, and exercises. Concurrently, it represents the completion of concept development for joint force development.
- ***JWC has become the basis for new doctrine, military education requirements, and force structure and provides the aim-point for modernization for the Joint Force.***

What is the Joint Warfighting Concept?

- The first joint concept to provide an ***overarching approach*** to describe how the Joint Force will fight in a future conflict that:
 - Aligns other ***joint and Service concepts to help enable the JWC.***
 - ***Recognizes the critical role of allies and partners*** in integrated deterrence, collective defense, and international stability.
 - Includes ***ways and means*** to ensure the U.S., allies, and partners can prevail against any adversary.
 - Calls for the Joint Force to ***leverage and integrate capabilities*** in space, cyberspace, and across the electromagnetic spectrum. Cross-domain integration remains a core strength of the Joint Force.
 - Contains a level of specificity to ***drive DOD investment*** in critical joint areas.
 - ***Is not*** an Operations Plan, Contingency Plan, or Concept of Operations. It is an operational approach to defending the U.S., our allies and partners in future conflict.

Why is JWC important?

- The re-emergence of ***great power competition and a rapidly changing character of war*** required a new warfighting concept.
- The NSS, NDS, and NMS tell the joint force “***what***” the nations expects to achieve.

Prepared by: Joint Staff, J-7/JFI/SEO // Cleared by Lt. Gen. Dagvin R.M. Anderson, Director, J-7

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- The JWC is the Department’s description of “*how*” the joint force will answer military threats from mature, comprehensive peer adversaries.
- The JWC provides the Department a *unifying vision* to guide force modernization, particularly given the changing character of war.
- The JWC *guides the Department's future force development, design, and warfighting approach* to ensure we have the right people, equipment, training, roles, and doctrine to deter and, if necessary, win in a future conflict.
- Implementing the JWC in the Joint Force is the *best preparatory action* to deter adversarial actors from military aggression and preserve peace.
- *JWC implementation is a journey—not a destination.* The Joint Force continuously and deliberately iterates to transform at or faster than the speed of relevance to fight and win.

What is new about JWC 3.0?

- *Culminates* four years of focused concept development, wargaming, and experimentation in response to great power competition.
- *Expands* the notion of maneuvering across multiple dimensions.
- *Updates* the description of the overarching military problem facing the Joint Force, a refined explanation of the military solution—expanded maneuver—and a detailed description of how the Joint Force will apply that solution.
- *Includes* greater fidelity on key warfighting ideas and more precision of operational approaches that help the Joint Force regain positions of advantage against peer adversaries.
- *Defines* specific capabilities that will drive materiel procurement, organizational changes, and training initiatives to posture the Joint Force.

How does JWC drive change within the Department?

- JWC capabilities will be reflected in joint requirements validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.
- The JWC will drive a multi-year program that institutionalizes key principles through Professional Military Education; operationalizes joint practices through wargames, exercises, and rehearsals; and synchronizes efforts that rapidly evolve the Joint Force.
- The Department is using the JWC to evaluate budgets. Services are adapting and aligning their future warfighting concepts to the JWC.
- The JWC is focusing Department and Service operational innovation and experimentation including targeted programs like the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve (RDER).

What are the Supporting Concepts?

- JWC was the primary driver for development of supporting concepts to address command and control, information, fires, and logistics. Each iteration built upon and refined supporting concepts.

- Each supporting concept generated concept required capabilities that inform force development and design.

What is the role of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)?

- The Secretary of Defense provides fundamental direction for the JWC through the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Defense Planning Scenarios and periodic review of the JWC.
- OSD can also implement the JWC through guidance (*e.g.*, Defense Planning Guidance, Global Campaign Plans, etc.).
- OSD provides review and oversight of concept implementation on an ongoing basis through the Deputy's Management Action Group and associated fora.
- Partnerships with specific offices in OSD provide technical analytical support to JWC development; critical mission engineering studies directly align to JWC supporting concepts and DoD modernization priorities.

What role do the Services and Combatant Commands play in JWC? How do Service Concepts relate?

- The JWC was developed under the direction and review of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs provide frequent review and approval at critical junctures of concept development.
- The Services provide critical ideas and resources for refining and testing the JWC during implementation. Service concept implementation is complementary for JWC implementation.
- Combatant Commands leverage the joint exercise program and provide a critical venue for testing hypotheses in the JWC.
- Service and Combatant Command wargames, Joint and Service experiments, professional military education, and academic research all contribute to a growing body of evidence for JWC implementation.

What role does commercial industry, the civilian sector, and the international community play?

- The JWC starts with Integrated Deterrence, which requires a whole-of-nation approach.
- Successful implementation requires the Department and industry to strengthen partnerships to accelerate the quantity and quality of innovation, experimentation, testing, and fielding.
- The joint force must work with the civilian sector to identify rapidly emerging technologies that the Joint Force can use quickly.
- Allies and partners are a central element of the JWC and have been involved in the development and testing of the core ideas.

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Sustainment



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Challenges



- Anticipating requirements in an uncertain, complex, rapidly changing, and contested operating environment
- Integrating and synchronizing capabilities from the Joint Logistics Enterprise to support the concept of operations
- Balancing global and theater-level considerations to set and sustain the theater

“You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.”

– General Dwight D. Eisenhower

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Global Strategic Environment



Contested Logistics Environment: An environment in which the armed forces engage in conflict with an adversary that presents challenges in all domains and directly targets logistics operations, facilities, and activities in the United States, abroad, or in transit from one location to the other”

- 10 U.S. Code § 2926(h)

Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt)



Insights

- Understand authorities, goals, and limitations of other JLEnt partners
- Establish relationships and build trust before a crisis occurs
- Capitalize on and leverage stakeholder capabilities and resources
- Be prepared to provide support to other JLEnt partners

Global Sustainment Considerations

Competition for Resources

Strategic Lift

Forces

Medical

Critical Munitions

War Reserve Materiel

Overflight, Transit, Basing

Operational Contract Support

Insights

- There is an overreliance on peacetime planning factors, assumptions and practices
- Access Basing and Overflight to sovereign nations may be conditional or temporal
- Understand critical resources other CCMDs require and how that will impact the mission (e.g., strategic lift, critical munitions, medical assets and OCS availability)
- Engage the JLEnt early to adjudicate limited global resources

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Key Takeaways

- **Anticipate requirements** in a contested logistics environment
- **Leverage and integrate the Joint Logistics Enterprise** to ensure rapid and precise response for the Joint Force Commander
- **Balance global and theater level considerations** to set and sustain the theater

“You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.”

– General Dwight D. Eisenhower

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Joint All-Domain Operations



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
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Challenges

- Integrating space and cyber domain considerations, and operations in the information environment, into all-domain planning, targeting, and synchronization
- Coordinating and synchronizing activities across domains to achieve unity of effort and gain positional and / or temporal advantage
- Align operations in the information environment within all-domain operations to influence the operational and strategic environments
- Assessing non-kinetic activities in the operational environment

– JP 3-04 highlights information synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of activities to achieve unity of effort

All-Domain Operations



“Currently, no single joint functional component commander or echelon of command has assigned or attached capabilities or self-contained C2 to conduct joint warfighting across all domains at all times throughout their OA.”
 - JP 3-0 App D, Ch 1.c

All-Domain Operations





Image taken from PRC Military Forum on All-Domain Operations 国防科技要聞

- Insights**
- Operations require integrating authorities, capabilities, and expertise across all domains early in planning
 - Speed of cyber and space activities and strategic effects demand rapid, proactive decisions
 - Joint all-domain C2 is progressing; CJADC2


Complexity of the Information Environment



Insights

- The IE is global in nature—complexities are created by technological advances, the speed and range of information / mis-information, and deliberate operations to influence audiences
- Relevant actors' (e.g., individuals, populations, automated systems) capabilities or behaviors have the potential to affect OAI success on a global scale
- Operations in the IE can degrade all-domain operations if not synchronized and nested with commander's objectives


Executing All-Domain Operations



Insights

- Leverage intelligence means to understand the adversary through an all-domain lens
- Gain a relative advantage throughout the competition continuum by integrating all-domain capabilities faster than the enemy
- Space, cyber, and information are difficult to access – start early to develop Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs)
- Consider lead time for authorities and devise alternate COAs and options to provide decision quality information to the commander

Assessments



Assessing JADO [Joint All-Domain Operations] requires the ability to detect change, and these changes require time. JADO produce changes. Some indicators emerge slowly, while others appear quickly. Lethal effects tend to be more observable, while nonlethal effects might not be readily apparent.

- JP 3-0, App D, D-28



Fighter aircraft from the U.S., Japan, and the Republic of Korea conducting a trilateral escort flight of a U.S. B-52H Stratofortress Bomber (22 Oct 23)

Insights

- Assessments are commander driven and are coordinated and integrated internally and externally through whole-of-staff / government / coalition efforts
- Assessments help staffs refine all-domain operations to achieve the commander's desired end state
- Operations in the information environment (OIE) battle damage assessments (BDA) requires deliberate planning and analysis
- Behavioral change assessments is a lengthy process; identify short- and long-term assessments

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Key Takeaways

- Integrating space and cyber domain considerations, and operations in the information environment, into all-domain planning, targeting, and synchronization
- Gaining positional and temporal advantages requires exercising unity of effort and leveraging capabilities and significant use of WoG, Allies and Partners, and industry
- Achieving decision advantage requires integrating operations in the information environment
- Assessing effects across domains requires a robust assessment plan to account for complexities

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Updated November 29, 2024

Defense Primer: Operations in the Information Environment

Information as a Joint Function

In 2017, Joint Publication (JP) 1 *Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States* was updated to establish information as the seventh joint function of the military, along with command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. This designation has necessitated clarification and revisions in some Department of Defense (DOD) doctrine.

Information Warfare

While there is currently no official United States government (USG) definition of information warfare (IW), DOD doctrine may use the term *information warfare* to describe “the mobilizing of information to attain a competitive advantage and achieve United States (US) policy goals.” Some DOD doctrine defines IW not as a strategy but as a subset of OIE conducted during both competition below armed conflict and during warfighting in order to dominate the IE at a specific place and time. The U.S. military contributes to information warfare by deliberately leveraging the inherent informational aspects of activities and by conducting operations in the information environment.

Operations in the Information Environment

According to the 2022 JP 3-04 *Information in Joint Operations*, Operations in the Information Environment (OIE) involve the integrated employment of multiple information forces to affect drivers of behavior by informing audiences; influencing foreign relevant actors; attacking and exploiting relevant actor information, information networks, and information systems; and protecting friendly information, information networks, and information systems. OIE activities take place within the information environment (IE), defined as “the aggregate of social, cultural, linguistic, psychological, technical, and physical factors that affect how humans and automated systems derive meaning from, act upon, and are impacted by information, including the individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or use information.” Strategic communication, public diplomacy and public and civil affairs, and cyberspace operations may be integrated and employed by information forces. These efforts may take place in and throughout each of the global domains of air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace, and in various forms unrelated to cyberspace, such as dropping pamphlets, cultural exchanges, jamming or broadcasting targeted communications, and foreign aid programs.

All instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME)—can be projected and employed in the information environment, and by nonmilitary elements of the federal government.

Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment

The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) places these activities in the context of the “gray zone,” coercive actions below the threshold of a military response and across USG areas of responsibility. With an eye toward the NDS, the 2023 Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment aims to improve the DOD’s ability to plan, resource, and apply informational power to enable integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring advantages. The NDS describes use of the electromagnetic spectrum across all domains, as well as integration with whole-of-government informational advantages to achieve these strategic goals.

History of OIE

In 2018, DOD issued a Joint Concept for Operations in the Information Environment. According to this document, the IE comprises and aggregates numerous social, cultural, cognitive, technical, and physical attributes that act upon and affect knowledge, understanding, beliefs, world views, and, ultimately, actions of an individual, group, system, community, or organization. Corresponding DOD policy defined OIE as actions taken to generate, preserve, and apply informational power against a relevant actor in order to increase or protect competitive advantage or combat power potential within all domains of the operating environment. OIE span the competition continuum (cooperation, competition short of armed conflict, and warfighting). This definition of the continuum aligned with the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which emphasized information warfare as competition short of open warfare.

Information Operations

Past definitions within DOD have conceptualized IO as a purely military activity involving a set of tactics or capabilities. In earlier iterations of DOD JP 3-13 *Information Operations*, IO consisted of five pillars: computer network operations (CNO), which include computer network attack, computer network defense, and computer network exploitation; psychological operations (PSYOP); electronic warfare (EW); operations security (OPSEC); and military deception (MILDEC). With the advent of U.S. Cyber Command, CNO became cyberspace operations, offensive and defensive with its own doctrine in JP 3-12. In 2010, PSYOP became military information support operations (MISO), to reflect a broader range of activities and the existing Military Information Support Teams consisting of PSYOP personnel deployed at U.S. embassies overseas. JP 3-13.2 *Military Information Support Operations* replaced the term PSYOP with MISO to “more accurately reflect and convey the nature of planned peacetime or combat operations activities.” The name change reportedly caused administrative confusion, and some services reverted to the PSYOP label.

The Secretary of Defense later characterized IO in JP 3-13 as “*the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.*” This definition shifted the focus from a set of tactics toward the desired effects and how to achieve them. JP 3-13 defined information-related capability (IRC) as a tool, technique, or activity employed within a dimension of the information environment that can be used to create effects and operationally desirable conditions. *JP 3-04 supersedes JP 3-13, and legacy terms such as IO and IRC are to be removed from the Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.*

Types of Information in OIE

In common parlance, the term *disinformation campaign* is often used interchangeably with *information operations* and/or *psychological operations*. However, disinformation or deception is only one of the informational tools that comprise an IW strategy; factual information can also be used to achieve strategic goals and in some cases more effectively than deceptive means. Different categories of information that may be used in OIE include the following:

Propaganda. The propagation of an idea or narrative that is intended to influence, similar to psychological or influence operations. It can be misleading but true, and may include stolen information. A government communicating its intent, policies, and values through speeches, press releases, and other public affairs can be considered propaganda.

Misinformation. The spreading of unintentionally false information. Examples include internet trolls who spread unfounded conspiracy theories or web hoaxes through social media, believing them to be true.

Disinformation. Unlike misinformation, disinformation is intentionally false. Examples include planting false news stories in the media and tampering with private and/or classified communications before their widespread release.

Cyberspace and OIE

Cyberspace presents a force multiplier for IW activities. Social media and botnets can amplify a message or narrative, using all three elements of information to foment discord and confusion in a target audience. Much of today’s IW is conducted in cyberspace, leading to associations with cybersecurity. Cyberspace operations can be used to achieve strategic IW goals; an offensive cyberattack, for example, may be used to create psychological effects in a target population. A foreign country may likewise use cyberattacks to influence decisionmaking and change behaviors. Cyberspace operations may be conducted for IW purposes, such as to disable or deny access to an adversary’s lines of communication or to demonstrate ability as a deterrent. These operations may be overt, such as a government’s production and dissemination of materials intended to convey democratic values. In this case, the government sponsorship of such activity is known. Covert operations are those in which government sponsorship is denied if exposed. The anonymity afforded

by cyberspace presents an ideal battlespace to conduct covert operations.

In JP 3-12, DOD defines cyberspace as “the global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.” Some have criticized this as lacking the cognitive, human element that the internet represents, which in turn could adversely affect how the military organizes, trains, and equips for IO in cyberspace. Additionally, there are concerns that the split between IO and cyberspace operations in doctrine and organization created a stovepipe effect that hinders coordination of these closely related forces. As such, some services such as the Army and Air Force are reorganizing assets from Cyber Commands into Information Warfare Commands. The Marine Corps created a Deputy Commandant for Information in order to oversee Operations in the Information Environment, to include cyberspace operations.

Who Is Responsible for the “I” in DIME?

Within the USG, much of the current information doctrine and capability resides with the military. Many consider DOD to be relatively well funded, leading some to posit that the epicenter for all IW activities should be the Pentagon. Some fear that military leadership of the IW sphere represents the militarization of cyberspace, or the weaponization of information. In addition, the military may not possess the best tools to successfully lead information efforts across the USG. Title 10 U.S.C. 2241 prohibits DOD from domestic “publicity or propaganda,” although the terms are undefined. It is unclear how OIE relate to this so-called military propaganda ban. P.L. 115-232 tasked the State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) to “direct, lead, synchronize, integrate, and coordinate efforts of the Federal Government to recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and foreign non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts.” P.L. 116-92 created a Principal Information Operations Advisor within DOD to coordinate and deconflict its operations with the GEC.

OIE as an Act of War?

Some have questioned whether tampering with, interfering with, or otherwise influencing a sovereign nation’s democratic processes in an IW campaign is an act of war that could trigger a military response, and not necessarily in cyberspace. U.S. policy suggests that these types of operations fall below the threshold of armed conflict.

CRS Reports

CRS Report R45142, *Information Warfare: Issues for Congress*, by Catherine A. Theohary.

Catherine A. Theohary, Specialist in National Security Policy, Cyber and Information Operations

IF10771

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anchoring

The first thing you judge influences your judgment of all that follows.

Human minds are associative in nature, so the order in which we receive information helps determine the course of our judgments and perceptions.

Be especially mindful of this bias during financial negotiations such as houses, cars, and salaries. The initial price offered is proven to have a significant effect.

confirmation bias

You look for ways to justify your existing beliefs.

We automatically find ways to make new information fit our existing narratives and preconceptions, and to dismiss information that does not.

Think of your ideas and beliefs as software you're actively trying to find problems with rather than things to be defended.

"The first principle is that you must not fool yourself – and you are the easiest person to fool." – Richard Feynman

backfire effect

When your core beliefs are challenged, it can cause you to believe even more strongly.

We can experience being wrong about some ideas as an attack upon our very selves, or our tribal identity. This can lead to motivated reasoning which causes us to reinforce our beliefs even if we might accept particular facts and disconfirming evidence.

"It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so."

– Mark Twain

declinism

You see the past as better than it was, and expect the future to be worse than is likely.

Despite living in the most peaceful and prosperous time in history, many people believe things are getting worse. The 24 hour news cycle, with its reporting of overtly negative and violent events, may account for some of this effect.

Instead of relying on nostalgic impressions of how great things used to be, use measurable metrics such as life expectancy, levels of crime and violence, and prosperity statistics.

just world hypothesis

Your preference for a just world makes you presume that it exists.

A world in which people don't always get what they deserve, hard work doesn't always pay off, and injustice happens is an uncomfortable one that threatens our preferred narrative. However, it is also the reality.

A more just world requires understanding rather than blame. Remember that everyone has their own life story, we're all fallible, and bad things happen to good people.

sunk cost fallacy

You irrationally cling to things that have already cost you something.

When we've invested our time, money, or emotion into something, it hurts us to let it go. This aversion to pain can distort our better judgment and cause us to make unwise investments.

To regain objectivity, ask yourself: had I not already invested something, would I still do so now? What would I counsel a friend to do if they were in the same situation?

dunning-kruger effect

The more you know, the less confident you're likely to be.

Because experts know just how much they don't know, they tend to underestimate their ability, but it's easy to be over-confident when you have only a simple idea of how things are.

"The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are so certain of themselves, yet wiser people so full of doubts." – Bertrand Russell

barnum effect

You see personal specifics in vague statements by filling in the gaps.

Because our minds are given to making connections, it's easy for us to take nebulous statements and find ways to interpret them so that they seem specific and personal.

Psychics, astrologers and others use this bias to make it seem like they're telling you something relevant. Consider how things might be interpreted to apply to anyone, not just you.

framing effect

You allow yourself to be unduly influenced by context and delivery.

We all like to think that we think independently, but the truth is that all of us are, in fact, influenced by delivery, framing and subtle cues. This is why the ad industry is a thing, despite almost everyone believing they're not affected by advertising messages.

Only when we have the intellectual humility to accept the fact that we can be manipulated, can we hope to limit how much we are. Try to be mindful of how things are being put to you.

in-group bias

You unfairly favor those who belong to your group.

We presume that we're fair and impartial, but the truth is that we automatically favor those who are most like us, or belong to our groups.

Try to imagine yourself in the position of those in out-groups; whilst also attempting to be dispassionate when judging those who belong to your in-groups.



availability heuristic

Your judgments are influenced by what springs most easily to mind.

How recent, emotionally powerful, or unusual your memories are can make them seem more relevant. This, in turn, can cause you to apply them too readily.

Try to gain different perspectives and relevant statistical information rather than relying purely on first judgments and emotive influences.

belief bias

If a conclusion supports your existing beliefs, you'll rationalize anything that supports it.

It's difficult for us to set aside our existing beliefs to consider the true merits of an argument. In practice this means that our ideas become impervious to criticism, and are perpetually reinforced.

A useful thing to ask is 'when and how did I get this belief?' We tend to automatically defend our ideas without ever really questioning them.

groupthink

You let the social dynamics of a group situation override the best outcomes.

Dissent can be uncomfortable and dangerous to one's social standing, and so often the most confident or first voice will determine group decisions.

Rather than openly contradicting others, seek to facilitate objective means of evaluation and critical thinking practices as a group activity.

optimism bias

You overestimate the likelihood of positive outcomes.

There can be benefits to a positive attitude, but it's unwise to allow such an attitude to adversely affect our ability to make rational judgments (they're not mutually exclusive).

If you make rational, realistic judgments you'll have a lot more to feel positive about.

reactance

You'd rather do the opposite of what someone is trying to make you do.

When we feel our liberty is being constrained, our inclination is to resist, however in doing so we can over-compensate.

Be careful not to lose objectivity when someone is being coercive/manipulative, or trying to force you do something. Wisdom springs from reflection, folly from reaction.

curse of knowledge

Once you understand something you presume it to be obvious to everyone.

Things makes sense once they make sense, so it can be hard to remember why they didn't. We build complex networks of understanding and forget how intricate the path to our available knowledge really is.

When teaching someone something new, go slow and explain like they're ten years old (without being patronizing). Repeat key points and facilitate active practice to help embed knowledge.

self-serving bias

You believe your failures are due to external factors, yet you're personally responsible for your successes.

Many of us enjoy unearned privileges, luck and advantages that others do not. It's easy to tell ourselves that we deserve these things, whilst blaming circumstance when things don't go our way.

When judging others, be mindful of how this bias interacts with the just-world hypothesis, fundamental attribution error, and the in-group bias.

negativity bias

You allow negative things to disproportionately influence your thinking.

The pain of loss and hurt are felt more keenly and persistently than the fleeting gratification of pleasant things. We are primed for survival, and our aversion to pain can distort our judgment for a modern world.

Pro-and-con lists, as well as thinking in terms of probabilities, can help you evaluate things more objectively than relying on a cognitive impression.

pessimism bias

You overestimate the likelihood of negative outcomes.

Pessimism is often a defense mechanism against disappointment, or it can be the result of depression and anxiety disorders.

Perhaps the worst aspect of pessimism is that even if something good happens, you'll probably feel pessimistic about it anyway.

spotlight effect

You overestimate how much people notice how you look and act.

Most people are much more concerned about themselves than they are about you. Absent overt prejudices, people generally want to like and get along with you as it gives them validation too.

Instead of worrying about how you're being judged, consider how you make others feel. They'll remember this much more, and you'll make the world a better place.

thou shalt not suffer cognitive biases

Cognitive biases make our judgments irrational. We have evolved to use shortcuts in our thinking, which are often useful, but a cognitive bias means there's a kind of misfiring going on causing us to lose objectivity. This poster has been designed to help you identify some of the most common biases and how to avoid falling victim to them. Help people become aware of their biases generally by sharing the website yourbias.is or more specifically e.g. yourbias.is/confirmation-bias



This poster is published under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND license 2020 by Jesse Richardson. You are free to print and redistribute this artwork non-commercially with the binding proviso that you reproduce it in full so that others may share alike. To learn more about biases you should read the books 'Thinking, Fast and Slow' and 'You Are Not So Smart'.

The illustration above is a reference to Michaelangelo's 'Creation of Adam' which many believe depicted the human brain in God's surrounding decoration.

Download this poster at www.yourbias.is

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HQ Organization and Process Insights



Deployable Training and Lessons Division Joint Staff J7

The overall classification of slides is


UNCLASSIFIED

Challenges

- Organizing to accomplish the joint mission
- Developing processes to operate with speed and agility
- Integrating joint, multinational, and interagency mission partners into the HQ structure and processes

Organizing - Roles and Responsibilities

J-Code Structure Organization (Baseline organizational structure)



* Above organization structure is greatly simplified for illustrative purposes only


Considerations

- Mission requirements drive HQ functions, organization, and processes
- Agility vs. size of HQ
- Terms of Reference for key personnel
- Liaison network
- Clear assignments of responsibilities for:
 - Assessment
 - Design
 - Integration of lethal and nonlethal effects
 - Narrative and Engagement
 - Reports to Higher HQ
 - Knowledge Management
 - Interorganizational Cooperation

Insights


- Maintain Commander-centric vs. staff-centric focus
- Be able to respond to crisis while retaining agility to plan and execute other missions
- Account for the transregional and all-domain nature of operations

Staff Integration




* JP 3-33, *Joint Force Headquarters*, defines "cross functional organizations" that include Centers, Groups, Cells, Offices, Elements, Boards, Working Groups, and Operational Planning Teams (OPTs).

Staff Support to Decision Making



Enabling Commander Decision Making



- Commander time for thinking, engagement, dialogue, battlefield circulation
- Staff preparation and empowered senior leader steering
- Commander assessment, guidance, and decision forums

Insights

- "White space" enables Commander and staff processes that inform decision making. Protect it
- Battle Rhythm must be nested with HHQ, partners, and external stakeholders

Integration with Mission Partners



Insights

- Leverage CCDR to acquire formal support
- Every echelon must integrate mission partners into plans and operations
- Flexibility is required to enable Allies and Partners to integrate
- Early planning and coordination is instrumental to success

Key Takeaways

- **Clear roles and responsibilities are needed to operate at the speed of relevance**
- **Effective staff integration enables shared understanding that supports decision making**
- **Early integration of all partners into the HQ is critical to achieve a comprehensive approach**

References

- **DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol. 1, “Joint Warfighting,” 27 Aug 2023**
- **Joint Pub 1, Vol 2, “The Joint Force,” 19 Jun 2020**
- **Joint Pub 3-33, “Joint Force Headquarters,” 9 Jun 2022**

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- Example -

JTF Senior Leader Terms of Reference (TOR)

	JTF Commander	JTF CSEL	Deputy JTF Cdr for Ops and Intel	Deputy JTF Cdr for Support	COS
Key Functions and B2C2WG Lead / Oversight	SecDef / CCDR SVTC, Daily CUB, Future Ops Synch Board, Plans Coord Board	SecDef / CCDR SVTC, Daily CUB, Future Ops Synch Board, Plans Coord Board, JRSOI	Joint Targeting Coord Board, Joint Collection Management Board; Current Ops; FUOPS	Personnel, Logistics and Comms, LNOs to and from external orgs, force protection	Staff synchronizer, Info flow and Battle Rhythm, Staff organization and manning, Coordinate / monitor TOR
Engagement Role Up and Out	SecDef, CCDR, Ambassador, MOD	HHQ CSEL, Sptg HQs CSELS and SELs. Foreign Mil SELs, Embassy Staff, Interagency Reps, LNO Teams	CCMD DCOM-Military, COS, J2, J3, J7; STRATCOM; MOI; CCMD Joint Targeting Coord Board	USAID; UN; CCMD J1, J4, J6, J8, TRANSCOM, CCMD Joint Log Board, Joint Requirements Review Board	Higher, Adjacent, Lower COS, National Support Element
Authorities	Transitions, Commit JTF reserve, changes to JTF C2	JFC Delegated and Enlisted Career Mgt	Second in Command, Approve JPITL, Target Engagement Authority	Third in Command, JPITL Approval (alt), TEA (alt)	Prioritize staff efforts Direct staff, As directed by JFC
Oversight of Sptg and Sub Organizations		JRSOI, Coalition and HN Enlisted NCO Training and Development	CJFACC, CJFLCC, SPMAGTF, CFMCC, SOJTF, JTF Reserve	Sustainment and Signal. Service Comp Command, TSC / ESC	None

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Deterrence

Gen Kevin P. Chilton, USAF (Ret)
Former Commander, United States Strategic Command

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“Apologetics”

Excerpts from “Defending the Record on US Nuclear Deterrence” by Gen Kevin P. Chilton (ret), Former Commander, US Strategic Command, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2018

Today, misinformation, falsehoods, and often deliberate distortions concerning nuclear deterrence continue to be repeated in public forums. Left unchallenged, these statements run the risk of becoming accepted as factual by the American public. [The following are] 11 of the more common fallacies.

“We Are Never Going to Use Nuclear Weapons”

The argument presented is this: if we are never going to use nuclear weapons, why are we wasting so much money sustaining them? Our adversaries see our 24/7 alert postures and consequently assess an attack on the US or its allies to be an unthinkable choice.

“Prompt Conventional Global Strike Can Replace a Portion of the Nuclear Deterrent Force”

Another fallacy is the notion that the deterrence mission can be adequately accomplished by substituting conventional warheads, because of their great accuracy, for nuclear warheads atop our ICBMs. This argument does not appreciate the “long, dark shadow” cast by the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the deterrent effect that “shadow” enables. A nuclear warhead is terribly frightening; a 2,000-pound conventional warhead is not.

“Conventional Weapon Overmatch Eliminates the Need for a Nuclear Deterrent”

Another argument presented to reduce or eliminate the US nuclear deterrent is the notion that our conventional overmatch in quality and size is adequate for the deterrence mission. There is simply no conventional weapon equivalency to the power and deterrent effects of nuclear weapons. So where should the US spend its first dollar on defense? On the triad.

“We Do Not Need a Triad”

The critical question to ask in response to the claim that we do not need a triad is, so which leg do you want to eliminate? The submarine leg provides the only stealth force we have—in essence, our assured response. The bombers are the flexible force that can signal our adversaries and assure our allies while encouraging them not to build their own nuclear deterrent. The ICBM is the most stabilizing leg of the triad. Stability, in this context, is defined as a state in which adversaries are never tempted to strike first. The value in the triad is that it complicates the adversary decision calculus. This is the definition of strategic stability: when an adversary understands that no day is a good day to go to war with the United States—nor is he ever tempted to launch first.

“Nuclear Forces Are on Hair-Trigger Alert”

Critics of our ICBM alert posture use this terminology as a scare tactic. Nuclear forces are not on hair-trigger alert. They certainly are on alert and at the ready, and this is necessary to provide the strategic stability.

“LRSO Is Destabilizing”

Another fallacious argument is that the long-range standoff weapon (LRSO), or cruise missile, is destabilizing. The fact is LRSO is not destabilizing in the sense of weakening strategic stability, as it does not invite a first strike—indeed it helps to prevent one. The United States and Russia have had these weapons for decades and employed them in regional conflicts, and neither country has considered striking first as a result. Today’s ALCM, which will age out in the next decade, must be replaced on schedule by the follow-on LRSO.

“We Cannot Afford Modernization”

Arguing against recapitalizing the nuclear triad because of sustainment costs is patently unfair. In today’s world and for the foreseeable future the US will need a nuclear deterrent in the form of a triad. So, including sustainment costs when discussing the cost of recapitalization is simply another attempt to convince the public not to invest in something that remains necessary for national security. So if nuclear deterrence is the number-one priority and every other defense investment depends on it, the cost spread over the lifetime of the programs is most certainly affordable. We should be rebuilding and exercising the infrastructure necessary to

sustain our deterrent and, more importantly, developing the human capital required to design and build nuclear weapons for an uncertain future. The cost to do this is modest.

“If We Reduce, Others Will Reduce”

We reduced our nuclear arsenal when we signed verifiable treaties with Russia. How effective has this leading by example been? How is showing constraint working? History does not support the proposition that if we reduce, others will follow our lead. The effectiveness of the leading-by-reducing approach to inspire others to show restraint is simply not supported by reality.

“Global Zero Is a Desirable Goal”

Many talk about global zero as a desirable goal. After all, if we could “put the genie back in the bottle” wouldn’t it be better to have a world without nuclear weapons? Of course, the “genie,” that is, the knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons, cannot be unlearned and put back in the bottle of ignorance. Alternatively, some suggest we should continue to strive to get all nations to agree to reduce their inventories to zero, eliminate their weapon production capabilities, and submit to a near omniscient oversight authority that could compel compliance and ensure that no one was cheating. Human beings for centuries upon centuries, in war after war, found better and better ways to kill each other—more efficiently, more lethally. Do we want to go back to a world without nuclear weapons? There is a reason why great powers that own ever more lethal conventional weapons have elected not to fight each other: they have been deterred by nuclear weapons.

“Nuclear Deterrence is Cold War Think”

Some argue the US nuclear deterrent should be eliminated because its existence represents Cold War think. The reality is nuclear deterrence underpins the national security of the United States and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. It remains relevant and necessary today to deter the existential threats to our nation. It also helps to deter nonnuclear attacks that could have catastrophic consequences, such as attacks involving biological weapons. The term Cold War think is a pejorative typically proffered by those who have never thought seriously about, let alone studied, deterrence theory or by those who have run out of ways to defend their position.

“No One Would Ever Use a Nuclear Weapon against the United States”

Those who would use this argument seem willing to risk the very existence of the nation on the basis of their speculation and without forethought. The US military must ensure national survival through deterrence provided by a safe, secure, capable, reliable, flexible, and vigilant nuclear posture. It is our duty to assume the worst and then take steps to ensure it never happens. Additionally, we must deter attacks on our friends, allies, and fielded US military forces deployed abroad.

Summary

These 11 statements are a few of the false arguments and positions directed toward the US nuclear deterrent, often by those who would wish to see this deterrent weakened or eliminated for purely ideological reasons. However, other serious scholars and students of deterrence theory present thoughtful and debatable positions that address issues pertaining to the size, capability, and posture requirements needed to provide the United States with a deterrent that will ensure no one would ever consider a nuclear attack on the United States, our military forces, or our friends or allies. It is the responsibility of members of the profession of arms to truthfully defend the record when false arguments are espoused and seriously consider those that are truly worthy of consideration. Only then can an informed debate begin on the subjects surrounding the US nuclear deterrent.

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Links to Gen Chilton’s speech to The Heritage Foundation from January 18, 2018 titled, “The Importance of the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent”:

- *The Heritage Foundation website: <https://www.heritage.org/defense/event/the-importance-the-us-nuclear-deterrent>*
- *The Heritage Foundation on YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g1J4LGOgZIU>*

DETERRENCE

Gen Kevin P. Chilton, USAF, Retired
Former Commander, United States Strategic Command

Definition: Persuading an adversarial decision maker not to take a particular action that you believe is harmful to your national interest.

Fundamental question: Deter (persuade) who from doing what, ... when?

Why do countries go to war?

- No other choice (least worst option).
- They think they can win (undeterred).

Never forget...

A Country will always behave in its own national interests first if they are in conflict with another Country's national interests.

What is necessary to deter?

- You must know what adversary values and/or fears.
- You must have:
 - Demonstrated ability to attribute undesired behavior.
 - Demonstrated capabilities the adversary fears.
 - Demonstrated the will to use your capabilities.
 - Capabilities must be able to impose unacceptable cost, and/or deny the benefit sought.
- What do we value/fear? Are our values/fears the same as Putin's? Xi's? Kim's?

The adversary must:

- Be able to comply.
- Believe you will unleash your capabilities.
 - Both will and capability must be credible...else,
 - Possibility of miscalculation...which can result in the failure of deterrence.
- Adversary must believe restraint is the least worst option (i.e., calculate that restraint will yield an acceptable outcome).

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