



Sweden

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ARMED FORCES

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UPDATED

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Executive summary

	Total strength ¹	Army	Air force	Navy
Active personnel	14,400	5,600	2,800	2,900
Reserves	11,400 ²	6,850	1,150	2,050

- Sweden has a relatively small standing military force, although it is well equipped and supported by a reserve force and large Home Guard. The Swedish Army has 13 active combat arms battalions, as well as one mechanised battle group on Gotland, and 40 Home

Guard battalions. Its equipment inventory includes 120 Leopard 2A5 tanks and 354 CV90 infantry fighting vehicles. The Swedish Air Force (SwAF) has 97 JAS 39C/D Gripen multirole combat aircraft and a range of support aircraft to provide support to the Swedish Army in the field and the Royal Swedish Navy (RSwN) at sea. The primary assets of the RSwN are seven corvettes and four attack submarines, coastal defence and littoral warfare. This structure and equipment allows the Swedish Armed Forces to undertake both territorial defence and expeditionary operations. That said, the latest Swedish Defence Policy, adopted in 2015, emphasises national defence against a conventional adversary. As part of this re-orientation, Sweden is also reinforcing military capabilities on the strategically important island of Gotland and building its ability to receive and host the military forces of allied nations. This new threat context is also compelling some further restructuring of the army to enhance its ability to carry out operations against what official documents call a 'qualified opponent' (a state actor with significant military forces and advance weaponry). Furthermore, in 2017 the country reintroduced conscription.

- Although Sweden participates in international peace support missions, the contributions are usually not large. The Swedish Armed Forces stated in their input to the 2019 budget that Sweden ought to reduce its contributions to international operations since these could negatively impact operational capability. The Swedish Armed Forces have asked the government to prioritise deployments in which Swedish units operate with countries with whom Sweden has established ties since this contributes to operational capability. To this end, the Swedish Armed Forces prefer to participate in operations led by NATO, then by the EU, and finally the UN.
- Priority programmes over the next decade are procurement of at least 60 JAS 39E Gripen fighters (with a stand-off air-to-surface missile and an extended-range, anti-ship missile) and Patriot medium-range air defence systems. Sweden has also launched a programme to upgrade a large part of its Leopard 2 tank and CV90 armoured vehicle fleets. In addition, *Sweden's Defence Policy 2016 to 2020* outlined several measures to strengthen anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities and implementation is well underway. Among these measures, the RSwN is upgrading its Göteborg/Gävle corvettes (including installation of a variable depth sonar) and the SwAF is bringing the NH90 ASW variants up to operational capability. Furthermore, the Swedish Defence Commission's white book on *Sweden's Security Policy and the Development of the Military Defence 2021-2025*, published in 2019, recommended the creation of additional units to bring the total army strength up to three mechanised brigades, a reduced motorised brigade, and a reinforced mechanised battalion on Gotland. The proposal calls for a future war organisation of about 100,000 persons by 2030.

2019-03-20

Threat environment

Despite Sweden's armed neutrality, the country could easily find itself drawn into any conflict between NATO and Russia. This is because, as was the case during the Cold War, Sweden is at a geographically important crossroads. For NATO, Sweden is an essential pathway to reinforce the

Baltic Republics while avoiding any Russian S-400 air defence systems in the Kaliningrad Oblast, which can reach well out over the Baltic Sea. Meanwhile, Russia sees Swedish territory as a vital place to control in order to block NATO forces. By placing military forces with air defence systems on the island of Gotland, for example, Russia could almost entirely block NATO reinforcements from reaching their allies in the Baltic Republics. Thus Russia has a strong incentive to seize the island in the event of a wider regional war.

Swedish security is also impacted by general conflict and instability (complex emergencies) that upset the world order. This has prompted the country to support peacekeeping missions. Lastly, Sweden faces risk of domestic terrorist attacks, although the response to this would be largely non-military.

2019-03-20

Doctrine and strategy

Sweden's military posture observes formal neutrality, and insists that the use of force can only be authorised under chapters VI and VII of the UN charter. Neither will it accede to any formal military alliance beyond what is inherent in the EU's common foreign and security policy and Partnership for Peace (PfP) status in NATO. However, such a view has increasingly become hard to maintain in light of Russia's increasingly aggressive posture in the region, to the effect of a breakdown of relations between Stockholm-Moscow.

Sweden is now effectively faced with three strategic choices. Maintain the status quo, and the inherent contradictions that go along with it; return to a genuine non-aligned position by turning its back on the close collaboration it's built up with NATO over the past decades; or take the plunge and become a full NATO member state, formally abandoning its non-aligned stance and risk incurring Russian anger.

Although NATO membership remains unlikely in the near future, recent events have put it back on the agenda. Sweden is now part of NATO's Enhanced Opportunities Partnership programme and the government has signed a NATO Host Nation Support Agreement (which was ratified by Parliament in May 2016). This agreement would make it easier for Sweden to receive military support in the future in theory

The military doctrine of the Swedish Armed Forces is set out in its the document *Militärstrategisk doktrin* (MSD) 12, which was released in July 2011. It states that the primary mission of the armed forces is "to defend Sweden and promote Swedish security nationally and internationally. The Armed Forces should be able to detect and repel violations of Swedish territory and to safeguard Sweden's sovereign rights and national interests outside the Swedish territory". Additionally, the military is tasked with providing capabilities and resources to civilian activities, if required.

The military must be able to undertake these missions independently, but also in collaboration with other Swedish government agencies, other nations, and multi-national organisations.

One of the most significant changes in new doctrine is the accommodation for high-intensity and low-intensity operations. Additionally, the doctrine in some ways moves Sweden away from its

historical neutrality by to some degree aligning and harmonising with NATO's Allied Joint Doctrine (AJP-01) and that of other EU nations. According to the report, "the basis of the MSD is that the Swedish concepts and definitions are as compatible as possible with NATO and the EU."

In practice, this has been demonstrated in deployments of CV90 combat vehicles to support its units in Chad and Afghanistan, and the commitment of Gripen combat aircraft to the multinational Operation Unified Protector over Libya in 2011.

Additionally, MSD 12 states that the armed forces and its respective units "will endeavour to apply manoeuvre warfare where possible" to "constantly strive for the initiative", with the aim of exploiting critical vulnerabilities in enemy forces. This is in line with the military's efforts to restructure and re-equip its forces to focus on more mobile and flexible units.

2019-03-20

Military capability assessment

Sweden capability assessment.

Sweden capability assessment. (IHS Markit)

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- The Swedish Army fields about 120 tanks, 350 IFVs, and hundreds of additional armoured vehicles. Sweden has launched a programme to upgrade a large part of its Leopard 2 tank and CV90 armoured vehicle fleets. The Swedish Army also has 24 FH-77 BW Archer 155 mm self-propelled howitzers. However, the only other indirect fire systems are mortars. Even when the planned new 120 mm mobile mortar systems enter service, the army's capabilities in this area will remain limited.
- The combat capability of the SwAF is provided by 73 JAS 39C Gripen multirole combat aircraft (with 24 JAS 39Ds also in the fleet for training). The SwAF Gripen is equipped to carry out air defence, ground attack, anti-ship attack, and reconnaissance tasks. Most significant, the Gripens are armed with the Meteor beyond visual range air-to-air missile. That said, although the Gripens have a ground attack capability (including with the GBU 39 SDB), it has no long-range air-to-surface missile.
- Air defence is also supported from the ground where the Swedish army fields low and medium range air defence systems. In contrast, RSwn's ships have no air defence missiles. Sweden is the only Nordic country that has not put such systems on their newest combat vessels.
- The air force also has a fleet of fixed- and rotary-wing logistics aircraft to carry out tactical and battlefield transport and other tasks. This includes C-130Hs, although these are the oldest in Europe. Meanwhile, the helicopters are primarily shore based, although the light AW109s can embark on some ships for limited periods of time. The rotary-wing fleet has been boosted through the procurement of 18 NH90 Tactical Transport Helicopters (TTH). Nine of these carry out troop transport, search and rescue, and medical evacuation tasks while the

other nine are modified to support the Royal Swedish Navy in ASW. While all the helicopters have been delivered, it will be some time before they have a full combat capability. Of note, the SwAF has not had any assets fully capable of ASW operations since the last Hkp 4 (Boeing Vertol 107) was taken out of service in 2011.

- The RSwN has a surface combatant fleet comprised of seven corvettes. The five Visby-class corvettes are particularly noteworthy for their high degree of stealth and they are well armed to undertake ASW and anti-surface warfare. Meanwhile, the other two corvettes are being upgraded to increase ASW capability. The navy also has seven mine warfare vessels, one versatile command and support ship (which can effectively serve as an ocean patrol vessel), and four attack submarines, in addition to a marine battalion.
- The RBS-15 coastal defence missile was re-introduced into service in late 2016, with at least one battery now based on Gotland. The land-based RBS-15 had been removed from service in 2000 due to budget cuts. However, the Mk 2 was developed in the 1990s and has technological limitations and thus will need replacement in the medium term.

Joint forces interoperability

2019-03-20

Tri-service interoperability

Future Swedish units, though fewer in number, are to increase their potency by being able to operate as modular units that may be organised from different components as required. A new joint radio system is under introduction in order to help facilitate this development. Until such efforts have been completed, interoperability remains limited. The various services have undertaken modernisation efforts though lacking co-ordination and integration. This has led, for instance, to a situation where the air force's Gripen fighter jets have fully adopted NATO standard encryption while the other services have yet to do so. This has further resulted in the air force being unable to communicate with other units through secure encrypted communications.

2019-03-20

Multinational interoperability

Multinational interoperability has traditionally had less priority within the Swedish Armed Forces due to its strict policy of military neutrality. However, this is changing, with multinational co-operation becoming a key priority. Previous efforts have limited themselves to the minimum required in order to ensure an ability to deploy on UN-led peace keeping operations. Swedish matériel investments are thus increasingly reflecting this situation and include significant investments in equipment to enable Swedish forces to interact more effectively with its partners. Additionally, the military is improving interoperability through increased participation in multinational exercises.

Sweden is a NATO PfP member and has also contributed to the NATO Response Force (NRF). In addition, Sweden is a full member of the European Defence Agency (EDA). Meanwhile, defence

cooperation with Finland has also been enhanced in recent years.

2019-03-20

Defence structure

The Swedish Armed Forces has three branches: the army, navy, and air force. Within the army, there is also a Home Guard, which is composed of volunteers but effectively serves as a large reserve force. The navy includes an Amphibious Regiment. The Swedish Coast Guard is an independent civilian authority with a board supervised by the Ministry of Defence. It is not part of the navy.

On 1 January 2011, the military's two Special Forces units, the Special Protection Group (Särskilda skyddsgruppen: SSG) and Special Gathering Group (Särskilda inhämtningsgruppen: SIG) were merged into a new tri-service Special Operations Group (SOG). The SOG is considered a "strategic resource" for the military as a whole.

2019-12-05

Command and control

Minister of Defence:	Peter Hultqvist
Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces:	General Micael Bydén
Director General of the Armed Forces:	Peter Sandwall
Chief of Staff, Army:	Major General Karl Engelbrektson
Chief of Staff, Air Force:	Major General Carl-Johan Edström
Chief of Staff, Navy:	Rear Admiral Jens Nykvist

The Supreme Commander has overall responsibility for the Swedish Armed Forces. The head of production (C PROD) is responsible for force generation, namely through the maintenance, development, and readiness of military units. The head of operational command (C INSATS) is responsible for executing military operations, at the request of the Supreme Commander. The C INSATS has operational control over the heads of the army, air force, and navy (who are designated inspector generals). The inspector generals/chiefs of staff are the foremost representative of each of their services.

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- The main driver of growth in 2019–20 is likely to be consumer spending, with households still enjoying ultra-low interest rates, and supportive employment and real wage gains.
- Nevertheless, the short-term narrative remains unchanged; namely external downside risks, primarily a less assured eurozone outlook, hurting Sweden's export-led economy.

- Meanwhile, an uncertain domestic political climate has damaged consumer and business sentiment. The policy outlook is uncertain, given the centre-left government's difficult task ahead of reconciling the policy needs of its base and the demands of its newfound centrist partners in parliament.
- Russian military assertiveness in the Baltic region has the potential to push Sweden, a historically neutral nation, closer to the prospect of joining NATO. However, such a move is contingent on its neighbour, Finland, making similar strides towards NATO membership.

2019-12-12

Political

The minority centre-left government of Stefan Löfven currently governs with the help of two centrist parties, the Centre Party and the Liberal. In exchange for their parliamentary support, the Social Democrat-led government made significant policy concessions including a commitment to lower taxes and weaker employment protection rules.

2019-12-13

External Relations

Sweden continues to seek closer defence co-operation with the US and NATO in light of growing tensions in the Baltic Sea region with Russia. Sweden's vulnerability stems from the strategic location of Gotland, Sweden's largest island, which would likely be targeted by the Russian military in the event of a conflict between Russia and NATO.

2019-12-12

Military Conflict

Sweden recently reintroduced military service and stationed troops on Gotland, the largest island on the Baltic Sea, for the first time in a decade. These measures reflect the deteriorating security situation in the Baltic region, which follows growing Russian military assertiveness since 2014. War risks remain low, but there is a heightened risk of unintended escalation due to Russian aerial and maritime incursions into Swedish territory. Although Swedish membership in NATO remains unlikely in the one-year outlook, the situation could change if Finland, Sweden's historical ally, takes concrete steps towards accession.

2019-12-12

Terrorism

On 7 April 2017, a hijacked truck was driven into crowds in central Stockholm, killing four and injuring 15 people. The terrorist attack highlights the continued risk of Islamic State-inspired vehicle-impact attacks. However, the risk of more complex and co-ordinated attacks similar to the November 2015 attacks in Paris is lower than in other Western European countries such as France or the United Kingdom, which are of greater strategic and symbolic significance.

2019-12-13

Social Unrest

In August 2018, up to 200 vehicles were set ablaze by youths in the outskirts of Uppsala, Gothenburg and other cities in western Sweden. The incident was reminiscent of the week-long riots in Stockholm and other cities in May 2013 and February 2017, and demonstrates the potential for unrest among disaffected youth. Triggers for renewed rioting would be instances of police brutality. The suburbs of Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö are most at risk. There is also a risk of violence in connection with neo-Nazi and anti-Nazi demonstrations across the country.

2019-12-13

Operational

Sweden has one of the world's most internationally integrated economies and welcomes foreign investment regardless of which government holds office. The transport and communications infrastructure are of the highest quality. From an international perspective, unit labour costs are comparatively high and labour laws very protective of workers' rights. However, workers are very well educated and relations between employers and trade unions generally accommodative. The public administration is transparent and incidents of corruption are very rare. Corruption is most likely to manifest itself at the local level, where the small environment of politicians and local businesspersons means conflicts of interest are more likely to occur.

2019-12-13

Crime

Organised criminal activity is concentrated in Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö. Malmö is a particular hotspot because of its location in southern Sweden, across the Öresund Bridge from the Danish capital, making it a node in arms and drug trafficking routes from continental Europe to Scandinavia. Rivalries between criminal gangs are likely to occasionally escalate into shootouts and IED attacks in all three cities.

2019-12-12

Risks to Individuals

Violent incidents affecting individuals are most likely during neo-Nazi and anti-Nazi demonstrations or in shootouts and grenade attacks between criminal gangs, particularly in Malmö and Gothenburg. However, such occasions are likely to be rare overall and mainly occur outside city centres. Far-right groups are known to occasionally target individuals of foreign appearance in physical assaults. Jihadist militants are more likely to target Jewish individuals or individuals associated with perceived anti-Islamic views.

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Security

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Major Threats: Conflict snapshot

Sweden recently reintroduced military service and stationed troops on Gotland, the largest island on the Baltic Sea, for the first time in a decade. These measures reflect the deteriorating security situation in the Baltic region, which follows growing Russian military assertiveness since 2014. War risks remain low, but there is a heightened risk of unintended escalation due to Russian aerial and maritime incursions into Swedish territory. Although Swedish membership in NATO remains unlikely in the one-year outlook, the situation could change if Finland, Sweden's historical ally, takes concrete steps towards accession.

2019-12-12

Major Threats: Interstate conflict

Interstate war risks are low, despite increased Russian military activity in the Baltic region and Sweden strengthening ties with NATO

Following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent conflict in eastern Ukraine, the Baltic region has seen growing Russian military assertiveness manifested in increased air and naval activity. In response to this, Sweden has increased its own military preparedness. In 2016, the government stationed troops in the strategically important island of Gotland, the first time in a decade. In July 2017, the government reintroduced military service, previously scrapped in 2010, and later that year it raised military spending, earmarking SEK6.1 billion for the Swedish army for the period of 2018–2020. Although the risk of war remains low, the strategic location of Gotland on the Baltic Sea heightens the risk of unintended incidents involving submarines. Sweden has in recent years also deepened its co-operation with NATO. In September 2014, the Swedish government signed a host nation support agreement with NATO, and in September 2017 it launched the biggest military exercise in two decades, involving nearly 20,000 participants, including units from several other countries such as the US. These preparations signal Sweden's responsiveness to the deteriorating security situation in the Baltic region. However, although such exercises with NATO will continue, co-operation will probably fall short of full membership. Although support for NATO membership is growing in the population, the majority is still opposed. Any shift in regard to membership is contingent on the trajectory of Finland, Sweden's historical ally, and whether the Finnish seriously contemplate joining the military alliance. In the unlikely event of a conflict between NATO and Russia, the government of Russia would most probably ignore the neutrality of Sweden and authorise a swift occupation of the island as a means of undercutting NATO support and supplies to the Baltics.

2019-12-12

Major Threats: Terrorism snapshot

On 7 April 2017, a hijacked truck was driven into crowds in central Stockholm, killing four and injuring 15 people. The terrorist attack highlights the continued risk of Islamic State-inspired vehicle-impact attacks. However, the risk of more complex and co-ordinated attacks similar to the November 2015 attacks in Paris is lower than in other Western European countries such as France or the United Kingdom, which are of greater strategic and symbolic significance.

2019-12-12

Major Threats: Terrorism hotspots and targets

The likeliest terrorist attack is a low-capability small-arms or knife attack causing casualties rather than property damage

The primary terrorism threat in Sweden stems from self-radicalised Islamist militants, acting alone or in small groups. On 7 April 2017, a hijacked truck was deliberately driven into crowds in Central Stockholm, killing four and injuring 15 pedestrians. Police subsequently apprehended an Uzbek national, suspected of being an Islamic State sympathiser. The attack revealed the continued risk of low-capability attacks in Sweden, including from vehicle-impact attacks, but also firearm and knife attacks. The main target sets are public spaces and malls similar to Åhléns on Drottninggatan, which was the target of the April attack. However, centrally commanded and co-ordinated attacks similar to what occurred in Paris in November 2015 are less likely compared to countries such as France, Germany, or the United Kingdom, which remain strategically and symbolically more important to the Islamic State and other terrorist organisations.

Far-right groups are active in Sweden, but are more likely to stage protests and counter-protests against left-wing demonstrations than conduct terrorist attacks.

2019-12-13

Major Threats: Social stability and unrest snapshot

In August 2018, up to 200 vehicles were set ablaze by youths in the outskirts of Uppsala, Gothenburg and other cities in western Sweden. The incident was reminiscent of the week-long riots in Stockholm and other cities in May 2013 and February 2017, and demonstrates the potential for unrest among disaffected youth. Triggers for renewed rioting would be instances of police brutality. The suburbs of Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö are most at risk. There is also a risk of violence in connection with neo-Nazi and anti-Nazi demonstrations across the country.

2019-12-13

Major Threats: Protests and riots

There are conditions for renewed rioting in Stockholm and other large cities; violence is likely at neo-Nazi and anti-Nazi demonstrations.

In August 2018, youths in disaffected neighbourhoods of Uppsala and Gothenburg (and vicinity) vandalised and set ablaze up to 200 cars. Police suspect that the acts were gang-related. The incidents in August reconfirmed the potential for unrest among disaffected youths following similar riots in previous years. In May 2013, protesters vandalised dozens of vehicles and properties, and fought with police. The rioting started after police shot dead an elderly man in his house in Husby, a suburban area in northern Stockholm with a relatively high proportion of economically disadvantaged residents of immigrant background. The riots spread from Husby to other suburban areas around Stockholm, as well as to other cities in southern Sweden. In February 2017, riots erupted again in the northern Stockholm suburb of Rinkeby, with residents scuffling with police and burning vehicles parked nearby. Although such riots are unlikely to be a regular occurrence, they demonstrate underlying conditions, such as a prevalent sense of marginalisation among youths

of immigrant background, which could cause renewed rioting if another trigger event occurs.

There is an ongoing risk of violence in connection with neo-Nazi and anti-Nazi demonstrations across the country. On 23 August 2014, 10 people were injured and six arrested in fighting between police and protesters at Kimhamn Square in Malmö. The violence occurred after up to 1,500 demonstrators arrived to protest against a public meeting of the neo-Nazi Party of the Swedes (Svenskarnas Parti). Some of the demonstrators threw firecrackers and smoke grenades at the police and attempted to break through police barricades. Police responded by riding horses through the crowd, causing injuries. This was the second time in a year that violence had occurred in connection with an anti-Nazi demonstration. The recent influx of refugees and resurgent antisemitism means that the risk of protests and rallies will continue to be elevated in the foreseeable future.

2019-12-12

Major Threats: Risks to individuals snapshot

Violent incidents affecting individuals are most likely during neo-Nazi and anti-Nazi demonstrations or in shootouts and grenade attacks between criminal gangs, particularly in Malmö and Gothenburg. However, such occasions are likely to be rare overall and mainly occur outside city centres. Far-right groups are known to occasionally target individuals of foreign appearance in physical assaults. Jihadist militants are more likely to target Jewish individuals or individuals associated with perceived anti-Islamic views.

2019-12-13

Crime Overview

Organised criminal activity is concentrated in Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö. Malmö is a particular hotspot because of its location in southern Sweden, across the Öresund Bridge from the Danish capital, making it a node in arms and drug trafficking routes from continental Europe to Scandinavia. Rivalries between criminal gangs are likely to occasionally escalate into shootouts and IED attacks in all three cities.

2018-09-19

Organised Crime

- Sweden faces a number of mid-level organised crime threats, the most notable of which are money laundering and drug and human trafficking.
- Members of biker gangs such as the Hells Angels and Bandidos, as well as criminal groups from former Communist states of Eastern Europe, are believed to be the main perpetrators of organised crime in Sweden.
- The Swedish government has undertaken a number of measures to tighten its laws and facilitate more effective police work in order to combat organised crime.

Several criminal networks operate in Sweden, including a growing number of groups from the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia. Their major activities include prostitution, economic crime, smuggling, and car theft. Another major interest is in the traffic of refugees into and through Sweden, as well as the smuggling of and dealing in narcotics.

Motorcycle gangs have grown rapidly in Sweden since the mid-1990s. On average Hells Angels Motorcycle Club (MC) Sweden, Bandidos MC Sweden, and Outlaws MC Sweden have been able to establish four additional branches or supporter gangs around the country each year. Members of the motorcycle gangs are involved in blackmailing, narcotics trafficking, and illegal employment. There are also gang formations in the suburbs of the main cities of Stockholm, Göteborg, and Malmö. Certain sections of these gangs are believed to be involved in illegal activities such as drugs and even arms trafficking, as well as extortion and money laundering. Across the Nordic countries, a violent feud between the rival Bandidos and Hells Angels has prompted an increase in occasional gun and IED attacks. Helsingborg has been especially affected by gang violence.

Enforcement in Sweden is efficient. The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) is a government agency tasked with reducing crime and improving levels of safety by producing data and disseminating knowledge on crime and crime prevention work. The BRÅ also produces official crime statistics, evaluates reforms, conducts research to develop knowledge, and provides support to local crime prevention work. Increasingly, projects pertaining to drugs offences and young offenders are gaining prominence within the crime prevention unit, as well as ongoing projects aimed at tackling general crime. Moreover, the Swedish Security Service (Säkerhetspolisen: SÄPO) is primarily responsible for preventing the effects of organised crime on politicians, journalists, and other authorities. The Swedish customs service has also been given the mandate of actively fighting crime through the Customs Criminal Investigators (Tullkriminalen). The group consists of 290 personnel whose aim is to eliminate or significantly disturb organised crime networks. This is done through analysis, surveillance, and crime investigation.

In 2004 the Swedish government adopted two laws related to human trafficking for sexual purposes, forced labour, and organ harvesting. Engagement in human trafficking, including failing to reveal a human trafficking crime, is now a criminal offence. In June 2008 a new wire-tapping law came into force that was then updated in late 2009. The law allows the Swedish intelligence authorities to monitor international calls, faxes, and e-mails without a court's consent. The law sparked a public outcry in Sweden, with various civil groups arguing it was too oppressive and threatened civil liberties. The government countered, however, that the law was needed to improve national security and prevent possible terrorist attacks.

2018-09-19

Trafficking

Human

Reported cases of human trafficking in Sweden have increased in recent years. It is difficult to determine whether this is due to increased media and police attention on the issue, or if it is because the number of cases has actually risen. One increasingly common method of human trafficking is via sham marriages: a tactic often used to get criminal elements from other countries into Sweden.

A fake marriage can cost SEK50,000–140,000. In recent years, young people (between the ages of 12 and 18) of Chinese nationality have entered Sweden seeking asylum and then disappeared. Authorities have limited knowledge about what happens to these individuals, although it is suspected that they have been the victims of human trafficking rings. One noticeable trend over recent years has been the spread of human trafficking to smaller cities, whereas before its presence was limited to the larger urban areas.

In 2002, the Nordic Baltic Task Force against Trafficking in Human Beings was established. The objective of the task force is to increase political attention given to human trafficking offences in the member states, creating more regional co-operation in this field. It also launched a project for the repatriation of victims of human trafficking. In June 2018, the Council of Europe's Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) reported that Sweden had achieved notable improvements in its legal framework against human trafficking, providing support to victims and creating specialist units to tackle such crimes. However, GRETA officials noted that Swedish authorities must accomplish more to broaden their focus from sexual exploitation to cover all forms of human trafficking (such as indentured labour).

2018-12-28

Financial Crime

Money laundering

The number of organised criminals involved in economic crimes has increased in recent years, leading to growing co-operation between Sweden's intelligence services and security agencies to tackle the resultant threat. The National Economic Crimes Bureau (ECB), which is under the direct responsibility of the Ministry of Justice, is charged with investigating and preventing crimes, including serious fraud, embezzlement, tax evasion, as well as money laundering. One particular area of focus is the use of money-laundering mechanisms in Sweden by terrorist organisations, including the Islamic State, attempting to process illicitly acquired funds. Following a 2006 evaluation by the intergovernmental organisation Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which highlighted a number of deficiencies in terms of Sweden's compliance with the organisation's recommendations, Swedish authorities have improved Sweden's anti-money laundering system. These have included organisational changes to relevant agencies and a revision of what constitutes money laundering offence and terrorist financing offence in 2014 and 2016, respectively. Sweden was also commended in the latest FATF report from 2017 for its efficiency in international co-operation. However, Sweden still lags in terms of domestic co-ordination of relevant authorities as well as effective supervision of financial institutions and non-financial businesses.

Cybercrime

The illegal downloading of films, music, and other licensed media products has become an increasingly important issue in recent years. An organisation called the Svenska Antipiratbyrå (APB), established in 2001, works to prevent the illegal use of licensed materials through lobbying, disseminating information on existing laws, and registering downloads and has in at least one case directly infiltrated a piracy network. It was created by the sectors of business most affected by piracy such as the film, computer games, and music industries. According to the Swedish Anti-Piracy Bureau, 2.2 million Swedes between the ages of 15 and 74 have access to broadband

connection. Of these, approximately half a million illegally download an average of three films per month, amounting to 15 million films per year. The number of downloads is expected to rise in the coming years as downloading from the internet becomes more common through the generations.

A less widespread, but potentially higher-impact, issue is that of cyber-attacks perpetrated by international groups. In late 2016, the Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST) judged Russia to present the greatest cyber threat to the country. Indeed, during the past few years there has been an uptick in cyber-attacks on Swedish government agencies and businesses, particularly after Russia's annexation of Crimea by Russia and the subsequent political fallout with the EU. This cyber threat to Sweden will persist, provided diplomatic relations with Russia remain tense. Such risks would increase further if the country were to shift foreign policy in a way that Russia perceived detrimental to its interests (for example, Sweden seeking NATO membership).

Political Leadership

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2020-01-14

Leadership

Leadership

Title	Name	Appointed
King of Sweden	CARL XVI GUSTAF	26908
Crown Princess of Sweden; Duchess of Västergötland	VICTORIA	29221
Prime Minister	Stefan LÖFVEN	41915
Deputy Prime Minister; Environment and Climate	Isabella LÖVIN	43486
Minister of Finance	Magdalena ANDERSSON	41915
Minister of Housing and Deputy Finance Minister (Ministry of Finance)	Per BOLUND	43486
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Ann LINDE	43718
Minister of Foreign Trade, responsible for Nordic Affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	Anna HALLBERG	43718
Minister of EU Affairs (Office of the Prime Minister)	Hans DAHLGREN	43486
Minister of Defence	Peter HULTQVIST	41915
Minister of Justice, responsible for Migration	Morgan JOHANSSON	43486
Minister of Employment	Eva NORDMARK	43718
Minister of Home Affairs (Ministry of Justice)	Mikael DAMBERG	43486

Minister of Energy and Digitalization (Ministry of Infrastructure)	Anders YGEMAN	43486
Minister of Education	Anna EKSTRÖM	43486
Minister of Industry	Ibrahim BAYLAN	43486
Minister of Infrastructure	Tomas ENEROTH	42943
Minister of Social Security (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs)	Annika STRANDHÄLL	43486
Minister of Social Affairs (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs)	Lena HALLENGREN	43486
Minister of Consumer Affairs (Ministry of Finance)	Ardalan SHEKARABI	43486
Source: IHS and CIRCA People in Power		

2018-10-12

Political Profiles

Prime Minister Stefan Löfven

Löfven started his career as a welder, and in 2001 was elected deputy chair of the Swedish Metalworkers' Union (Metall). Five years later, he became chair of IF Metall, a new union formed through a merger of Metall and the Swedish Industrial Union (Industrifacket: IF), covering approximately 370,000 members. In 2006, Löfven was elected into Socialdemokraterna's executive committee. He has also been on the board of directors of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen: LO). Stefan Löfven assumed the Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokraterna) leadership post in January 2012. He succeeded Håkan Juholt, who resigned a mere 10 months into his term. With a background as a trade unionist, Löfven had not held a political position previously, but Socialdemokraterna executives hoped that his non-alignment to any of the two factions within the party, which had been trying to pull the party towards the left or the middle, could help unite the embattled party. In 2014 he led his party to electoral victory and formed a minority government together with Miljöpartiet.

Left Party leader Jonas Sjöstedt

Jonas Sjöstedt was born on 25 December 1964. A former metalworker and union leader, Sjöstedt served as a member of the European Parliament in 1996–2007. He was elected to parliament in 2010 and took over as leader of the left-wing Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) in 2012. Sjöstedt openly declared his party's desire to join in a centre-left alliance with Socialdemokraterna and the MP after the 2014 election, but was shunned by Prime Minister Löfven because of his ambitions to co-operate with centrist parties. Still, the party has maintained a tacit parliamentary alliance with the

ruling coalition, which depends on it to pass budgets. As a consequence it has enjoyed significant influence in policymaking.

Moderate Party leader Ulf Kristersson

Ulf Kristersson was born in Lund, Skåne, and first entered politics as a campaigner in 1985. In 1991, he gained a seat in the unicameral legislature (Riksdag), where he served on various committees, before leaving politics for two years from 2000 after a dispute with then party leader Bo Lundgren. Between 2010 and 2014 he served as Minister of Social Security under Fredrik Reinfeldt, and as Shadow Finance Minister under his predecessor as Moderate Party leader, Anna Kinberg Batra. Following Batra's resignation in August 2017, Kristersson ran for the party leadership and took up the position in October 2017.

Centre Party leader Annie Lööf

Annie Lööf was born on 16 July 1983. She obtained a law degree from Lund University in 2011. In the same year, Lööf became leader of the Centre Party (Centerpartiet) and also head of the industry ministry, replacing Maud Olofsson. Lööf is the youngest ever leader of Centerpartiet, and she has tried to freshen up its image and boost its popularity in the face of general decline. Despite Lööf's high personal popularity, the party's electoral support fell from 6.56% in the 2010 election to 6.1% in 2014 when it lost government power, although its poll ratings had been lower. Lööf has categorically rejected Löfven's calls for centre-left co-operation between Socialdemokraterna, the MP, Centerpartiet, and the Liberals (Folkpartiet: FP).

Sweden Democrats leader Jimmie Åkesson

Jimmie Åkesson was born on 17 May 1979. He was a member of the Moderate Party's (Moderaterna) youth wing before becoming a member of Sweden Democratic Youth Association, the youth wing of the far-right, nationalist Sweden Democrat Party (Sverigedemokraterna: SD), at the age of 15. Åkesson assumed the helm of SD in 2005, defeating former party leader Mikael Jansson in a party election. Åkesson is credited with the party's subsequent populist makeover and shedding of open ties to white supremacist movements, securing the party's first 20 seats in parliament in the 2010 election and its rise to take 12.9% of the vote and 49 seats in the 2014 election. Åkesson took indefinite sick leave owing to burnout in November 2014 and was replaced temporarily by SD's main ideologue, Mattias Karlsson. He gradually returned to the political scene as head of SD in 2015 and has overseen a sustained increase in the party's poll ratings.

Internal Affairs

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2020-01-14

Political Summary

Political summary

Presidential elections	Next contest: N/AP; Last contest: N/AP
Legislative elections	Next contest: September 2022; Last contest: 9 September 2018.
Head of State	CARL XVI GUSTAF (since 9/1/1973)
Crown Princess of Sweden; Duchess of Västergötland	Victoria (since 1 January 1980)
Prime Minister	Stefan Löfven (since 3 October 2014)
Deputy Prime Minister	Isabella Lövin (since 21 January 2019)
Finance	Magdalena Andersson (since 3 October 2014)
Finance	Per Bolund (since 21 January 2019)
Foreign Affairs	Hans Dahlgren (since 21 January 2019)
Foreign Affairs	Anna Hallberg (since 10 September 2019)
Source: IHS and CIRCA People in Power	

2019-12-12

Political Outlook

The minority centre-left government of Stefan Löfven currently governs with the help of two centrist parties, the Centre Party and the Liberal. In exchange for their parliamentary support, the Social Democrat-led government made significant policy concessions including a commitment to lower taxes and weaker employment protection rules.

2019-12-13

Government Stability

Fragmentation of political landscape to threaten government stability

The September 2018 general election produced a hung parliament, with both mainstream blocs securing just above 40% of the vote. The largest gains were made by the far-right Sweden Democrats (SD), who secured just under 18% of the vote. The subsequent deadlock was overcome in January when the ruling coalition comprising the Social Democrats (S) and the Green Party (Miljöpartiet De Gröna) came to an agreement with the centrist Liberals and Centre Party. In exchange for the Liberals' and Centre Party's parliamentary support to form a government, the ruling centre-left coalition has committed itself to a host of tax-lowering and liberalising measures.

One of the principal reasons for the compromise was the objective to preclude SD from power. This agreement heralds a new period in Swedish politics, characterised by the fragmentation of the political landscape, fragile government coalitions and reconfiguration of traditional alliances.

2020-01-14

Party Data

Parliament Summary

Party abbr.	Party name	Seats
Parliament		
S	Social Democrats	101
M	Moderate Party	70
SD	Sweden Democrats	62
C	Centre Party	31
V	Left Party	28
KD	Christian Democrats	23
L	Liberals	19
MP	Green Party	15
Data reflects seat distribution following last election Source: IHS and CIRCA People in Power		

2019-12-13

Opposition Prospects and Programme

Co-operation agreement between the minority government and two centrist parties has weakened the mainstream centre-right opposition

Following an inconclusive general election in September 2018, the Liberals (Liberalerna) and Centre Party (Centerpartiet) reached a co-operation agreement with the ruling centre-left coalition, allowing Prime Minister Stefan Löfven to sit for another term in exchange for a series of policy concessions. The move has effectively put an end to the mainstream centre-right Alliance (Alliansen), which was formed in 2004 and led by the Moderate Party (Moderaterna) throughout most of this period. Moderaterna was opposed to such a deal with the ruling centre-left parties and has instead countenanced the idea of governing with the parliamentary support of the far-right Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna: SD), something which Liberalerna and Centerpartiet vehemently oppose. This will likely reconfigure the opposition, drawing Liberalerna and

Centerpartiet towards the centre while pulling Moderaterna more to the right.

The far-right SD entered parliament in the 2010 election with 5.7% of the vote. It more than doubled this in the September 2014 election, taking 12.9% as the third-largest party in parliament, and in 2018 it won 17.5%, gaining a total of 62 out of 349 parliamentary seats. The mainstream parties have so far refused co-operation with SD on account of its extremist policies, robbing it of the opportunity to become kingmaker in parliament. This will be increasingly more difficult if SD's rise continues unabated. SD's continued ascent is contingent on immigration and the integration of immigrants remaining a key electoral issue. It also stands to capitalise on any further labour displacement, whether through automation or outsourcing. These two drivers will serve as key indicators for the continued success of SD in parliamentary elections.

2019-07-04

Political Parties

Government

Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokraterna)

- **Political stance:** The centre-left Socialdemokraterna was founded in 1889, and pioneered and shaped the Swedish welfare system, which serves as a basis for the party's ideology. The party retains close links to labour unions and, although it is EU friendly, it has taken a strong stance against "social dumping", namely the use of cheap labour from elsewhere in the European Union. Given the electoral challenge presented by the far-right Sweden Democrats party, Socialdemokraterna has sought to tighten immigration rules.
- **Support base:** Socialdemokraterna has traditionally enjoyed strong support from unionised employees, blue-collar workers, the unemployed, and similar working-class groups; it retains strong links to labour unions at present. However, it is also among unionised workers that the party has haemorrhaged the most votes to the far right in recent elections.
- **Recent history:** From 2006 to 2014, Socialdemokraterna, which had dominated Swedish politics for much of the 20th century, spent an unprecedented two full parliamentary terms in opposition, but returned at the helm of a minority government in 2014 and was re-elected in 2018. Support for the party has dwindled from a peak of nearly 50% of the vote in the 1950s and 1960s to just under 30% in 2018, but it remains the largest party in Sweden.
- **Potential future leaders:** In early 2012, the party elected former trade union leader Stefan Löfven as party leader. One of the most popular politicians likely to replace Löfven is Anders Ygeman, who currently serves as minister of energy and digital development.

Green Party (Miljöpartiet de Gröna: MP)

- **Political stance:** The MP is a centrist environmentalist party that favours taxing environmentally harmful economic activities. Owing to its centrist position cutting across the left-right divide, it has supported centre-left and centre-right governments – in particular, it helped the centre-right Alliance (Alliansen) government of 2010–14 isolate the far-right Sweden Democrats in return for a liberal agreement on immigration policy. Increased

concern among the Swedish electorate over climate change issues will probably help buoy support for the party in the long term.

- **Support base:** Most of the MP's support comes from the young, urban, and well-educated demographics. Founded in 1981, the party's electoral record has been steady at between 4.5% and 7.3% of the vote since 1994.
- **Recent history:** In 2014, MP entered government for the first time in a coalition with Socialdemokraterna. The coalition was re-elected in September 2018.
- **Potential future leaders:** The party has a dual leadership of two party representatives – one female and one male – to promote equality. Isabella Lövin and Per Bolund were appointed representatives in May 2016 and May 2019, respectively, and are unlikely to be challenged before the next election.

Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna: SD)

- **Political stance:** SD is a right-wing nationalist, Eurosceptic, and anti-immigrant party with roots in the Swedish white supremacist movements of the 1980s and early 1990s. It advocates drastic cuts to immigration and foreign aid to fund increased public spending in Sweden. It does not follow the traditionally consensus-oriented practice of Swedish politics.
- **Support base:** Geographically, traditional support for SD was concentrated in southern Sweden, from where much of its leadership originates. From there, the party has gradually spread and grown, attracting in particular working-class voters across the country.
- **Recent history:** SD entered parliament for the first time in the 2010 election, winning 5.9% of the vote and 20 seats. In 2014, it more than doubled this support to win 12.9% of the vote and 49 seats, becoming Sweden's third-largest party. In September 2018, it further expanded its share of the vote, winning 17.53% of all votes cast and 62 seats in parliament. The rise has been partly fuelled by SD's ability to portray itself as the only "real" political alternative to the establishment, attracting disaffected voters.
- **Potential future leaders:** Party leader Jimmie Åkesson remains the most popular SD politician currently. One of the prospective replacements when he retires from the position is Björn Söder.

Left Party (Vänsterpartiet)

- **Political stance:** Vänsterpartiet is a socialist and feminist party that opposes privatisation and Sweden joining the EU's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
- **Support base:** The party's support base comprises left-wing supporters, mainly in the northern parts of Sweden. The party was formerly known as the Communist Party (1921–67) and Left-Party-Communists (1967–91), but distanced itself from communist ideology after the fall of the Soviet Union.

- **Recent history:** Jonas Sjöstedt has led Vänsterpartiet since 2012. In the 2018 general election, the party performed better than in previous elections, securing 8% of the vote. Despite this, and similar to the aftermath of the 2014 general election, Vänsterpartiet was excluded from entering government with Socialdemokraterna and MP because of Prime Minister Stefan Löfven's willingness to seek co-operation with the centre. However, the government still relies on Vänsterpartiet's support to pass budgets, giving the party a high level of influence.
- Potential future leaders:

Moderate Party (Moderaterna)

- **Political stance:** Moderaterna is Sweden's main centre-right party, committed to reducing taxation and state involvement in the economy. Its former leader and prime minister in 2006–14, Fredrik Reinfeldt, spearheaded a series of reforms that sought to increase private-sector participation in domains traditionally dominated by the state, notably healthcare.
- **Support base:** Moderaterna's main support base is among the country's white-collar workers and business owners, especially in capital Stockholm.
- **Recent history:** In September 2018, the Moderaterna-led alliance once again lost the election to the centre-left coalition. Disagreements within the mainstream centre-right have caused a split between Moderaterna, which is more open to ad hoc collaboration with SD, and its centrist coalition partners, which preferred to underpin a centre-left government over any co-operation with SD.
- **Potential future leaders:** In October 2017, Anna Kinberg Batra, the first female party leader who herself succeeded Reinfeldt in 2015, stepped down because she was unpopular with her party. She was replaced by Ulf Kristersson, who is likely to remain party leader until at least after the next general election. A potential replacement is Tobias Billström, Moderaterna's parliamentary group leader.

2018-10-10

Historical Context

Executive power in Sweden was historically shared between the king and a noble Privy Council until 1680; this institutional arrangement was interrupted by the king's growing autocratic rule. Modern institutional origins can be traced back to the death of the warrior king Karl XII in 1718, and Sweden's defeat in the Great Northern War, which saw the introduction of a parliamentary system. It was followed by a constitutional monarchy in 1772, 1789, and 1809. In 1866 Sweden became a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral parliament. The first Social Democrats entered the government in 1917. Universal suffrage was introduced for men in 1909 and for women in 1921. The latter year also marked the final breakthrough of the principle of parliamentary government. Plans for a welfare state were laid in the 1930s after the Social Democrats had become the governing party. Sweden joined the European Union (EU) in 1995, but the country's entry into the Eurozone remains beyond sight. Sweden is known for its neutrality, but deploys forces

overseas.

Historical context

Date	Event
1866	Sweden became a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral parliament.
1917	The first Social Democrats entered the government.
1909	Universal suffrage was introduced for men.
1921	Universal suffrage was introduced for women.
1971	Unicameral parliament was introduced (Riksdag), abolishing the second chamber.
1975	Last constitutional powers of monarch removed.
1986	Prime Minister Olof Palme assassinated (28 February).
1995	Sweden entered the European Union (EU).
2003	Foreign minister Anna Lindh was stabbed to death in a Stockholm department store (September). More than 50% of voters rejected Sweden's adoption of the euro in a referendum (September).
2006	The New Moderate Party, led by Fredrik Reinfeldt, and its three coalition partners defeated the Social Democratic Party and its partners in the general election with a seven-seat majority (September).
2010	The Moderate Party-led Alliance coalition secured the historic second victory in the general election (September). The far-right Sweden Democrats entered parliament (September).
2012	Trade union head Stefan Löfven took over leadership of the opposition Social Democrats from Håkan Juholt, who had only been in charge for 10 months (January).
2013	Riots erupted in Stockholm's suburbs (May).
2014	The Social Democratic Party won the general election and formed a minority government with the Green Party, excluding the Left Party in an attempt to entice centrist parties to collaborate (September). The Sweden Democrats secured 12.9%, consolidating its place as Sweden's third-largest party (September).

2018-09-19

Major Pressure Groups

The Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landstingsorganisationen i Sverige: LO)

Trade unions are the most obvious extra-parliamentary interest group in Sweden, and their power is well recognised by all parties. Union membership among employees between the ages of 16 and 64 has been hovering at 80 to 85% since 1980. The Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landstingsorganisationen i Sverige: LO) is the main umbrella organisation that unites 14 different national trade unions encompassing a wide range of sectors. The confederation boasts a membership of 1.5 million workers. In the last few years, the strength of LO has diminished somewhat because of legislation enacted by the previous centre-right administration, notably raising the fees for union unemployment funds. This decreased the number of blue-collar workers by 10% between 2006 and 2012. The trend has continued even after the victory of the centre-left government coalition in 2014, suggesting a broader structural trend linked to decreasing number of blue-collar workplaces relative to service sector jobs.

The Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (Svenskt Näringsliv: SN)

The Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (Svenskt Näringsliv: SN) is Sweden's main employer's organisation. The organisation represents 60,000 companies divided in different member associations. SN consistently lobbies in favour of business interests. It advocates lowering taxes on property and inheritance, and increasing the role of the private sector in healthcare and education, which have traditionally been the remit of the public sector. SN finances the libertarian, right-wing think-tank Timbro, which has historically played a significant role in shaping economic ideas in the country.

2018-10-10

Executive

King Carl XVI Gustaf of Sweden is the official head of state, but the monarch's role is primarily symbolic and ceremonial. He or she has no executive powers and cannot make unsupervised political statements, although the monarch is regularly kept informed of national affairs and chairs the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs.

Executive power is exercised by the government (Regeringen), which comprises a prime minister appointed by parliament and a cabinet of ministers who run the government departments. Collectively, they are responsible to parliament. The party of the coalition with the majority of seats in parliament forms the government. The prime minister is first appointed by the speaker of parliament and then confirmed by parliament. The monarch plays no part in this process. The prime minister appoints all the ministers without any confirmation from the parliament; however, parliament does have the power to dismiss them.

2018-10-10

Legislature

The unicameral parliament (Riksdag) has 349 members who are elected by proportional representation for a four-year term. Some 310 constituencies vote directly, and the remaining 39 seats are apportioned according to the percentage of the votes cast nationally. The threshold required for a party to enter parliament is 4%. Suffrage is universal for Swedish citizens aged 18 or over, while non-Swedish citizens are eligible to vote in municipal and county council elections after three years of legal residence but may not vote in national elections or referenda. Either the cabinet or members of parliament may initiate legislation. The Riksdag can alter the constitution, but only after obtaining majority votes and receiving confirmation after the following general election.

2018-10-10

Judiciary

The Swedish justice system is divided into general courts consisting of 95 district courts, six courts of appeal, and the Supreme Court; general administrative courts consisting of 23 county administrative courts, four administrative courts of appeal, and the Supreme Administrative Court; and a number of courts of special jurisdiction, for example the Labour Court and the Work Environment Court. Sweden has no constitutional court, although legal arguments referring to the constitution have become more commonplace. General courts handle criminal cases and civil law disputes between individuals, including those relating to divorce proceedings. The Supreme Court, which is the highest court for the general courts, consists of at least 16 judges known as justices of the Supreme Court. The general administrative courts deal primarily with cases between a private individual and public authorities. At the head of this section is the Supreme Administrative Court, which is currently made up of 17 justices of the Supreme Administrative Court, at least two-thirds of whom must be legally trained. Permanent judges throughout the system are appointed for life by the government. Swedish courts do not use the jury system. Instead, the municipal council, on recommendations from political parties, appoints "nämndemän" (lay judges). The system has received criticism for significant bias due to the influence of political parties in determining the makeup of the pool of lay judges. The party's influence in particular jurisdictions is proportionate to its representation in individual municipalities, with the far-right Sweden Democrat Party enjoying considerable influence in many jurisdictions. A study from the School of Business, Economics and Law at the University of Gothenburg showed that convictions of people with distinctly Arabic sounding names increased significantly when a Sweden Democrat appointee was assigned as lay judge.

2018-10-10

Regional and Local Institutions

At the local level, there are 21 county councils (län), which administer public health and medical services, and 289 municipalities (kommuner), which operate schools and administer housing services. The capital, Stockholm, is the seat of the monarch, parliament, and government. Local elections are held in tandem with national elections.

External Affairs

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2019-12-13

Outlook

Sweden continues to seek closer defence co-operation with the US and NATO in light of growing tensions in the Baltic Sea region with Russia. Sweden's vulnerability stems from the strategic location of Gotland, Sweden's largest island, which would likely be targeted by the Russian military in the event of a conflict between Russia and NATO.

2018-09-12

Bilateral: Europe and CIS

Relations with Finland

Helsinki and Stockholm enjoy close relations that have strengthened in recent years. The two countries share similar value systems and interests at the domestic and international levels. Both are

unaligned, successful welfare states that rely on high-technology markets. Trade ties are strong and Swedish commercial law applies in Finland. A previous dispute over Stockholm's territorial claim to the Swedish-populated, Finnish-controlled Åland Islands has been defused by giving the islanders independent membership at the Nordic Council. On 1 April 2000, Finnish was finally accorded official minority language status in Sweden. In Finland, Swedish has always been an official language. Bilateral meetings at a high political level are regular and ties between civil society organisations in both countries are strong.

Stockholm and Helsinki largely share common aims in the Baltic and the EU, and co-operation between the two takes place on multiple levels, including security and defence. The two countries' foreign and security policies are similar, and they are likely to stick together regarding deeper co-operation and potential membership of NATO. Sweden and Finland continue to collaborate to influence and shape the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Although they are committed to the EU's work in these areas, Sweden and Finland are concerned that the EU would develop into a military bloc similar to NATO, which could result in an end to both countries' neutrality. They would prefer the EU to develop its capabilities to prevent, rather than fight, conflicts through peacekeeping, development aid, and diplomacy.

Following increased tensions in the Baltic Sea region, due to Russian activities in Ukraine, Finland and Sweden have increased their defence co-operation. Procurement co-operation within NORDEFCO has increased and in July 2018 the two countries' defence ministers signed a new memorandum of understanding on security co-operation. However, as Stockholm and Helsinki remain wary of provoking Russia, the new agreement did not include a mutual defence clause.

Relations with Norway

After Norway gained independence from Sweden in 1905 both countries pursued a policy of neutrality until 1940, but different experiences during the Second World War led Norway and Sweden to adopt different security arrangements. Norway became a founding member of NATO while Sweden remained neutral. Swedish neutrality (together with Finland's Friendship agreement with the Soviet Union at the time) allowed Norway and Denmark to oppose nuclear arms and foreign troops on their soil in times of peace. The end of the Cold War has allowed the Nordic countries to engage in military co-operation within joint peacekeeping battalions and to consider joint procurement of hardware such as the joint programme to purchase helicopters between Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. More recently, Norwegian and Swedish co-operation has increased in the defence and military realm.

Following years of negotiations, Norway and the EU agreed in March 2004 to revise customs duties on Swedish-processed agricultural products. This helped boost bilateral trade, enabling Norway to become Sweden's main trading partner outside the EU, buying USD14 billion of Swedish exports in 2016. Commercial collaboration between Norway and Sweden is considerable and joint ventures are common. Migration flows also demonstrate interaction; Swedes were the third-largest immigrant group in Norway as of 2017, behind Poles and Lithuanians. Although Sweden's Norwegian migrant community is slightly more numerous (approximately 42,000 rather than 36,000), it constituted only the 12th-largest such migrant group in Sweden in 2017.

2018-09-12

Multilateral: Global Organisations

Relations with the European Union

Following a referendum vote of 52.3% in favour to 46.8% against, Sweden joined the EU on 1 January 1995. However, its relations with the union have, at times, appeared somewhat confused. On the one hand, the country fears being left at the periphery of Europe and has accordingly sought to encourage EU enlargement and reform. Such measures have included enhancing individual and state security within the EU and facilitating co-operation in common security areas, such as organised crime, human trafficking, and environmental problems. On the other hand, Sweden remains wary of attempts to tighten economic and especially military integration within the EU, for fear of jeopardising its traditionally neutral status and eroding its national sovereignty. Such proposals are viewed by a predominantly eurosceptic public in Sweden as steps towards the creation of a European state. Sweden's scepticism towards increased EU influence into other sectors of society was also illustrated by the results of the 2003 referendum that rejected the introduction of the euro by 55% to 42%. A major division remains between the Swedish government and the EU over the handling of the refugee crisis, with Sweden advocating a quota system that would ensure a fairer distribution of the burden of accommodating refugees among member states. Sweden's comparative openness to migration in recent years has contributed to the rise in the far-right, and eurosceptic, Sweden Democrats party. Although the party achieved its highest number of votes at elections in September 2018, it will likely remain outside any governing coalition. Therefore, it appears it will exert only indirect influence over the direction of Sweden's EU policy.

Relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Sweden has agreed not to join NATO, but is a keen participant in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. The role of NATO in Swedish foreign policy has increased since the early 1990s. The rethinking of NATO strategies led to a focus on seeking dialogue and co-operation with Eastern European countries and manifested itself in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the PfP, which have now been reconstructed in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). For Sweden this development threatened to marginalise it from its traditional role as a bridge-builder between the East and West. More recently, the increasing military assertiveness of Russia in its near abroad has driven a rise in public support for NATO membership in Sweden. Although parties on the centre-right now support the idea of NATO membership, it is unlikely to materialise unless concrete steps are also taken in neighbouring Finland.

The rapid reconciliation from Swedish non-alignment to its active participation in peacekeeping operations led by NATO, for example the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and the Kosovo Force (KFOR), reflects the country's desire to maintain a high international profile as a contributor to world and regional peace. Three key aspects related to operating with NATO have affected Sweden's foreign policy: defence alliance obligations, crisis management, and the creation of international stability. Although the first is excluded on grounds of non-alignment, Sweden actively pursues a role in the other two. In this respect, Sweden and Finland were the principal drivers behind the EU's acceptance at the 1997 Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of the Petersberg Tasks that, among other things, preserve the

right of non-aligned countries to participate in Western European peacekeeping activities.

2018-09-12

Multilateral: Regional Organisations

Relations with the Nordic Council

Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden formed the Nordic Council in 1952. Finland joined the council in 1955 following negotiations with Moscow, which still maintained leverage over Finnish politics because of the 1948 Finnish-Soviet Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Nordic prime ministers agreed to meet before European Council meetings to discuss and potentially co-ordinate policies in an effort to exert greater influence over the direction of EU proceedings. Sub-regional blocs are not allowed within the EU framework. Rather, the meetings of the council are intended to make the Nordic EU states more aware of each other's positions before these major EU meetings. The utility of this approach is limited by the fact that the Nordic member states appear to have contradictory approaches to the EU, while Norway is not even a member. Furthermore, while Sweden and Denmark remain outside the Eurozone, the Finns are members and keen to place themselves at the core of all EU developments.

Geography

Date Posted: 01-Oct-2018

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UPDATED

2018-10-01

Data

Geography: Sweden

Location	Northern Europe
	Bordering the Baltic Sea
	Gulf of Bothnia
	Kattegat and Skagerrak
	Between Finland and Norway
Total area (sq km)	450,295
Land area (sq km)	410,335
Water area (sq km)	39,960
Land boundaries (km)	2,211
Coastline (km)	3,218
Total renewable water resources (cu km)	NA
Water supply and sanitation access (% of population)	92
Border countries and border length (km)	

Finland	545 km
Norway	1,666
Highest point	
Location	Kebnekaise
Height (m)	2,111
Land use - agricultural	
Arable land	6.4%
Permanent crops	0.0%
Permanent pasture	1.1%
Terrain	Mostly flat or gently rolling lowlands; mountains in west.
Natural resources	Iron ore, copper, lead, zinc, gold, silver, tungsten, uranium, arsenic, feldspar, timber, hydropower.
Climate	Temperate in south with cold, cloudy winters and cool, partly cloudy summers; subarctic in north.
Natural disasters	Ice floes in the surrounding waters, especially in the Gulf of Bothnia, can interfere with maritime traffic.
Environmental issues	Marine pollution (Baltic Sea and North Sea); acid rain damage to soils and lakes.
Environment – international agreements	<p>Party to: Air Pollution, Air Pollution-Nitrogen Oxides, Air Pollution-Persistent Organic Pollutants, Air Pollution-Sulfur 85, Air Pollution-Sulfur 94, Air Pollution-Volatile Organic Compounds, Antarctic-Environmental Protocol, Antarctic-Marine Living Resources, Antarctic Treaty, Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Tropical Timber 83, Tropical Timber 94, Wetlands, Whaling</p> <p>Signed, but not ratified: none of the selected agreements.</p>
Source: IHS Markit, CIA World Factbook, World Bank	

NATURAL RESOURCES

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UPDATED

Contents

Overview

Oil

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Mineral deposits

Power generation

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Land use

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Water supply

Overview

Sweden is the third-largest country in Western Europe, but its northerly position implies that as much as half of the country suffers from extremely harsh winters. Much of the northern half of the country's access to the sea is restricted during winters because of ice floes. Sweden's main natural resource is, nevertheless, its large tracts of fertile soil suitable for farming and extensive forests, covering some two-thirds of the country's area. Forestry and associated processing in particular is a major industry. In addition, there are sizeable deposits of high-grade iron ore and other minerals. The country possesses an estimated 15% of the world's uranium reserves, as well as sources of waterpower. Moreover, large freshwater lakes have enabled Sweden to exploit and develop significant hydroelectricity generation capacity.

Oil

Sweden's only oil is extracted from the reserves of alum shale located in the south of the country. The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) places production of oil in Sweden at 11,000

barrels per day (b/d) in 2011. Sweden exports few petroleum products and imports oil primarily from non-OPEC countries. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), in 2011 Sweden imported nearly 18.8 million tonnes (Mt) of crude oil, or an average of roughly 380,000 b/d, primarily from Russia (50%), Norway (20%), and Denmark (15%). Additionally, Sweden imported some 0.5 Mt of feedstock in 2011. Russia's share in Sweden's total crude imports has risen significantly in the past decade, having represented less than 10% of total crude imports in 2000.

Natural gas

Sweden does not have any reserves of natural gas and is forced to import the majority of its gas requirements. All of Sweden's natural gas requirements are imported from Denmark. The IEA notes domestic gas consumption in Sweden at 1.3 billion m³ in 2011, compared with more than 1.5 m³ in 2010.

The International Energy Agency notes that Sweden does have biogas production, primarily coming from sewage plants in the Stockholm area. The IEA also notes that while biogas production is relatively small, sources in Swedish industry believe it can be increase to more than 10 times this level.

Mineral deposits

Iron ore, copper, and a variety of sulphide ores, including sulphur, zinc, lead, and arsenic, are all mined in Sweden. The most important iron ore deposits are found in the northern district of Kiruna-Malmberget, which is also home to Sweden's largest copper mine, Aitik. Sulphide ore deposits are located in the Skellefteå district and the mountainous region along the Norwegian border. Larger deposits of alum shale, containing oil and uranium, are located in the south of the country. Sweden's small deposits of lead and zinc ore are barely sufficient to cover domestic demand.

Power generation

Energy mix

The domestic production of energy has not changed much since the 1990s, and the nation depends essentially on hydropower and nuclear power for all its electrical power supply. Sweden has had a somewhat ambivalent position towards nuclear power, deciding to move towards phasing out nuclear power following accidents at Three Mile Island (1979) and Chernobyl (1986), before moving back towards nuclear power from 2009. Part of this reversion has been due to the perception that more environmentally friendly nuclear alternatives would be unable to take over nuclear's dominant role in electricity generation and that importing power from abroad would likely mean buying from Denmark and Polish suppliers using polluting coal power. Ironically, the environmental consequences of this have led to a certain reappraisal of the virtues of nuclear power, and the debate over the issue has become fierce. At the same time, Sweden has been pushing for the development of its renewable energy potential, particularly an expansion in wind power.

A 1980 referendum on nuclear power saw Sweden move to phase out nuclear power in the long-term while keeping existing plants running as long as they were economical. Ukraine's Chernobyl disaster, which severely affected Sweden and global confidence in nuclear safety, was followed by

accelerated efforts to phase out nuclear power in Sweden by 2010. While Swedish industry lobbied for, and was granted, a brief postponement, the first reactor at Barsebäck nuclear power plant was closed down in 1998, costing the state USD928.4 million paid out in compensation to the owners. The second reactor in Barsebäck was closed in May 2005 to the delight of many Danes, as the plant was approximately 30 km from Copenhagen. Despite the renewed nuclear safety debate following a power outage in Reactor 1 at Forsmark nuclear power plant in July 2006—an incident that forced the reactor to temporarily shut down—Sweden's policy of phasing out nuclear power stations effectively ended in 2009 when the parliament passed a bill providing for the replacement of existing nuclear reactors. According to the IAEA, in 2011 Sweden had 10 operational nuclear power reactors, providing 39.62% share of electricity production, with three nuclear power reactors in permanent shutdown.

A total of 47% of the nation's energy supply is provided by renewable energy sources, mainly hydropower and bioenergy, with the latter accounting for 29% of final energy consumption. In 2008 Sweden had approximately 1,100 wind generators, compared with Denmark's 3,000, although Sweden has been investing strongly in this sector since. Wind-generated electricity constituted 1% of Sweden's total electricity production in 2007 and had increased to 4.5% in 2011-12. In 2008 wind power supplied 1,984 GWh, while total turbine capacity had risen to 2,935 GWh by June 2012. The government's goal is to increase capacity to 30 TWh of wind power by 2020.

Land use

Sweden's most abundant raw material is timber. It plays an important role in the Swedish economy, accounting for 10% of all employment in the industrial sector. Data from 2005 indicates that of the 41 million ha of land area in Sweden, 22.7 million ha consists of forests (55.36%). In 2007 production within the forestry industry was 18.6 million m³ of sawn wood products, the majority of which came from coniferous trees. Of this, 11.3 million m³ was exported, a reduction of 14% from the previous year. Sawn wood products are exported mainly to the Denmark, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In 2007 Sweden also produced 12.4 million tonnes of paper wood pulp and 11.9 million tonnes of paper. Total Swedish exports in the forestry industry for 2007 amounted to SEK128 billion (USD21.3 billion), which constitutes 10.8% of the country's total exports for the year.

Food supply

Sweden has few problems with food supply, and according to the FAO it produces 80% of its total supply of food and beverages. However, the import figure reaches 70% for fresh fruit and vegetables. Fish, meat, and potatoes are staples of the Swedish diet.

Water supply

The majority of the Swedish population has access to treated, piped water. In the north of the country, water pipes are specially insulated to withstand the region's extreme temperatures.

Demography

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UPDATED

2020-01-07

Demographic Data

Demography: Sweden

Population (mil.)	10.04
Population growth rate (%)	0.80
Life expectancy at birth (years)	Male - 80.3, Female - 84.3
Population density	22.12 per sq km
Urbanisation (% of total population)	87.7
Health spending as % GDP	11.9
No. doctors/1,000 people	4.19
Internet users (% of population)	91.5
Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people)	126
Adult literacy rate (% ages 15+)	Male : 99 Female : 99
Major urban areas - population	
Stockhom (capital)	1.608 mil.
Ethnic groups (by % population)	
Swedish	80.9
Syrian	1.8
Finnish	1.4

Iraqi	1.4
Other	14.5
Religions (by % population)	
Church of Sweden (Lutheran)	60.2
None or Unspecified	31.3
Other (includes Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Baptist, Muslim, Jewish, and Buddhist)	8.5
Languages (by % population)	
Swedish (official)	NA
Source: IHS Markit consumer markets, CIA World Factbook, World Health Organization	

Infrastructure

Date Posted: 01-Apr-2019

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UPDATED

2019-04-01

Overview

Infrastructure: Sweden

Roads	
Total road network length (km)	573,134
Paved (km)	140,100
Unpaved (km)	433,034
Railways	
Total rail network length (km)	14,127
Standard gauge (mm)	1,435
Waterways	
Navigable waterways length (km)	2,052
Airports	
Number of commercial airports	15
Ports	

Number of ports	94
Name of all ports	Kapellskar, Iggesund, Karlsborg, Borgholm, Brofjorden, Degerhamn, Enköping, Hallstavik, Åhus, Åla, Falkenberg, Gävle, Lomma, Gothenburg, Halmstad, Nynashamn, Hargshamn, Harnosand, Simrishamn, Helsingborg, Höganas, Skoghall, Skutskar, Slite, Hudiksvall, Solvesborg, Kalmar, Karlshamn, Storugns, Strängnäs, Karlskrona, Trollhatte Canal, Karlstad, Karskar, Valdemarsvik, Klintehamn, Västervik, Koping, Kristinehamn, Landskrona, Lidköping, Limhamn, Luleå, Lysekil, Norrköping, Norrsundet, Nyköping, Ornskoldsvik, Oskarshamn, Otterbacken, Oxelosund, Piteå, Ronehamn, Ronneby, Skellefteå, Skredsvik, Södertälje, Stenungsund, Stockholm, Strömstad, Söderhamn, Sundsvall, Trelleborg, Uddevalla, Umeå, Vallvik, Vanersborg, Varberg, Västerås, Visby, Wallhamn, Ystad, Malmö, Kalix, Donso, Varöbacka, Lönnebo, Bohus, Elleholm, Grisslehamn, Rundvik, Norrtälje, Stora Vika, Munksund, Nö, Grums, Åmal, Balsta, Surte, Jätterson, Backviken, Kungshamn, Barsebäcksværket, Flivik.
Communications	
Telephones: Fixed lines (mil.)	2.205
Subscriptions per 100 inhabitants	47
Telephones: Mobile cellular (mil.)	14.641
Subscriptions per 100 inhabitants	147
Telephones: International country code	46
Internet country code	.se
Broadband subscribers (mil.)	4.142

Subscriptions per 100 inhabitants	88
Internet users per cent of population (%)	96.41%
Source: IHS Markit, International Telecommunications Union, CIA World Factbook	

Economy

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UPDATED

Contents

Economic Outlook

Data

Data

2020-01-14

Economic Outlook

- Following several years of strong growth, the Swedish economy is facing severe headwinds, with net exports struggling to offset flat domestic demand. We expect growth of 1.2% in 2019 and 1.0% in 2020, with risks tilted to the downside.
- Despite the weak economic outlook and persistence of downside risks, the Riksbank hiked the policy rate in December, while continuing its quantitative easing program. Looking ahead, the policy rate is expected to be unchanged for an extended period.
- The labor market has weakened and in November, the unemployment rate surpassed 7%. However, there are lingering issues with data quality.
- The government is in a strong position to support the economy, having run fiscal surpluses since 2015 and with public debt at just 38% of GDP. However, a meaningful fiscal stimulus for 2020 has not been budgeted.

2019-10-30

Data

Sweden: Top-10 sectors ranked by value added

	2018 level	% change	% GDP
	(Billion USD)	(2019, real)	(Nominal)

1. Human health and social work activities(Q)	53.5	-0.2	10.8
2. Real estate activities(L)	40.5	2.2	8.2
3. Public admin & defense, other services (O,S,T,U)	31.9	0.9	6.5
4. Construction(F)	29.2	1.2	5.9
5. Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles(G46)	28.2	1.8	5.7
6. Education(P)	27.3	3.4	5.5
7. IT & information services (J62,J63)	19.9	4.0	4.0
8. Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles(G47)	18.5	1.5	3.8
9. Security, buildings, employment (N78,N80,N81,N82)	15.0	1.8	3.0
10. Legal, accounting, consultancy (M69,M70)	14.3	2.0	2.9
Top-10 Total	278.2		56.4
Updated: 28 October 2019			
Source: Comparative Industry Service, IHS Markit			

2019-10-29

Data

Sweden: Major Trading Partners, 2018

EXPORTS			IMPORTS		
Country	Billion USD	Share (%)	Country	Billion USD	Share (%)
Germany	18.1	10.9	Germany	30.6	18.0
Norway	17.5	10.5	Netherlands	16.0	9.4
Denmark	11.6	7.0	Norway	14.1	8.3
Finland	11.6	7.0	Denmark	11.9	7.0

United States	11.3	6.8	China	8.9	5.2
Netherlands	9.7	5.8	United Kingdom	8.4	4.9
United Kingdom	9.4	5.7	Finland	8.0	4.7
China	7.7	4.7	Poland	6.9	4.1
France	7.2	4.4	Belgium	6.9	4.0
Belgium	6.7	4.0	France	6.3	3.7
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade					

Sweden: Major Trading Partners, 2010

EXPORTS			IMPORTS		
Country	Billion USD	Share (%)	Country	Billion USD	Share (%)
Norway	15.8	10.0	Germany	26.8	18.0
Germany	15.7	9.9	Norway	13.0	8.7
United Kingdom	11.7	7.4	Denmark	12.3	8.3
United States	11.6	7.3	Netherlands	9.2	6.2
Denmark	10.4	6.6	United Kingdom	8.3	5.6
Finland	9.8	6.2	Finland	7.8	5.3
Netherlands	7.8	4.9	China	7.4	5.0
France	7.7	4.9	Russia	7.2	4.8
Belgium	6.4	4.1	France	6.8	4.6
China	4.9	3.1	Belgium	5.7	3.8
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade					

Sweden: Major Trading Partners, 2000

EXPORTS			IMPORTS		
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Country	Billion USD	Share (%)	Country	Billion USD	Share (%)
Germany	9.3	5.6	Germany	11.7	16.2
United States	8.2	5.0	United Kingdom	6.3	8.7
United Kingdom	8.0	4.8	Norway	5.8	8.0
Norway	6.5	3.9	United States	5.1	7.0
Denmark	4.7	2.8	Denmark	4.9	6.7
France	4.5	2.7	Netherlands	4.7	6.5
Finland	4.4	2.7	France	4.0	5.5
Netherlands	4.2	2.6	Finland	3.7	5.1
Belgium	3.6	2.2	Japan	2.5	3.5
Italy	3.3	2.0	Belgium	2.5	3.4
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade					

Sweden: Major Trading Partners, 1990

EXPORTS			IMPORTS		
Country	Billion USD	Share (%)	Country	Billion USD	Share (%)
Germany	8.1	4.9	Germany	10.6	21.5
United Kingdom	5.7	3.4	United States	4.6	9.4
United States	5.1	3.1	United Kingdom	4.4	8.8
Norway	4.8	2.9	Norway	4.1	8.3
Finland	3.9	2.3	Finland	3.7	7.4
France	3.0	1.8	Japan	2.8	5.6
Netherlands	3.0	1.8	France	2.7	5.4
Italy	2.7	1.6	Italy	2.2	4.5

Spain	1.4	0.9	Netherlands	2.2	4.5
Switzerland	1.3	0.8	Switzerland	1.0	2.1
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade					

Sweden: Top-12 Commodities

Exports					Imports			
		Shar e of	2019	2018		Shar e of	2019	2018
		2018 (%)	(Mil. USD)	(Mil. USD)		2018 (%)	(Mil. USD)	(Mil. USD)
1.	Motor vehicles	11.8	18,903	19,128	Oil & gas mining	6.6	10,329	10,835
2.	Paper & pulp	8.0	12,853	12,942	Motor vehicles	6.4	10,164	10,481
3.	Parts and accessories	7.2	11,428	11,700	Parts and accessories	5.8	9,307	9,436
4.	Refined petroleum products	6.9	10,376	11,175	Iron & steel	5.1	8,559	8,291
5.	Iron & steel	6.2	9,761	9,941	Food Products	5.2	8,176	8,489
6.	Pharma: drugs & medicines	4.9	7,738	7,894	Refined petroleum products	4.6	7,172	7,577
7.	Agriculture	4.8	7,330	7,725	Transmitters , routers, telephony	4.4	6,770	7,147
8.	Nonferrous metals	3.5	5,434	5,610	Computers & related equipment	3.3	5,920	5,394
9.	Lifting & handling	2.9	4,820	4,765	Agriculture	3.3	5,199	5,411

10	Food Products	2.7	4,080	4,288	Wearing apparel	3.1	4,882	5,087
11	Transmitters, routers, telephony	2.5	4,017	4,108	Pharma: drugs & medicines	2.6	4,300	4,346
12	Mining of metals & stone	2.2	3,499	3,518	Nonferrous metals	2.5	4,095	4,068
Top-12 total		63.6				52.8		
All commodities		100.0	159,261	161,588		100.0	161,062	164,069
Last updated: 28 October 2019								
Source: Comparative Industry Service, IHS Markit								

Non-state Armed Groups

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UPDATED

Group Profiles

Sweden has no major organised non-state armed groups.

DEFENCE BUDGET OVERVIEW

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UPDATED

SUMMARY - DEFENCE BUDGET AND MANPOWER

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Defence Budget - Constant 2019 USD billion	6.011	6.073	6.303	6.864	7.267	7.819	8.399	8.637
Defence Budget - Constant 2019 LCU billion	52.601	53.146	55.159	60.067	63.592	68.422	73.504	75.581
Total Regular Forces	14,795	14,795	14,795	14,795	14,795	14,795	14,795	14,795
Budget per Manpower (Constant 2019 USD)	406,277	410,482	426,032	463,939	491,164	528,473	567,724	583,766
% GDP	1.124%	1.108%	1.125%	1.200%	1.248%	1.320%	1.394%	1.411%

DEFENCE BUDGET TRENDS

Financial Crisis Fallout

Between 2005 and 2007, the Swedish defence budget was holding steady at USD6.5-6.6 billion however the financial crisis led to steep cuts in 2008 and 2009 of 7.5% and 2.1% respectively (10.6% and 4.4% in real terms). Despite a mild recovery in 2010, the 2011 budget was again cut and spending fell to just 1.2% of GDP compared to 1.5% in 2005.

The 2012 budget stated that from 2013 the planned SEK700 million in freed-up financial resources resulting from savings in the wider budget would be spent in line with the Defence Structure

Survey (FSU) proposal to increase availability of deployable war units. However, it would appear that funding for international operations declined between 2012 and 2014 with any extra funding channelled into unit activities and preparedness.

The 2014 budget allocated SEK47.2 billion for defence and contingency funding which was a 2% real increase over the 2013 allocation but still USD700 million lower than 2007 levels in real terms. Following the 2014 budget release, then Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces Sverker Göranson warned that budget shortfalls may force the military to scale back acquisition plans and disband units.

The Swedish government made revisions to the 2014 budget on 22 April 2014 and announced proposals to implement incremental increases to the defence budget in order to strengthen core capabilities. According to these proposals, allocations to defence in 2024 would be SEK5.5 billion higher than previous estimates. The proposed increase was to be split between investment in new equipment and boosting training and the operational availability of units. It was to be paid for by making savings in other areas of government, reducing spending on international peace operations, environmental and nuclear safety cooperation with Russia, defence R&D and increasing fines for late payment of taxes. As a result of these initiatives, final 2014 defence spending came to SEK47.98 billion marking a significant increase over 2013 spending levels.

Heightened Security Concerns

Sweden's then coalition government revealed its 2015 budget proposal on 23 October 2014 which included an allocation of SEK48.6 billion for military and emergency investment. Swedish Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist stated at the time that Sweden's security situation has changed. "The Russian annexation of the Crimea, the armed conflict in Ukraine, increased exercise and intelligence operations in the Baltic Sea region, an increasingly intrusive behaviour, and now Defence Forces intelligence operation in the Stockholm archipelago shows the necessity of Sweden has a functioning and effective response organization." Consequently, Hultqvist stated that funding for operations, preparedness and materiel procurement should strengthen in the near term. The 2016 Budget confirmed that final spending for 2015 was actually SEK48.3 billion.

The 2016-2020 Swedish Defence Policy - released June 2015 - stated that over the 2016-2020 period, an extra SEK17 billion would be added to the budget of the Armed Forces when compared with the previous 2011-2015 period. Indeed, the draft 2016 budget, Spring Fiscal Policy Bill and 2017 budget outlined a more aggressive defence budget projection than previously announced, with spending coming to SEK56 billion by 2020.

Hultqvist announced in March 2017 that the 2017 budget would receive an in-year SEK500 million boost which would benefit cyber defence, defence planning and ground vehicles. The 2017 Spring Fiscal Policy Bill, released April 2017, confirmed the SEK 500 million boost for defence in 2017 as part of a SEK3.1 billion package of measures intended to strengthen security, welfare and climate action. Upon confirming this funding package, the Swedish government highlighted the 7 April 2017 terror attack and the need to bolster security efforts as a result.

Further to this 2017 boost, the Swedish government agreed in August 2017 to increase total Swedish defence spending (including emergency preparedness) by SEK2.7 billion annually for the years 2018-2020. That was, over and above the 2017 Budget plan. Consequently, the Swedish

defence budget was expected to reach SEK58.63 billion by 2020 or 1.16% of GDP as compared to 1.13% in 2017. The 2018 Draft Budget, submitted 20 September 2017, fell just short of this expectation with 2020 spending projected to reach SEK58.1 billion by 2020 however the SEK53.8 billion defence budget for 2018 is still a 6% increase over 2017 levels.

The 2018 Spring Policy Bill was more pessimistic about final 2018 defence spending levels but outlined a more positive profile for defence out to 2021. The defence budget was projected to reach SEK59.2 billion by 2021 which presented a remarkable nominal rate of growth in defence spending of 4% annually over the 2017-2021 period compared to 1.3% over the 2011-2016 period.

2020 Budget and Outlook

The 2019 draft budget was delayed following the inconclusive result of the September 2018 election. The 2019 continuity budget was published by Stefan Löfven's caretaker government on 15 November 2018 and was largely in line with the 2018 Spring Fiscal Policy Bill but with a slightly lower allocation for 2019, 2020 and 2021. According to the caretaker budget, 2019 defence funding would increase by 4.4% (2.3% in real terms) to reach SEK56.19 billion - compared to SEK56.28 billion in the Spring bill.

In December 2018, the Swedish parliament approved a stronger increase for the 2019 budget, with funding for defence reaching SEK60.07 billion. This represented a 12% increase (9% in real terms) over 2018 levels and accounts for 1.2% of GDP compared to 1.12% in 2018.

After almost four months of negotiations following the September 2018 election, Stefan Löfven managed to gain enough support in Parliament to be re-elected as prime minister on 18 January 2019. Löfven relies on the support of the Greens, Center Party and Liberals. As such, increases for defence were initially thought to be tempered as indicated by the muted projections in the 2019 draft budget. However the 2019 Spring Fiscal Policy Bill, published April 2019, built upon the 2019 increase already approved and requested further, albeit less substantial, increases for defence spending between 2020 and 2022. According to the Bill, the defence budget will increase by 8%, 9% and 2% in 2020, 2021 and 2022 respectively to reach SEK71.7 billion by 2022 - equivalent to 1.3% of GDP.

In May 2019, the Swedish Defence Commission published a white book entitled "Defensive power - Sweden's Security Policy and the Development of its Military Defence 2021-2025". The report recommended building on the increases already approved for Swedish defence spending in 2019 with the budget increasing by SEK5 billion annually between 2022-2025. By 2025, the Commission proposed that the budget should reach SEK84 billion annually equivalent to 1.5 percent of GDP.

On 30 August 2019, the Government agreed to increase the 2022 allocation for defence budget SEK5 billion which would be funded through a Bank tax. The 2020 draft budget - released 18 September 2019 - confirmed this increase, allocating SEK76.7 billion to defence for 2022 which is SEK5 billion higher than in the April 2019 fiscal bill. The 2020 budget of SEK64.8 billion is a 8% nominal increase over 2019 levels or 6% in real terms and brings the defence budget up to account for 1.25% of GDP.

The 2020 draft budget went on to propose that funding for defence would then increase by SEK 5 billion annually. This would result in a 2025 defence budget of SEK91.7 billion - far higher than Defence Commission proposal of SEK84 billion. JDB projections are more in line with the Defence Commission, with 2025 funding coming to SEK86.7 billion. Beyond 2025, JDB projects annual nominal increases of 3.5-4% annually with funding growing to account for 1.43% of GDP by 2030.

Swedish Defence and Emergency Preparedness Budget Projections - Ministry of Defence (SEK m)

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
2014 Budg et	46,19 7	47,19 6	47,84 7	48,50 8	49,63 5					
2015 Budg et	45,40 9	47,56 2	48,58 9	47,27 2	48,56 2	50,00 3				
2015 Sprin g Fiscal Policy Bill	45,40 0	47,97 8	46,87 0	47,40 0	48,53 0	49,38 1	50,40 2			
2016 Budg et		47,97 8	46,75 7	48,82 7	50,21 6	51,17 1	53,35 9	56,44 7		
2016 Sprin g Fiscal Policy Bill			48,27 1	48,77 7	50,24 0	51,37 5	53,79 6	56,18 8		
2017 Budg et			48,27 1	49,12 8	50,25 4	51,40 6	53,72 6	55,93 1		
2018 Budg et (draft)				49,40 0	50,10 0	53,80 0	56,10 0	58,10 0		

2018 Spring Fiscal Policy Bill	50,383	52,676	56,283	58,222	59,319	
2019 Budget (draft)			56,191	57,169	58,172	58,172
2019 Spring Fiscal Policy Bill			60,067	64,788	70,463	71,700
2020 Budget (draft)			59,759	64,800	70,543	76,738

ARMED FORCES

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UPDATED

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2019-11-22

Executive summary

	Total strength¹	Army	Air force	Navy
Active personnel	14,400	5,600	2,800	2,900
Reserves	11,400 ²	6,850	1,150	2,050

- Sweden has a relatively small standing military force, although it is well equipped and supported by a reserve force and large Home Guard. The Swedish Army has 13 active combat arms battalions, as well as one mechanised battle group on Gotland, and 40 Home

Guard battalions. Its equipment inventory includes 120 Leopard 2A5 tanks and 354 CV90 infantry fighting vehicles. The Swedish Air Force (SwAF) has 97 JAS 39C/D Gripen multirole combat aircraft and a range of support aircraft to provide support to the Swedish Army in the field and the Royal Swedish Navy (RSwN) at sea. The primary assets of the RSwN are seven corvettes and four attack submarines, coastal defence and littoral warfare. This structure and equipment allows the Swedish Armed Forces to undertake both territorial defence and expeditionary operations. That said, the latest Swedish Defence Policy, adopted in 2015, emphasises national defence against a conventional adversary. As part of this re-orientation, Sweden is also reinforcing military capabilities on the strategically important island of Gotland and building its ability to receive and host the military forces of allied nations. This new threat context is also compelling some further restructuring of the army to enhance its ability to carry out operations against what official documents call a 'qualified opponent' (a state actor with significant military forces and advance weaponry). Furthermore, in 2017 the country reintroduced conscription.

- Although Sweden participates in international peace support missions, the contributions are usually not large. The Swedish Armed Forces stated in their input to the 2019 budget that Sweden ought to reduce its contributions to international operations since these could negatively impact operational capability. The Swedish Armed Forces have asked the government to prioritise deployments in which Swedish units operate with countries with whom Sweden has established ties since this contributes to operational capability. To this end, the Swedish Armed Forces prefer to participate in operations led by NATO, then by the EU, and finally the UN.
- Priority programmes over the next decade are procurement of at least 60 JAS 39E Gripen fighters (with a stand-off air-to-surface missile and an extended-range, anti-ship missile) and Patriot medium-range air defence systems. Sweden has also launched a programme to upgrade a large part of its Leopard 2 tank and CV90 armoured vehicle fleets. In addition, *Sweden's Defence Policy 2016 to 2020* outlined several measures to strengthen anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities and implementation is well underway. Among these measures, the RSwN is upgrading its Göteborg/Gävle corvettes (including installation of a variable depth sonar) and the SwAF is bringing the NH90 ASW variants up to operational capability. Furthermore, the Swedish Defence Commission's white book on *Sweden's Security Policy and the Development of the Military Defence 2021-2025*, published in 2019, recommended the creation of additional units to bring the total army strength up to three mechanised brigades, a reduced motorised brigade, and a reinforced mechanised battalion on Gotland. The proposal calls for a future war organisation of about 100,000 persons by 2030.

2019-03-20

Threat environment

Despite Sweden's armed neutrality, the country could easily find itself drawn into any conflict between NATO and Russia. This is because, as was the case during the Cold War, Sweden is at a geographically important crossroads. For NATO, Sweden is an essential pathway to reinforce the

Baltic Republics while avoiding any Russian S-400 air defence systems in the Kaliningrad Oblast, which can reach well out over the Baltic Sea. Meanwhile, Russia sees Swedish territory as a vital place to control in order to block NATO forces. By placing military forces with air defence systems on the island of Gotland, for example, Russia could almost entirely block NATO reinforcements from reaching their allies in the Baltic Republics. Thus Russia has a strong incentive to seize the island in the event of a wider regional war.

Swedish security is also impacted by general conflict and instability (complex emergencies) that upset the world order. This has prompted the country to support peacekeeping missions. Lastly, Sweden faces risk of domestic terrorist attacks, although the response to this would be largely non-military.

2019-03-20

Doctrine and strategy

Sweden's military posture observes formal neutrality, and insists that the use of force can only be authorised under chapters VI and VII of the UN charter. Neither will it accede to any formal military alliance beyond what is inherent in the EU's common foreign and security policy and Partnership for Peace (PfP) status in NATO. However, such a view has increasingly become hard to maintain in light of Russia's increasingly aggressive posture in the region, to the effect of a breakdown of relations between Stockholm-Moscow.

Sweden is now effectively faced with three strategic choices. Maintain the status quo, and the inherent contradictions that go along with it; return to a genuine non-aligned position by turning its back on the close collaboration it's built up with NATO over the past decades; or take the plunge and become a full NATO member state, formally abandoning its non-aligned stance and risk incurring Russian anger.

Although NATO membership remains unlikely in the near future, recent events have put it back on the agenda. Sweden is now part of NATO's Enhanced Opportunities Partnership programme and the government has signed a NATO Host Nation Support Agreement (which was ratified by Parliament in May 2016). This agreement would make it easier for Sweden to receive military support in the future in theory

The military doctrine of the Swedish Armed Forces is set out in its the document *Militärstrategisk doktrin (MSD) 12*, which was released in July 2011. It states that the primary mission of the armed forces is "to defend Sweden and promote Swedish security nationally and internationally. The Armed Forces should be able to detect and repel violations of Swedish territory and to safeguard Sweden's sovereign rights and national interests outside the Swedish territory". Additionally, the military is tasked with providing capabilities and resources to civilian activities, if required.

The military must be able to undertake these missions independently, but also in collaboration with other Swedish government agencies, other nations, and multi-national organisations.

One of the most significant changes in new doctrine is the accommodation for high-intensity and low-intensity operations. Additionally, the doctrine in some ways moves Sweden away from its


historical neutrality by to some degree aligning and harmonising with NATO's Allied Joint Doctrine (AJP-01) and that of other EU nations. According to the report, "the basis of the MSD is that the Swedish concepts and definitions are as compatible as possible with NATO and the EU."

In practice, this has been demonstrated in deployments of CV90 combat vehicles to support its units in Chad and Afghanistan, and the commitment of Gripen combat aircraft to the multinational Operation Unified Protector over Libya in 2011.

Additionally, MSD 12 states that the armed forces and its respective units "will endeavour to apply manoeuvre warfare where possible" to "constantly strive for the initiative", with the aim of exploiting critical vulnerabilities in enemy forces. This is in line with the military's efforts to restructure and re-equip its forces to focus on more mobile and flexible units.

2019-03-20

Military capability assessment



Sweden capability assessment. (IHS Markit)

1720762

- The Swedish Army fields about 120 tanks, 350 IFVs, and hundreds of additional armoured vehicles. Sweden has launched a programme to upgrade a large part of its Leopard 2 tank and CV90 armoured vehicle fleets. The Swedish Army also has 24 FH-77 BW Archer 155 mm self-propelled howitzers. However, the only other indirect fire systems are mortars. Even when the planned new 120 mm mobile mortar systems enter service, the army's capabilities in this area will remain limited.
- The combat capability of the SwAF is provided by 73 JAS 39C Gripen multirole combat aircraft (with 24 JAS 39Ds also in the fleet for training). The SwAF Gripen is equipped to carry out air defence, ground attack, anti-ship attack, and reconnaissance tasks. Most significant, the Gripens are armed with the Meteor beyond visual range air-to-air missile. That said, although the Gripens have a ground attack capability (including with the GBU 39 SDB), it has no long-range air-to-surface missile.

- Air defence is also supported from the ground where the Swedish army fields low and medium range air defence systems. In contrast, RSwN's ships have no air defence missiles. Sweden is the only Nordic country that has not put such systems on their newest combat vessels.
- The air force also has a fleet of fixed- and rotary-wing logistics aircraft to carry out tactical and battlefield transport and other tasks. This includes C-130Hs, although these are the oldest in Europe. Meanwhile, the helicopters are primarily shore based, although the light AW109s can embark on some ships for limited periods of time. The rotary-wing fleet has been boosted through the procurement of 18 NH90 Tactical Transport Helicopters (TTH). Nine of these carry out troop transport, search and rescue, and medical evacuation tasks while the other nine are modified to support the Royal Swedish Navy in ASW. While all the helicopters have been delivered, it will be some time before they have a full combat capability. Of note, the SwAF has not had any assets fully capable of ASW operations since the last Hkp 4 (Boeing Vertol 107) was taken out of service in 2011.
- The RSwN has a surface combatant fleet comprised of seven corvettes. The five Visby-class corvettes are particularly noteworthy for their high degree of stealth and they are well armed to undertake ASW and anti-surface warfare. Meanwhile, the other two corvettes are being upgraded to increase ASW capability. The navy also has seven mine warfare vessels, one versatile command and support ship (which can effectively serve as an ocean patrol vessel), and four attack submarines, in addition to a marine battalion.
- The RBS-15 coastal defence missile was re-introduced into service in late 2016, with at least one battery now based on Gotland. The land-based RBS-15 had been removed from service in 2000 due to budget cuts. However, the Mk 2 was developed in the 1990s and has technological limitations and thus will need replacement in the medium term.

Joint forces interoperability

2019-03-20

Tri-service interoperability

Future Swedish units, though fewer in number, are to increase their potency by being able to operate as modular units that may be organised from different components as required. A new joint radio system is under introduction in order to help facilitate this development. Until such efforts have been completed, interoperability remains limited. The various services have undertaken modernisation efforts though lacking co-ordination and integration. This has led, for instance, to a situation where the air force's Gripen fighter jets have fully adopted NATO standard encryption while the other services have yet to do so. This has further resulted in the air force being unable to communicate with other units through secure encrypted communications.

2019-03-20

Multinational interoperability

Multinational interoperability has traditionally had less priority within the Swedish Armed Forces due to its strict policy of military neutrality. However, this is changing, with multinational co-operation becoming a key priority. Previous efforts have limited themselves to the minimum required in order to ensure an ability to deploy on UN-led peace keeping operations. Swedish matériel investments are thus increasingly reflecting this situation and include significant investments in equipment to enable Swedish forces to interact more effectively with its partners. Additionally, the military is improving interoperability through increased participation in multinational exercises.

Sweden is a NATO PfP member and has also contributed to the NATO Response Force (NRF). In addition, Sweden is a full member of the European Defence Agency (EDA). Meanwhile, defence cooperation with Finland has also been enhanced in recent years.

2019-03-20

Defence structure

The Swedish Armed Forces has three branches: the army, navy, and air force. Within the army, there is also a Home Guard, which is composed of volunteers but effectively serves as a large reserve force. The navy includes an Amphibious Regiment. The Swedish Coast Guard is an independent civilian authority with a board supervised by the Ministry of Defence. It is not part of the navy.

On 1 January 2011, the military's two Special Forces units, the Special Protection Group (Särskilda skyddsgruppen: SSG) and Special Gathering Group (Särskilda inhämtningsgruppen: SIG) were merged into a new tri-service Special Operations Group (SOG). The SOG is considered a "strategic resource" for the military as a whole.

2019-12-05

Command and control

Minister of Defence:	Peter Hultqvist
Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces:	General Micael Bydén
Director General of the Armed Forces:	Peter Sandwall
Chief of Staff, Army:	Major General Karl Engelbrektson
Chief of Staff, Air Force:	Major General Carl-Johan Edström
Chief of Staff, Navy:	Rear Admiral Jens Nykvist

The Supreme Commander has overall responsibility for the Swedish Armed Forces. The head of production (C PROD) is responsible for force generation, namely through the maintenance, development, and readiness of military units. The head of operational command (C INSATS) is

responsible for executing military operations, at the request of the Supreme Commander. The C INSATS has operational control over the heads of the army, air force, and navy (who are designated inspector generals). The inspector generals/chiefs of staff are the foremost representative of each of their services.

Army

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Armour

Leopard 2A5 tank

CV90 armoured vehicle

Armoured modular vehicle (Pansarterrängbil 360)

Artillery

FH-77BW L52 Archer

Granatkastarpansarbandvagn 90 (Mjölner) self-propelled mortar system

Anti-tank systems

Carl Gustaf M2/3 (Ggr m/48/86)

Pansarskott m/86

RBS 58

Ground-based air defence systems

RBS 70

RBS 23

IRIS-T (RBS 98)

Hawk (RBS 97)

Patriot air defence system

CV90 autonomous armoured air defence system

Army aviation

Equipment in service

Small arms and light weapons

Man-portable air defence systems

Infantry support weapons

Small arms

Army aviation

2019-11-22

Summary

Strength	Regular: 5,600 Reserves: 6,850 (Plus 21,000 Home Guard personnel)
Primary combat units	5 Mechanised infantry battalions 2 Motorised infantry battalions 1 Light infantry battalion 1 Ranger battalion 2 Artillery battalions 2 Air defence battalions
Armoured vehicles	Leopard 2A5 main battle tanks CV9040 infantry fighting vehicles
Artillery	FH-77 BW Archer 155 mm self-propelled howitzers
Ground-based air defence systems	RBS 70 manportable surface-to-air missile launchers RBS 97 HAWK medium-altitude surface-to-air missile launchers Lvkv 90 (CV90) TriAD self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (40 mm L/70 gun)

2019-11-19

Executive summary

- The Swedish Army is an effective force capable of territorial defence and expeditionary operations. Its core combat capability is provided by 13 active combat arms battalions, as well as one mechanised battle group on Gotland, and 40 Home Guard battalions. Equipment holdings include 120 Leopard 2A5 tanks, 356 CV90 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and 150 CV90s in other roles, 24 FH-77 BW L52 Archer 155 mm self-propelled howitzers (SPHs), hundreds of other armoured vehicles, and short- and medium-range air defence systems. Following the Ukraine crisis and in light of the deteriorating security situation in Europe, Sweden has re-emphasised territorial defence (in particular on the strategically important island of Gotland) and in 2017 reintroduced conscription.
- The latest Swedish defence policy, adopted in 2015, shifts the focus of the Swedish Armed Forces back to national defence against a conventional adversary (since the end of the Cold War it had been increasingly focused on expeditionary operations). The Swedish government has publicly stated that it will not remain indifferent in a situation where any of its Nordic neighbours or an EU country comes under attack or becomes the victim of a major crisis or disaster, and it expects the same in return.
- The Swedish Armed Forces stated in their input to the 2019 budget that Sweden ought to reduce its contributions to international operations since these could negatively impact operational capability. The contribution to the UN mission in Mali was specifically cited. The Swedish Armed Forces have asked the government to prioritise deployments in which Swedish units operate with countries with whom Sweden has established ties since this contributes to operational capability. To this end, the Swedish Armed Forces prefer to participate in operations led by NATO, then by the EU, and finally the UN.
- The Swedish Army continues to bring its FH-77 BW Archer 155 mm SPHs up to full operational capability (FOC). This is providing the army with a long-range indirect fire capability, which it has lacked since 2011. Sweden fields 24 Archer systems and will ultimately have at least another 12. Sweden has also launched a programme to upgrade a large part of its Leopard 2 tank and CV90 armoured vehicle fleets. The army is also in the midst of procuring a 120 mm mobile mortar system that can keep up with the tanks and the CV90 and is expanding its bridging capability. In addition, Sweden is procuring four Patriot medium-range air defence systems to be delivered in 2021-22.
- The threat context is compelling further restructuring to enhance the army's ability to carry out operations against what official documents call a 'qualified opponent' (a state actor with significant military forces and advance weaponry). Thus, according to the 2015 Defence Bill (for the period 2016-20), by 2020 the majority of Swedish Army units are to be organised in such a way to enable them to function as two brigades (with different levels of readiness). The Swedish Defence Commission's white book on *Sweden's Security Policy and the Development of the Military Defence 2021-2025*, published in 2019, recommended further strengthening. Its recommendations included the creation of additional units to bring the total army strength up to three mechanised brigades, a reduced motorised brigade, and a

reinforced mechanised battalion on Gotland. The proposal calls for a future war organisation of about 100,000 persons by 2030. The Commission also proposed upgrading the entire inventory of armoured fighting vehicles and tanks; bringing all 48 guns of the Archer artillery system into service; and procurement of a new artillery system.

Deployments and operations

2019-04-22

Force distribution

The majority of Swedish Army units are located in Boden, in north Sweden, and in Skövde, about halfway between Gothenburg and Stockholm in southcentral Sweden. This allows for a quick deployment of forces in the north or south of the country as required. However, the air defence regiment is based in Halmstad, in the very south of the country, quite far from Stockholm.

Of particular note, Sweden is making a concerted effort to re-establish an army presence on the island of Gotland.

Also of note, on 1 January 2019 the Army Staff (and the other armed services staffs) moved its headquarters in order to address vulnerabilities due to being overly concentrated in Stockholm (although all will remain located in the wider Stockholm area).

2019-11-19

Recent and current operations

Sweden is a staunch advocate of the United Nations and has made large contributions to several of its peacekeeping operations. However, like most Western countries, Sweden largely withdrew from UN operations in the 2000s, opting instead to focus its resources on the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. In this light, Sweden's contribution the UN peacekeeping operation in Mali starting in 2015 is significant. However, in light of scarce resources and the deteriorating security situation in the near abroad, it remains to be seen whether Sweden will continue to deploy sizable contingents in the future.

The Swedish Armed Forces are deployed on the following missions:

- Operation 'Inherent Resolve' (Iraq): 61 personnel
- Kosovo Force (KFOR): four personnel
- 'Resolute Support' Mission (Afghanistan): 29 personnel.
- UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO): one military expert
- UN Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO): one military expert and one staff officer
- UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS): two military experts

- UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP): six military experts
- UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) - Middle East: six military experts
- UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA): 233 troops and 14 staff officers (in addition to a 50-person National Support Element outside UN command).
- EU Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA): nine personnel
- EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali): eight personnel
- EU Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia): five personnel
- The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC): five personnel

Mali

The Swedish Armed Forces contribute approximately 290 military personnel to MINUSMA. The first Swedish unit deployed to Mali in February 2015. The contribution includes an intelligence company and staff officers. The intelligence company is based in Timbuktu (at Camp Nobel) and performs ISR operations in northern Mali (sector west). To support this mission, Sweden has also deployed AAI Shadow 200, AeroVironment Puma, and AeroVironment Wasp unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

The Swedish contingent is supported by a National Support Element, which is technically outside UN framework.

The Swedish contribution to MINUSMA is set to scale down in late 2019.

Iraq

The Swedish Armed Forces contribute about 60 military personnel to the US-led international coalition against the Islamic State. The Swedish force is based in northern Iraq and since the second half of 2017 also at Al Asad Airbase in central Iraq. It consists largely of specialists drawn from elite combat units within the Swedish Army. The Swedish contribution to the mission started in August 2015.

The Swedish troops provide training to local Kurdish Peshmerga forces in areas such as basic warfighting, urban warfare, medical care, and countering improvised explosive devices. In addition, they provide advice to Peshmerga officers at the battalion and brigade levels. The Swedish troops in central Iraq also provide training on CBRN incident preparedness.

In light of the volatile and unpredictable security situation in Iraq, the Swedish unit in Iraq can be temporarily reinforced by 120 troops so that additional protection or evacuation can be provided.

Afghanistan

Following on from its contribution to NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Sweden now contributes about 30 military personnel to the follow-up 'Resolute Support' Mission, although up to 50 personnel are authorised. The contribution includes staff officers and military advisers. Swedish troops are based primarily at the German airbase Camp Marmal near Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan, where they provide assistance and advice to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and Afghan security institutions. In addition, there are a small number of HQ staff, medical, and logistics personnel. A few individuals are also located in Kabul.

The Swedish contribution can be reinforced to 200 troops, in case the security situation in Afghanistan would require additional protection or evacuation of Swedish forces.

2019-11-19

Organisation

The Swedish Army's core combat capability is provided by 5 mechanised battalions (including tank elements); 2 motorised battalions; 1 light infantry battalion (to be airmobile); 1 ranger battalion; 1 mechanised battle group on Gotland (also including tank elements); 2 artillery battalions; 2 air defence battalions; and 40 Home Guard battalions.

Of note, the Gotland Combat Group was permanently established in November 2017, although it is still working up to its full combat capability. Sweden has also reestablished the Gotland Regiment, but again it will be some time before it is fully capable, and created a Gotland Military Region to command the island's defence.

Also of note, the 31 Light Infantry Battalion in Karlsborg is being reorganised in order to be deployable by air and thus able to quickly reinforce strategically important areas, including Gotland.

In addition to the order of battle there is a pool of personnel and equipment roughly equivalent to four mechanised battalions with no assigned readiness but with the ability to be activated within three years of a governmental decision and depending on additional funding.

2019-04-22

Order of battle

Unit hierarchy	Base	Type	Primary role (General)	Primary role (Specific)	Primary equipment	Notes
Swedish Army		Service Support	Command and Control			

Army Staff	Enköping	Combat Support	Command and Control	
Air Defence Regiment	Halmstad	Combat Arms	Air Defence	Air Defence Missile
45 (Hallands) Home Guard Battalion	Halmstad	Combat Arms	Infantry	
61 Air Defence Battalion	Halmstad	Combat Arms	Air Defence	Air Defence Missile
62 Air Defence Battalion	Halmstad	Combat Arms	Air Defence	Air Defence Missile
Armed Forces Communication and Information Systems Unit	Orebro	Combat Support	Signal	
Armed Forces Logistics	FMLOG Headquarters	Combat Support	Logistics	
Armed Forces Technical School	Halmstad	Combat Support	Training	
1 Technical Maintenance Battalion	Halmstad	Combat Support	Logistics	Maintenance
Artillery Regiment	Boden	Combat Arms	Artillery	Self-propelled Howitzer

91 Artillery Battalion	Boden	Com bat Arms	Artillery	Self-propelled Howitzer
92 Artillery Battalion	Boden	Com bat Arms	Artillery	Self-propelled Howitzer
Centre for Defence Medicine	Goteborg Medical Centre	Com bat Support	Medical	
1 Medical Company	Goteborg Medical Centre	Com bat Support	Medical	
2 Medical Company	Goteborg Medical Centre	Com bat Support	Medical	
41 (Goteborgs Sodra) Home Guard Battalion	Goteborg Medical Centre	Com bat Arms	Infantry	
42 (Goteborgs Norra) Home Guard Battalion	Goteborg Medical Centre	Com bat Arms	Infantry	
43 (Goteborgs Skargards) Home Guard Battalion	Goteborg Medical Centre	Com bat Arms	Infantry	
44 (Alvsborgs) Home Guard Battalion	Goteborg Medical Centre	Com bat Arms	Infantry	

Command and Control Regiment	Enköping	Combat Support	Command and Control	
21 (Upplands) Home Guard Battalion	Enköping	Combat Arms	Infantry	
22 (Vastmanlands) Home Guard Battalion	Enköping	Combat Arms	Infantry	
27 (Sodermanlands) Home Guard Battalion	Svalten Camp	Combat Arms	Infantry	
C4I Support Unit	Enköping	Combat Support	ISTAR	
Electronic Warfare Battalion	Enköping	Combat Support	Electronic Warfare	
Headquarters Support Battalion	Enköping	Combat Support	Command and Control	
Meteorological and Oceanographic Centre	Enköping	Combat Support	Military Intelligence	Meteorological
Psychological Operations Unit	Enköping	Combat Support	Psychological Operations	

Signal Battalion	Enköping	Combat Support	Signal	
Gota Engineer Regiment	Eksjö	Combat Support	Engineer	
21 Engineer Battalion	Eksjö	Combat Support	Engineer	
22 Engineer Battalion	Eksjö	Combat Support	Engineer	
33 (Norra Smålands) Home Guard Battalion	Eksjö	Combat Support	Engineer	
Gotland Regiment	Visby	Combat Arms	Infantry	Not yet at full strength.
Life Guards	Kungsängen	Combat Support	Command and Control	
11 Military Police Battalion	Kungsängen	Combat Support	Military Police	
12 Motorised Battalion	Kungsängen	Combat Arms	Infantry	Wheeled Mechanised Infantry
13 Security Battalion	Gothenburg	Combat Arms	Security	

17 (Dala) Home Guard Battalion	Falun	Combat Arms	Infantry	
18 (Gavleborgs) Home Guard Battalion	Gavle	Combat Arms	Infantry	
23 (Attundalands) Home Guard Battalion	Kungsängen	Combat Arms	Infantry	
24 (Stockholms) Home Guard Battalion	Kungsängen	Combat Arms	Infantry	
25 (Hemvarns) Home Guard Battalion	Kungsängen	Combat Arms	Infantry	
26 (Jarva) Home Guard Battalion	Kungsängen	Combat Arms	Infantry	
Life Guards Battalion	Kavalleri Barracks	Combat Arms	Infantry	Ceremonial/Public Duties
Regional Command Centre	Kungsängen	Combat Support	Command and Control	
Life Regiment Husars	Karlsborg	Combat Support	Command and Control	

19 (Varmlands) Home Guard Battalion	Orebro	Com bat Arms	Infantry	
20 (Sannahed) Home Guard Battalion	Orebro	Com bat Arms	Infantry	
31 Light Infantry Battalion	Karlsborg	Com bat Arms	Infantry	Light Infantry
32 Intelligence Battalion	Karlsborg	Com bat Supp ort	ISTAR	
Logistics Regiment	Skovde	Com bat Supp ort	Logistics	
1 Logistics Battalion	Skovde	Com bat Supp ort	Logistics	
1 Medical Support Company	Skovde	Com bat Supp ort	Medical	
2 Logistics Battalion	Skovde	Com bat Supp ort	Logistics	
2 Medical Support Company	Skovde	Com bat Supp ort	Medical	

Movement Control (MOVCON) Company	Skovde	Combat Support	Logistics	Transport
National CBRN Defence Centre	Umea	Combat Support	NBC Defence	
1 CBRN Company	Umea	Combat Support	NBC Defence	
Norrbotten Regiment	Boden	Combat Support	Command and Control	
1 Heavy Transport Company, Boden Detachment	Boden	Combat Support	Logistics	Transport
10 (Lapland Jaeger) Home Guard Battalion	Kiruna	Combat Arms	Infantry	
11 (Border Jaeger) Home Guard Battalion	Kiruna	Combat Arms	Infantry	
12 (Norrbotten) Home Guard Battalion	Boden	Combat Arms	Infantry	

13 (Vasterbotten) Home Guard Battalion	Umea	Combat Arms	Infantry	
14 (Field Jaeger) Home Guard Battalion	Fronson	Combat Arms	Infantry	
15 (Angermanland) Home Guard Battalion	Harnosand	Combat Arms	Infantry	
16 (Medelpad) Home Guard Battalion	Harnosand	Combat Arms	Infantry	
191 Mechanised Battalion	Boden	Combat Arms	Combined Arms	
192 Mechanised Battalion	Boden	Combat Arms	Combined Arms	
3 Brigade Reconnaissance Company	Boden	Combat Support	ISTAR	Reconnaissance
3 Brigade Staff Battalion	Boden	Combat Support	Command and Control	
Armed Forces Winter Unit	Boden	Combat Arms	Infantry	Arctic Infantry

Army Ranger Battalion	Arvidsjau r	Com bat Arms	Special Operations	
Regional Command North	Boden	Com bat Supp ort	Command and Control	
Skaraborg Regiment	Skovde	Com bat Supp ort	Command and Control	
1 Heavy Transport Company	Skovde	Com bat Supp ort	Logistics	Transport
18 Battle Group	Tofta Shooting Range	Com bat Arms	Combined Arms	
2 Brigade Reconnaiss ance Company	Skovde	Com bat Supp ort	ISTAR	Reconnaissanc e
2 Brigade Staff Battalion	Skovde	Com bat Supp ort	Command and Control	
38 (Kinne) Home Guard Battalion	Skovde	Com bat Arms	Infantry	
39 (Kakind) Home Guard Battalion	Skovde	Com bat Arms	Infantry	
40 (Bohus) Home Guard Battalion	Skovde	Com bat Arms	Infantry	

41 Mechanised Battalion	Skovde	Com bat Arms	Combined Arms	
42 Mechanised Battalion	Skovde	Com bat Arms	Combined Arms	
Regional Command West	Skovde	Com bat Supp ort	Command and Control	
South Skåne Regiment	Revingeh ed	Com bat Supp ort	Command and Control	
46 (Sodra Skanska) Home Guard Battalion	Revingeh ed	Com bat Arms	Infantry	
47 (Malmöhus) Home Guard Battalion	Revingeh ed	Com bat Arms	Infantry	
48 (Skanska Dragon) Home Guard Battalion	Revingeh ed	Com bat Arms	Infantry	
49 (Norra Skanska Home Guard Battalion	Revingeh ed	Com bat Arms	Infantry	
71 Motorised Battalion	Revingeh ed	Com bat Arms	Infantry	Mechanised Infantry

72 Mechanised Battalion	Revingeh ed	Com bat Arms	Combined Arms
Regional Command South	Revingeh ed	Com bat Supp ort	Command and Control
Special Operations Group	Karlsborg	Com bat Arms	Special Operations

2019-11-19

Home Guard

The Home Guard is an organisation with voluntary members, but it forms part of the army. The size of the Home Guard has been massively reduced from Cold War-era numbers and it now has about 21,000 personnel in 40 battalions. These personnel are included in the plan for territorial defence and would be assigned defence and security tasks if required. The Home Guard practises its combat tasks annually and maintains a very high degree of preparedness by keeping uniforms, weapons, and ammunition at home.

2019-04-22

Bases

Name	Latitude	Longitude	Notes
Karlsborg	58.5291667	14.5236111	Karlsborg is operated by both the army and the air force.
Orebro	59.301106	15.205542	
Gavle	60.669191	17.135917	
Halmstad	56.6897222	12.8597222	
Visby	57.661389	18.345556	
Skovde	58.3805556	13.8469444	
Eksjo	57.6775	14.965	
Kiruna	67.845233	20.250539	

Revingehed	55.715983	13.49836	
Falun	60.606194	15.630256	
Enköping	59.6647222	17.1027778	
Harnosand	62.634739	17.943836	
Umea	63.837383	20.253289	
Kavalleri Barracks	59.347087	18.089581	
Kungsängen	59.515	17.7777778	
Svalten Camp	59.388192	16.996802	
Goteborg Medical Centre	57.673002	11.86864	
Boden	65.8194444	21.6583333	
Fronson	63.195579	14.478524	
Arvidsjaur	65.5805556	19.1641667	
Tofta Shooting Range	57.556667	18.136389	Training area that is now serving as a temporary base

2019-11-19

Personnel

- The Swedish parliament suspended compulsory military service in May 2010. From 1 July 2010 recruitment became based on a voluntary application system. However, Sweden announced on 2 March 2017 that conscription was to be reactivated. Registration began on 1 July 2017, with liability to undergo basic military training starting from 1 January 2018. Individuals are selected for basic military training depending on their suitability and motivation.
- Without conscription, the Swedish Armed Forces had difficulties satisfying personnel requirements. On average, only 2,500 of the 4,000 recruits required annually could be attracted. This shortfall is of note given that the number of conscripts trained each year needs to be around 8,000 by 2025 in order to meet the long-term force strength goals.
- Looking ahead, a major area of concern is that a large number of officers in the Swedish Armed Forces are expected to retire between now and 2025. It will be a challenge to replace these losses.

2019-04-22

Training

- Swedish Army training is focused on territorial defence in a conventional war. Training includes battalion and brigade-level exercises, with the latter receiving particular attention since 2015 as part of the wider effort in increase the army's capability to fight a 'qualified opponent'. These are often combined arms and joint events.
- Despite Sweden not being part of any formal alliances, the Swedish Army does train to operate with multinational forces.
- The Land Warfare Centre has a platoon level simulator for tanks and IFVs and the Swedish Army also has other simulation systems in use.

Army schools

Name	Latitude	Longitude	Notes
Land Warfare School	58.380693	13.847155	
Military Academy Karlberg	59.340772	18.022121	
Military Academy Halmstad	56.686065	12.840607	
Home Guard Combat School	59.262157	17.711664	
Swedish Armed Forces International Centre	59.515758	17.773525	Part of the Life Guards Regiment.
Swedish EOD and Demining Centre	57.677877	14.965988	

There are also smaller schools embedded within various regiments that provide specific-to-trade education.

Training areas

Name	Latitude	Longitude	Notes
Skovde Training Area	58.351865	13.889390	Includes urban warfare training area.
Vällinge exercise area	59.263277	17.664307	

2019-11-19

Military exercises

'Northern Wind' : Exercise 'Northern Wind' was held in March 2019 in northern Sweden. It involved 10,000 personnel, 3,000 of whom were Swedish while the remainder were from allied countries. The main objectives were to develop the ability to operate as a brigade with subordinate foreign units and exercise Host Nation Support capabilities.

'Trident Juncture 18' : In October and November 2018, NATO held the high-visibility Exercise 'Trident Juncture 18'. The event took place primarily in Norway but also included locations in the Baltic Sea, Iceland, Finland, and Sweden. It involved about 50,000 soldiers, 10,000 vehicles, 250 aircraft, and 65 naval vessels. Approximately 1,900 Swedish Army personnel participated in the exercise, primarily units of the 2. Brigade. The main objectives for the army were to develop further the ability to operate as a brigade, strengthen cooperation with Finland and the United States, and exercise Host Nation Support capabilities.

'Aurora 17' : In September 2017, Sweden hosted the 'Aurora 17' multinational exercise. Approximately 20,000 personnel participated, making 'Aurora 17' the largest military exercise in Sweden since 1993. The exercise scenario was a surprise attack on Sweden as part of a broader conflict. 'Aurora 17' was thus in line with the new Swedish defence policy focusing on national defence. Gothenburg and Gotland were key areas in the exercise. The exercise involved all branches of the Swedish Armed Forces. Importantly, the event allowed Sweden to test its capacity to provide host nation support and receive foreign military assistance. Sweden is planning a bigger follow-up exercise in 2020 ('Aurora 20').

Core assets and procurement initiatives

2019-11-14

Armour

Leopard 2A5 tank

The Swedish Army has 120 Leopard 2A5 tanks. The Leopard 2A5s, designated as the Stridsvagn 122 (Strv 122) by the Swedish Army, were ordered as newbuild vehicles and delivered between 1997 and 2002. Sweden previously also operated 160 ex-German Army Leopard 2A4s (Strv 121), but these have been retired. The Leopards replaced 350 Centurion and 300 Bofors Strv 103B (S-tank) tanks. Thus, with the removal of the A4s, Sweden has a vastly reduced MBT fleet compared to that of two decades ago.

Despite these reductions, the Swedish Army is standing up a reserve armoured company on the island of Gotland, which is seen as a particularly strategic point in the Baltic Sea. Training of the company started in mid-2018. In addition, the Swedish Army has integrated the three independent tank companies into the mechanised battalions. This reorganisation increases the number of MBTs in the units compared with the previous organisation. The army's goal is that all five mechanised battalions will ultimately have two tank companies. The 191 and 192 Mechanised Battalions already have this structure, but the status of the other three battalions is not clear.

The Leopards 2A5's primary armament is a 120 mm L44 smoothbore gun, although two 7.62 mm MGs are also fitted. The A5s can carry 42 rounds of ammunition for the main gun. Sweden's

Leopard 2A5s differ from their German counterparts in a number of areas. First, they are fitted with Nexter Systems' Galix vehicle protection system. Second, they have a passive armour system developed Åkers, which provides a high degree of protection from kinetic and chemical attack. It also has additional armour protection over the frontal arc. Lastly, the Swedish A5s were the first MBTs in Europe to receive an advanced C2 system, which, among other things, offers crews superior situational awareness.

Sweden has upgraded about 10 of its Leopard 2A5s with a mine protection package (at which point they were redesignated as Leopard 2A5M or Strv 122B). The upgrade was intended to enable Sweden to deploy the tanks for international operations. Five of the upgraded tanks have also been modified to make them deployable to desert theatres.

The Swedish Army is upgrading 101 of its Strv 122 Leopard 2A5s (initial plans had only called for 42 to be upgraded). After the upgrade, the Strv 122As will be designated Strv 122C and upgraded Strv 122Bs will be classified as Strv 122D. The upgrades are to include replacement of batteries, improved tank chief sights, and integration of a new battlefield management system (BMS). The upgraded tanks are expected to be brought back into service (in phases) from 2019-23. The work will extend the tanks' service lives out to 2030. While it is possible additional 2A5s will be upgraded (and options for this are in place), it is also possible that the remaining 2A5s could be mothballed.

CV90 armoured vehicle

The Swedish Army has more than 500 CV90 AFVs serving in six different roles (in addition to hulls in storage). The vast majority of these, about 350, are IFVs. The other variants are forward observer, command, air defence, recovery, and mortar. The CV90s were delivered to the Swedish Army between 1994 and 2003.

The CV90 was designed specifically to meet the operational requirements of the Swedish Army for a vehicle with improved armour, mobility, and firepower. The vehicle is optimised for the Swedish environment and thus able to operate in deep snow, marshy terrain, thin ice, and extreme cold.

The primary armament of the CV90 IFV (CV9040) is a Bofors 40 mm cannon capable of single shot or automatic fire. The magazine for this gun holds a total of 24 rounds in three sections (each of which can hold a different ammunition type if required) and there are 48 additional rounds stored under the turret floor. In addition the CV90s are equipped with a 7.62 mm MG parallel to the cannon. The CV90 air defence vehicles also have a 40 mm cannon, while the mortar variant has two 102 mm mortars. All other variants are only armed with a 7.62 mm MG.

The Swedish Army has operated three versions of the CV9040. The CV9040A has an external gyrostabilised main gun system and fire-on-the-move capability. Compared to the CV9040 standard production version, the CV9040A has a modified chassis and more storage capacity, which reduces the maximum number of troops it can carry in the transportation compartment from eight to seven. Modifications to the subsequent version, designated CV9040B, include a fully stabilised gun system that enables moving targets to be engaged with a higher first-round hit probability. Additionally, the CV9040Bs received a new suspension system for improved cross-country mobility.

Finally, the CV9040C is specifically modified for overseas operations, with extra armour and protection against anti-vehicle mines as well as air conditioning for operations in hot climates. Overall, Sweden upgraded 42 IFVs to C standard, along with 8 forward observer vehicles, 2 forward command vehicles, 3 ARVs, and 3 air defence vehicles. Some of these have received further upgrades, after which they were redesignated CV9040C+. Sweden has deployed CV9040Cs to Liberia and Afghanistan.

Further upgrades have been made on some of the Swedish CV90 inventory, but it is unclear if these will be rolled out to a larger part of the fleet. For example, at least one vehicle was fitted with LEMUR commander's roof-mounted stabilised sights. Theoretically, if fitted to CV90 IFVs, this would give the vehicles a hunter-killer capability in day and night conditions.

The Swedish Army has ordered upgrades to 262 CV90s, with redelivery to take place from 2019 to 2023. The upgrade will include 172 Strf 9040 IFVs, 40 Stripbv 90 command vehicles, 22 Epbv 90 forward observation vehicles, 16 Lvk 90 air defence vehicles, and 12 Bgbv 90 ARVs. The vehicles will receive a new BMS, the existing Ksp m/39 (M1919A4) co-axial MGs will be traded for the Ksp m/59 (FN MAG), and their chassis will be refurbished. Besides the general upgrades across all the variants, the Epbv 90 and Lvk 90 variants will have their thermal imagers replaced by the same one used by the Strf 9040C IFV. The Strf 9040s will also receive a software update to their FCSs.

There are options for additional upgrades (and initial plans had called for 365 vehicles to be upgraded), but it is also possible some vehicles will be placed in reserve.

Armoured modular vehicle (Pansarterrängbil 360)

Sweden in 2009 chose Patria's 8×8 armoured modular vehicle (AMV) to meet the army's armoured wheeled vehicle requirement. A total of 113 AMVs were ordered, enough to equip one battalion with 79 APCs capable of carrying 9 dismounts, 16 C2 vehicles, 11 ambulances, and 7 repair vehicles. The first vehicle was handed over to Sweden in 2013 and all vehicles were delivered by late 2014.

Just under 150 XA-203 armoured vehicles remain in Swedish service (in addition to smaller numbers of XA-180 and XA-202S), but the AMV, known in Swedish service as the Pansarterrängbil 360, is a more versatile and survivable platform. First, it has a greater payload capability and more volume than the legacy XA-203s. This relatively large hull and payload allow the AMV to be configured for a variety of roles and be fitted with a range of weapon systems if required. In addition, the XA-203 is a 6×6 while the AMV is an 8×8, which gives the latter improved cross-country mobility.

Lastly, the AMV has an all-welded steel armour hull that provides crew and passengers with protection from small-arms fire and shell splinters. Passive armour can also be added. Sweden has also procured a mobile camouflage systems to help increase the vehicle's survivability.

The AMVs are fitted with a Kongsberg Protector RWS that can be armed with a 7.62 mm MG (KSP58), a 12.7 mm MG (KSP88), or a 40 mm grenade launcher.

Sweden had an option for another 113 AMVs but this was not exercised, as organisational changes eliminated the requirement for more vehicles.

2019-11-19

Artillery

FH-77BW L52 Archer

Sweden has converted 24 FH-77B towed howitzers into self-propelled systems, which are designated the FH-77BW L52 Archer. This is providing the army with a fully automatic artillery system that is highly mobile and can be quickly brought into action, laid onto the target, loaded and fired with the crew fully protected from small-arms fire, shell splinters, and other threats. Of note, all of Sweden's 51 FH-77Bs were taken out of service in 2011 in preparation for the upgrade. Thus, the artillery units for a time had no weapons at their disposal.

The first operational Archer system was delivered by BAE Systems Bofors AB to the FMV on 28 September 2015 (although four prototypes were delivered in 2013 for training). The FMV in turn delivered the first four operational systems to the army in February 2016 and the last in 2017.

In addition, Sweden has resigned itself to buying at least some of the Archers originally meant to be bought by Norway. Twelve of the guns are being delivered in 2019 and 2020. Meanwhile, a decision on the last 12 meant for Norway is pending.

The Archer platform is a Volvo A30D 6×6 articulated all-terrain hauler vehicle with a mounted 155 mm gun and a fully armoured cabin. The crew can carry out the loading, laying, and firing of the gun from inside this cabin. This design allows the gun to be brought into and out of action quickly (in about 30 seconds), making it less vulnerable to counter-battery fire. For self-defence, a Kongsberg Protector RWS is mounted on the top of the crew compartment.

The Archer gun can fire a wide range of 155 mm artillery projectiles with an average maximum range of 35-40 km with conventional projectiles and 60 km with the 155 mm M982 Excalibur. In addition, the Archer is also able to fire the Bofors/Giat BONUS top-attack munition already in service. The BONUS round can be fired up to 35 km, deploying two sensor-fused munitions that each search for and neutralise armoured targets. Sweden in 2017 ordered the latest version of BONUS, which combines the use of the system's infrared detectors with a laser sensor that analyses objects to better identify targets.

The gun has a magazine with 21 rounds that are automatically loaded, allowing it to fire 3 rounds in 16 seconds or 7 rounds in 1 minute and achieve a multiple-round simultaneous impact capability of 4-6 rounds depending on the distance to the target. The gun has a sustained rate of fire of one round per eight seconds.

In addition, a direct fire day/night sight is fitted, which enables targets to be engaged out to 2,000 m.

The Archer vehicle can reach road speeds of 70 km/h and has good mobility in snow. It is rail transportable and can also be moved by an A400M aircraft.

Granatkastarpansarbandvagn 90 (Mjölner) self-propelled mortar system

In December 2016 BAE Systems Hagglunds was awarded a contract to install 120 mm Mjölner (Hammer of Thor) twin mortar systems on 40 CV90s (these being in storage). The system, called the Granatkastarpansarbandvagn 90, will provide army mechanised battalions with a highly mobile and survivable indirect fire capability to contribute to combined arms manoeuvre warfare operations. Delivery started in 2019 and is expected to be concluded in 2020.

The Mjölner comprises two 120 mm smoothbore mortars that are muzzle loaded using a mechanical ammunition handing system. They are mounted in a fully enclosed turret and thus retractable. Traditionally 81 mm and 120 mm mortars are fired through the open roof hatches of a vehicle. This leaves the crew vulnerable to overhead attack and thus there is a clear move towards turret mounted mortar systems.

The Mjölner system takes less than two minutes to come into action and carry out a fire mission and with the first four 120 mm mortar bombs being fired in about eight seconds. It takes less than one minute to come out of action and maximum rate of fire is stated to be up to 16 rounds a minute with a sustained rate of fire of up to 10 rounds a minute. Maximum range depends on the type of mortar bomb being fired and its associated charge, but is typically about 9 km.

A typical ammunition load is about 50 mortar bombs, which will be carried in the rear of the turret with additional ammunition possibly stowed in the hull.

2019-09-11

Anti-tank systems

Carl Gustaf M2/3 (Ggr m/48/86)

The Carl Gustaf M2 (Ggr or Granatgevär m/48B and m/48C) is an 84 mm manportable recoilless anti-tank rifle used by the Swedish Army. The M2 is rechargeable and can fire anti-tank and anti-personnel rounds, as well as smoke grenades. It can fire between 6 and 10 grenades per minute. The Swedish Army also uses the Carl Gustaf M3 (GRG m/86) version. Compared to the M2, which is completely made up of steel, the newer M3 is significantly lighter thanks to its carbon fibre sleeve (instead of steel) and aluminium and plastic external parts.

Pansarskott m/86

The Pansarskott m/86 (AT4) is a single-shot disposable 84 mm manportable unguided anti-tank weapon in service with the Swedish Army. The army also fields a version specifically designed for use in buildings and urban environments.

RBS 58

The Swedish FMV had started a procurement procedure for a new anti-tank guided missile under the designation RBS 58 (Robotsystem or Missile System 58). However, the programme was cancelled in December 2018 due to lack of funding. That said, it is possible it will be restarted.

The system was to equip motorised infantry units of the regular Swedish Army, which has the older RBS 56 BILL. The requirements were for a man-portable system with a minimum range of 4,000 m, lock-on after launch, and a fire-and-forget capability.

2019-12-09

Ground-based air defence systems

For air defence, the Swedish Army operates the Robotsystem (RBS) 70 short-range man-portable air defence system (MANPADS), the RBS 97 medium-range SAM, and 30 CV9040 anti-aircraft vehicles (Lvk 90). Together these systems are tasked to protect Swedish Army units and high-priority targets (for example, population centres and critical military and civilian infrastructure).

Sweden is in the process of replacing its RBS 70 with the IRIS-T SLS (RBS 98), which should enter service in 2019. Looking further ahead, Sweden plans to procure the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system to replace the RBS 97.

Supreme Commander Byden announced in January 2019 that the army's air defence capability would be strengthened. As part of this, and as an interim solution, systems that had been mothballed after budget cuts in 2004 are to be reintroduced. New air defence companies are being stood up to operate the systems.

RBS 70

The RBS 70 MANPADS has been in service with the Swedish Army since 1977. It has an inventory of 60 RBS 70 launchers. The RBS 70 replaced the 20 mm cannon and General Dynamics Redeye (known locally as the RB69) shoulder-launched SAM at brigade level and the Bofors 40 mm and 57 mm AAGs at divisional level. Over the past decades, the RBS 70 has received upgrades to extend its area coverage and improve its kill capabilities. In addition, the Swedish Army has procured the RBS 70 New Generation (NG) in limited numbers.

Following an upgrade in the early 2000s, the (fourth generation) RBS 70 is armed with a Bolide all-target missile that can travel at higher speed (Mach 2) and engage targets at a range of 8,000 m, with a maximum engagement altitude range of 5,000 m. The Bolide has a shaped charge warhead with a pre-fragmented jacket, adaptable proximity fuze, and reprogrammable electronics, which enables it to engage cruise missiles and UAVs.

Meanwhile, the RBS 70 NG builds on the earlier RBS 70, but adds an advanced, integrated sighting system. This includes an integrated thermal imager (the earlier RBS 70 variant used a BORC

clip-on thermal imager), an autotracker for improved aiming/guidance, an improved acquisition and engagement system to shorten the engagement sequence, 3-D visual cueing, automatic after-action video, and improved human-machine interface (HMI) functions for the gunner.

RBS 23

In mid-2019, the RBS re-entered service with the Swedish Army's Air Defence Regiment (on the island of Gotland after having been taken out of storage. The system is produced by Saab and consists of the PS-90 radar and several fire units. Its missiles (based on those used by the RBS 70) have a range of 15–20 km and can reach a speed of more than Mach 3.

IRIS-T (RBS 98)

Sweden has ordered an undisclosed number of IRIS-T SLS short-range, self-propelled SAM systems to replace its RBS 70 MANPADS. The IRIS-T system will be known as the RBS 98 in Swedish service. Sweden took delivery of a trial version in 2016 and entry into service was expected in 2017, but this has been delayed until late 2019.

Hawk (RBS 97)

The MIM-23 PIP Phase III Hawk (RBS 97 in Swedish service) is the only medium-range SAM in service with the Swedish Armed Forces. The effective range of the RBS 97 is 40,000 m, while it can cover altitudes up to 18,000 m. The RBS 97 system was delivered to the Swedish Army in 2006.

The RBS 97 is a rebuilt and upgraded version of the Swedish variant of the MIM-23 Hawk (RBS 77), which entered service in 1983. Compared to the RBS 77, the RBS 97 has a modified gun carriage, a PE-542 high-power illuminator/continuous wave radar, and renovated missiles. The system does not have its own tracking radar, but receives data from a separate Surveillance and Control Centre (Underrättelseenhet [UndE] 23) with a ground-based Saab Giraffe 3-D radar. Each carriage can carry three missiles.

The RBS 97 is receiving upgrades to extend its life at least 10 years. The upgrades' service life extension started in early 2016 and will run three years, with an IOC anticipated in 2019.

Patriot air defence system

The Swedish government in November 2017 announced its intention to acquire the Patriot air and missile defence system to replace the RBS 97. Sweden has requested four Patriot Configuration-3+ Modernized Fire Units comprising: four AN/MPQ-65 phased array radar sets, four AN/MSQ-132 engagement control stations, nine antenna mast groups, 12 M903 launching stations, 100 Patriot MIM-104E Guidance Enhanced Missile-TBM (GEM-T) missiles, 200 Lockheed Martin PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) missiles, and four Electrical Power Plants (EPP) III. Deliveries should begin in 2020, with the system becoming operational no later than 2025.

CV90 autonomous armoured air defence system

There are 30 CV9040 anti-aircraft vehicles (designated Luftvärnkanonsvagn 90: Lkvk 90) in service with the Swedish Armed Forces, of which three have been upgraded to the CV9040 C standard. The Lkvk 90 is capable of engaging aerial targets, including helicopters, at ranges up to 4,000 m. The vehicles have been in service with the Swedish Army since 1997.

The Lkvk 90 has the same hull as the CV9040. It is fitted with the Bofors 40 mm L/70 cannon, Saab Systems' UTAAS AAG sight (which includes a thermal imager, laser rangefinder, and fire-control computer), a Thales TRS 2620 reconnaissance radar, and automatic threat evaluation. Mounted on the rear of the turret is the radar, which is the French Thales Air Defence Gerfaut system.

An identification friend-or-foe system is fitted as standard on this version of the CV90 vehicle and a maximum of six targets can be prioritised. If required by the tactical situation, the radar can be switched off and target information received from another source.

A demonstrator version of the Lkvk 90, designated Lkvk 90 Teknikdemonstrator (TD), was delivered to the armed forces in late 2002. The TD was created to test a major improvement of target data communication that enables the Lkvk 90 to engage air and ground defence targets on the move, which would increase reaction time and enable the Lkvk 90 to keep up with other elements of the battlegroup such as the Leopard 2 tank and CV9040.

2019-11-19

Army aviation

All Swedish military aircraft are operated by the SwAF. Rotary-wing aircraft that operate primarily to support the Swedish Army in the land domain include the:

- AW109 (Hkp 15A)
- S-70A Black Hawk
- NH90 tactical transport helicopter (TTH).

In addition, the SwAF's C-130H transport aircraft and RQ-7B UAVs (in the ISR role) routinely support the land forces. For complete profiles of these assets, see the separate entries in *Jane's World's Air Forces Sweden* entry.

The Swedish Army does operate its own UAVs. Sweden has procured at least 12 Puma AE ("Korpen") and Wasp ("Svalan") UAVs (ordered in 2012).

2019-11-14

Equipment in service

System name	Family name	Running gear	Mobility	Role general	Role specific	Total delivered	In service	Year of initial delivery	Notes
Pansarterrangil 360 C2	Pansarterrangil 360	Wheeled	Self-propelled	C4ISTAR	Command/information	16	16	2013	
XA-202	XA-200	Wheeled	Self-propelled	C4ISTAR	Command/information	20	20	2001	Number in service includes electronic counter measures vehicle, home vehicle and radio relay vehicle.
Stridsledningspansarbandvagn 90	CV90	Tracked	Self-propelled	C4ISTAR	Command/information	54	54	1995	
CV90 FOV	CV90	Tracked	Self-propelled	C4ISTAR, Combat/offensive	Forward observation	42	42	1995	

Lvk 90	CV90	Tracked	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Air defence	30	30	1993	Fitted with a 40 mm L/70 gun.
RBS 97	HAWK			Combat/offensive	Air defence	unknown	unknown	2006	Number is officially classified.
Pansarterrangil 360 APC	Pansarterrangil 360	Wheeled	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Armoured personnel carrier	79	78	2013	

XA-203	XA-200	Wheel ed	Self - propelled	Combat/ offensive	Armoured personnel carrier	150	148	2001	In service number includes anti-aircraft command vehicle, command and control vehicle, ambulance, CBRN detection vehicle, maintenance vehicle and IED vehicle.
XA-180	XA-180	Wheel ed	Self - propelled	Combat/ offensive	Armoured personnel carrier	41	34	1992	

Granatkastarpa nsarbandvagn 90	CV90	Tracked	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Gun	8	8	2019
FH-77 BW L52 Archer	FH-77	Wheeled	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Gun	24	24	2015
CV90	CV90	Tracked	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Infantry fighting vehicle	356	356	1993
Strv 122A	Strv 122	Tracked	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Tank	120	110	1996
Strv 122D	Strv 122	Tracked	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Tank	unknown	unknown	2019
Strv 122B	Strv 122	Tracked	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Tank	10	10	1996
Strv 122C	Strv 122	Tracked	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Tank	unknown	unknown	2019
Bv206S	Bv206S	Tracked	Self-propelled	Logistics/support	Cargo, Transport	93	93	2011

PioneerPanzer 3 Kodiak	Leopard 2	Tracked	Self-propelled	Logistics/support	Combat engineer	6	6	2011
Leopard 2 LEGUAN	Leopard 2	Tracked	Self-propelled	Logistics/support	Mechanised bridge	3	3	2017
Pansarterrangil 360 Medical	Pansarterrangil 360	Wheeled	Self-propelled	Logistics/support	Medical	11	11	2013
Bärgningsbandvagn 90	CV90	Tracked	Self-propelled	Logistics/support	Recovery	26	26	1995
Bärgningsbandvagn 120	Büffel	Tracked	Self-propelled	Logistics/support	Recovery, Repair	14	14	2002
Pansarterrangil 360 Repair	Pansarterrangil 360	Wheeled	Self-propelled	Logistics/support	Repair	7	7	2013
RG32M	RG32M	Wheeled	Self-propelled	Logistics/support	Tactical/light utility, Transport	260	260	2006
BvS10 Mk IIB	BvS10	Tracked	Self-propelled	Logistics/support	Transport, Cargo	150	150	2013

2019-04-22

Small arms and light weapons

Man-portable air defence systems

Type	Role
RBS 70	Man-portable surface-to-air missile launcher

Infantry support weapons

Type	Role
TOW (RBS 55)	Anti-tank guided weapon
NLAW (Robot 57)	Anti-tank guided weapon
84 mm Pansarskott 86 (AT-4/4C)	Light anti-tank weapon
84 mm Carl Gustaf M2 (Ggr m/48B/48C)	Recoilless rifle
84 mm Carl Gustaf M3 (Ggr m/86)	Recoilless rifle
40 mm Grsp 92 (MK19 M3)	Belt-fed automatic grenade launcher
120 mm Grk m/41D	Mortar
81 mm Grk m/29	Mortar

Small arms

Type	Role
9 mm Pist 88 (Glock 17/19)	Pistol
12-guage Förstärkningsvapen 870C (Remington 870)	Shotgun
Remington 11-87	Shotgun
Beretta 686	Shotgun
5.56 mm Ak 5C/D (FN FNC)	Assault rifle
7.62 mm Ak 4B/C (G3)	Assault rifle

7.62 mm Psg 90/90B (Accuracy Int. Arctic Warfare)	Assault rifle
12.7 mm AG 90C (Barrett M82A1)	Anti-materiel rifle
5.56 mm Ksp 90C (FN MINIMI)	Machine gun
7.62 mm Ksp 58B/C STRF/C2/E/F (FN MAG)	Machine gun
12.7 mm Tksp 88/60 (FNM2HB-QCB)	Machine gun
40 mm Granattillsats (M203)	Grenade launcher

2019-09-20

Army aviation

Syst em nam e	Fa mil y na me	Ty pe	Manne d- unman ned	Role gener al	Role specific	Total delive red	In servi ce	Year of initia l deliv ery	No tes
Was p AE	Was p III	Fix ed- win g	Unman ned		Surveillance/reconn aissance	unkno wn	unkn own	unkn own	
RQ- 20B	Pum a AE	Fix ed- win g	Unman ned	C4IS TAR	Surveillance/reconn aissance	unkno wn	unkn own	unkn own	

Air Force

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UPDATED

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2019-11-22

Summary



Sweden – Air Force ()

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Strength	Regular: 2,800 Reserves: 1,150
Fixed-wing multirole combat aircraft	JAS 39C Gripen JAS 39Ds Gripen (also used for training)
Fixed-wing transport aircraft	C-130H
Fixed-wing tanker aircraft	TP84T (C-130H tanker conversion)
Rotary-wing multirole transport aircraft	NH90 TTH (being upgraded to final configuration)
Rotary-wing anti-submarine aircraft	HKP 14F (NH90 TTH modified for anti-submarine warfare) (not yet fully capable of operations)

2019-11-22

Executive summary

- Although modest in size, the Swedish Air Force (Svenska Flygvapnet: SwAF) is well equipped and capable of undertaking a range of security tasks. The combat capability of the

SwAF is provided by about 100 JAS 39C/D Gripen multirole combat aircraft. The Gripen can perform air defence, ground attack, anti-ship attack, and reconnaissance tasks. Of note, in 2016 the SwAF accepted into service both the Meteor beyond visual range (BVR) air-to-air missiles and GBU-39 small diameter bomb (SDB), which significantly enhanced anti-air and ground attack capabilities respectively. The SwAF also has a fleet of fixed- and rotary-wing logistics aircraft to carry out tactical and battlefield transport, as well as other tasks. Helicopters are primarily land based, although the AW109s can embark on some Royal Swedish Navy (RSwN) ships for limited periods of time. The rotary-wing fleet also included 18 NH90 tactical transport helicopters (TTHs). Nine of these carry out logistics tasks while the other nine are designated an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) role. Although delivery has been completed, modification is ongoing and the maritime helicopters will not achieve a full combat capability until the mid 2020s.

- In addition to being responsible for the defence of national airspace, the SwAF also provides support to the Swedish Army in the field and the RSwN at sea. It also provides assistance to the state as need, in particular in the event of national emergencies.
- Sweden, for many years, has emphasised participation in international peace support missions, although the contributions are usually not large. The SwAF contributes to the UN mission in Mali, but provides only unmanned aerial vehicles. Of note, in 2011 it deployed combat aircraft to support the international mission in Libya. This was the first international mission for SwAF combat aircraft since 1961 and the first time Sweden's Gripens undertook combat duty.
- Priority programmes over the next decade are procurement of 60 JAS 39E Gripen fighters, bringing the NH90 ASW variants up to operational capability, and procuring a stand-off air-to-surface missile and an extended-range, anti-ship missile for the Gripen. Meanwhile, a decision on the replacement of the C-130 fleet was considered a top priority, especially in view of the 2015 retirement of a quarter of the fleet, leaving just six aircraft (one of which is a tanker conversion) in service. However, Sweden has decided that a replacement for the C-130 will not be fielded until after 2030. In the interim, the C-130s will receive upgrades.
- Sweden reversed an earlier decision to use parts from the operational JAS 39C/D aircraft for the construction of the JAS 39E. This enables the SwAF to maintain better availability of the JAS 39C/D fleet as the new fighter aircraft are built. In addition, as announced in the Swedish Defence Commission's white book on *Sweden's Security Policy and the Development of the Military Defence 2021-2025*, it allows the SwAF to continue operating some JAS 39C/D fighters beyond 2030. This compensates for an anticipated shortfall in JAS 39E numbers, as procurement is 20 aircraft short of the 80 initially requested by the SwAF.

Deployments and operations

2019-05-10

Force distribution

The SwAF has five operational Gripen squadrons - two in northern Sweden and three in the southern part of the country. This distribution leaves it well poised to respond to any incursions of national airspace. Meanwhile, fixed-wing transports and rotary-wing assets are located at southern bases, where they can more easily support the navy and army.

In the event of war, tactical aircraft would be dispersed to predesignated stretches of road and remote landing strips around the country, ensuring they are not easily targeted by an enemy.

2019-12-09

Recent and current operations

Mali

The Swedish Armed Forces have deployed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Timbuktu to support the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). It appears that the AAI Shadow 200, AeroVironment Puma, and AeroVironment Wasp UAVs have all been deployed.

From November 2017 to May 2018 Sweden deployed a C-130H transport aircraft to Mali. This contribution was part of an agreement with Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and Portugal to enhance MINUSMA's tactical transport capability on a rotational basis. Besides the aircraft, this contribution included approximately 60 personnel.

Operation 'Unified Protector' (Libya)

The NATO-led Operation 'Unified Protector' over Libya in 2011 marked the first occasion on which Sweden's Gripen fighter force undertook combat duty. From April to October 2011 Gripen aircraft completed some 650 sorties and accumulated 2,000 flying hours, although no munitions were dropped. In Sweden, the Libyan operation was known by the codename Operation 'Karakal'.

Afghanistan

The SwAF from April 2013 to May 2014 deployed four Hkp 16 Black Hawk helicopters to Camp Marmal, Afghanistan to undertake casualty evacuation duties in support of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations. This task was initially undertaken by Hkp 10B Super Pumas, which began operations from Mazar-i-Sharif on 1 April 2011.

ELINT missions

Sweden's S102B Korpen ELINT aircraft are routinely used to fly surveillance missions over the Baltic Sea monitoring Russian activity in and around the Kaliningrad enclave. The aircraft also flew missions over Libya to support SwAF Gripen aircraft participating in NATO-led Operation 'Unified Protector' in 2011. More recently, once in 2018 and again in 2019 a SwAF Korpen operated over the eastern Mediterranean off the coast of Lebanon, Israel, and Syria. The mission was most likely linked to the Russian presence in Syria.

2019-05-10

Organisation

The SwAF is organised into three wings, each with two fighter squadrons. One of the wings also has a logistics squadron that includes C-130Hs and special mission aircraft. The SwAF also has a helicopter wing assigned all rotary-wing assets and one training wing

2019-05-10

Order of battle

Unit hierarchy	Base	Type	Primary role (General)	Primary role (Specific)	Primary equipment	Notes
Swedish Air Force		Service Support	Command and Control			
Air Combat School	Uppsala	Support (Ground-based)	Training			
Air Control and Surveillance Battalion	Uppsala	Support (Ground-based)	Ground-based Air Control			
Flying School	Linköping-Malmen	Fixed Wing	Training		SK60AU	
Armed Forces Helicopter Wing	Linköping-Malmen	Rotary Wing	Logistics			
1 Helicopter Squadron	Lulea	Rotary Wing	Logistics	Multirole Logistics	NH90 TTH	
2 Helicopter Squadron	Linköping-Malmen	Rotary Wing	Logistics	Multirole Logistics	NH90 TTH, UH-60M, AW109LUH	
3 Helicopter Squadron	Ronneby	Rotary Wing	Logistics	Multirole Logistics	Hkp 14F, NH90 TTH, Hkp 15B, Hkp 15A	

30 (1 Livgrendajar) Home Guard Battalion	Linköping -Malmö	Combat Support	Security		
31 (2 Livgrendajar) Home Guard Battalion	Linköping -Malmö	Combat Support	Security		
Blekinge Wing	Ronneby	Fixed Wing	Combat	Multirole Combat	
1 Airbase Battalion	Ronneby	Support (Ground-based)	Logistics		
171 Fighter Squadron	Ronneby	Fixed Wing	Combat	Multirole Combat	JAS 39C, JAS 39D
172 Fighter Squadron	Ronneby	Fixed Wing	Combat	Multirole Combat	JAS 39C, JAS 39D
Norbotten Wing	Luleå	Fixed Wing	Combat	Multirole Combat	
2 Airbase Battalion	Luleå	Support (Ground-based)	Logistics		
211 Fighter Squadron	Luleå	Fixed Wing	Combat	Multirole Combat	JAS 39C, JAS 39D
212 Fighter Squadron	Luleå	Fixed Wing	Combat	Multirole Combat	JAS 39C, JAS 39D
Skaraborg Wing	Sätersås	Fixed Wing	Combat	Multirole Combat	
71 Fighter Squadron	Sätersås	Fixed Wing	Combat	Multirole Combat	JAS 39C, JAS 39D
72 Fighter Squadron	Sätersås	Fixed Wing	Combat	Multirole Combat	JAS 39C

73rd Tactical Air Transport Squadron	Linköping -Malmö	Fixed Wing	ISTAR	Electronic Intelligence	S 102B Korpen, Saab 340BPlus
73rd Tactical Air Transport Squadron, Satenas Detachment	Satenas	Fixed Wing	Logistics	Transport	C-130H
73rd Tactical Air Transport Squadron, Stockholm Detachment	Stockholm Bromma	Fixed Wing	Logistics	VIP Transport	Gulfstream IV, G550

2019-05-10

EU pooling and sharing

Sweden is involved in efforts by the European Defence Agency to enhance the military capabilities of member states through pooling and sharing of equipment and technology. Pooling and sharing initiatives in which the SwAF participates include The European Air Transport Fleet.

2019-05-10

Bases

Name	Latitude	Longitude	Number of Runways	Notes
Froson-Ostersund	63.194722	14.499444	1	
Karlsborg	58.5291667	14.5236111	1	Karlsborg is operated by both the army and the air force.
Lulea	65.542902	22.123864	1	
Uppsala	59.888799	17.608138	2	

Ronneby	56.266526	15.26519	1	
Visby	57.661389	18.345556	2	
Linköping-Malmen	58.402249	15.525785	2	
Vidsele Airfield	65.876015	20.147382	3	Forward operating location and testing/evaluation site
Sundsvall	62.52719	17.444535	1	
Satenas	58.429587	12.711399	2	
Stockholm Bromma	59.353056	17.945	1	

Dispersal airfields are operated by base battalions. These are not used on a day-to-day basis, but may be activated as and when required.

2019-11-18

Personnel

- The Swedish parliament suspended compulsory military service in May 2010. From 1 July 2010 recruitment became based on a voluntary application system. However, Sweden announced on 2 March 2017 that conscription was to be reactivated. Registration began on 1 July 2017, with liability to undergo basic military training starting from 1 January 2018. Individuals are selected for basic military training depending on their suitability and motivation.
- Without conscription, the Swedish Armed Forces had difficulties satisfying personnel requirements. On average, only 2,500 of the 4,000 recruits required annually could be attracted.
- The SwAF has a shortfall in personnel, especially fighter pilots. Looking ahead, a major area of concern is an upcoming wave of officer retirements.
- The Defence Commission has proposed the number of conscripts serving annually be doubled from 4,000 to 8,000 by 2024. This will allow for a new war-time organization and improve the ability to recruit officers.

2019-05-10

Training

- Technical and flight training are conducted in-country at several locations. The air force also trains its own base-defence troops.

- There is no publically available information on the number of flight hours each fighter pilot receives annually. In 2017 the number of flight hours for the JAS 39C/D Gripen was approximately 10,600. Assuming that there are at least as many pilots as there are aircraft (and there are likely more) and an even distribution of flight hours per pilot, the SwAF likely falls below the NATO standard of 180 hours per year per pilot.

Air schools

Name	Latitude	Longitude	Notes
Air Combat School	59.888283	17.606373	Includes the Flying School, Battle Management and Air Surveillance School, Flight Officer School, R3 School, and Basic Command School.

Training areas

Name	Latitude	Longitude	Notes
Vidsel Test Range	66.348465	19.251728	

2019-11-18

Military exercises

'Air Force Exercise 19' : The SwAF in late March 2019 conducted 'Air Force Exercise 18' (Flygvapenövning 18'). The objective of the exercise was to practice tactical command and control of the SwAF and its capability to contribute to national defense in the context of a high-spectrum conflict in winter conditions against a technologically advanced enemy. The exercise was conducted in north Sweden and north-western Finland, in parallel with the multinational 'Northern Wind' military exercise. Participating SwAF aircraft included Jas 39 Gripen fighters. Finnish Air Force F/A-18 Hornets also participated.

'Arctic Challenge 2019' : The SwAF participated in 'Arctic Challenge 2019' ('ACE 19') between 22 May and 4 June 2019. This was the fourth instalment of the exercise, which is organised in the context of the CBT agreement between Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Denmark. Besides Sweden, which led the exercise, eight other countries participated in the exercise (Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States) with more than 100 aircraft. The scenario involved a UN-mandated international crisis management operation. Sweden participated with JAS 39 Gripen aircraft and NH90 TTT helicopters.

Core assets and procurement initiatives

2019-11-18

Combat aircraft

JAS 39C/D Gripen

The SwAF has a fleet of just more than 70 JAS 39C (single-seat) and about 2 dozen JAS 39D (two-seat) Gripen multirole fighters. These are assigned to five operational squadrons and a training element. The Gripen is highly versatile, having a multimode avionics package that allows the aircraft's systems to be rapidly reconfigured for air defence, attack, or reconnaissance tasks.

The Gripen achieved initial operational capability (IOC) in September 1997 and eventually replaced the Saab JA 37 Viggen and Saab J 35 Draken. It offered greater manoeuvrability and a greater payload capacity with an equivalent range. The last new-build aircraft (a JAS 39C) was delivered in November 2008. Overall, Sweden has procured 195 Gripens – 5 JAS 39 prototypes and 1 JAS 39C testbed, plus 105 J 39As, 15 J 39Bs, 57 J 39Cs, and 12 J 39Ds. In addition, 18 J 39As and 13 J 39Bs were upgraded to J 39C and J 39D standard respectively. The last JAS 39A to be upgraded to JAS 39C standard was handed over in March 2015.

The JAS 39C represented a significant upgrade from the JAS 39A. First, the JAS 39A could not be refuelled in flight. This capability was added to the J 39C, increasing the endurance of the Swedish fighter fleet significantly. J 39Cs also received Link 16 and identification friend-or-foe (IFF) systems, allowing them to better co-operate with NATO air forces. The 39A had only national networking and identification systems, making integration into a multinational force more difficult. Other upgrades on the JAS 39C/D included the addition of a helmet-mounted sight and enhanced electronic warfare (EW) systems.

The Gripen's air-to-air weapons include the AIM-120B AMRAAM (RB 99), Sidewinder AIM-9L (RB 74), IRIS-T (RB 98), and Meteor BVR AAM, which became operational in April 2016. It also has a 27 mm Mauser BK27 automatic cannon.

Air-to-surface options include the RB 15F anti-ship missile, cluster bombs, rockets, and either dumb or laser guided bombs, including the GBU-39 SDB.

Like the Viggen before it, the Gripen can operate from small airstrips and straight stretches of road. The Gripen also has rapid turnaround capability (10 minutes for air defence missions and 20 for attack missions) and simple maintenance (needing a ground team of only five conscripts and one supervisory technician). This allows Sweden to disperse the aircraft in the event of war, increasing their chances of survival.

The most recent upgrade, called the MS20 upgrade, included integration of the GBU-39 SDB and Meteor BVR missile, full implementation of the Link 16 datalink, improved radar modes, a digital close air support capability, night-capable operations using the SPK 39 Modular Reconnaissance Pod, and a ground collision avoidance system. The first upgraded aircraft was accepted into service in June 2016 and all aircraft have since received the upgrade. Integration of the Meteor is reported as being on schedule (in the 2018 Swedish Armed Forces Annual Report) but no further details are available.

Saab has already been awarded a contract to upgrade the MS20 configuration. Improvements will be made to the aircraft's 'central capabilities', including the target acquisition, self-protection,

communication, and human-machine interface systems, as well as a number of key support and training systems.

The SwAF will continue operating the JAS 39C fighter until the end of the 2030s. Meanwhile, the twin-seat JAS 39Ds are to be used as trainers for tactical and advanced pilot training.

Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile

The Meteor has a very high extreme range (officially stated as beyond 100 km, but reportedly more than 300 km) and a dual rocket and ramjet propulsion system that continues to provide power and acceleration even at maximum range. Traditional rocket-powered AAMs tend to only be powered for their initial flight phase, and thus suffer significantly reduced performance in their terminal phase when at maximum range. Saab claims the Meteor has a no-escape zone three times greater than any current BVR missile.

Long-range air-to-surface missile

The SwAF has a requirement for a precision long-range air-to-surface missile, as it lacks this capability. The Taurus KEPD 350 missile is one possibility being considered, as it has already been integrated on to the Gripen and thus could offer a quick operational capability. However, no concrete plans to procure such systems for the JAS 39C/D exist today. Looking further ahead, the JAS 39E version will likely be fitted with long-range air-to-surface missiles when this model becomes operational in the 2020s.

JAS 39E Gripen

In order to maintain its fighter capability through to 2040, Sweden is procuring 60 JAS 39E aircraft (also referred to as the Gripen Next Generation). Although it was originally intended that they would be remanufactured airframes, it has since been decided that they will be entirely new-build aircraft. The Gripen E took its maiden flight on 15 June 2017. The first examples should be delivered in 2020 and all aircraft are expected to be handed over by around 2026.

Larger than previous models, the JAS 39E has two extra weapons stations and will be able to stay airborne 50% longer than current versions, as it has greater fuel capacity. Despite this larger size, the aircraft also has a reduced radar cross-section when compared to the JAS 39C/D.

In addition, the new active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar will be more powerful than current radars, which allows the JAS 39E to detect enemy aircraft sooner.

The JAS 39E also has powerful EW system that includes a "smart" jamming technology and three types of signal generators (digital radio frequency memory, Doppler, and noise) to obscure the existence of the aircraft and confuse an adversary. The EW suite will be a standard fit, which allows a group of several Gripen E aircraft to also engage in a tactic called "blinking" in order to try and confuse enemy aircraft or air defence systems.

The Swedish government has also stated that the JAS 39E Gripen will employ a long-range air-to-surface missile system.

Saab next-generation anti-ship missile

Saab has signed a contract with the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration for the development and production of a new-generation, extended-range, anti-ship missile system to enter service in the early 2020s. The new weapon will build on the existing RBS15 Mk 3 anti-ship missile but with enhanced capabilities. The current RBS15 Mk 3 has a range in excess of 200 km, but the new turbojet-powered weapon is expected to be able to fly considerably further. The missile will be employed by the JAS 39E and the RSwN's Visby-class corvettes. Saab has stated that it expects to complete deliveries in 2026.

2019-11-18

Logistics aircraft

C-130H transports

The SwAF has five C-130H Hercules (Tp 84) transports in service out of an original fleet of eight. One of the transports was converted into a tanker beginning in 2001, while another two were mothballed in April 2015. Sweden's C-130s are the oldest examples active in Europe today, having first entered service in 1966.

The aircraft have been through multiple life extension and upgrade programmes and will be put through a mid-life upgrade (MLU) that will run from about 2020 to 2024. Work will likely cover the aircraft's avionics (as some instruments are still analogue) but will not involve major structural work. Even with the MLU, the Swedish C-130Hs will not fly beyond 2030-32.

C-130 air-to-air refuelling tanker

In 2001 Sweden contracted Lockheed Martin to convert one C-130H transport to an AAR tanker configuration. To accomplish this, the aircraft received wing-mounted Mk 32B-904E hose-and-drogue pods. Following significant integration delays, the converted C-130H was returned to service in 2005 and continues to support Gripen operations.

The C-130H tanker conversion will undergo the same MLU as the transport variants around 2020-24. With only one of the SwAF's C-130Hs serving as an aerial refuelling platform, the SwAF will lose this capability temporarily while that aircraft goes through the MLU.

C-130 replacement

Sweden had planned to launch a procurement programme for a replacement transport aircraft in 2021. However, in May 2017 it decided instead to upgrade its ageing C-130H Hercules fleet. Despite this, a new transport aircraft capability will be required by about 2030.

UH-60M Black Hawk

Sweden has 15 UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters known locally as the Hkp 16A. These perform medevac, tactical troop transport (TTT), utility, transport (including sling load operations), and SAR missions.

The first six Black Hawks were delivered in 2011 (the first four of which were in basic configuration for training purposes) and the remaining nine in 2012 under an accelerated production schedule. IOC was achieved in 2013. Procurement of the Black Hawk was prompted by incidents in Afghanistan where injured Swedish personnel had to be evacuated by US helicopters because Sweden lacked a helicopter that was able to operate in non-permissive environments.

Four Black Hawks deployed to Afghanistan in early 2013, replacing three Super Pumas. Before going to the war zone, they were upgraded with AN/AAR-57(V)-3 missile warning systems, AN/APR-39 radar warning receivers and AN/AVR-2B laser warning sets. They also gained an exterior rescue hoist, gunner seats, an armoured floor, stackable litters, a cockpit heater, and an environmental control system. The primary mission was forward-deployed medical evacuation, which involved collecting casualties from the point of injury. The Super Pumas in service with the SwAF only flew in daylight and shuttled between hospitals with paved landing areas, and thus undertook no forward evacuations.

NH90 TTH

Sweden is procuring 18 NH90 TTHs (high-cabin versions), comprising 9 TTT/SAR variants, and 9 with ASW capability. The helicopters will be designated Hkp 14E and Hkp 14F, respectively, in their final configurations. Sweden's NH90 fleet was to have been fully operational in 2008, but this has been progressively delayed and still not achieved. All the helicopters are now expected to be in their final configuration by about 2022. Until that time, the SwAF will on average have access to between 10 and 12 helicopters of differing configurations at any one time.

The Sweden-only configurations include twin rescue hoists as a result of lessons learned from the Estonia passenger ferry disaster in 1994, when a number of helicopters suffered malfunctions in their single hoist systems, hampering the rescue effort that night. However, the most noticeable difference that sets the Swedish NH90s apart from others is an additional 25 cm of head room in the main cabin compared with the baseline variants of the aircraft.

NH90 TTT/SAR

The SwAF has received all 13 TTT/SAR variants although not all of these are in service since the earlier configurations are being upgraded to the final standard. The basic variants are suitable only for flight training, while the operational variants are fully mission capable. The helicopters can each carry up to 20 troops (and have room for nine stretchers). They also have the capability to carry internal and sling loaded cargo, including 'Bambi buckets' for firefighting.

The first complete helicopter was originally scheduled for acceptance by Sweden at the end of 2005, but slippage occurred and it was not handed over until June 2007. Subsequent deliveries were subject to further delay, but the first four NH90s in basic configuration (Hkp 14A/B) were formally transferred to the air force in 2011. Two NH90 Enhanced Basic (eBasic) TTTs (designated Hkp

14C) were delivered in December 2010, but never accepted by the SwAF. Instead, they were returned to the manufacturer to be retrofitted to E standard. Meanwhile, the first mission capable NH90 (Hkp 14D) was delivered in late 2013 and the last (the seventh) in 2015. The D variants are now receiving upgrades to bring them up to E standard (incremental work started in mid-2017). Delivery of the first Hkp 14E took place in 2018.

The four basic variant helicopters were originally also supposed to be upgraded to the E standard, but because of Sweden's renewed focus on ASW, the Swedish government decided in September 2015 to modify them into Hkp 14F standard instead.

Strategic Airlift Capability

Sweden has purchased 550 hours per year of the 12-nation Strategic Airlift Capability, which operates three C-17 Globemaster III aircraft.

2019-11-18

Maritime aircraft

NH90 ASW

The first NH90 in ASW configuration (Hkp 14F), was delivered to the SwAF in December 2015 and all five from the original order have now been handed over. In addition, the Swedish Government decided in September 2015 to upgrade four basic configuration Hkp 14A/Bs to this standard in order to further boost ASW capability.

The Hkp 14F should not be confused with the NH90 NATO Frigate Helicopter (NFH). Whereas the NH90 NFH is specifically designed for ASW and ASuW, the Hkp 14F is based on the NH90 TTH, but modified for ASW and the operating environment of the Baltic Sea. The Hkp 14F will have a customised mission system that includes underwater sonar and a tactical radar.

It will take several years before the Hkp 14F will be able to fully conduct effective ASW operations. This is in part because the Hkp 14F is supposed to be fitted with a new lightweight torpedo (Torpedo 47), which is not expected to enter service until at least 2022. Taking into account testing and integration, the torpedo may not arm the Hkp 14F until between 2025 and 2030. In the meantime, the Hkp 14F will be able to detect and track submarines but will have to pass information to other assets if an attack becomes necessary. The helicopters can also carry out transport and SAR tasks.

Of note, the SwAF has not had any assets capable of ASW operations since the last Helikopter 4 (Hkp 4) (Boeing Vertol 107) was retired in 2011.

The NH90 Hkp 14F cannot land on any RSwN vessels and there are no plans in place to modify any ship decks to enable this. Also problematic, Swedish NH90s are equipped with the Link 11 secure tactical datalink, which is not used by any naval units that would be involved in an ASW mission. This would make co-operation in joint operations difficult. The Swedish Defence Commission in 2019 announced a new tactical data link will be integrated.

2019-05-10

C4ISR aircraft

Airborne early warning and control aircraft replacement

The SwAF's Saab 340 Argus AEW aircraft with Erieye radar is reaching the end of its operational life and options for a replacement system are under consideration (although upgrade or retirement of the capability are also being considered). The favoured solution is an AEW version of the Saab 2000, which offers more flight autonomy and a higher operational ceiling. The Saab 2000 would also permit longer time on station and make best use of the surveillance capabilities of the Erieye radar, with its larger cabin permitting more radar operators, display units, and equipment to be carried.

In the interim, the Swedish government has allocated additional funding to keep the 340 Argus AEW aircraft in service 'beyond 2020'. According to the Swedish Armed Forces' 2018 study on long-term equipment needs, this is not likely to extend the operational lifetime of the aircraft beyond 2025.

Of note, Sweden originally has six 340 Argus AEW aircraft but sold four in the wake of 2004 defence budget cuts. With only two of the aircraft now in service, there is almost no ability to absorb losses and maintain an AEW capability.

Shadow UAV

The SwAF operates an estimated eight AAI RQ-7B tactical UAVs. These were delivered in 2011 and replaced the Sperwer A (Ugglan). The RQ-7B, also known as the Shadow 200B or the Örnen (Eagle) in Swedish service, is used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. It is not armed.

2019-08-28

Equipment in service

System name	Family name	Type	Manned-unmanned	Role general	Role specific	Total delivered	In service	Year of initial delivery	Notes
S 102B Korpen	Gulfstream IV	Fixed-wing	Manned	C4ISTAR	Intelligence, Electronic warfare	2	2	1995	
Saab 340B	Saab 340	Fixed-wing	Manned	C4ISTAR	Surveillance/reconnaissance	1	1	2003	

RQ-7B	Shadow	Fixed-wing	Unmanned	C4ISTAR	Surveillance/reconnaissance	unknown	8	2011
340 AEW & C Erieye	Saab 340	Fixed-wing	Manned	C4ISTAR, Logistics/support	Electronic warfare, Early warning	2	2	2004
JAS 39C	JAS 39	Fixed-wing	Manned	Combat/offensive	Attack, Fighter	75	73	2004
JAS 39D	JAS 39	Fixed-wing	Manned	Combat/offensive, Training	Fighter, Attack, Trainer	25	24	2004
Gulfstream IV	Gulfstream IV	Fixed-wing	Manned	Logistics/support	Transport	2	1	1992
C-130H	C-130	Fixed-wing	Manned	Logistics/support	Transport	8	5	unknown
G550	G500	Fixed-wing	Manned	Logistics/support	Transport	1	1	2011
TP84T	C-130	Fixed-wing	Manned	Logistics/support	Tanker	1	1	2005
Saab 340B Plus	Saab 340	Fixed-wing	Manned	Logistics/support	Transport	2	1	2004

SK60 AU	Saab 105	Fixed- wing	Manned	Training	Trainer	unknown	37	2012	
HKP 14F	NH90	Rotary- wing	Manned	C4ISTAR	Anti-submarine, Maritime patrol	9	9	2015	Not at F O C.
Hkp 15B	AW1 09	Rotary- wing	Manned	Logistics/s upport	Utility, Maritime patrol	8	8	2008	
UH-6 0M	UH-6 0	Rotary- wing	Manned	Logistics/s upport	Utility	15	15	2012	
HKP 14E	NH90	Rotary- wing	Manned	Logistics/s upport	Transport, Search/rescue	9	9	2018	
Hkp 15A	AW1 09	Rotary- wing	Manned	Logistics/s upport	Utility	12	12	2007	

Navy

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Summary

Strength	Regular: 2,900 Reserves: 2,050
Attack submarines	Gotland class Södermanland class
Corvettes	Visby class Göteborg/Gävle class
Patrol ship	Stockholm class
Mine-warfare vessels	Spårö class minesweepers Koster class minehunters
Command and support ship	Carlskrona class (can also carry out patrol tasks)
Marines	1 combat battalion

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Executive summary

- The Royal Swedish Navy (Svenska Marinen: RSwN) is focused on coastal defence and littoral warfare. Its surface combatant fleet comprises seven corvettes well suited for such greenwater operations. The five Visby-class corvettes are noteworthy for their high degree of stealth and are well armed to undertake ASW and anti-surface warfare (ASuW). However, in contrast with the two Göteborg/Gävle-class corvettes, they lack even a modest AAW

capability. Meanwhile, two Stockholm-class vessels have been converted into patrol ships. These are still capable of many warfighting tasks, but they cannot perform these tasks simultaneously. The navy also has seven mine-warfare vessels, one versatile command and support ship, and four attack submarines. On land, the RSwN fields a marine infantry battalion and RBS15 Mk 2 coastal defence missiles, which were reintroduced into service in late 2016 (having been removed from service in 2000 due to budget cuts).

- The role of the RSwN is to maintain surveillance of the Baltic Sea and prevent invasion by sea through using a combination of submarines, small surface combatants, maritime helicopters, and coastal defence systems. In addition to conventional warfare tasks, the navy's other key roles include monitoring of sea areas, maritime traffic and fisheries, intelligence gathering, mine clearance, and logistic support.
- The RSwN does not participate extensively in international operations. That said, the bigger size and characteristics of the new Visby corvettes enable high-sea, long-distance deployments. Despite its political neutrality, Sweden is prepared to deploy warships in support of the European Union and participates in NATO's standing maritime groups as part of its Partnership for Peace (PfP) membership.
- *Sweden's Defence Policy 2016 to 2020* outlined several measures to strengthen ASW capabilities, and implementation is well under way. Among these measures, the RSwN is upgrading its Göteborg/Gävle corvettes (including installation of a variable depth sonar). In addition, Sweden is modifying some of its Tapper-class surveillance boats for ASW duties and reinstalling anti-submarine grenade launchers on its Koster-class minehunters. Meanwhile, the Swedish Air Force (Svenska Flygvapnet: SwAF) is procuring nine NH90 helicopters modified for ASW. The SwAF has not had any assets capable of ASW operations since 2011. However, the NH90s will not be armed with a torpedo until the mid-2020s. In addition, they lack a national datalink that would enable them to more effectively conduct joint operations with the corvettes. Sweden is also procuring two Blekinge-class (Type A 26) submarines, with delivery expected in the mid-2020s.
- *Sweden's Defence Policy 2016 to 2020* prioritised ASW and the defence of Stockholm county and Gotland Island. Looking ahead, the Defence Commission in May 2019 recommended further increases in the Swedish Armed Forces' ability to defend against an armed attack. With this in mind, it has recommend that the next defence policy include an upgrade of the Visby corvettes with air defence missiles and new anti-ship missiles; an increase in the number of submarines from four to five, through an upgrade of the third Gotland-class boat; the establishment of a new amphibious battalion; an increase in mine laying capability; the long-term retention of a land-based anti-ship missile system; and the addition of a tactical data link and torpedoes to the SwAF's NH90s.

Deployments and operations

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Force distribution

The RSwN fleet is based in southern Sweden, about half (including the entire submarine flotilla) at Karlskrona and the other half at Berga near Stockholm. These bases give the Swedish fleet easy access to the Baltic Sea, with Berga also being near the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia. However, with the submarines all in Karlskrona, it can take some time for them to get to the Stockholm region if they are needed in the Stockholm archipelago. In the past, submarines were also based at Berga. There is also a small patrol boat squadron at Gothenberg to provide a presence on Sweden's west coast in the confined waters of the Skagerrak.

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Recent and current operations

The RSwN does not make regular contributions to multinational operations or deploy its ships unilaterally at long distances.

Operation 'Atalanta'

Since 2009 the RSwN has contributed five naval units to EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Somalia as part of the counter-piracy effort Operation 'Atalanta'.

The RSwN's latest stint in Operation 'Atalanta' was between August and December 2017. It did not contribute any ships but embarked two Combat Boat (CB) 90s aboard the Royal Netherlands Navy's amphibious warfare ship HNLMS *Rotterdam*.

The RSwN previously contributed naval units to Operation 'Atalanta' in 2009, 2010, 2013, and 2015. In addition to CB90s, deployed assets have included Stockholm-class corvettes, support ships, and AW109 helicopters.

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Organisation

The RSwN is organised into two naval warfare and one submarine flotilla, as well as one amphibious/marine infantry regiment and a support organisation (the Naval Base).

Of note, the Defence Commission in May 2019 proposed the establishment of a new amphibious battalion on Sweden's west coast. Sweden's current amphibious battalion contains 1,200 marines; under the plans for a second battalion, each unit would consist of 800 personnel.

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Order of battle

Unit hierarchy	Base	Type	Primary role (General)	Primary role (Specific)	Primary equipment	Notes
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Royal Swedish Navy		Service Support	Command and Control		
Naval Staff	Musko	Service Support	Command and Control		
Amphibious Regiment	Berga	Combat Arms	Infantry	Naval Infantry	
132 Maritime Security Company	Gothenburg	Combat Arms	Security		Detached part of the 13th Security Battalion.
17 Patrol Boat Company	Gothenburg	Surface	Combat	Special Operations	
2 Amphibious Battalion	Berga	Combat Arms	Infantry	Naval Infantry	Includes one command, one coastal rangers/amphibious special operations, three amphibious infantry, and one maintenance company.
28 (Roslags) Home Guard Battalion	Berga	Combat Arms	Security		Subordinate units based across multiple municipalities. Includes a flight group and a boat platoon.

29 (Sodertors) Home Guard Battalion	Berga	Combat Arms	Security		Subordinate units based across multiple municipalities. Includes a flight group, a boat company, and a CBRN platoon.
First Submarine Flotilla	Karlskrona	Support (Ashore)	Command and Control		
1 Submarine Flotilla Command	Karlskrona	Support (Ashore)	Command and Control		
11 Submarine Squadron	Karlskrona	Under sea	Attack Submarine		
Maritime Transport Unit	Karlskrona	Surface	Combat	Special Operations	
Signals Intelligence Vessel	Karlskrona	Surface	ISTAR	Signals Intelligence	
Submarine Rescue Unit	Karlskrona	Under sea	Rescue		
Fourth Naval Warfare Flotilla	Berga	Support (Ashore)	Command and Control		

4 Naval Warfare Flotilla Command	Berga	Support (Ashore)	Command and Control	
41 Corvette Squadron	Berga	Surface	Combat	Surface Combat
42 Mine Clearance Squadron	Berga	Surface	Combat	Mine Countermeasures
43 Naval Supply Squadron	Berga	Surface	Logistics	
44 Mine Clearance Diver Division	Skredsvik	Under sea	Diver	
Naval Base	Karlskrona	Support (Ashore)	Logistics	Subordinate units located at Karlskrona, Berga, Gothenburg, and Musko.
34 (Kalmar) Home Guard Battalion	Vaxjo	Combat Arms	Security	Subordinate units based across multiple municipalities.

35 (Kronobergs) Home Guard Battalion	Vaxjo	Combat Arms	Security		Subordinate units based across multiple municipalities. Includes a flight group.
36 (Blekinge Vastra) Home Guard Battalion	Karlskrona	Combat Arms	Security		Subordinate units based across multiple municipalities. Includes a flight group.
37 (Blekinge Ostra) Home Guard Battalion	Karlskrona	Combat Arms	Security		Subordinate units based across multiple municipalities. Includes a boat company.
Base Logistics Company	Karlskrona	Support (Ashore)	Logistics		
Base Security Company	Karlskrona	Combat Support	Security		
Carriage Company	Karlskrona	Surface	Logistics	Service Support	
Maritime Information Company	Karlskrona	Support (Ashore)	ISTAR		

Third Naval Warfare Flotilla	Karlskrona	Support (Ashore)	Command and Control	
3 Naval Warfare Flotilla Command	Karlskrona	Support (Ashore)	Command and Control	
31 Corvette Squadron	Karlskrona	Surface	Combat	Surface Combat
33 Mine Clearance Squadron	Karlskrona	Surface	Combat	Mine Countermeasures
34 Naval Supply Squadron	Karlskrona	Surface	Logistics	

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Swedish Coast Guard

The Swedish Coast Guard is an independent civilian authority with a board supervised by the Ministry of Defence. It is not part of the navy. In a time of war, the Swedish Coast Guard would co-operate with the RSwN but it would not fall under its command.

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Bases

Name	Latitude	Longitude	Notes
Berga	59.0725	18.14	
Visborgsslatt	57.613549	18.270452	
Karlskrona	56.155	15.582778	

Gothenburg	57.676111	11.860278
Farosund	57.867484	19.049342
Kappelshamn	57.848685	18.788752
Skredsvik	58.391489	11.638366
Vaxjo	56.877753	14.804211
Musko	58.97967	18.063827

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Marine bases

Name	Latitude	Longitude	Notes
Berga	59.0725	18.14	

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Personnel

- The Swedish parliament suspended compulsory military service in May 2010. From 1 July 2010 recruitment became based on a voluntary application system. However, Sweden announced in March 2017 that conscription was to be reactivated. Registration began on 1 July 2017, with liability to undergo basic military training starting from 1 January 2018. Individuals are selected for basic military training depending on their suitability and motivation.
- Without conscription, the Swedish Armed Forces had difficulties satisfying personnel requirements. On average, only 2,500 of the 4,000 recruits required annually could be attracted.
- Looking ahead, the Defence Commission has proposed the number of conscripts serving annually be doubled from 4,000 to 8,000 by 2024. This will enable a new war-time organisation and improve the ability to recruit officers.

2019-12-18

Training

- Navy-specific training is carried out as much as possible afloat. About one-third of all peacetime operations are training deployments.

- Almost all naval classroom training is conducted at the Naval School. It is responsible for training recruits to become sailors, cadets to become naval officers, and professional officers for higher leadership positions within the navy.
- The RSwn uses a range of simulators for training crew and officers. A central element of this simulation capability is the Naval Warfare Training System, which includes over 60 simulator stations that allow an entire ship or submarine crew to train together. The RSwn is also building a simulator for its Blekinge/A26-class submarine and is upgrading the C2 simulator for its Gävle-class corvette; it is also interested in an NH90 helicopter rear-cabin simulator.

Naval schools

Name	Latitude	Longitude	Notes
Naval School	56.157706	15.590441	Includes the Swedish Armed Forces Diving and Naval Medicine Centre, as well as the Naval Test Command.

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Military exercises

The RSwn typically conducts one major annual national exercise ('SWENEX') to maintain combat capability across its major surface combatants. It also routinely participates in multinational training events and has focused on joint exercises with the Finnish Navy in the context of developing the Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group.

'SWENEX 18' : From 21 to 31 May 2018 the RSwn conducted its annual national exercise ('SWENEX 18'), which focuses on the defence of Swedish territory and interests. The exercise took place along Sweden's southeastern coastline and around Gotland. It involved almost 2,000 personnel, multiple surface ships and submarines, and a large number of combat and patrol boats, as well as SwAF helicopters and JAS 39C Gripen aircraft. The parallel SwAF exercise ('Flygvapenövning 18') allowed the RSwn and SwAF to exercise joint (anti-ship) operations.

'Baltic Operations' ('BALTOPS') : Sweden regularly participates in the annual US-led multinational military Exercise 'Baltic Operations' ('BALTOPS'). The 2019 edition took place from 9 to 21 June in the Baltic Sea and along the Danish, German, Lithuanian, Polish, and Swedish coasts. The exercise involved approximately 12,000 personnel, 44 naval assets, and more than 40 combat aircraft and helicopters from 18 countries. Sweden contributed one submarine and two Visby-class corvettes. The two corvettes participated in the exercise as part of the United Kingdom-led Joint Expeditionary Force. The 'BALTOPS' exercises allow the RSwn (and SwAF in some iterations) to increase their capability and interoperability with partner countries

'Northern Coasts' ('NOCO'): Sweden is a leading participant in the multinational Exercise 'Northern Coasts' ('NOCO'), which has been held annually since 2007. 'NOCO' is one of the largest exercises in the Baltic Sea and provides training in joint shallow and confined water operations. The 2018 iteration was hosted by Finland and took place from 29 October to 8

November in and along the coasts of the Northern Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland. The exercise involved 12 nations, 4,000 personnel, and more than 40 vessels, in addition to land vehicles and air assets. Sweden's contribution included 10 naval vessels, one AW109 helicopter (Helikopter 15), and approximately 300 personnel.

Core assets and procurement initiatives

2019-08-26

Attack submarines

Södermanland-class submarine

The RSwN has one Södermanland-class (A 17) submarine in service. A second is in material reserve. The two Södermanland-class boats began their lives as Västergötland-class submarines, four of which were commissioned from 1987 to 1990, but were redesignated after a mid-life upgrade (MLU). Once the upgraded boats returned to service in 2004 and 2005, the two remaining Västergötland-class boats were retired.

The upgrades were in part a response to the changing threat context since the end of the Cold War, which has compelled the submarine force to focus less on ASW and more on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and working with special forces (SF).

The key part of the upgrade was the installation of an AIP system based on two Stirling Mk 3 engines. This allows the boats to stay submerged for several weeks, seven times longer than conventionally powered diesel-electric submarines. The AIP thus significantly increases the ISR capability of the boats, as they can remain hidden off a coastline for longer time periods. Meanwhile, operation in extreme littoral waters is facilitated by the boats' X-form tailplane structure, which makes them highly manoeuvrable.

The upgrade also included installation of a pressurised diver's lock-out for use by SF and a new cooling system.

For armament, the Södermanland class has six 21 in/533 mm torpedo tubes and three 15.75 in/400 mm tubes for Type 62 (Torpedo 2000) heavy anti-ship torpedoes and Type 45 (Torpedo 45) lightweight anti-submarine torpedoes, respectively.

Since the initial upgrades and redesignation of the boats, further capability enhancements have also been made. These largely focus on ISR capabilities. For example, the Thales Optronics CK 038 periscope has been upgraded with a thermal imaging camera and an improved image intensifier.

The remaining Södermanland-class boat will stay in service until replaced by an A 26 submarine in the early 2020s.

Gotland-class submarine

Sweden has three Gotland-class (A 19) submarines in service. These were commissioned in 1996 and 1997 to replace the five boats of the Sjöormen class. The boats are used primarily to patrol the Baltic and the Kattegat, as well as to conduct surveillance.

The Gotland class is based on the Västergötland class (Type A 17) and thus shares some design features. For example, the boats have the same X-form tailplane structure, making them highly manoeuvrable and well suited for littoral operations. That said, the Gotland boats have improved sonar and reduced magnetic, noise, chemical, and infrared (IR) signatures. They can also carry more stores, reducing dependence on shore-based support.

The Gotland class is the first submarine to be built with an AIP system as part of the design (specifically using two Stirling engines). The AIP allows the boats to stay submerged for several weeks. This increases possible time on station and provides greater stealth since they do not need to snorkel, facilitating combat and peacetime surveillance missions.

In terms of armament, the Gotland-class boats have four 21 in/533 mm torpedo tubes and two 15.75 in/400 mm tubes. The larger tubes fire Type 62 (Torpedo 2000) heavy anti-ship torpedoes. Meanwhile, the small tubes can each carry two Type 45 anti-submarine torpedoes (and in the future the new Torpedo 47). The fire-control system has the capacity to control several torpedoes in the water simultaneously, greatly increasing its ability to bring down large vessels.

The boats have received a number of upgrades since commissioning. For example, when they first entered service the Gotland class used only passive sensors, but all three boats were fitted with active sonar systems by 2008.

Sweden confirmed in April 2014 that two boats of the Gotland class would receive further upgrades, including installation of a new active sonar suite and three new masts (for optronics and communications), upgrading of the Stirling AIP plant, and the addition of a pressurised divers' lock-out to support SF. In addition, an extra hull section incorporates new cooling equipment. The first boat was redelivered to the navy in 2019 and the second is on track for redelivery in 2020.

The option to put the boat, HMS *Halland*, through the same upgrade is likely to be taken up following the recommendation of the Defence Commission in May 2019. A decision will be made in 2020.

The work will keep the boats in service until about 2030–35. The acquisition process for a replacement will thus need to begin no later than the end of 2025.

Blekinge-class (Type A 26) submarine

The Swedish government stated in its 2008 Defence Bill that it would investigate whether it would maintain the RSwN's submarine capability through life extensions of the current Södermanland- and Gotland-class types or through the procurement of new submarines. In 2010 it proposed to parliament to procure two Type A 26 submarines to replace the Södermanland-class submarines by 2018–19, while ordering MLUs for two Gotland-class submarines. After severe delays, the Swedish government in March 2015 approved the procurement of the first two boats, dubbed the

Blekinge class, and a contract with Saab for construction was signed on 30 June 2015. The delivery of the first submarine is expected in 2024 and the second in 2025. It is possible that an additional A 26 boat will be ordered in the future.

The A 26 has been conceived as a modular, affordable design capable of supporting international operations and placing heavy emphasis on ISR missions. Principal characteristics include very low signatures (using Genuine Holistic Stealth technology), extended submerged endurance (expected to be more than 18 days at patrol speed using an AIP system based on three Stirling engines [these could be Mk 4 or 5 but the Swedish Ministry of Defence will not confirm details]), exceptional manoeuvrability (using X-form control surfaces), advanced sonar suite and electronic countermeasure sensors, and a Sagem Series 30 non-hull penetrating optronic search mast system. Crew size will be in the range of 17–28 sailors, although the exact complement will vary according to the mission.

The submarines will also feature a large (1.6 m) diameter ‘supertube’ ocean interface in the bow (also called a multimission portal). The ‘supertube’ will enable the submarine to deploy divers and unmanned underwater vehicles hosted in a flexible payload compartment.

For armament, the A 26 will have twin pairs of conventional 21 in/533 mm and 15.75 in/400 mm torpedo tubes. Envisaged weapons include torpedoes (both heavy torpedoes and the new lightweight torpedo [Torpedo 47] to enter service in the 2020s) and mines, but not anti-ship or cruise missiles (although both are technically feasible).

New lightweight torpedo

Sweden has ordered the development and production of a new lightweight torpedo from Saab. To be called the Torpedo 47, the new torpedo will replace the Torpedo 45. Torpedo 47 will have a longer range (out to 20 km or more) and better speed performance (from 10 kt up to a maximum of at least 35 kt). In addition, the torpedo has been designed to enable range and speed upgrades.

Torpedo 47 will arm anti-submarine vessels and helicopters and be optimised for very shallow water and the extreme littoral, which is an important consideration for Sweden given the average depths of the Baltic Sea. Operational capability is expected on the Visby-class corvettes and the Gotland-class submarines by about 2023.

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Surface combatants

Visby-class corvette

There are five Visby-class corvettes in service with the RSwN. Although the first corvettes of the class were handed over in 2006, the vessels were subjected to protracted testing, evaluation, and reworking. As a result, initial operational capability (IOC) was only achieved in 2010 and only with two vessels. The first fully mission-capable ship was not delivered until 2012, and it was mid-2015 before all five corvettes were upgraded to final standard.

The Visby-class corvettes are extremely versatile, being able to carry out mine countermeasures (MCM), ASW, ASuW, patrol, ISR, and escort tasks. These missions can be conducted nationally and out of area, as the ships have received modifications to enable them to deploy internationally. The corvettes are particularly well suited for operations in the extreme littoral, due to their stealth and weight.

The Visby-class vessels are built almost entirely from carbon fibre reinforced plastic and designed to have minimal radar, acoustic, magnetic, hydrodynamic, electronic, visual, and IR signatures. In addition to reducing the chance that the ship will be detected and identified by an adversary, these features also increase the performance of the corvette's own sensors and countermeasures. The plastic construction also reduces the ship's weight and thus its draught, further reinforcing its ability to operate near shore.

For armament, the Visby-class corvettes have eight RBS15 Mk2 anti-ship missiles, four 15.75 in/400 mm tubes for Type 45 torpedoes, and one Bofors 57 mm/70 SAK Mk 3 gun, in addition to machine gun mounts.

Three ships of the class can host an AW109 helicopter, but they have no hangar and limited support capability. The corvettes cannot embark the NH90, and there are no plans to reinforce the decks to make this possible. The corvettes are conducting trials for hosting and operating VTOL UAVs.

In order to carry out MCM tasks, the ships carry a Double Eagle Mk III remotely operated vehicle (ROV) with active sonar and expendable Seafox ROVs for mine disposal.

Of note, there is space and weight allowance in the Visby-class design for a vertical missile launcher, and there were plans to fit the vessels with a SAM system for air defence. However, these were shelved in 2008.

Jane's believes that the lack of a SAM system leaves the Visby corvettes vulnerable to air attack. Counting on their stealth is risky since the primary area of operations in the Baltic Sea is relatively small and easily reached by possible enemy aircraft. Sweden is the only Nordic country that has not put SAM systems on their newest combat vessels. That said, the Defence Commission in May 2019 recommended the Visby class receive air defence missiles. A decision on such an upgrade is expected in 2020.

Saab next-generation anti-ship missile

Saab has signed a contract with the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration for the development and production of a new-generation extended-range anti-ship missile system to enter service in the early 2020s. The new weapon will build on the existing RBS15 Mk 3 anti-ship missile but will have enhanced capabilities. While the RBS15 Mk 3 is designed to achieve ranges in excess of 200 km, the new turbojet-powered missile is expected to be able to fly considerably farther (>300 km). It will also include integration of anti-jam GPS and improved manoeuvring/thrust performance in the terminal phase to evade close-in defences.

The missile will be integrated on the Visby-class corvettes and SwAF's JAS 39E Gripen (designated the RBS15 Mk 3+ for the Visby and Rb15 F-Extended Range [ER] for the Gripen E). Saab has confirmed that it plans to complete deliveries in 2026.

Göteborg-/Gävle-class corvette

The RSwN has in service two Göteborg-/Gävle-class corvettes. Sweden originally ordered and commissioned four Göteborg-class corvettes to replace its Spica I-class vessels. The corvettes entered service between 1990 and 1993. One ship was taken out of service in 2004 and another in 2006. Plans were to convert them into patrol ships but this was cancelled.

The Göteborg class was intended to improve Sweden's ability to defend its coastline, primarily against submarines although the corvettes also have an ASuW capability.

The armament of the Göteborg-class corvettes includes eight (four twin) RBS15 Mark II launchers, four 15.75 in/400 mm tubes for Type 43/45 torpedoes, one Bofors 57 mm/70 Mk 3 gun, and one Bofors 40 mm/70 gun in a stealth dome. Meanwhile, the Saab 601 anti-submarine mortars have been removed.

Both ships still in service are receiving a MLU that will upgrade their ASW capability and extend their operational lives out to 2026. Equipment being added includes the ST2400 compact active variable depth sonar (designed for operations in shallow-water environments), a new combat management system, a modern navigation system, and a new propulsion control system. Once the upgrade is completed, the ships will be designated the Gävle class. Upgrade work is taking place between 2017 and 2020.

Stockholm-class patrol ship

There are two Stockholm-class patrol ships in service with the RSwN, both of which were commissioned as corvettes in 1985. The Stockholm class was developed from the Spica II-class torpedo boat and was originally optimised for ASW. However, since the end of the Cold War, the vessels have focused on other roles and they have been converted to a patrol ship role intended primarily for maritime surveillance. The conversion of HMS *Stockholm* was completed in September 2016, with the HMS *Malmö* following in September 2017.

The Stockholm-class vessels are armed with four (two twin) RBS15 Mk II anti-ship missile launchers, four 15.75 in/400 mm tubes for Type 45 torpedoes, and one Bofors 57 mm/70 Mk 2 gun. Contrary to initial plans, it appears that no weapon systems were removed when the ships switched to their new roles. Of note, two 21 in/533 mm torpedo tubes, one 40 mm aft gun, four nine-tube anti-submarine mortars, and a rail for depth chargers were removed from the ships in 1999–2002.

As part of the switch to the patrol role, the normal crew size was reduced from 35 to 24 persons. Because of the smaller crew size, the ships cannot undertake ASW, surface warfare, and air defence simultaneously (thus the reason they are no longer classified as corvettes). However, the ships are capable of being assigned these tasks on short notice if needed.

Of note, although the crew size has been reduced, the two ships are dual-crewed to increase availability.

Future surface combatants

The RSwN has begun planning its requirements for a future surface combatant that is planned to enter service from the mid-2020s, when the two in-service Gävle-class corvettes retire.

The RSwN is also exploring the possibility of procuring four second-generation Visby-class corvettes. The navy, the Defence Materiel Administration, and Saab Kockums have already undertaken preliminary work to examine an evolution of the Visby corvette. *Jane's* understands that the current Visby G2 concept is for a slightly larger (about 100 m) all-diesel design with a vertical launcher silo and expanded aviation facilities. The ships would enter service in the 2030s.

2019-08-26

Mine-warfare vessels

Koster-class mine countermeasures vessels

There are five Koster-class mine countermeasures vessels (MCMVs) in service with the RSwN. These were originally designated as Landsort-class MCMVs, seven of which entered service between 1984 and 1992. The redesignation as the Koster class came after five vessels completed an upgrade between 2005 and 2010, emerging as multirole ships capable of escort and ASW missions as well as MCM tasks. The two oldest Landsort-class ships were decommissioned rather than upgraded.

The Koster-class MCMVs are fitted to undertake mechanical sweeps for moored mines and magnetic and acoustic sweeps. The MCMVs have an integrated MCM system that includes a hull-mounted sonar, a variable depth sonar on a Double Eagle Mk III ROV, and a mine identification and disposal system based on the Atlas SeaFox. The ships can also operate two self-propelled acoustic magnetic minesweeper drones.

As part of the upgrade to the Koster class, the ships received new combat and propulsion systems, which better enable them to participate in international operations and carry out additional roles. Meanwhile, the installation of a 40 mm gun gives the vessels a limited escort and anti-aircraft capability.

The Koster-class MCMVs also have a hull-mounted sonar that enables them to undertake ASW tasks, and they are receiving ASW 600 Elma anti-submarine grenade launching systems. The ASW 600 Elma system was originally developed in the 1980s to provide the RSwN with a low-cost ASW weapon suitable for use in shallow coastal and archipelagic waters. ASW 600 launchers were previously installed on RSwN corvettes, fast attack craft, and Landsort-class MCMVs but were withdrawn in the early 2000s. The decision to return the system to service reflects renewed concerns over incursions by foreign submarines and submersibles in Swedish territorial waters.

Installation on the first vessels has been completed and all are expected to be done by the start of 2020.

Styrsö-/Spårö-class mine countermeasures vessels

The RSwN has four Styrsö-class vessels, which were commissioned in 1996 and 1997. However, only two of these remain in the MCMV role, and they are now referred to as the Spårö class.

The Styrsö-/Spårö-class ships were procured to replace the obsolete Arko-class minesweepers and complement the Landsort-class MCMVs. The class is optimised for inshore MCM tasks, and the vessels were some of the first MCMVs designed to rely heavily on offboard minehunting systems.

The MCMVs are equipped with mechanical, magnetic, and acoustic sweeps, which are deployed over the stern. The ships can also control two self-propelled acoustic magnetic drones for remote influence sweeps. In addition, the vessels have a remote minehunting capability.

The Spårö-class ships will go through an MLU, although work has been delayed and it will be about 2020 before any upgraded vessels are operational.

Mine-laying capability

Of note, the Defence Commission in May 2019 recommended that the mine-laying capability be strengthened. What this means is not yet clear.

2019-08-26

Combat Boat 90 assault craft

The RSwN has a large fleet of CB (Stridsbåt) 90 fast assault craft in service, including CB 90H and CB 90HS variants. A total of 120 CB 90Hs were originally ordered and delivered to the RSwN in three batches between 1990 and 1997. This was followed by an additional order for 27 CB 90HS, which were delivered between 2001 and 2003.

The CB 90H/HS is used primarily by the amphibious regiment (but also by the marine base and Home Guard). The primary functions of the boats are surveillance and transport of troops and equipment. The CB 90HS variant was designed specifically for use in international operations and has extra protection. The Swedish government decided in March 2013 to order MLUs of a number of CB 90Hs to extend their service life until 2040.

The RSwN also has a small number of CB 90Es in service. This variant is used by the amphibious regiment primarily for casualty evacuation. The E variant is smaller in size and lighter than the H/HS variant. It can reach a maximum speed of 40 kt, compared with the CB 90 H/HS maximum speed of 30 kt.

Dockstavarvet is under contract to build 18 CB90 HSM boats with delivery running to early 2020. Strengthened to perform beachings at high speed, the craft will be based on the existing CB90 design but fitted with larger engines. The boats will be armed with the Trackfire remote weapon station, as are some of the older CB 90s.

2019-08-26

Tapper-class (Rapp-class) surveillance boats

The RSwN has eight Tapper-class surveillance boats in service out of an original class of 12 vessels. Designed for operations in extremely shallow water littoral environments, the Tapper-class patrol craft are employed by the RSwN to protect and patrol Swedish coastal waters.

Five boats have most recently been used for coastal patrol but are to return to their original ASW role on completion of a MLU. Modifications include new engines, Kongsberg sonar, and radar systems. The first modified boat was delivered back to the RSwN in 2018, and work on all boats is to be completed in 2020.

Six Tapper-class boats that had been mothballed are being modified and returned to service as sonobuoy boats, which Sweden has lacked since removing the Ejderen class from service more than a decade ago. The first sonobuoy boat was returned to service in July 2017, and all six are expected to be delivered by 2020.

2019-08-26

Support ships

The RSwN has one Carlskrona-class support ship. The vessel was commissioned in 1982 as a minelayer, but converted into a hybrid command/support ship in 2010. HSwMS *Carlskrona* has a range of workshops, a medical facility, fuel storage, and facilities for a HQ staff. It can operate and refuel helicopters (but lacks a hangar) and has a davit for launch and recovery of a high-speed rigid-hull inflatable boat. Armament includes one 57 mm and two 40 mm guns. These capabilities enable it to carry out maritime security operations.

The RSwN also has a smaller command and support ship: HSwMS *Trossö*. Originally built for the Soviet Union, the ship was acquired by Sweden in 1996 and entered service in 1997.

Of note, the RSwN intends to retain HSwMS *Carlskrona* and HSwMS *Trossö* in service into the mid-2020s, after plans to acquire new afloat support and logistics vessels were shelved due to funding constraints.

2019-08-26

Surveillance vessel

The RSwN has one electronic surveillance ship, HSwMS *Orion*, which was built in the early 1980s. In 2017 Saab was awarded a contract covering the design, construction, and delivery of a new signals intelligence (SIGINT) vessel to replace this legacy ship. Due for delivery in 2020, the new ship (to be named HMS *Artemis*) will be primarily used for the monitoring and analysis of communications traffic in the Baltic region. *Artemis* will be 71 m long and displace approximately 2,300 tons. This is larger than the current 1,400-ton *Orion*, which will facilitate international deployments. *Artemis* will also have improved electromagnetic compatibility characteristics (an

important consideration for the sensitivity of the SIGINT receivers), increased operational reliability, and improved working and living environments for personnel onboard.

2019-08-26

Naval aviation

All Swedish military aircraft are operated by the SwAF. Aircraft that operate specifically to support the RSwN in the maritime domain include the AW109 (Hkp 15B).

These are primarily shore based but can be embarked on the Visby-class corvettes and Carlskrona-class support ship for refuelling and short-span carriage.

In addition, the SwAF is procuring nine NH90 helicopters that will be modified for ASW operations (referred to in Swedish service as the Hkp 14F). The first of these was delivered in 2015, but it will be the mid-2020s before a combat capability (including the ability to employ ASW torpedoes) is achieved. In the interim, they will provide surveillance for ASW and other capabilities.

Of note, the RSwN has evaluated VTOL UAVs for use on ships. CybAero's APID 60 was evaluated in 2015 and 2016, although it did not satisfy all key criteria.

2019-08-26

Coastal defence systems

The Swedish Armed Forces in November 2016 announced the reactivation of its land-based RBS15 anti-ship missile system. To resurrect this capability, Sweden and Saab Dynamics refurbished Scania 3 Series trucks that had been in museums and fire-control systems from decommissioned corvettes and missile boats. The launch system has four missile canisters in an elevating frame on a Scania truck, while another vehicle serves as a command unit. Sweden has not confirmed how many missile systems have been reactivated.

While the old coastal defence batteries used the RBS15 M3 missile, the new system is based on the RBS15 Mk II. These missiles are used by current RSwN vessels and were thus already in the inventory. The RBS15 Mk II has an operational range of about 100 km, a GPS system that allows mid-course updates and re-attack capability, and an altimeter that enables terminal phase sea-skimming down to 1 m.

Sweden had maintained a coastal defence system comprising artillery and missile batteries throughout the Cold War, with the RBS15 entering service in 1995. However, only one of the four planned RBS15 batteries was delivered before the entire coastal defence system was eliminated in 2000. This was due in part to budget cuts but also rooted in a threat perception that prioritised expeditionary operations above territorial defence. With Russian military activism and territorial incursions on the rise, Sweden is reorienting back towards direct defence of the nation.

The land-based RBS15 Mk II system will be operational until the mid-2020s although the Defence Commission has proposed maintaining the land-based anti-ship capability past this point. What

form a future system might take is unclear. Other countries are opting for the RBS15 Mk III with improved target discrimination, superior penetration capability, and a range of more than 200 km, double that of the Mk II. This would enable Sweden to reach all the way across the Baltic Sea and provide a much more robust capability.

Equipment in service

2019-08-26

Submarines

Class	Manufacturer	Role	Original total	In service	Commissioned
Gotland (A 19)	Kockums, Malmö	Attack	3	3	1996
Södermanland (A 17)	Kockums, Malmö	Attack	2	1	1989
<i>Urf</i>	Kockums	Submersible – rescue	1	1	1979

2019-08-26

Surface fleet

Class	Manufacturer	Role	Original total	In service	Commissioned
Visby	Karlskronavarvet	Corvette	5	5	2006
Göteborg/Gävle	Karlskronavarvet	Corvette	4	2	1991
Malmö	Karlskronavarvet	Patrol ship ¹	2	2	1985
Spårö	Karlskronavarvet	Minesweeper	4	2	1997
Koster	Karlskronavarvet	Minehunter	5	5	1986
SAM	Karlskronavarvet	Minesweeper – drone	5	2	1983
Tapper (Rapp)/Bevakningsbåt 80	Djupviksvarvet	ASW patrol craft – archipelago	12	5	1993

Tapper (Rapp)/Bevakningsbåt 80	Djupviksvarvet	Sonobuoy boat/surveillance	6	3	1993
Combat Boat 90H (Stridsbåt)	Dockstavarvet/Gotl and	Landing craft – amphibious	120	106	1991
Combat Boat 90HS (Stridsbåt)	Dockstavarvet/Gotl and	Landing craft – amphibious ²	27	27	1991
LCMs (Trossbåt)	Djupviksvarvet	Landing craft – mechanised/support boat	17	1	1980
<i>Orion</i>	Karlskronavarvet	Surveillance ship	1	1	1984
<i>Skaftö</i>	Karlskronavarvet	Command ship ³	4	1	1997
Command Boat 450 (Ledningsbåt 2000)	Djupviksvarvet	Command boat (amphibious battalion)	2	2	2000
Raiding Craft (Gruppbåt)	n/a	Raiding craft	n/k	85	n/a
Griffon 8100TD (Type 392) (Svävare 2000)	Griffon Hovercraft	Hovercraft	3	3	2006

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Auxiliaries

Class	Manufacturer	Role	Original total	In service	Commissioned
Carlskrona	Karlskronavarvet	Support	1	1	1982
Trossö	Valmet	Support	1	1	1984
Support vessel (Lått Trossbåt)	Holms Shipyard	Support	17	16	1991
Styrsö	Karlskronavarvet	Supply	4	1	1996

<i>Loke</i>	Oskarsham Shipyard	Support/ferry	1	1	1994
<i>Rödnäbba</i>	n/a	Personnel transport	1	1	1984
Fast personnel craft 90E	Storebro	Medical evacuation	53	7	1995
Belos III	n/a	Submarine rescue ship	1	1	1992
Furusund	ASI Verken	Salvage and diving support ship	1	1	1983
Ägir	n/a	Diving support ship	1	1	1984
<i>Pelikanen</i>	Djupviksvarvet	Torpedo and missile recovery	1	1	1963
<i>Hector</i>	n/a	Coastal tug - icebreaking	n/k	2	2016
700	n/a	Coastal tug - icebreaking	n/k	2	1980
<i>Altair</i>	Swede Ship Marine AB	Training	5	5	2008
Sail training ships	Naval Dockyard , Stockholm	Training	2	2	1947

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Unmanned underwater vehicles

Class	Manufacturer	Role
UF 01 Sjöugglan	n/a	C4ISR/logistics
UF 10 Phantom	n/a	C4ISR/logistics
Seaeye Falcon	Saab	C4ISR

Double Eagle Mk III	Saab	C4ISR/mine clearance
SeaFox	Atlas	Mine clearance

2019-08-26

Missiles

Type	Manufacturer	Role
RBS17 (Hellfire Shore Defense System)	n/a	Anti-ship
RBS15 Mk II (ship and land based)	n/a	Anti-ship

DEFENCE PRODUCTION AND R & D

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Executive overview

Sweden is one of Europe's best managed and most open economies.

Sweden is politically stable, notwithstanding an inconclusive general election in 2018 that led to the country being led by a caretaker administration during the latter months of that year.

Sweden has a well established and fair legal system, benefiting from well-implemented business laws, providing a fundamentally secure and attractive environment for foreign direct investment (FDI). The relatively high cost of labour is offset by a strong productivity performance.

The country has been a member of the European Union (EU) since 1995 but sits outside the eurozone currency union. Sweden also remains outside NATO although it has been aligned with the west following a period of neutrality during the Cold War.

Defence spending

Swedish defence spending declined as a percentage of GDP from 1.5% in 2005 to 1.1% in 2018 although investment is on an upward trajectory having been relatively flat for an extended period.

Indeed, the draft 2016 budget, Spring Fiscal Policy Bill and 2017 budget outlined a more aggressive defence budget projection than previously announced, with spending coming to SEK56 billion by 2020.

The 2018 Draft Budget, submitted 20 September 2017, fell just short of this expectation with 2020 spending projected to reach SEK58.1 billion by 2020. The SEK53.8 billion defence budget for 2018 was still a 6% increase over the 2017 level.

The 2019 Draft Budget was presented to parliament in November 2018, although this was a continuity budget by a caretaker administration ahead of the formation of a new government (which took place in January 2019). A defence budget of SEK56.2 billion was set; a figure in line with expectations under the 2018 spring budget.

Industry

Sweden's defence industry has not been shielded from external competition nor foreign investment resulting in almost all of Sweden's industry now being owned by international majors with Saab the last-remaining Swedish-owned, large-scale global contractor. Beyond Saab, the principal Swedish defence companies are either formerly locally owned ventures that are now in the hands of international groups (such as BAE Systems' Hägglunds and Bofors plus Volvo Aero which became GKN Aerospace Engine Systems), or the local subsidiaries of foreign groups (such as the in-country units of QinetiQ, FLIR Systems and Rolls-Royce).

Swedish defence industrial capabilities cover: command-and-control systems; telecommunications; aircraft engines; combat aircraft; electronic warfare systems; camouflage technologies; naval vessels; radar systems; propellants; military land systems; and artillery ammunition.

Exports

Sweden has a strong position in defence export markets with sales of SEK59.6 billion (USD7.3 billion) between 2012 and 2017.

Foreign sales of defence products and services are a politically contentious issue, however, and export criteria is closed linked to foreign policy. Sweden was moving towards even tighter export criteria with a destination's democratic credentials given strong consideration from April 2018.

Sweden terminated active government support for national defence exports through the termination of the Swedish Defence and Security Export Agency (Försvarsexportmyndighetens - FXM) at the close of 2015.

Procurement

Defence procurement is a centralised process managed through the Försvarets materielverk (FMV). As the sole tendering and defence procurement contracting authority, FMV is responsible for the supply and contracts of all defence related materiel and logistics for primarily the Swedish armed forces but also the Coast Guard, Police and Civil Contingencies Agency, MSB. FMV is also responsible for the setting and management of offsets.

Swedish industry has broad capabilities and therefore relatively high self-sufficiency despite an ostensibly open approach to foreign entrants.

Sweden: Market Potential Index (MPI)

Factor/risik	Score	Rating
Defence investment:	3.01	Moderate appeal

Pro cur em ent spe ndi ng - lan d:	3.56	Moderate appeal
Pro cur em ent spe ndi ng - nav al:	3.58	Moderate appeal
Pro cur em ent spe ndi ng - air:	3.29	Moderate appeal
Def enc e ind ust rial cap abil itie s sco re:	4.00	High appeal

Pro cur em ent env iro nm ent sco re:	4.25	High appeal
Su ppl ier rel atio ns sco re: (cre dit reli anc e, inte rnat ion al em bar go stat us and deg ree of hist oric sin gle sup plie r reli anc e)	3.6	Moderate appeal

Market status score: (based on political and economic stability, the internal and external security environment, ease of doing business and transparency)	3.96	Moderate appeal
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Final market rating:	3.55	Moderate appeal
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Note: 1 = high risk/low appeal. 5 = very low risk/very high appeal.

Source: Jane's Market Potential Index. Full methodology available on request.

National defence companies

Multi-domain

Saab

Summary: Saab is principally an aircraft and defence equipment company, and is leading the JAS Gripen military aircraft programme and Erieye AEW&C. In addition to military aircraft, the company's activities in the defence sector comprise space systems, guided weapons, defence electronics, and training systems. In addition to the company's activities in the defence sector, the company also has a significant presence in the commercial aircraft maintenance and overhaul markets and develops and integrates complete aircraft systems. See next section.

Ownership: Saab is a privately owned and publicly traded company. Its principal shareholder is the Swedish Wallenberg Group which collectively owns almost 40% of the company through the Investor Group and the Wallenberg Foundation.

Web: saab.com

Air

Volvo Aero (GKN Aerospace Engine Systems)

Summary: Volvo Aero (acquired by GKN in 2012) designs, engineers and manufactures components and sub-assemblies for aircraft engine turbines, and supplies all the major aero-engine manufacturers. It employs some 3,000 people based in Sweden, Norway and the USA and has strong life-of-programme positions on existing platforms. Although Volvo Aero is principally a supplier of components, sub-assemblies and services to the commercial aerospace engines markets, it has strong defence sector exposure. It is the company behind the RM12 engine (based on the GE F404), which powers the Saab Gripen multirole fighter aircraft. It also provides maintenance, repair and overhaul and logistics support to air forces.

Ownership: Owned by GKN (UK).

Web: www.gkn.com

Cybaero

Summary: A producer of tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (notably the APID One rotary-wing UAV). The APID One is used in critical national infrastructure monitoring for power lines, water & oil pipelines and industrial facilities, as well as environmental research and geodesy. A military system, the APID One Defence, has been developed for operations including anti-submarine warfare and ISR.

Ownership: Publicly listed

Web: www.cybaero.se

Recotech

Summary: Recotech is a provider of aeroengine turbine production and repair services. It also produces container carrier systems.

Ownership: Privately owned - created through the restructuring of what was Volvo Aero.

Web: www.recotech.com

Scama

Summary: A producer of arrestor systems for manned military aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles and security applications (notably the arrest of vehicles).

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.scama.se

C4

Air Target

Summary: Air Target is a developer of acoustic scoring products to measure the miss distance between a missile and a target.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.airtarget.se

Aqeri

Summary: A producer of ruggedised computer systems for military and industrial applications.

Ownership: Acquired by Borderlight Group in 2017

Web: www.aqeri.com

Carmenta

Summary: A developer of software for military domains relating to C4ISR systems; mission support systems; mission planning systems; battlefield management systems and electronic warfare systems. It specialises in the development of geographic information systems.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.carmenta.com/en

Comex

Summary: A provider of data security services (and related IT services) to the Swedish armed forces. It also provides ruggedised computer systems.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.comex.se

Flir Systems AB

Summary: Flir Systems is an infrared imaging systems specialist headquartered in the US. It maintains a presence in Sweden that was established through the 1998 acquisition of Agema Infrared Systems.

Ownership: Flir Systems

Web: www.flir.se

Kitron

Summary: Kitron is a manufacturer of electronic systems for industrial and military applications (notably relating to avionics, communications and weapon control systems). It has exposure to the F-35 programme. The company is Norway based with a manufacturing centre in Sweden (Jonkoping).

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.kitron.com

MilDef

Summary: MilDef AB and Mildef Systems form the Swedish arm of the MilDef group (which is also active in the UK, Norway, US and Taiwan - RoC). It is a producer of rugged computer systems.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.mildef.com

TD Fiberoptik AB

Summary: A supplier of fibre-optic products and components for defence, industrial and telecom applications. It employs 85 people and turned over SEK150 million in 2016.

Ownership: Part of the Hexatronic Group (a Swedish connectors and cables company)

Web: www.td.se

UMS Skeldar

Summary: In December 2015 UMS and Saab of Sweden announced an agreement under which Saab would transfer all assets relating to its Skeldar rotary-wing UAS into a new joint venture called UMS Skeldar. Saab holds 47% of the venture with UMS holding the remainder. The JV was employs 55 people. Headquartered near Basel, manufacturing takes place in Linköping (Sweden) and Möhlin (Switzerland).

Ownership: Saab and the UMS Aero Group

Web: umsskeldar.aero

Land systems

Åkers Krutbruk Protection AB

Summary: A producer of ballistic protection, mine protection and active protection systems for military vehicles. Swedish AMV vehicles feature the enhanced passive protection package supplied by Åkers Krutbruk Protection.

Ownership: IBD Deisenroth

Web: www.akerskrutbruk.se

BAE Systems Hägglunds (BAE Systems AB)

Summary: Active in the production of medium-weight combat vehicles, armoured all-terrain vehicles and the provision of related support and services. It also develops hybrid drive systems for the civilian market on the basis of technology developed for the aborted SEP armoured vehicle programme. Products include the BvS10 all-terrain vehicle.

Ownership: BAE Systems Plc

Web: www.baesystems.com

BAE Systems Weapons Systems Sweden (Bofors - BAE Systems AB)

Summary: A producer of munitions and gun systems. Products include the 40 mm (40Mk4) and 57 mm (57Mk3) Naval Gun System; the Archer 155 mm wheeled howitzer; and the LEMUR family of remote weapon systems.

Ownership: BAE Systems Plc

Web: www.baesystems.com

Brokk

Summary: Brokk is a Swedish demolition systems developer. Its products include the SR120D demolition robot that has been offered to the defence sector to accomplish tasks including explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD), as well as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defence. It can also be employed to clear obstacles,

access confined spaces, and perform civil defence tasks including firefighting and search and rescue.

Ownership: Part of investment company the Lifco Group.

Web: www.brokk.com

Kaller

Summary: Kaller is a producer of gas springs for industrial applications and for military vehicle suspension systems.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.kaller.com

Scania

Summary: Scania is a producer of heavy trucks for commercial applications. Its Special Vehicles business produces trucks for military applications, including heavy haulage vehicles; hook lift loading systems, and heavy recovery vehicles.

Ownership: Volkswagen Truck and Bus

Web: www.scania.com

Sepson

Summary: Sepson is a developer of heavy-duty winch systems for rescue and recovery vehicles and armoured fighting vehicles.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.sepson.se

Volvo Trucks

Summary: Manufactures trucks, military vehicles, buses, construction equipment, boat engines and industrial engines for government and military customers. The company owns Renault Trucks Defence (wheeled medium-sized military vehicles) and Panhard (small military vehicles). Volvo Trucks defence products include engineering vehicles and haulage vehicles. Volvo announced in November 2016 that it was to sell its defence interests (RTD and Panhard) and by July 2017 Nexter/KMW of France/Germany; CMI of Belgium and private equity firm Advent had reportedly expressed an interest. The divestment was subsequently abandoned and RTD was rebranded as Arquus.

Ownership: Volvo AB (a publicly listed company)

Web: www.volvodefense.com

Marine systems

Docksta Varvet

Summary: A manufacturer of aluminium boats for military and commercial use. The shipyard also specialises in building patrol and pilot boats. The company has also since 2007 owned 55% of Muskövarvet, a repair yard located at the former Naval Dockyard on Muskö in the southern part of the Stockholm Archipelago.

Ownership: Privately owned - acquired by Saab in December 2017 and integrated in to Kockums

Web: www.dockstavarvet.com

Kockums

Summary: Kockums - which employs around 900 people and returned sales of SEK1.7 billion in 2013 - designs, builds and maintains naval systems including surface vessels and submarines. It also produces mine counter-measures systems and air independent propulsion systems. It was the producer of Sweden's Visby-class and Göteborg-class corvettes. The company - which traces its history back over three centuries - became part of ThyssenKrupp in 2005 through the merger of the marine interests of Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) and ThyssenKrupp. HDW had itself acquired Kockums through the acquisition of interests of what was the Celsius group in the late 1990s. It was acquired by Saab in 2014.

Ownership: Saab

Web: saab.com/naval/Submarines-and-Warships

Lidan Marine

Summary: Lidan Marine supplies handling systems for the launch and recovery of equipment for anti-submarine warfare and mine counter measures. The company is also involved in launch systems for RHIBs and AUVs as well as missile and munitions handling systems.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.lidanmarine.com

Rolls-Royce AB

Summary: The Swedish interests of Rolls-Royce are geared towards the production of marine propulsion technologies.

Web: www.rolls-royce.com/marine

Ownership: Rolls-Royce (UK LSE listed)

SwedeShip

Summary: A producer of aluminium, steel and composite boats up to 50 m long. It had produced 26 m fast supply vessels, gun boats, 24 m mortar equipped boats and 24 m transport vessels for the navy of the UAE, a fast supply boat, 22m patrol boat and a high speed landing craft for the Swedish navy.

Web: www.swedeship.se

Ownership: Privately owned

Swedish Steel Yachts

Summary: A producer of steel patrol boats

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.ssy.se

Munitions, arms and other systems

Aimpoint

Summary: The originator of red dot sighting technology for fire arm applications.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.aimpoint.com

Armstech International

Ownership: Privately owned

Summary: A supplier of tactical equipment (including body armour) for military and security applications.

Web: www.armstech.se

CRD Protection

Summary: A producer of security products ranging from communication systems to tactical riot nets and crowd control fencing.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: crdprotection.com

Eurenco Bofors

Summary: A producer of energetic materials. It was created in January 2004 from the merger between France-based SNPE Explosives & Propellants, NEXPLO Bofors of Sweden and Finland's NEXPLO Vihtavuori. One of the four European production plants is in Sweden (Karlskoga). It employs approximately 240 people in Sweden.

Ownership: Eurenco (Giat Industries)

Web: www.eurenco.com/

Habia Cable

Summary: A producer of cables for military land systems, aircraft, and naval applications.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.habia.com

Hammar Government and Defence

Summary: A provider of military logistics services relating to the Hammar company's side-loading container system.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.hammar.eu

MSE Engineering

Summary: MSE Engineering is a producer of simulation systems hardware, ground power units and cable systems (target winches and cable winding systems).

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.mseab.se

Nammo Sweden

Summary: Nammo is a Nordic munitions group that also provides demilitarisation services. The company was founded in 1998 through the merger of the interests of Celsius AB, Patria Oyj, and Raufoss ASA. It operates from four locations in Sweden. These are Lindesberg (modernisation and conversion of 20 mm to 155 mm ammunition and the production of 120 mm MBT ammunition), Karlsborg (production of small calibre ammunition), Vingaker (demilitarisation activities), and Karlskoga (a filling plant for shells from 40 mm to 155 mm).

Ownership: Patria/Norwegian state

Web: www.nammo.com

Polyamp

Summary: Polyamp is a producer of DC/DC electrical converters for military applications including land vehicles and submarines.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.polyamp.com

QinetiQ Sweden

Summary: QinetiQ Sweden AB was launched in 2011 as a result of a contract from the FMV to operate the Flight Physiological Centre (FPC) in Linköping.

Ownership: QinetiQ (UK LSE listed)

Web: www.qinetiq.com

RSG Connexion

Summary: A producer of rugged cable and connector assemblies for military and heavy-duty industrial applications.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.rsg-connexion.se

Skyddsprodukter i Sverige AB

Summary: A producer of tactical shelters and NBC filters.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.skyddsrum.eu

Snigeldesign

Summary: A producer of military clothing and related tactical equipment

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: snigeldesign.nordicshops.com/index.html

Saab

Address

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Key personnel

Marcus Wallenberg - Chairman

Hakan Buskhe - President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO)

Micael Johansson - Deputy Chief Executive Officer

Jonas Hjelm - Senior Vice President - Aeronautics

Anders Carp - Senior Vice President - Surveillance

Görge Johansson - Senior Vice President - Dynamics

Ellen Molin - Senior Vice President - Support and Services

Jessica Oberg - Senior Vice President - Industrial Products and Services

Gunnar Wieslander - Senior Vice President - Kockums

Employees

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total	14,140	14,716	14,685	15,465	16,427

Summary

Saab AB develops and manufactures advanced high-technology products, marketing an extensive range of equipment in several important market segments.

Saab is principally an aircraft and defence equipment company, and the company behind the JAS Gripen military aircraft programme. In addition to military aircraft, the company's activities in the defence sector comprise space systems, guided weapons, unmanned systems (sea and air), defence electronics, and training systems. The company also has a significant presence in the commercial aircraft maintenance and overhaul markets and develops and integrates complete aircraft systems. Saab moved into the naval shipbuilding and design domain during 2014 through the purchase of Kockums.

Saab looked to the defence markets for 84% of sales in 2017. The Swedish market accounted for 42% of sales.

Saab's geographical markets are the Americas; Asia-Pacific; Europe and the Greater Middle East; Nordic and Baltic Countries; and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Parent/shareholders

Saab is a privately owned and publicly traded company. Its principal shareholder is the Swedish Wallenberg Group which collectively owns almost 40% of the company through the Investor Group and the Wallenberg Foundation. BAE Systems of the UK is a former major shareholder (with a 20% holding prior to 2010). BAE Systems is no longer a shareholder.

Financial performance (SEK millions)

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Revenue	23,750	23,527	27,186	28,631	31,394
Net profit	742	1,168	1,402	1,175	1,438
Order book backlog	59,870	60,128	113,834	107,606	106,849

Revenue by area (SEK millions)

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Aeronautics	6,869	6,720	6,262	7,138	7,267
Dynamics	3,572	2,974	4,009	4,927	5,267
Electronic Defence Systems (Surveillance - included elements of S&DS unit from January 2016)	4,161	4,629	7,305	7,659	8,015
Security and Defence Solutions (Dissolved 2016)	5,891	5,762	6,387	N/A	N/A
Support and Services	3,419	3,570	6,012	5,081	6,201
Combitech (discontinued as a business line on 1 January 2015)	1,598	1,649	N/A	N/A	N/A
Industrial products and services	N/A	3,465	3,562	3,605	4,022
Note: 2015 business unit financials were restated to reflect the changed structure retrospectively.					

Key products

System/platform type	System/platform name	Description
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Multi-role fighter aircraft

Gripen

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Cze
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Rep
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Uni
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Kin
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Hu
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Sou
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Afr
ica;
and
Tha
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Unmanned air system

Skeldar

Small, rotary wing unmanne
d air system for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance applications; primarily in maritime and civil domains

Airborne Early Warning and Control

ERIEYE

AE
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340
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Em
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145
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Radar systems	Sea Giraffe AMB LT	2D surveillance radar system for naval applications
Radar systems	GIRAFFE AMB	3D surveillance radar system for short and medium range air defence systems

Radar systems	Sea Giraffe AMB	3D surveillance radar for naval applications
Radar systems	CARABAS	Wide-area airborne reconnaissance and target detection system
Air defence systems	RBS-70	Man-portable air defence system

Air defence systems	BAMSE	Ground-based air defence missile system
Air defence systems	ASRAD-R	Vehicle-mounted air defence system

Structure

Aside from its corporate division, Saab's business units were - up until January 2010 (see below) divided into three areas. These were: Defence and Security Solutions, Systems and Products, and Aeronautics. These areas were further divided into 15 business units.

It was announced in September 2009 that Saab was to restructure from January 2010. The three existing units were to be replaced with five units. These are: Aeronautics; Dynamics; Electronic Defence Systems; Security and Defence Solutions; and Support and Services. To this list was added the Combitech unit.

In September 2014 it was announced that a new business unit would be created. Industrial Products and Services (taking Combitech, Saab Ventures, Aerostructures from Aeronautics and Avionics from Electronic Defence Systems) was to be stood up from 1 January 2015.

In June 2014 Saab announced that it would acquire Swedish submarine and surface naval vessels designer and producer Kockums (ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems AB) from ThyssenKrupp of Germany. This transaction - valued at SEK340 million (USD50 million) was completed by July 2014 and brought 900 workers and a significant naval shipbuilding capability. The company was housed within the Security and Defence Solutions business unit.

Saab announced further changes to its organisational structure in October 2015. Kockums (which had been trading under Security and Defence Solutions) became an independent unit reporting to

the chief executive, while the Security and Defence Solutions business was dissolved and its interests distributed to other business lines.

Saab is organised as follows: Aeronautics, Dynamics, Electronic Defence Systems (Surveillance from 2016), Kockums, Support and Services and Industrial Products and Services.

Aeronautics

Aeronautics, which includes both military and commercial operations, is dominated by the advanced Gripen programme. Commercial operations are expanding in the area of subsystems and components for the major manufacturers of passenger and transport planes, Airbus and Boeing. Maintenance and support for the fleet of Saab 340 and Saab 2000, as well as certain other aircraft, are also included in these operations. Saab's business model is to offer lifecycle commitments for the Gripen programme in the home market and to support an effective export programme. Investments in new programmes are based on Sweden's participation in international programmes and risk-sharing in commercial programmes. The strong home market is based on deliveries of Gripen to Sweden. The order backlog is more heavily weighted toward exports.

Saab Aerosystems

Saab Aerosystems develop and integrate complete aircraft systems. The company's main areas of interest include the Gripen; UAVs; Tactical Mission System; pilot training, flight training and verification; training and support systems; network enabled capabilities and after sales service.

Saab Aircraft Leasing

Saab Aircraft Leasing is primarily involved with sales, leasing and support for the Saab 340 and Saab 2000 regional aircraft (approximately 500 in total) operating around the world. These aircraft are expected to remain in service for another 30 years.

Gripen International

Gripen International acts as a prime-contracting organisation, responsible for marketing, selling and supporting the Gripen aircraft outside Sweden. The company works closely with its parent companies, drawing on their resources as required, and has a number of strategic international partners and subcontractors. Their organisational structure includes programme and technical-management expertise, as well as logistic support functions.

Dynamics

Dynamics offers ground combat weapons, missile systems, torpedoes, sensor systems, unmanned underwater vehicles and signature management systems for armed forces as well as remotely operated vehicles and security systems for the offshore industry and nuclear power plants. Dynamics took over - from 1 January 2010 - the bulk of the interests of the former Systems and Products business unit. Specific interests are as follows:

- Support weapons
- Missiles

- Torpedoes and remotely operated vehicles
- Signature management systems
- Training and simulation.

Electronic Defence Systems (Surveillance)

Electronic Defence Systems (Surveillance from 2016) took over many of the interests of the former Defence & Security Solutions business. The rest of the Defence & Security Solutions business became Security & Defence Solutions. The principal interests of Electronic Defence Systems are as follows:

- Airborne radar and sensors for airborne early warning & control
- Surface based radar systems
- Electronic warfare systems
- Integrated systems and services for detection, location and protection
- Defence electronics
- Traffic Management
- Combat Systems
- C4I Solutions.

Support and services

This unit - created 1 January 2010 - amalgamated the support and services interests of the former three business units. From 1 January 2016 it included the Critical Systems and Communications Solutions interests of the former Security and Defence Solutions business.

Kockums (Nautics)

Kockums manufactures conventional submarines and surface combat ships. It was acquired by Saab in July 2014 from TKMS of Germany. It initially operated within the Security and Defence Solutions business until the Security and Defence Solutions unit was dissolved in January 2016 (announced October 2015). It now reports to the chief executive and for financial purposes reports within the corporate unit. It was announced in October 2016 that Kockums was to become a business unit called Nautics. From December 2017 Kockums included small boat maker Dockstavavet and repair yard Muskovarvet.

Industrial Products and Services

Industrial Products and Services was established on 1 January 2015 and comprises the business units Combitech, Avionics Systems, Aerostructures and Vricon as well as the development of product ideas that fall outside of Saab's core business. The business units within Industrial Products

and Services differ from Saab's other operations by their focus on business-to-business customers or because they are not dependent on Saab's principal end-customers.

Strategic Weapon Systems

Date Posted: 01-Aug-2019

Publication: Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Europe And The Baltic States

UPDATED

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Assessment

Sweden has no strategic weapons.

2018-07-19

Ballistic missiles

Sweden has no ballistic missile capabilities.

2018-07-19

Missile defence

Sweden has no missile defence capabilities.

Information warfare

2018-07-19

Cyber warfare

Stated government policy

In 2010 the Swedish government developed a national strategy for the protection of critical public services and infrastructure. The strategy recognised that cyber security was vital to ensure that key national services and infrastructure were able to run without disruption. Since then, other reports and defence bills have further stressed that Sweden's collective ability to prevent, counter, and handle the consequences of civilian and military threats, incidents, and attacks and aggression in the cyber domain need to be developed and strengthened.

In October 2013 a planning document outlined a requirement for an offensive cyber capability, stating that the military needs an ability to attack other networks in order to protect itself. The Defence Bill for 2016-20 reiterates this, stating that Sweden should be able to execute “active operations” in the cyber domain.

In June 2017 the Swedish government presented a new national (whole-of-society) cyber security strategy. The strategy stressed that cyber attacks can threaten Sweden in peacetime through sabotage of critical infrastructure and that opponents could also use cyber attacks openly in the initial stages of an armed attack against Sweden. The Swedish Armed Forces are thus mandated to maintain and further develop their capacity and capabilities for defense against attacks in cyberspace, as well as for computer and network operations at the high end of the conflict spectrum.

Actual capabilities

The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap: MSB) supports and co-ordinates information security across Swedish society, including critical national infrastructure operators. MSB also leads co-operation with the armed forces as well as the Swedish Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT).

The cyber capabilities of the Swedish Armed Forces are, at the present, defensive in nature. The Armed Forces Network and Telecommunications Unit (Försvarsmaktens Telenät- och Markteleförband) is tasked with the protection of the military's information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure and management systems. This roughly 450-strong force undertakes "preventive security [such] as intrusion detection and monitoring of other nations and actors".

Sweden on 1 January 2016 stood up a joint Communication Information System Command (Försvarsmaktens telekommunikations- och informationssystemförband: FMTIS). This provides a

unified command with responsibility for the operation, maintenance, management, and protection of the military's information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure. Specifically, FMTIS's IT Defence Unit has the task of protecting against attacks. This unit includes a computer emergency response team.

Of note, in May 2016 the director of the Military Intelligence and Security Service confirmed that the Swedish government has tasked the military to establish a cyber command that can conduct offensive operations against other countries in the cyber domain.

The Swedish defence forces were the target of a major cyber attack in early 2017 that forced the shutdown of their Caxcis IT system. This system is used to plan, manage, and monitor military exercises. Partially in response to this, when the Swedish government decided to increase defence spending in its spring budget of 2017, it earmarked some funds for improving cyber defence.

2018-07-19

Space warfare

For intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), Sweden participated in the Multinational Space-based Imaging System (MUSIS) programme. This is done through bilateral agreements with Germany and France. Specifically, the Swedish Space Corporation provides data downlink and transfer from the Esrange Space Center and in return Sweden receives satellite images.

The Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) and US Air Force Research Laboratory are also co-operating on the Nanosatellite And Plug-and-play Architecture (NAPA 3) programme. This programme is testing and evaluating miniaturised components, including for high-bandwidth nanosatellite radio and space situational awareness sensor payloads.

Meanwhile, the FMV contracts private companies (such as UltiSat) to provide satellite bandwidth to enable internet protocol connectivity for forward-deployed troops.

Sweden also participates in the European Union's Galileo global navigation satellite system, which aims to provide European countries with an independent positioning system so that they do not have to use Russian, Chinese, or US systems. Sweden hosts a Telemetry, Tracking, and Command Galileo station at Kiruna.

2018-07-19

Nuclear capabilities

Sweden carried out nuclear weapons research in the 1950s and 1960s as a possible means to deter a potential Soviet military attack, but the country abandoned this programme when it signed and ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 and 1970 respectively.

It has been a member in good standing of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since 1957 and has fully adhered to the IAEA safeguards agreement. In addition, Sweden is party to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Safety Convention, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Moreover, Sweden

is a member of various non-proliferation export controls, such as the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Sweden has three operational nuclear powerplants with eight operational nuclear reactors, altogether responsible for producing roughly 35% of the country's electricity. Four older reactors are due to be shut down by 2020, although the construction of new reactors has not been ruled out. Sweden does not have any uranium conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, or plutonium reprocessing facilities. It does have a spent fuel storage site and nuclear waste repositories.

2018-07-19

Biological capabilities

The Swedish government does not have stockpiled biological weapons (BW) and is not pursuing an offensive BW programme. Sweden signed the Biological Weapons Convention in 1975 and ratified it in 1976.

Sweden does have a sophisticated bio-technology sector and is actively researching and developing defences against BW and other dangerous pathogens.

2018-07-19

Chemical capabilities

Sweden does not have chemical weapons (CW) and is not pursuing an offensive CW programme. Sweden in 1925 signed the Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of poisonous gasses in warfare, and ratified the protocol in April 1930. More recently, Sweden signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993. The convention entered into force in Sweden on 29 April 1997. Since then, Sweden has been a member in good standing with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the main administrative organ of the convention. Sweden is also a member of the Australia Group, which enforces its export licensing guidelines for materials that recipients could employ to manufacture CW.

Sweden does have a well-developed chemical and pharmaceutical industry. It also is actively researching and developing defences against CW to protect its own military forces.



SWEDEN



GOVERNMENT

Chief of State

King CARL XVI GUSTAF

Head of Government

Prime Minister Stefan LOFVEN

Government Type

parliamentary constitutional monarchy

Capital

Stockholm

Legislature

unicameral Parliament or Riksdag (349 seats)

Judiciary

Supreme Court of Sweden (consists of 16 justices, including the court chairman);

Supreme Administrative Court (consists of 18 justices, including the court president)

Ambassador to US

Ambassador Karin Ulrika OLOFSDOTTER

US Ambassador

Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires ad interim Clifford G. BOND

GEOGRAPHY

Area

Total: 450,295 sq km

Land: 410,335 sq km

Water: 39,960 sq km

Climate

temperate in south with cold, cloudy winters and cool, partly cloudy summers; subarctic in north

Natural Resources

iron ore, copper, lead, zinc, gold, silver, tungsten, uranium, arsenic, feldspar, timber, hydropower

ECONOMY

Economic Overview

Sweden's small, open, and competitive economy, which remains outside of the euro zone, has been thriving, and Sweden has achieved an enviable standard of living, with its combination of free-market capitalism and extensive welfare benefits

GDP (Purchasing Power Parity)

\$518 billion (2017 est.)

GDP per capita (Purchasing Power Parity)

\$51,200 (2017 est.)

Exports

\$165.6 billion (2017 est.)

partners: Germany 11%, Norway 10.2%, Finland 6.9%, US 6.9%, Denmark 6.9%, UK 6.2%, Netherlands 5.5%, China 4.5%, Belgium 4.4%, France 4.2% (2017)

Imports

\$153.2 billion (2017 est.)

partners: Germany 18.7%, Netherlands 8.9%, Norway 7.7%, Denmark 7.2%, China 5.5%, UK 5.1%, Finland 4.7%, Belgium 4.7% (2017)

PEOPLE & SOCIETY

Population

10 million (July 2018 est.)

Population Growth

0.8% (2018 est.)

Ethnicity

Swedish 81.5%, Syrian 1.7%, Finnish 1.5%, Iraqi 1.4%, other 13.9% (2017 est.)

Language

Swedish (official)

note: Finnish, Sami, Romani, Yiddish, and Meankieli are official minority languages


Religion

Church of Sweden (Lutheran) 61.8%, other (includes Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Baptist, Muslim, Jewish, and Buddhist) 8.2%, none or unspecified 30% (2016 est.)

Urbanization

urban population: 87.4% of total population (2018)

rate of urbanization: 1.05% annual rate of change (2015-20 est.)





Boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative.

BACKGROUND

Land and Climate

Sweden, one of the “three fingers” of Scandinavia, is just larger than Morocco or the U.S. state of California. From the northern to the southern tip, Sweden is about 1,000 miles (1,600 kilometers) long but only 310 miles (500 kilometers) wide. Thousands of tiny islands line the coast. Mountains form much of the northwest, but most of Sweden is relatively flat with some rolling hills. More than two-thirds of the land is forested.

Many rivers flow from the mountains through the forests and into the Baltic Sea. Sweden has numerous lakes and rivers, which provide ample water for the country. Rivers in the Norrland region (roughly the country's northernmost two-thirds) provide most hydroelectric power.

North of the Arctic Circle, winters are long and cold, while summers are short and pleasant. But summer's “midnight sun” makes the days long. Despite Sweden's northern location, most of the country has a relatively temperate climate, moderated by warm Gulf Stream currents. July temperatures in Stockholm average 64°F (18°C); January temperatures average 27°F (-3°C). Snow remains on the ground about one hundred days each year; in northern areas, snow lasts even longer.

History

Germanic Tribes

Sweden has been inhabited for nearly five thousand years and was first settled by several Germanic tribes. In the ninth

century, Rurik, a semi-legendary chief of the Swedes, is said to have founded Russia. In the 11th century, Olof Skötkonung declared himself king of Sweden. When he adopted Christianity, the religion began to spread.

Kingdom of Sweden

Opponents vied for control of a unified Sweden until the 12th century, when the loose group of provinces became united as one nation. Queen Margrethe I of Denmark united Denmark, Norway, and Sweden in the Union of Kalmar in 1397. Sweden remained fairly autonomous and began its own parliament in 1435. It became an independent kingdom in 1523, with Gustav I Vasa as ruler.

The kingdom fought wars with Denmark, Poland, and Russia in the 16th and 17th centuries, and Sweden became one of the Great Powers of Europe. It acquired Norway in 1814 through the Napoleonic Wars. During the 19th century, however, Swedish power declined. Finland was part of Sweden until 1809, when it briefly became an archdukedom of Russia. The Frenchman Jean Baptiste Bernadotte was elected Sweden's crown prince in 1810 and became king in 1818 as Karl XIV Johan. His dynasty continues today.

Neutrality and the European Union

During the 20th century, neutrality was a cornerstone of Sweden's foreign policy, keeping it out of both world wars and allowing it to transform its rather poor society into a prosperous social welfare state. By the end of World War II, Sweden had become one of the world's most important industrial nations. With increased European integration and the end of the Cold War, Sweden joined the European Union (EU) in 1995. Sweden opted out of joining Europe's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 and again in

2003 because voters opposed giving up local control over economic issues such as welfare services and interest rates.

Modern Sweden

After years of economic stagnation in the 1980s and 1990s, Sweden's economy began to thrive in the early 21st century thanks to a series of economic reforms. Sweden's trade-reliant economy has had setbacks, including the 2008 global economic crisis, but fiscal discipline has helped the country weather such challenges. Today, Sweden's economy is among the world's most competitive. Its combination of free-market capitalism and a strong social welfare system has afforded its citizens an exceptionally high standard of living and quality of life.

Even though Sweden is known for its welcoming immigration policy, it has struggled in recent years to deal with an influx of asylum seekers from the Middle East and Africa. As a result, immigration has become a major political issue. Many Swedes are increasingly concerned that the high immigration rate will burden the economy and the social welfare system. Some also are worried over whether immigrants unaccustomed to European values will be able to integrate successfully into Swedish society. Managing immigration and sustaining economic growth continue to be some of Sweden's biggest challenges going forward.

Recent Events and Trends

- **Military conscription:** On 1 January 2018, after struggling for years to fill its army ranks with volunteers, Sweden reinstituted military conscription. The draft covers men and women born in 1999 or later, and around a third of those will be selected for basic military training each year. The move came in response to rising tensions with Russia and makes Sweden only the second European country (along with Norway) to have compulsory military service for women as well as men.
- **Elections:** In September 2018, national elections failed to produce a majority winner, forcing negotiations to form a coalition government. The ruling center-left Social Democratic Party received the highest share of votes, though it had its worst showing in a century. The center-right Moderate Party came in second, followed by the far-right Sweden Democrats, which saw its best results ever. Immigration was a defining campaign issue: the Sweden Democrats ran on a staunchly anti-immigration platform, tapping into growing frustrations over the nation's high rate of immigration in recent years.
- **New government:** In January 2019, Social Democrat Stefan Löfven narrowly maintained his position as prime minister, forming a new center-left minority government composed of the Green, Centre, and Liberal parties. Löfven initially came to power as prime minister in 2014 and was ousted in 2018 by Parliament in a no-confidence vote that followed inconclusive national elections. Immigration has been a defining campaign issue, with far-right Sweden Democrats seeing their best election results ever after running on a staunchly anti-immigration platform.

THE PEOPLE

Population

Most Swedes live in the southern third of the country. Most of the population is ethnic Swede. Finns compose a small minority of the population; most are immigrants from Finland, but some are native to northern Sweden.

A small indigenous minority (an estimated 20,000 to 40,000 people), the Sami (pronounced "SAW-me"), lives in the north. Traditionally, they herded reindeer. While some continue that occupation, most are involved in other fields. The Sami are sometimes called Lapps, but this is a derogatory term and therefore not encouraged in Sweden.

Immigrants have added to Sweden's population since the 1960s; Swedish immigration laws are some of the most liberal in Europe. Nearly 20 percent of Swedish citizens were born outside of Sweden, a number that has risen sharply in recent years. Many immigrants come from Finland, Syria, Iraq, Poland, and Iran.

Language

Swedes speak Swedish—a Germanic language that is closely related to Danish and Norwegian and more distantly related to Icelandic. It developed from Old Norse, which was spoken by the Vikings. Swedish emerged as a distinct language around the 10th century, but speakers of Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian can still understand each other.

The Sami speak their own language in addition to Swedish, and the Finnish minority speaks both Finnish and Swedish. Most immigrants speak their native tongue at home. Many people speak English, which is also taught in the schools.

Religion

Sweden, like most of Europe, is a highly secular society. Freedom of religion is guaranteed by the constitution. A majority of Swedes are members of the Evangelical Lutheran Church but rarely attend church services. The Lutheran Church still enjoys limited support from the state; however, a complete legal separation of church and state took place in 2000. Now all church decisions are made by church leaders rather than the government.

Membership is growing in other religious organizations. Most of these are various other Christian churches, such as the Roman Catholic faith. Other groups, such as Muslims and Jews, are also expanding, primarily because of the immigrant population.

General Attitudes

Swedes are somewhat reserved. Friendships are important but take time to develop. Swedes are proud of their nation as well as their regions and towns. Visitors who recognize this pride are careful not to praise another area over the one being visited. Swedes value modesty and material security. Punctuality is also emphasized in various aspects of daily life.

Sweden has created an egalitarian society in which men and women enjoy equal access to opportunities for personal advancement. In addition, Swedes highly value their extensive social welfare system, which provides for most of the population's health, education, and retirement benefits. While public sentiment in the early 1990s led to some cuts in

the system, most people oppose deep changes in what are called “cradle-to-grave” benefits.

Sweden takes great pride in awarding the Nobel Prizes each year, with the exception of the Nobel Peace Prize, which Norway sponsors. These prizes are given to significant contributors in the areas of chemistry, literature, medicine, economics, and physics. Alfred Bernhard Nobel (1833–96), the inventor of dynamite and a wealthy Swedish businessman, sponsored the prizes (with the exception of the prize in economics, which was added in 1969).

Personal Appearance

European fashions are common in Sweden, and Swedes are generally considered quite trendy, usually among the first to adopt new styles in fashion and design. However, because of the country's cooler climate, Swedes wear warm clothing more often than other Europeans. Dress is generally conservative; it is important to be neat and clean in public. Swedes may not dress up as much as people in other countries when they go out. They prefer to avoid glamorous clothing but are still fashionable. Traditional costumes, which vary by region, are worn on certain holidays.

CUSTOMS AND COURTESIES

Greetings

Swedes commonly shake hands when meeting. In rural areas, the custom of hand shaking is less common and is traditionally associated with sealing agreements, resolving disagreements, and greeting on formal occasions. Friends often hug when greeting one another. Most adults will shake hands with each person in the room when entering or leaving a social setting. From a distance, one may nod the head or raise the hand to greet another person.

People usually address each other by first name; they use titles only in very formal situations. One answers the phone with *Hallå* (Hello) and clearly identifies oneself. The most common greeting is the casual *Hej* (pronounced “HEY,” meaning “Hi”), and the most common way to say “Good-bye” is *Hej då*. However, more formal phrases include *God dag* (Good day), *God morgon* (Good morning), and *Adjö* (Good-bye).

Gestures

Eye contact is important during conversation. Swedes avoid excessive hand gestures when speaking. Chewing gum, yawning, or having one's hands in the pockets when speaking to another person is considered impolite. Although in the past people seldom embraced in public or put their arm around another's shoulder, the population in general is becoming more casual, and such displays of friendship are increasing.

Visiting

Swedes enjoy visiting one another, but they do not often visit without prior arrangement. Hosts usually offer guests coffee or something else to drink. People most often entertain in the home; it is popular to invite friends over for an evening meal.

Guests are expected to arrive on time. Flowers or a box of

chocolates is a common gift for the hosts. Sweets for the children are appropriate if the parents approve. Guests unwrap flowers before giving them to the hostess. A thank-you note or phone call is customary after a party, depending on the formality of the situation. It is also important for guests to thank the hosts for their hospitality the next time they meet, using the phrase *Tack för senast* (Thank you for last time).

It is impolite to “eat and run.” Swedes expect guests to stay for coffee and conversation, even as late as 11 p.m. Conversation, ranging over a wide variety of topics, is a popular leisure activity, though people rarely speak about religion or spiritual matters. It's quite popular to meet over coffee and spend time chatting at a café. When leaving, guests say good-bye before they put on their coats.

Eating

Many Swedes eat a light breakfast around 7 a.m., and they might have a coffee or tea break at midmorning. Traditionally, the main meal (*middag*) was eaten at midday. This is still the case in most rural areas, but many urban residents eat only a light lunch at noon and then have their main meal around 6 p.m. It is common to get together with friends for *fika* (coffee, tea, or soft drinks, perhaps with a light snack of a sandwich or pastries). People may meet for *fika* at cafés or at home.

Most Swedes eat in the continental style, meaning they hold the fork in the left hand and the knife in the right. A dinner knife is not used as a butter knife, since separate butter knives are usually provided. Diners keep hands, but not elbows, above the table during the meal.

Guests are served first. When finished eating, a person places the utensils side by side on the plate. Leaving any food on the plate is impolite. Guests usually wait for the hosts to offer second helpings. Declining is not impolite, but guests may take more if they desire. Food is placed in serving dishes on the table, so if the dishes are empty there is usually no more food; asking for more would be impolite.

For some occasions, the host makes a welcome speech at the beginning of the meal. The host then makes a toast (*skål*) and all dinner guests taste the wine. The guest of honor makes a speech during the dessert, elaborating on the meal and the charm of the hostess. Each guest personally thanks the host directly after the meal.

LIFESTYLE

Family Structure

The nuclear family is the basic social unit and is usually strong and close-knit. While the nuclear family remains the ideal, many families are now structured less traditionally because many parents have never married, have divorced, or have remarried. Most families have only one or two children. Extended family relationships are maintained through gatherings and holiday visits.

Parents and Children

The government provides working parents with some

resources to care for their children. For example, the government heavily subsidizes day-care costs. In response to public demand, more facilities for private child care are now available.

Parents often dote on their children, a tradition that prompted the term *curling parents* (which refers to the sport of curling, in which players sweep the ground in front of the curling stones), indicating the belief that many Swedish parents spoil their children too much and for too long. Today, it is common for families to help children financially for longer than in past generations; to what extent depends on the economical means of the family. However, it is also common for university students to work in addition to studying.

Due to grants and student loans, many young Swedes can afford to move away from home after high school, often to student dormitories and apartments. Many young people who work can also afford to find a home of their own, while young unemployed people might need to continue living with their parents.

While in past generations, families expected to care for aging parents in the home, elderly individuals now generally rely on the social system or themselves for their care and support.

Gender Roles

Sweden offers some of the world's most generous paid parental leave benefits. Parents share a total of 480 days of paid parental leave between a child's birth and eighth birthday. In general, the mother takes the majority of the parental leave time, but fathers have begun taking more time off in recent years.

More than half of Swedish women work outside the home. However, women remain underrepresented in leadership positions. During recent years, there has been debate in Swedish society about how to increase the number of women in top positions. In the home, women still do most of the household chores, though this is changing among the younger generations.

Housing

Urban

Urban apartments are generally spacious and well kept. In the center of larger cities, apartment buildings are usually from the latter part of the 19th century and onwards. The apartments in these buildings are usually very expensive. Storage space and laundry rooms can be found in the basements of apartment buildings, which may be surrounded by gardens and play areas.

The larger cities are surrounded by suburbs, which range from wealthy areas with large, high-quality homes to poorer suburbs dominated by public-housing apartment buildings from the 1960s and 1970s. Recent debates have centered on the increasing segregation within Swedish society, which is visible in many suburban areas, where large groups of immigrants inhabit older, lower-quality buildings and are not integrated into the community.

Rural

Most people in smaller towns and rural areas live in single-family dwellings. Sweden is known for its red wooden houses, built centuries ago, that still dot the countryside.

Today, traditional homes may stand next to a variety of modern styles of homes.

Interiors and Exteriors

Swedes take pride in making their homes beautiful. In past years, Swedes preferred a white, shabby-chic style with vintage objects and furniture. More recently, the modern Scandinavian style has become widespread, including blonde woods, natural fibers, pale tones, and abundant light. IKEA, a Swedish furniture company, is among the most popular brands of furniture.

Wood is commonly used for home exteriors. Houses are usually built of timber and brick. Most houses are painted in bright colors, such as white, yellow, light blue, or light grey. Apartment buildings built in the 1950s or earlier tend to be built with brick and can be red, brown, or white. Newer apartments may have timber or stucco exteriors. Houses and apartments on the ground level almost always have gardens. Residents of such homes tend their gardens carefully.

Ownership

About two-thirds of Swedes own the homes they live in, and home ownership is a common dream. However, it is also common to rent an apartment for many years. Many families rent an urban apartment and own a country cottage in the mountains or on Sweden's islands, where they spend holidays and vacations. Larger cities often experience housing shortages, which impact young people and low-income families most. There is a booming do-it-yourself movement since it is generally very expensive to pay someone to do work in a private home.

Dating and Marriage

Dating and Courtship

Although serious dating is reserved for older teens, Swedes start to date early. They enjoy going to movies, dining out, having parties, and dancing. Many couples meet through internet dating sites or social networking sites. Casual sexual relationships are common.

Marriage in Society

Many people choose to live together before or instead of marrying. Often, a couple marries when they have a child. About half of all Swedish marriages end in divorce, and single-parent homes are becoming more common. There is no stigma associated with divorce, and it is common for people to marry several times. Unmarried couples who live together have nearly the same rights and obligations as married couples. That is, cohabitation is nearly the same as marriage under the law. Same-sex marriage is legal in Sweden.

Weddings

In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in marriage, and the wedding industry in Sweden is growing. Swedes traditionally have either a religious or a civil ceremony; both are common. Civil weddings have a long tradition in Sweden and are closely tied to the society's secular ideals. Both religious and civil ceremonies vary according to the preferences and economic means of the bride and groom. Most ceremonies include the exchanging of rings and vows.

At church weddings, the priest speaks, passages are read from the Bible, and a relative or friend might sing a song or read a poem. At the end of the ceremony, the priest blesses

the couple.

Civil ceremonies usually contain roughly the same components as church weddings but without the religious elements, with the officiator speaking and friends or relatives singing or reading poems. Civil ceremonies tend to be shorter than church weddings.

The specifics of each ceremony are decided upon by the couple, in conjunction with the priest or the officiator. When the couple comes out of the church or other building, guests usually throw rice or confetti over them. After the ceremony, there is often a reception and dinner followed by a party.

Life Cycle

Birth

Most women work full-time through the length of their pregnancies, if possible. Swedish fathers are very involved in pregnancies, attending courses at the children's clinic and checkups at the midwife's in addition to the actual birth of the child.

A room in the house is generally converted into a nursery, which parents carefully prepare for the baby. When the parents return home with the new baby, family and friends come to visit and bring gifts.

Many children are given a Christian baptism even if their parents rarely or never attend church services. After the baptism, there is usually a reception. However, an increasing number of parents are choosing not to baptize their children.

A growing number of families opt for a non-religious naming ceremony. Since this is a relatively new tradition in Sweden, there are few set patterns for these ceremonies. Generally, parents hold a small party and serve cake. Sometime during the party, the parents ask for everyone's attention and announce the child's name. They might tell a short story about why they selected the name.

Milestones

Young people are considered adults at age 18. Milestones include receiving a driver's license (usually at 18) and reaching the voting age and the drinking age (also 18). Graduation from high school is considered a milestone and is celebrated with a large party for families and friends. After graduating high school, many students take a year (or years) off to work or travel. Many people then go on to some sort of higher education.

Many young Swedes leave home after high school but continue to be supported by their families until they finish university or get a job. The time between leaving high school and becoming financially independent has steadily increased over the last few generations. Some families support their adult children well into their twenties. During this time, young Swedes often mix work, travel, and schooling. Between their different activities, they often return home and stay with their parents. However, while this lifestyle is very common among the middle class, not all Swedes can afford to prolong their entrance into the workforce, and many choose to complete their university studies more quickly or skip straight to getting a job.

On average, people retire at age 65, though some people retire a bit sooner or later, depending on their situation. The current generation of retirees has approached retirement

differently than in the past. Today's retirees often have more savings, which allows them to continue their lifestyle after they stop working. Many do not consider themselves old and instead see retirement as their "golden years," in which they will stay active and pursue their interests.

Death

Funerals are quiet family affairs that take place within a few weeks of the death. Church funerals are common even if the deceased rarely visited church during his or her lifetime. Secular funerals are increasing in popularity.

At church funerals, the priest usually talks about the deceased. Passages are read from the Bible and a prayer may be said. Sometimes a relative sings a song or reads a poem. The specifics of the ceremony are usually decided upon by the priest and the relatives.

Secular funerals follow a similar pattern, but without any allusions to religion. After the ceremony, relatives and friends usually bid a final farewell to the deceased by passing by the coffin, placing a flower on top, and saying a few last words.

A reception usually follows after the funeral. Food is served (usually a simple cold meal with dessert and coffee). At the reception, the closest relatives usually thank everyone for attending the funeral. Those who wish to may share a memory about the deceased. Today, some Swedes are choosing to have their ashes spread in memorial groves, though many still prefer a traditional burial.

Diet

Health concerns have affected eating patterns in Sweden in much the same way they have in other industrialized countries. Once heavy in meat, fish, and cheese, the diet now includes many fresh vegetables and fruits. Vegetarianism is a growing movement among Swedes of all ages.

Cuisine from all areas of the world is popular, both in restaurants and home kitchens. Common foods include potatoes (eaten a few times a week), seafood, cheeses of many types, and other fresh foods.

For breakfast, one might eat *fil* (a kind of yogurt), *knäckebröd* (crisp bread) with margarine, and coffee. Oat porridge with milk and jam or syrup is another common breakfast. *Smörgåsar* (open-faced sandwiches) are also popular.

Some favorite main-meal dishes include *köttbullar med kokt potatis, brun sås och lingonsylt* (meatballs with brown sauce, boiled potatoes, and lingonberry jam); *stekt falukorv med senap och potatis* (fried slices of thick German sausage with mustard and boiled or fried potatoes); *grillad lax med spenat, citron och potatis eller ris* (grilled slices of salmon with spinach, slices of lemon, and potatoes or rice); and *pytt i panna* (potatoes, leftover meats, and onions, fried with an egg on top and served with pickled beets). The average Swede drinks several cups of coffee each day, and Sweden ranks as one of the top consumers of coffee, per capita, in the world.

The *smörgåsbord* is a lavish buffet eaten (mostly at restaurants) on holidays or special occasions. It is not an everyday meal. A *smörgåsbord* includes warm and cold dishes, meat, fish, and desserts. Some families have a special type of *smörgåsbord* on Christmas Eve.

Recreation

Sports

Swedes are sports enthusiasts. Popular sports include soccer, horseback riding, ice-skating, skiing, tennis, golf, swimming, ice hockey, *bandy* (a sport similar to hockey), and orienteering races (using a map and compass to cross an area). Ice-skating and other winter sports are common.

In the wintertime, Swedes enjoy participating in and watching downhill and cross-country skiing. In February, schools are given a week off, called the “sport vacation.” During this time, most students take part in winter sports, and ski resorts are usually fully booked.

Physical fitness is particularly important to Swedes. Most aspire to lead active, healthy lives. Most towns have lighted exercise trails for jogging and walking (in the summer) or cross-country skiing (in the winter). Indoor gyms are also popular for activities like aerobics and yoga.

Leisure

Even more popular than sports are activities such as hiking, fishing, and bird-watching. Swedes love nature and spend as much time as possible outdoors. Many people consider it ideal to own a summer cottage for weekends and vacations. Sweden's mountains are popular destinations. Many Swedes also enjoy boating, and boat ownership is common.

Favorite leisure activities also include attending cultural events such as the theater or concerts, reading, watching movies or television, and surfing the internet or playing computer games. More traditional entertainment, such as opera and classical theater, are usually popular with older audiences.

More modern culture, such as break-dancing performances and hip-hop concerts, attract a younger, more mixed crowd. Many people are taking a greater interest in food and cooking. Singing in choirs was once a very popular pastime in Sweden, and today some still enjoy this hobby.

Vacation

By law, Swedish workers are given at least 25 days off each year. Vacation activities vary according to a family's income. Summer cottages are very popular, and people who do not have their own often visit the cottages of family and friends. Group camping trips are affordable and popular. It is increasingly common for people to go abroad during their vacations, with warm-weather destinations among the most common.

The Arts

Because the arts in Sweden receive substantial public and private funding, cultural activities are accessible throughout the country. Each city has a community center, where young people can gather and stage performances. Common crafts include wood carvings, ceramics, textiles, and stainless steel. Traditional handicrafts have increased in popularity in recent years, with more young people, particularly women, taking them up as hobbies.

Some Swedes enjoy traditional music by singing, playing instruments, or attending festivals. Common types of music are the *polska* (polka) and the *vals* (waltz). Prominent instruments include various wind instruments, the fiddle, and the accordion. The *nyckelharpa* (key fiddle) is a Swedish

invention. Sweden also has a lively modern music scene. Swedish filmmakers, like Ingmar Bergman, are known worldwide, and Swedish design and architecture are recognized for their simplicity and functionality.

Holidays

Sweden's national holidays include New Year's Day (1 January), May Day (1 May), and National Day (6 June). Other holidays are often associated with the season or a religious event.

Easter

Påsk (Easter) is celebrated over several days, beginning with *Skärtorsdagen*, the day before Good Friday. Children dress up like old witches with brooms and go door to door (among friends and neighbors only) to hand out Easter cards and collect candy. On Easter, people dye eggs and give away egg-shaped boxes of candy. Homes are decorated with twigs, colored feathers, and Easter lilies.

Valborgsmässoafton

Valborgsmässoafton celebrates the arrival of spring and traces its roots back to paganism. On the last day of April, bonfires are lit throughout the country and choirs gather to sing traditional songs. In some university towns, students wear traditional *studentmössa* (white hats with black bills) and celebrate with outdoor champagne breakfasts.

Midsommar

Midsommar (Midsummer) celebrations are held in late June (usually around the 20th), when the summer days are much longer than the nights. Most celebrations take place the day before the actual summer solstice (the longest day of the year), on Midsummer Eve.

Some people see this as Sweden's actual national holiday, since it is much more widely celebrated and has more traditions associated with it than the Swedish National Day. Most people try to celebrate outdoors in the countryside, where festivities include traditional music, dancing around the maypole, and barbecues and picnics of fresh potatoes, herring, salmon, and strawberries. People bring drinks and sing traditional drinking songs. Women and children also wear flowers in their hair.

Lucia

In contrast, Lucia falls near the longest night of the year. The holiday marks the beginning of the Christmas season. On the morning of 13 December, a girl in the family (or school or town) assumes the role of Saint Lucia (the “light queen”) and dresses in white with a crown of candles in her hair. She sings a special song and serves coffee and *lussekatter* (Lucia cats), a type of roll. She also leads a procession of girls and boys carrying candles and stars to bring light to people during the darkest time of year. The group goes to sing traditional songs at schools and workplaces.

Christmas

While Lucia marks the beginning of the *Jul* (Christmas) season, the climax is Christmas Eve, when a family *smörgåsbord* (buffet), which usually includes ham, sausages, herring, salmon, and gingerbread cookies, is accompanied by gift giving. Homes are decorated with a Christmas tree and lights. Christmas Day is spent relaxing, while 26 December is for visiting family and friends.

An important part of many Swedes' modern Christmas celebrations is a television program called *Kalle Ankas Jul*, which is broadcast on the afternoon of Christmas Eve. Each year since 1959, much of the country has gathered to watch this compilation of clips from different cartoons, whose ratings outperform nearly all other television events throughout the year.

Santa Claus is called *Jultomten*—the “Christmas gnome.” The name *Jultomten* once referred to a fabled gnome who watched over Swedish homes during the year. In the modern tradition, he brings gifts for the children to the door on Christmas Eve. After *Jultomten* delivers the gifts, the family dances around the tree and sings carols.

SOCIETY

Government

Structure

Sweden is a parliamentary constitutional monarchy. King Carl XVI Gustaf, a descendant of the Bernadotte Dynasty, has ruled since 1973. His duties as head of state are mostly ceremonial. The head of government is the prime minister, who is the leader of the majority party or ruling coalition. Members of the 349-seat unicameral Parliament (*Riksdag*) are elected by popular vote to four-year terms. The *Hogsta Domstolen* (Supreme Court) is the highest court of general jurisdiction, while the Supreme Administrative Court is the highest administrative court. Sweden is divided into 21 counties, each with its own government. Municipal councils handle local affairs.

Political Landscape

Like many European countries, Sweden has multiple political parties, though two parties tend to dominate the political landscape: the center-left Social Democratic Party (SAP) and the center-right Moderate Party. The SAP, also known as the Workers' Party, is the largest and oldest party in the country. It supports social welfare programs, opposes racism, and advocates for social justice movements like feminism. The Moderate Party supports less government regulation, lower taxes, and reductions to social welfare programs. The far-right Sweden Democrats, which backs anti-immigration policies, has gained influence in recent elections.

Sweden prides itself on its stance of political neutrality. As a result, it is cautious about joining international groups. In 1995, Sweden joined the European Union (EU), but it has not joined NATO. Because of the country's neutrality, Swedish politicians often serve as mediators in international conflicts. Within the country, major political issues include immigration and social welfare.

Government and the People

Swedes enjoy some of the most expansive civil liberties in the world, including freedom of speech, information, press, assembly, and religion. The government gives some financial support to many churches, synagogues, and mosques. The judiciary is largely free from corruption or political influence. The government also actively works to prevent discrimination over gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or disability. Elections in Sweden are free and fair. Swedes may vote at age

18. Although voting is not compulsory, voter turnout regularly exceeds 80 percent. Sweden is one of the least corrupt nations in the world, and it is very transparent with its budget.

Economy

A mix of high-tech capitalism and extensive welfare benefits, Sweden's economy is one of the most prosperous in the world. It is highly industrialized, has a modern distribution system, and boasts a skilled and educated labor force. Only around 2 percent of the workforce is engaged in agriculture, while 12 percent is in the industrial sector. Just over 85 percent of the workforce is in the service sector.

Sweden's economy is heavily reliant on trade. Membership in the European Union (EU), which is Sweden's most important export market, has provided opportunities for trade and economic growth. Sweden's top exports include machinery, motor vehicles, timber (mostly pulp for paper products), chemicals, and iron and steel products. Although still important, Sweden's automobile industry is less prominent now than it was in the past.

Although salaries are high, the cost of living is high too. An income tax funds the country's extensive welfare system. Private service alternatives and spending cuts have encouraged greater productivity and reduced overall costs. Preserving key elements of the country's welfare system remains important to most Swedes. The currency is the Swedish *krona* (SEK).

Transportation and Communications

Private cars are an important means of transportation, but not everyone owns a car. Many continue to use the well-developed and punctual public transportation system. Trains, buses, subways, and streetcars are common. There are three international airports. Most roads are in good condition. The Øresund Link, a combined motorway and railway, links the Danish city of Copenhagen and the southern coastal Swedish city of Malmö.

The telecommunications system is excellent. Sweden relies heavily on cellular phone service. Most households have cable or satellite television. Sweden is among the world's top consumers of newspapers. The government subsidizes newspapers without regard to political affiliation, and laws guaranteeing freedom of the press date back to 1766. However, hate speech, threats, and expressions of contempt directed against a group or member of a group are considered criminal acts. Most Swedes use the internet, and Sweden offers one of the fastest internet connections in the world.

Education

Structure and Access

The Swedish education system is divided into three stages: *grundskola*, *gymnasium*, and higher education. Students begin *grundskola* at age six or seven. Compulsory education ends at age 16, when students finish *grundskola*. At this time, students have several choices. Some start working, but most choose to attend a three-year high school (called *gymnasium*). A small number of students choose to attend private

vocational schools.

Students who attend high school are admitted into different *gymnasiums* based on their grades in *grundskola*. More popular *gymnasiums* may accept only the students with the highest grades. Students graduate from *gymnasium* in the spring of the year they turn 19. At this point, they may choose to continue on to higher education.

The Swedish government spends more money per pupil than most other countries, and illiteracy is virtually unknown. There is little variation between schools in terms of student performance. Students have access to public and private schools, both of which are free of charge. Private schools have fewer regulations placed on them by the state, and their curriculums vary according to each school's emphasis.

School Life

Instruction in *grundskola* focuses on the basic subjects (reading, writing, math, etc.). As education continues, a broader range of subjects is available. *Gymnasium* students choose a program of study; programs vary and may focus on social or natural sciences, the arts, or on vocational training in fields such as auto repair, restaurant services, or hairdressing.

The Swedish teaching style is non-authoritarian and emphasizes discussions and teaching critical and independent thinking. The teacher-student relationship is relatively informal, with students addressing their teachers by first name. Schoolwork is usually a mix of group work, individual papers, and traditional tests (although multiple-choice tests are almost never used). Cheating is not tolerated and is looked upon seriously, especially at universities. Most schools use technology tools in the classroom.

Multiculturalism is highly valued in Sweden. Immigrant children have the right to some instruction in their native language, usually an hour or two each week. Gender equality is another important value in Swedish education; some progressive primary schools use a gender-neutral pronoun.

Schools offer a very limited number of extracurricular activities. However, there is a large non-profit sector in Sweden that offers children different types of after-school activities, and cities also offer different activities.

Higher Education

The country has dozens of institutions of higher learning, which vary in size and offerings. Tuition is free for most, and loans are available for living costs. Adult education programs are extensive.

Health

Swedes enjoy some of the best health in the world. All Swedes are covered by national health insurance. The government pays nearly all fees incurred for medical care. Dental fees are shared by the individual. While basic health care is readily available, patients must often wait several months before their elective surgeries are approved. In response to public demand, private medical care options are now more widely available. The government pays an ill person's wages for an extended period. The infant mortality rate is one of the world's lowest.

Contact Information

Embassy of Sweden, 2900 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20007; phone (202) 467-2600; web site <https://www.swedenabroad.se/en/embassies/usa-washington/>. Visit Sweden web site www.visitsweden.com.

Country and Development Data

Capital	Stockholm
Population	10,040,995 (rank=90)
Area (sq. mi.)	173,860 (rank=55)
Area (sq. km.)	450,295
Human Development Index	7 of 188 countries
Gender Inequality Index	3 of 188 countries
GDP (PPP) per capita	\$51,000
Adult Literacy	99%
Infant Mortality	3 per 1,000 births
Life Expectancy	81 (male); 84 (female)
Currency	Swedish Krona

Sweden country profile

1 October 2018



Sweden's position as one of the world's most highly developed post-industrial societies looks fundamentally secure.

Unemployment is low and the economy strong. Public-private partnership is at the core of "the Swedish model", which was developed by the Social Democrats, who governed for most of the 70 years up to 2006.

This mixed economy traditionally featured centralised wage negotiations and a heavily tax-subsidised social security network. The Swedes still enjoy an advanced welfare system, and their standard of living and life expectancy are among the highest in the world.

Relative to its population size, Sweden has taken in far more migrants than any other EU country since the beginning of the migration crisis in 2015. This has put pressure on public services, and prompted a surge in support for the far-right Sweden Democrats party.

- Read [full overview](#)
- Read [more country profiles](#) - Profiles by **BBC Monitoring**

FACTS

Kingdom of Sweden

Capital: Stockholm

Population 9.5 million

Area 449,964 sq km (173,732 sq miles)

Major language Swedish

Major religion Christianity

Life expectancy 80 years (men), 84 years (women)

Currency krona

UN, World Bank

Getty Images

LEADERS

King: Carl XVI Gustaf



GETTY IMAGES

King Carl XVI Gustaf ascended the throne in 1973, on the death of his grandfather Gustaf VI Adolf. The current king's father died in a plane crash in 1947, when Carl Gustav was only nine months old.

During his long royal apprenticeship, Carl Gustav underwent the usual military training, but also studied history, politics and economics at Swedish universities, served in the diplomatic corps, and worked in banking and commerce.

Constitutional changes in 1974 deprived the king of all but ceremonial duties, such as opening parliament and representing Sweden at the diplomatic level.

Prime minister (outgoing): Stefan Lofven



GETTY IMAGES

Former union boss Stefan Lofven formed a minority, centre-left coalition government made up of his Social Democrats and the Green Party.

He put together the coalition after parliamentary elections of September 2014, in which his party gained 31% of the votes and the Greens 7%.

He promised he would seek wide support for his plans to boost welfare, schools and jobs.

Elections in September 2018 produced a result that allowed neither the centre-left nor centre-right to form an immediate coalition. Parliament voted down Mr Lofven, and the speaker began the process of asking party leaders to try to form a new government.

MEDIA



AFP/GETTY IMAGES

Swedish audiences enjoy a wide variety of public and commercial broadcast services.

TV is the most-popular medium. Public Sveriges Television's (SVT) main competitor is commercial network TV4. Sweden is home to the regional media giants Bonnier and the Modern Times Group (MTG).

Most households have multichannel cable or satellite TV. Sweden has made the switch to digital terrestrial TV (DTT) and pay TV is broadcast in the format.

Public radio is run by Sveriges Radio. There are nearly 100 private radios; some are part of near-national networks.

- Read [full media profile](#)

TIMELINE

Some key dates in Sweden's history:

1905 - Union between Sweden and Norway peacefully dissolved, 90 years after Sweden invaded Norway.

1914 - Outbreak of World War I. Sweden remains neutral.



AFP/GETTY IMAGES

1920s - Sweden develops from an agricultural into an industrial society. Social democratic governments enact social reforms.

1939 - At the outbreak of World War II, Sweden declares neutrality.

1959 - Sweden becomes founder member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).

1994 - Swedes narrowly support EU membership in a referendum.



Bulgaria

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ARMED FORCES

Date Posted: 09-Dec-2019

Publication: Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - The Balkans

UPDATED

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Joint Forces Interoperability

Multinational interoperability

Defence structure

Command and control

National Military Command Centre

2019-12-09

Military capabilities

	Total strength	Army	Air force	Navy
Active personnel	26,700	16,000	6,500	3,500

Reserves

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

- The Bulgarian armed forces have struggled to maintain capable, modern, NATO-standard forces in the face of severe budget constraints and political and social divisions that tend to undermine progress. Like other regional powers, Russian aggression in Ukraine and the militarisation of the Black Sea since 2014 have energised the armed forces to renew national defence capabilities after more than a decade of focusing on support to multinational operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, during which conventional skills atrophied and remaining stocks of Soviet-era weapons and equipment reached obsolescence. However, increasingly urgent procurement programmes and further professional development may finally enjoying substantial support from the government. Nonetheless, despite targeted assistance from allies to bridge gaps and the regular deployment of NATO forces into the region to help secure the eastern flank and deter Russia, the Bulgarian armed forces face major hurdles in developing required capabilities and professionalism.
- Contingents of about 160 Bulgarian troops continue deployments to Afghanistan in support of the NATO 'Resolute Support' mission to train, advise, and support Afghan security forces. Bulgarian troops also serve with multinational missions in Bosnia Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, and Mali. The Bulgarian Navy is required to be able to deploy the "equivalent" of a frigate for three to six months every year, while the air force should be able to provide a helicopter detachment for at least six months per year and one C-27J airlifter as required. Joint logistics capacity is under development to support Bulgarian forces on multinational operations abroad. Plans also call for further investment in C4ISR systems and a build-up in cyber defence capability for national and coalition operations.
- In September 2015 the government approved the 'Programme for the Development of the Defence Capabilities of the Bulgarian Armed Forces 2020'. A May 2018 annual report by the Council of Ministers stated that by the end of 2018, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) will be focused on implementation of the 2020 Programme; development of a roadmap for a new long-term 'Programme for the Development of the Armed Forces until 2032'; full implementation of the National Plan for increasing the Defence Budget to 2% of GDP by 2024; launch of the three major modernisation projects – for the land forces, the air force, and the navy; and the development of cyber defence and effective strategic communications capabilities.
- The bulk of the armed forces are maintained at minimal Manning and readiness levels due to funding, equipment, and recruiting constraints. However, the government and the armed forces leadership are committed to improvement and there is reason for some optimism, particularly regarding Bulgarian participation in the increasing frequency of NATO exercises taking place in the Black Sea region, which affords valuable training and exposure. These include near continuous deployments of US land forces training in Bulgaria and Romania.

2019-04-04

Threat environment

While Bulgaria faces no immediate military threat, escalating tensions between NATO and Russia could increase the likelihood of confrontation in the region, either in the Black Sea or along the borders between fellow NATO ally Romania with Moldova and Ukraine. Similarly, the tense situation in Syria could prove problematic, with most Russian material bound for the war there passing the Bulgarian coast before entering the Dardanelles. Closer political and military co-operation between Russia and Turkey in the face of NATO concerns is another potential source of concern for Bulgaria.

Other long-standing regional issues also remain relevant, such as transnational terrorism and illegal trafficking in arms, people, and drugs in concert with the growing influence of organised crime.

Along with Romania, Russia, Turkey, Georgia and Ukraine, Bulgaria shares the Black Sea littoral. In addition to fallout from the Russia-Ukraine crisis, which includes the introduction of ever more capable Russian naval and air capability into the Black Sea and the transit of Russian Navy units to and from the Mediterranean, Bulgaria must be mindful of other potential regional disputes between Greece and Turkey, and Georgia and Russia. Bulgaria is also the eastern anchor of the volatile Balkans region that includes Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina Northern Macedonia , and Kosovo.

2019-04-04

Doctrine and strategy

National and regional developments since the fall of communism have produced a defence strategy based on multilateral co-operation centred on the Black Sea region and the Balkans, along with solid support for NATO and the European Union.

2019-04-04

Evaluation of strategy

Bulgarian military doctrine recognises that security is directly related to wider regional conditions, with the main sources of military risk for the foreseeable future being active and potential conflicts in the eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea littoral, and the wider Middle East. Regional concerns gained new emphasis as a result of the Ukraine crisis with Russia, prompting consideration of how Bulgaria can best contribute to a collective NATO response. As the situation has evolved through the end of 2018, the Bulgarian armed forces continue to shift to a renewed emphasis on joint combined conventional force operations, including maritime operations and special operations forces (SOF), while maintaining the ability to provide forces for limited coalition operations in distant lands.

As comprehensive reforms continue, the Bulgarian armed forces have achieved basic NATO interoperability, with further advances expected in the medium term. However, hurdles remain in the form of ageing Soviet-era equipment and weapon systems and the need to improve individual unit proficiency to the levels required for effective NATO combined operations.

Military capability assessment

2019-04-04

Capability assessment

- After a decade of delays and reversals caused by political disagreements and inadequate funding, the government announced on 1 October 2018 the receipt of four offers to replace Soviet-era fighter aircraft. This follows the selection in April 2017, later withdrawn, of refurbished Saab JAS-39 C/D Gripens. This latest round of fighter offers finally resulted in selection of the Lockheed Martin F-16V Fighting Falcon by early in July 2019, when Defence Minister Krasimir Karakachanov signed four international agreements totalling nearly USD1.3 billion for the US Foreign Military Sale (FMS) procurement of eight F-16 Block 70 fighters – six single-seat and two twin-seat aircraft. To conclude the deal, parliament had to override a presidential veto based on procedural objections. Deliveries are expected to commence in 2023. The F-16V beat out of the same field of previously considered candidates – newbuild Gripens from Sweden, new Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, and upgraded tranche 1 Eurofighter Typhoons from Italy.
- Meanwhile, the air force relies on 15 MiG-29 fighters – 12 single-seat MiG-29As and three MiG-29UB trainers, that depend heavily on Russian logistics support. Some could remain in service until 2030, but may be phased out earlier if plans proceed to introduce 16+ new multirole fighters in the late 2020s. To establish a credible multirole fighter capability, Bulgaria requires about 24 new jets.
- Given the low serviceability rates of Bulgaria's existing Soviet-era MiG-29s, in August 2016 an agreement was concluded with the US for the periodic deployment of fighters to Bulgaria to conduct joint QRA missions. This follows a comprehensive 2014 bilateral agreement with Greece to share air policing of Bulgarian airspace. Italy has also deployed Typhoons to Bulgaria.
- Naval requirements are another area of concern, with the government promising to support a 2020 budget that includes funding for two new multirole corvettes, with additional funding programmed through planned delivery in 2022. These are likely to be Gowind-class helicopter-capable corvettes completed in Bulgaria.
- Meanwhile, the land forces lack the weapons and systems to effectively conduct conventional combined arms manoeuvre warfare, specifically modern armoured vehicles, main battle tanks (MBT), modern artillery with digital fire control systems, secure digital command-and-control (C2) systems, and effective logistics capability. A hopeful indicator is the August 2019 release of an RFI for acquisition of about 150 new armoured vehicles with the intent to eventually outfit the entire 2nd Mechanised Brigade.

Joint forces interoperability

2019-11-05

Joint Forces Interoperability

In May 2019 approval was granted for the establishment of a Joint Special Operations Command directly subordinate to the Chief of Defence, built around the existing 68th Special Forces Brigade. The new command will be operational by October 2019.

2019-04-04

Multinational interoperability

The Bulgarian armed forces have gained some worthwhile operational experience since joining NATO in 2004, although generating sufficiently trained and equipped forces remains challenging. This is due to a small force pool from which to draw, limited funding for new equipment and training, the poor quality of many service members, and the generally poor training they receive. As a result, Bulgaria historically restricted deployments to small numbers of individually selected and specifically trained and equipped personnel formed into ad hoc units for specific tasks, such as peacekeeping in Kosovo or training the Afghan National Army (ANA). This is changing as properly trained and equipped company battlegroups from standing infantry battalions participate in training exercises with NATO forces in Bulgaria and Romania, and as far afield as Germany and the Baltic States. Bulgarian special forces receive more training and better equipment than other elements and regularly work closely with US and other NATO SOF.

Bulgaria has been an active member of the South-East Europe Defence Ministerial (SEDM) process, which began with a meeting of regional defence ministers in 1996. The then Bulgarian deputy defence minister Avgustina Tzvetkova chaired the organisation from 2009 to 2011. The 14 member states include all of the Balkan countries, along with Italy, Turkey, Ukraine, and the US. A prominent SEDM initiative is the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE), also known as the South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG), which involves a multinational brigade structure that maintains an operational core staff and can mobilise quickly when required.

SEEBRIG's capabilities were expected to advance rapidly, but this is now on hold due to multilateral tensions in the Black Sea region, particularly the Russia-Ukraine conflict and deteriorating relations between NATO and Turkey.

Beyond SEEBRIG, the regional exercise series 'Danube Guard', involving Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia, has taken place every summer since 2007 on the Danube River. The three countries mount air, naval, and land operations simulating combined action in a crisis situation along their common border and action against a terrorist attack. On a multinational level, the exercise is designed to check whether the authorities in charge of national security in the three countries have the capacity to combine forces to deal with crisis situations on their borders.

As a result of increasing security concerns stemming from the Russia-Ukraine crisis, the tempo of multinational exercises in Bulgaria and involving Bulgarian forces has increased dramatically since 2014. These have included NATO sponsored multinational land and air exercises in Bulgaria and elsewhere in Europe, and combined naval exercises in the Black Sea.

2019-04-04

Defence structure

Bulgaria has focused on sustainable multinational deployments and interoperability with NATO and EU forces for the past decade. Plans call for maintaining a force of 3,000 to 5,000 for international missions of up to six months, with more than half of the army reconfigured to support this role. In light of new concerns for regional security along NATO's eastern and southern flanks, this expeditionary outlook is changing to reflect more conventional, combined arms operations in a national and regional security context. Specific initiatives include forming a standing, high readiness contingency battalion battlegroup for the regional framework brigade and the NATO Response Force, comprising light infantry, nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) reconnaissance, and engineers. However, the limited number of properly trained and equipped high readiness units means these units constitute the effective core of the armed forces in response to any contingency situation.

In January 2016 the latest iteration of the EU Balkan Battlegroup was formally established in Greece under Greek command for a six-month period, with subordinate units from Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, and Romania. Bulgaria provides a mechanised infantry company to the 1,200-strong force, which activated in the second half of 2007, the first half of 2009, the second half of 2011, the first half of 2014, and the first half of 2018.

Armed forces units have served in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1997, first with the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and now with the EU Force (EUFOR). This contribution has now been reduced to just 10 personnel assigned to EUFOR Headquarters (HQ) in Butmir near Sarajevo airport. Another 10 personnel are assigned to Kosovo, split between Kosovo Force (KFOR) HQ in Pristina and the NATO training group.

2019-04-04

Command and control

Commander-in-Chief:	President Rumen Radev
Minister of Defence:	Krasimir Karakachanov
Chief of Defence Staff:	Lieutenant General Andrey Botsev
Commander, Joint Operations Command:	Lieutenant General Lyubcho Spasov Todorov
Land Forces Commander:	Major General Mihail Dimitrov Popov
Air Forces Commander:	Major General Tsanko Ivanov Stoykov
Navy Commander:	Rear Admiral Mitko Alexandrov Petev

2019-04-04

National Military Command Centre

As part of the extensive restructuring necessitated by Bulgaria's entry into NATO a National Military Command Centre (NMCC) was established in Sofia. The NMCC is responsible for operational planning and the C2 of Bulgarian armed forces units deployed on operations inside the country and abroad, thereby ensuring the joint employment of forces from all three services. When national units deploy on NATO, EU, UN, or other coalition operations, the NMCC co-ordinates the national administrative and logistical support effort following the transfer of operational control to the multinational command. The NMCC is also responsible for the co-ordination of all civil-military emergency response operations within and outside Bulgaria.

The individual service HQ are responsible for recruitment, manning, training, and providing units and sub-units to the NMCC for joint training and participation in operations. They are also responsible for the recovery of personnel and units that have participated in an operation.

The NMCC is equipped with a C2 system supplied by Northrop Grumman, which became fully operational in 2004.

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Overall

- There is an elevated risk that the government coalition, led by the centre-right GERB party, does not complete its full four-year term ending in 2021. Government instability risk stems from reoccurring corruption-related scandals involving politicians from the ruling coalition, and leadership battles within GERB and its junior coalition partner, the UP. Ministerial resignations are probable.
- The government is likely to pursue orthodox economic policies to stimulate business activity and attract foreign investment, emphasising preservation of the low corporate tax environment and balanced budgets. However, the business environment is likely to continue suffering from heavy administrative burdens and corruption risks. Policy reversal, especially on environmental and social issues, is likely in response to civil protests.

- Bulgaria currently is preparing to join the Eurozone's financial sector oversight – the banking union – at the same time as it enters the European Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM-II), the two-year interim arrangement required before full Eurozone entry. Our baseline forecast is that Bulgaria will enter ERM-II by 2022 and adopt the euro in 2023 at the earliest.
- Private consumption and fixed investment will remain the main drivers of growth, gaining momentum following gradual, modestly paced recovery from the 2009 global recession, and being boosted by the inflow of EU structural funds. A wide domestic output gap and elevated unemployment had weighed on real incomes, but the recently improving labour market is now pushing up real wages, supporting household budgets. Exports will continue to hinder growth, reflecting the slowdown in key export markets.
- There is an elevated risk of construction delays or contract cancellations given the inconsistent regulatory framework, corruption allegations, environmental protests, court challenges, and inadequate enforcement of regulation. Local contractors are likely to be favoured when awarding procurement contracts. Corruption risks remain high, posing barriers to entry for foreign companies and reputational and business disruption risks after entering market.

2019-11-04

Political

Government changes and policy reversals are common. A third centre-right, GERB-led government emerged after the March 2017 early election. An early vote before March 2021 is also probable. Many influential individuals remain outside the political system, with significant private business interests infiltrating policy-making and judicial processes. The parliamentary adoption of legislation is likely to be slow. Legislative changes to improve the judiciary's efficiency and transparency or tackling of high-level corruption are unlikely. Civil society protests are likely. In the past 10 years Bulgaria has initiated large energy projects to be developed by Russian companies.

2019-12-04

External Relations

Since 1997, Bulgaria has made substantial progress in moving closer to the West, with the majority of the political elite and the wider public supporting membership of the EU (January 2007) and NATO (April 2004). Relations with NATO and the US have been largely smooth, with Bulgarian troops participating in various overseas peacekeeping operations. However, economic dependence on Russia, particularly in energy imports, persists and is often influencing the country's political course. Relations between Bulgaria and China have started intensifying in the past few years, with Sofia attempting to attract Chinese investors and increase exports to China.

2019-10-10

Military Conflict

Bulgaria's relations with its neighbours are expected to remain peaceful. Although military conflict with Russia is highly unlikely, relations with Moscow have been somewhat strained because of Russia's opposition to Bulgaria's defence co-operation with the US. In 2015, NATO opened a regional co-ordinating unit in Bulgaria. Bulgaria will participate in NATO military exercises in the Black Sea as part of the Alliance strategy to establish a deterrence capability against Russia along its eastern flank. This elevates the risk of maritime incidents between military and potentially commercial vessels, which could lead to transport disruption. Exploratory cyber attacks against governmental websites or CNI assets are likely.

2019-10-10

Terrorism

Close co-operation with the US, troop contributions in Afghanistan (about 160 troops under the Resolute Support mission), weapons' sale to the Middle East, and an influx of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, and elsewhere have increased the likelihood of domestic Muslim radicalisation, but home-grown terrorist risk remains low. The overall terrorist threat is lower than in Western Europe. In 2016, parliament passed legislative measures intended to strengthen prevention and enforcement tools. However, the capacity of law-enforcement bodies and specialised courts on organised crime and terrorism remains questionable amid high corruption risks, including among security officials, and lack of a successful record in combating organised crime.

2019-11-04

Social Unrest

Environmental demonstrations attracting up to several thousand people are likely in capital Sofia and other big cities, causing traffic disruption of up to a day. Anti-government protests of up to a few thousand people are probable in Sofia, remaining peaceful and causing transport disruption for up to a day. Union-supported protests by public sector employees, usually leading to road closures in Sofia, are also likely. They often occur in the run-up to legislative amendments on social or taxation issues. Protests by far-right groups pose moderate risk of physical attacks, such as beatings, causing injury to refugees and people perceived as representing minorities.

2019-11-04

Operational

Road and rail infrastructure quality remains below the EU average, with much modernisation needed in some regions, especially for rail. Governments are likely to continue prioritising infrastructure projects, but regulatory constraints and corruption are likely to lead to slow progress. Priority projects include rail lines refurbishment, a rail connection from Sofia to Skopje, North Macedonia, a tunnel under the Balkan Mountains, and the Hemus motorway. Attracting foreign direct investment and EU funds for such projects is a priority. The labour force is relatively cheap, and there is a low risk of long and disruptive strikes. There is a high risk of political corruption.

2019-12-05

Crime

Bulgaria has a persistent problem with organised crime. However, violent incidents are rare and there is a low likelihood of injury to bystanders. Extortion demands are probable, especially in tourist resorts. Governments have made efforts to tackle the issue, but the risk of extortion is likely to persist. Bulgaria is an important transition country for smugglers of hard drugs, counterfeit products, and people. The government is keen to join the Schengen zone, the EU's free-movement area, but this has repeatedly been blocked by various other member states, which have cited concerns over organised crime and corruption. Increased cyber-crime capabilities pose a threat to businesses, particularly financial institutions.

2019-11-04

Risks to Individuals

Extortion, kidnap, and contract assassination risks stemming from 'for-profit' organised crime are elevated in large cities and sea resorts, but they are unlikely to target foreign businesspersons; there have been only a few opportunistic incidents targeting foreigners. Individuals perceived to be from minorities or people of colour are at a moderate risk of attack by far-right activists. The risk of attack, including vandalism, physical assaults, and potentially arson against NGO assets and personnel, as well as refugee centres, are likely.

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2019-11-04

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Major Threats: Conflict snapshot

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2019-10-10

Major Threats: Interstate conflict

Open military confrontation with Russia is unlikely; information warfare and influence of pro-Russian parties to persist

Bulgaria's relations with its neighbours are likely to remain peaceful. Although military conflict with Russia is very unlikely, Bulgarian-Russian relations have suffered from Russia's opposition to Bulgaria's NATO membership and defence co-operation with the US. Bulgaria has agreed to host one of the six new NATO force integration units, launched in September 2015, as part of the Alliance's effort to strengthen deterrence on its eastern flank. Many pro-Western Bulgarian politicians and academics blame Russia for waging information warfare on Bulgaria, involving propaganda and infiltration into Bulgarian politics and media through paid agents, including political parties and MPs. The opposition Socialist Party regularly adopts a pro-Russian stance, defending the lifting of EU sanctions against Russia. The government, which now includes pro-Russian parties as junior coalition partners, is likely to strive to improve relations with Russia. In 2017, Prime Minister Boyko Borisov said that Bulgaria would work to lift the EU sanctions against Russia.

Nevertheless, Bulgaria is likely to continue supporting its active NATO membership and allocate funds for capital spending. As per a parliamentary decision from 2016, Bulgaria has to acquire 18 multi-role fighter jets and two naval patrol vessels by 2022 to comply with NATO requirements in terms of strengthening its defence capabilities. In July 2019, Bulgaria approved the contracts for the acquisition of the US F-16 combat aircrafts. However, the country's military budget is unlikely to reach the 2% of GDP NATO target in the next four years. Bulgaria is expected to continue take part in NATO military exercises in the Black Sea. In response to that, Russia is likely to continue to assert its presence by air and sea border incursions, as well as increased intelligence collection and cyber-attacks of the kind attributed to Russia in the Baltic states. The cyber activity will probably target critical national infrastructure (CNI), government websites, and state-owned companies, causing temporary disruption and data breaches.

In 2013, relations between Bulgaria and Turkey temporarily deteriorated after a sudden influx of Syrian refugees through the Turkish border, but this had no serious consequences apart from the construction of a border fence on the Bulgarian side. Ahead of Bulgaria's early general election in March 2017, Bulgarian nationalist political parties argued that Turkey was trying to influence the election, supporting a particular party, but the incident did not lead to a substantial deterioration in bilateral relations. Overall, relations with Turkey are likely to continue to be influenced by fears of a refugee influx, with the government aiming to maintain good relations with Ankara. There is a low risk of re-emergence of a minor maritime border dispute with Romania, a contention that is most likely to be resolved diplomatically.

2019-10-10

Major Threats: Terrorism snapshot

Close co-operation with the US, troop contributions in Afghanistan (about 160 troops under the Resolute Support mission), weapons' sale to the Middle East, and an influx of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, and elsewhere have increased the likelihood of domestic Muslim radicalisation, but home-grown terrorist risk remains low. The overall terrorist threat is lower than in Western Europe. In 2016, parliament passed legislative measures intended to strengthen prevention and enforcement tools. However, the capacity of law-enforcement bodies and specialised courts on organised crime and terrorism remains questionable amid high corruption risks, including among security officials, and lack of a successful record in combating organised crime.

2019-10-10

Major Threats: Terrorism hotspots and targets

Terrorist risk is lower than in Western Europe; attacks are likely to target Jewish, Bulgarian government, and US assets

The risk of small-scale attacks by lone self-generated fighters involving IEDs at ports, airports, and shopping centres is low in comparison to Western Europe despite the geographically close proximity of Bulgaria to Turkey and the Middle East. The latest terrorist attack was in July 2012, when a suicide bomber killed five Israeli tourists and a Bulgarian in an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a bus at Sarafovo Airport, close to Burgas. Investigators found it was organised by members of the Iranian-backed Lebanese Shia Islamist group, Hizbullah, without support from Bulgaria's Muslim community. Law enforcement bodies still consider Israeli individuals and targets at the highest risk of terrorist attack, so ensure increased security for Israeli diplomats or tourist groups. Tighter security measures at airports and tourist centres have been introduced as well as increased co-operation between Bulgarian and foreign intelligence services. Since 2012, security at airports has marginally improved, but law enforcement and intelligence capacity still experience deficiencies due to lack of equipment, specific expertise and alleged widespread corruption within the relative bodies. In addition to Jewish assets and individuals, Bulgarian government and US assets are at risk of attacks by Islamist groups. Probable locations include the ones used by NATO and US forces, such as the Burgas Port, Bezmer Airport, and Novo Selo firing range. Bulgaria is part of the global coalition against the Islamic State and provides firearms and munitions to the Iraqi government.

There are signs of funded radicalisation practices and cases of preaching radical Islam in Bulgaria. In October 2017, a Syrian-born Bulgarian citizen was arrested on organised crime and terrorism charges. In 2013, he allegedly joined the Islamic State in Syria, then returned to Bulgaria in 2016 and organised a criminal group for the illegal distribution and sale of tobacco. This event can be attributed to crime and does not indicate the broader support for the Islamic state in Bulgaria. In 2016, parliament adopted an anti-terrorism bill, giving more power to the police, national security forces, and army in cases of terrorist threats, but security forces are lacking operational experience in handling terrorism cases. Corruption and well-developed organised crime groups, providing fake passports and Schengen visas and the presence of established smuggling routes to Western Europe, make Bulgaria a transit country for foreign militants from North Africa and the Middle East.

There is an elevated risk of low-level violence by far-right activists, particularly in the form of physical assaults against individuals perceived as representing minorities. The risk of injury to refugees and asylum seekers is moderate. Low-level property damage to asylum centres, and other places of migrant accommodation, and NGOs defending human rights is likely.

2019-11-04

Major Threats: Social stability and unrest snapshot

Environmental demonstrations attracting up to several thousand people are likely in capital Sofia and other big cities, causing traffic disruption of up to a day. Anti-government protests of up to a few thousand people are probable in Sofia, remaining peaceful and causing transport disruption for up to a day. Union-supported protests by public sector employees, usually leading to road closures in Sofia, are also likely. They often occur in the run-up to legislative amendments on social or taxation issues. Protests by far-right groups pose moderate risk of physical attacks, such as beatings, causing injury to refugees and people perceived as representing minorities.

2019-11-04

Major Threats: Protests and riots

Anti-government and environmental protests are likely, potentially leading to policy reversal

Mass civil demonstrations in Sofia have ceased since 2014, but civil society groups are at times capable of influencing public sentiment. This, together with the broad public dissatisfaction with the political elite over small-scale crime and perceived widespread corruption, means that the probability of future protests of up to several hundred people, mainly in Sofia, is elevated. Demonstrations will probably be organised over crime incidents, corruption scandals, or difficult living conditions for marginalised groups. These protests would probably be staged in the capital Sofia and major cities such as Varna and Plovdiv, blocking central roads, and government buildings. The risk of substantial property damage or injury to protesters or bystanders is low, with the last cases of limited violence from 2014. These protests are likely to disrupt cargo and transport for up to a day.

Trade union-backed demonstrations by employees of state-owned companies in security, healthcare, education, mining, and transport are likely triggered by restructuring or wage disputes. Such demonstrations, lasting up to a week, will remain largely peaceful, unless covertly funded and

instigated by opposition groups. Bulgarian police officers, firefighters, and prison guards are capable of organising countrywide protests. In 2015, after they protested against cuts to their pensions and benefits, as part of a reform in the security sector, the government withdrew most of the legislative amendments. After protests, in 2018 the government approved a wage increase for police officers and firefighters.

Bulgaria has a strong environmental movement, with a number of issue-specific environmental protest groups. These groups have helped incite protests against tourism developments on the Black Sea coast, some of which in 2013 resulted in a construction ban over areas defined as sand dunes. In the beginning of 2018, environmentalists demonstrated against the Pirin National Park's management plan allowing the construction of a second cabin lift and additional infrastructure in Bansko ski resort. The likelihood of protests against the expansion of the Bansko ski resort is high. Demonstrations in Sofia have the potential to attract several thousand people, and are likely to be non-violent and disrupt traffic for up to a day. Other environmental issues, such as air and water pollution, are also likely to trigger protests across Bulgaria. Probable sectors to be affected by similar demonstrations and follow-up legislative measures include construction, heavy manufacturing, and energy.

Local demonstrations against immigrants and refugees, particularly Muslim, are likely in Sofia and other cities with a large presence of recent immigrants and migrant shelters. Sporadic protests, particularly in areas near the refugee camps and against NGOs defending human rights, are probable. Demonstrators would likely seek to block nearby national and international roads and motorways for up to a few days. Protests against the Roma community are likely in smaller cities, posing risk of ethnically motivated assaults.

2019-11-04

Major Threats: Risks to individuals snapshot

Extortion, kidnap, and contract assassination risks stemming from 'for-profit' organised crime are elevated in large cities and sea resorts, but they are unlikely to target foreign businesspersons; there have been only a few opportunistic incidents targeting foreigners. Individuals perceived to be from minorities or people of colour are at a moderate risk of attack by far-right activists. The risk of attack, including vandalism, physical assaults, and potentially arson against NGO assets and personnel, as well as refugee centres, are likely.

2019-11-04

Major Threats: Death and injury

Ethnically motivated attacks are likely; risks from organised crime groups more acute for local businesspeople than foreigners

Violence stemming from organised criminal groups presents an elevated risk in urban areas. Much of this does not affect international business operations. However, incidents of violence occur in public once or twice a year, such as explosives in cars, setting vehicles on fire, or shootings targeting prominent business figures, typically without collateral harm to bystanders. The January 2016 assassination of businessman Alexander Antov led to calls by the business community for a

swift investigation, as Antov was not known to be connected to organised crime groups; progress on the case has been limited. The latest shooting of a wealthy businessman, Petar Hristov, occurred in January 2018 in Sofia. Murders in turf battles between organised crime groups are moderately probable. In June 2016, a gang-related shooting, involving up to 40 men, took place in popular sea resort Sunny Beach. The approximately 150 contract killings known to have occurred in the first 20 years post-communism remain unprosecuted. Since Bulgaria's EU accession in 2007, the frequency of such killings has dropped compared with the 1990s. Nevertheless, the problem persists and has been partly responsible for Bulgaria's delayed entry into the border-free Schengen zone.

Far-right groups are active in Sofia and cities with larger Muslim or Roma populations, posing elevated risks of physical assault against people perceived to be from ethnic minorities or people of colour. Far-right groups are also known to be linked to football fan clubs and assaults against minorities are likely before and after football matches. These crimes are unlikely to be prosecuted or lead to convictions. In October 2016, the head of human rights NGO the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, Krasimir Kanev, was physically assaulted by two men in central Sofia. Protests by far-right nationalist groups tend to be organised quickly, typically within a couple of days and using social media, and characterised by a high level of co-ordination and a military-style structure. Although demonstrations will most likely attract relatively low numbers, they are likely to prompt occasional violence from protesters, which would pose moderate risks to bystanders, nearby vehicles, and building fronts. The risk of civil unrest is elevated in close proximity to existing refugee camps in Harmanli, Pleven, Nova Zagora, and Haskovo.

Limited fighting with knives and other less-lethal weapons between Roma and ethnic Bulgarians, particularly in some districts in Sofia and small towns around the country, are likely. Nevertheless, in comparison with its neighbours in the former Yugoslavia, overall Bulgaria has better inter-ethnic relations, with tension highly unlikely to lead to civil war. Bulgaria has a Turkish and smaller Roma minority, but their organisations tend to be secular and moderate. The Turkish minority is well represented at the political level.

2019-12-05

Crime Overview

Bulgaria has a persistent problem with organised crime. However, violent incidents are rare and there is a low likelihood of injury to bystanders. Extortion demands are probable, especially in tourist resorts. Governments have made efforts to tackle the issue, but the risk of extortion is likely to persist. Bulgaria is an important transition country for smugglers of hard drugs, counterfeit products, and people. The government is keen to join the Schengen zone, the EU's free-movement area, but this has repeatedly been blocked by various other member states, which have cited concerns over organised crime and corruption. Increased cyber-crime capabilities pose a threat to businesses, particularly financial institutions.

2019-09-10

Organised Crime

Organised crime groups in Bulgaria vary in size and structure, from localised and limited-in-size groupings, involving sportspersons and common criminals, to larger and hierarchical structures,

resembling Russian oligarch cliques and involving high-ranking members of the formerly ruling communist party. Traditionally, smaller groups resorted to systemic violence and engaged in trafficking, theft, extortion in return of security provision, racketeering, currency speculation, and fraud. The oligarch-type groups focused on privatisation deals and control over public companies, establishment of banks and media outlets, at times constituting de facto state capture. Although consecutive governments have had some success with the first type of groups, the second one has proved significantly more challenging. Although public assassinations and violent demonstrations involving mafia members have decreased after Bulgaria's accession to the EU in 2007, their activity and close connections with the political elite have likely not been affected. There are Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish, Arab, and Serbian mafia groups also known to be active. Bulgaria is a hub for cross-border drug-trafficking networks in the Balkans, including transit routes from Asia to Western Europe.

Bulgaria remains a major transit route for drugs, arms, and people to Western Europe. In the 2000s, pre-EU accession reforms shifted the groups' focus from racketeering, theft, and trafficking to financial crime and fraud with EU funds. From arms and consumer goods smuggling, the groups have reoriented part of their operations towards immigrant smuggling, drug production and trafficking, and fiscal and cyber-crimes. Most recently, cigarette and fuel smuggling have been two of the most profitable and widespread criminal activities in Bulgaria. Cyber-crime in Bulgaria has been rising also, with criminals attracted by the underdeveloped law enforcement capabilities and relatively low penalties under national criminal law. Bulgarian criminal groups mainly specialise in credit card fraud and child pornography. The threat of cyber-crime has been receiving wider attention at the public and state level. Institutional capacity to tackle cyber-criminals is currently niche and institutions often lack the necessary jurisdiction to tackle trans-border offences. However, co-operation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), NATO, and Europol has been continuously intensifying.

2019-09-10

Trafficking

Arms

Small-arms are trafficked to and from Bulgaria, but the country is primarily an exporter of illegal weapons, given its geographical position, its history of skilled small-arms production, a legal defence industry, and endemic corruption. Arms move to and from Turkey from southern Bulgaria, with a key route from Sofia to western Balkan states and to Greece. From Serbia, these Bulgarian, Chinese, and Turkish arms are trafficked to Western Europe, particularly Italy, Spain, Germany, and the United Kingdom. A large portion of the illegal arms exports or semi-legal arms export is directed to North Africa and the Middle East. A few examples of smuggled nuclear materials have surfaced over the years, primarily coming from Ukraine and Moldova.

Human

Bulgaria is both a transit point and a source country of human trafficking. Trafficking of babies and children, primarily of Roma origin, for adoption in Western Europe stands out as a particular problem, often done with the family's consent. In terms of people smuggling, Bulgaria serves primarily as a transit and destination country since its EU accession. Smuggled immigrants

primarily come from the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus via Turkey or Ukraine. The role of the respective local diaspora is pivotal, particularly in passport forgery, while Bulgarian- and Romanian-headed groups mainly provide established smuggling channels.

Drug

Bulgaria's key position on the Balkan drug-transit route ensures that most of the heroin destined for Western Europe passes through its territory. Heroin from Afghanistan is usually transported via Turkey and enters Bulgaria at one of its border crossings with Turkey, in particular Kapikule, Turnovo, and Derekoy. In this region, drugs tend to be smuggled through official border crossings rather than over unpatrolled borders, with this movement facilitated by corruption within the border police. Bulgaria is a transit route for cocaine trafficking from Latin America as well. Local groups mainly collaborate with Turkish, Greek, Albanian, and Baltic groups, rather than Latin American cartels directly. Bulgarian groups have become more active in synthetic drugs markets, with production gradually shifting from the Nordic countries to the Balkans with the active participation of people from the local Turkish diasporas. In the reverse direction of heroin and cocaine trafficking, synthetic drugs distribution usually goes from Romania and Bulgaria into Turkey, Africa, and the Middle East. Bulgaria has reported an increased number of dismantled methamphetamine laboratories in recent years.

2019-12-20

Financial Crime

Eradication of financing channels for criminal groups has formed a central part of the government's strategy to combat organised crime. Bulgaria has implemented a number of legislative initiatives to tackle the problem of financial crime. The backbone of the Bulgarian anti-money-laundering regime is the Law on Measures against Money Laundering. A new Law on Measures against Money Laundering, passed in March 2018, has incorporated the EU's Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive from 2015. The full incorporation of the EU's Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive from 2018 to affect virtual currency exchanges and e-commerce platforms is expected by September 2020. The 2003 Law on Measures against the Financing of Terrorism was last amended in 2016. Parliament has adopted various banking, tax, and commercial secrecy laws. The main body collecting and analysing information on suspected money-laundering transactions is the Financial Intelligence Directorate (FID) within the State Agency for National Security (DANS). The FID operates under the terms and procedures of the Law on Measures against Money Laundering and Law on Measures against the Financing of Terrorism. Although the legal framework has progressed significantly, enforcement of the relevant laws remains inefficient. The sectors most prone to money laundering are hospitality, construction, and gambling. A recent example of substantial counterfeiting activity was from November 2016 when about EUR13 million in counterfeit notes were found in a reservoir in Bulgaria.

Political Leadership

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2020-01-14

Leadership

Leadership

Title	Name	Appointed
President	Maj.-Gen. (retd) Rumen RADEV	42757
Vice President	Iliana YOTOVA	42757
Prime Minister	Boyko BORISSOV	42859
Deputy Prime Minister for Public Order and Security; Minister of Defence	Krasimir KARAKACHANOV	42859
Minister of Education and Science	Krasimir VALCHEV	42859
Deputy Prime Minister for Economic and Demographic Policy	Mariana NIKOLOVA	43425
Deputy Prime Minister	Tomislav DONCHEV	42859
Minister of Finance	Vladislav GORANOV	42859
Deputy Prime Minister for Judicial Reform; Minister of Foreign Affairs	Ekaterina GECHEVA-ZAKHARIEVA	42859
Minister of the Economy	Emil KARANIKOLOV	42859
Minister of Justice	Danail KIRILOV	43560
Minister of the Interior	Mladen MARINOV	43363
Minister of Transport, Information Technologies and Communications	Rossen JELIAZKOV	43363

Minister of Energy	Temenuzhka PETKOVA	42859
Minister of Health	Kiril ANANIEV	43049
Minister of Agriculture, Food and Forestry	Desislava TANEVA	43600
Minister of Labour and Social Policy	Denitsa SACHEVA	43802
Minister of the Environment and Water	Neno DIMOV	42859
Minister of Tourism	Nikolina ANGELKOVA	42859
Minister of Culture	Boil BANOVA	42859
Source: IHS and CIRCA People in Power		

2019-06-10

Political Profiles

Political figures

President Rumen Radev

Radev assumed the presidential office in January 2017, following the November 2016 presidential election. Radev, a former air force major general, ran as an independent, but was backed by the left-leaning opposition BSP. Radev attracted almost 60% of the vote, whereas centre-right GERB's nominee Tsetska Tsacheva, a parliamentary speaker under the GERB-led government coalition, came second with 36%. During his presidential campaign, Radev has been perceived to be the pro-Russian candidate because of the link to BSP, but he is likely to remain a pro-EU and particularly pro-NATO political figure in his public appearances. Radev is actively lobbying for the allocation of additional funds for the modernisation of the army and air force, particularly noting the need of acquiring new multirole fighter jets. Radev has said that he supports reforms in the judiciary, but he is unlikely to take a detail-oriented and consistent stance on the issue of judiciary reform as did former president Rosen Plevneliev, who was known for his right leaning orientation and support for civil society.

Prime Minister Boyko Borissov

Borissov served as mayor of Sofia from 2005 to 2009 before being appointed as prime minister for two mandates, in 2009 and then again in 2014. In May 2017, Borissov again assumed the office of Prime Minister following the March 2017 early election due to the second resignation of his government in November 2016. Between 1982 and 1990, he worked in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as a firefighter, and later as a professor at the Police Academy in Sofia. His party, GERB, founded in 2006, lasted longer than experts predicted in a country where it is not atypical for newcomers to emerge at elections then quickly disappear from the public eye. After a drop in support, Borissov's popularity increased again in 2013. He is known for his populist stances and

policy U-turns. Borissov is also the first Bulgarian PM to be re-elected and his second and third terms will largely comply with his first term's priorities: infrastructure, large investment projects, fiscal stability, and close relations with the EU and NATO. However, he has failed to disassociate himself from pro-Russian business lobbies.

Minister of Finance Vladislav Goranov

Goranov is one of the surprises in Borissov's first cabinet, as he previously left the parliament group of GERB and the political elite, allegedly over a lack of opportunity for personal development. Goranov served as deputy finance minister under former finance minister Simeon Dyankov, a contentious figure praised for fiscal discipline but blamed for weak economic growth. Goranov is a controversial choice primarily for his allegedly close previous relations with DSP MP and media tycoon Delyan Peevski, which Goranov denies. Goranov was again appointed as Bulgaria's finance minister with the instalment of the third GERB-led government in May 2017.

Media mogul Delyan Peevski

Peevski is a media magnate and member of the DPS whose appointment as a chief of the National Security Agency (DANS) sparked immediate mass protests in Bulgaria, demanding the resignation of then two-week-old Oresharski government. While the appointment was reversed, calls for resignation and protests continued. Peevski and his mother, Irena Krasteva, control a wide network of national and local newspaper, a few TV channels, websites, and a freighting company. Peevski has also started to reveal ownership and acquisition agreements in a number of sectors, including retail and a fertiliser plant. His indirect influence goes even further through investments in a number of ventures, some allegedly recipients of loans from the now-insolvent CorpBank and its majority owner, Tsvetan Vassilev. For about 10 years, Peevski accumulated considerable wealth and influence in Bulgaria, as well as strong antagonism from the civil society, which considers him symbolic of the murky power brokerage that has impoverished the country and weakened Bulgarian institutions ever since the beginning of the transition period in the 1990s. His powerful media group, New Bulgarian Media Group, regularly attacks his political and business rivals. In 2001, aged 21 and only a second-year university student, Peevski was appointed to the cabinet of then-transport minister Plamen Petrov as parliamentary secretary and entrusted with chairing the board of the largest port in Bulgaria, Varna, despite his lack of an appropriate background and qualifications. In 2007, Peevski was appointed deputy emergency response minister in a Socialist-led cabinet. He was dismissed two years later on corruption allegations, but the investigation was dropped and Peevski was reinstated in his position. Public antagonism towards Peevski erupted in a year of daily protests in 2013/2014, when he was suggested as a chair for the anti-corruption parliamentary committee. His application was withdrawn but he was then controversially appointed head of DANS in 2013. Peevski's name also cropped up in the 2014 CorpBank (KTB) bank crisis, which civil society and some national media suggested followed his falling out with his former business partner and creditor Tsvetan Vassilev. The conflict between the two businessmen, involving accusations of murder attempts, puts in doubt the stability and quality of monitoring bodies and their political independence.

DPS leader Ahmed Dogan

Dogan is one of the country's most influential people and the founder of DPS. He arguably never stopped setting the DPS party's direction from behind the scenes, despite passing its leadership over to Lyutvi Mestan. In December 2015, Dogan officially resumed DPS leadership after Mestan's public ouster at DPS congress, allegedly over the latter's close connection to Turkey (as opposed to Russia). Dogan has significant influence on the Bulgarian political and economic life, controlling many structures, with his party considerably overriding BSP's prerogatives in the 2013–14 BSP-led cabinet. Companies indirectly related to Dogan, or under his protectorship, participate in almost every strategic Bulgarian infrastructural project, including the failed South Stream oil gas pipeline project.

Internal Affairs

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2020-01-14

Political Summary

Political summary

Presidential elections	Next contest: November 2021; Last contest: 6 and 13 November 2016.
Legislative elections	Next contest: March 2021; Last contest: 26 March 2017.
Head of State	Maj.-Gen. (Retd) Rumen Radev (since 22 January 2017)
Vice President	Iliana YOTOVA (since 1/22/2017)
Prime Minister	Boyko BORISSOV (since 5/4/2017)
Deputy Prime Minister	Krasimir Valchev (since 4 May 2017)
Deputy Prime Minister	Tomislav Donchev (since 4 May 2017)
Deputy Prime Minister	Krasimir Karakachanov (since 4 May 2017)
Deputy Prime Minister	Mariana Nikolova (since 21 November 2018)
Finance	Vladislav Goranov (since 4 May 2017)
Source: IHS and CIRCA People in Power	

2019-11-04

Political Outlook

Government changes and policy reversals are common. A third centre-right, GERB-led government emerged after the March 2017 early election. An early vote before March 2021 is also probable. Many influential individuals remain outside the political system, with significant private business interests infiltrating policy-making and judicial processes. The parliamentary adoption of legislation is likely to be slow. Legislative changes to improve the judiciary's efficiency and transparency or tackling of high-level corruption are unlikely. Civil society protests are likely. In the past 10 years Bulgaria has initiated large energy projects to be developed by Russian companies.

2019-11-04

Government Stability

Third GERB-led government likely to suffer from disagreements within ruling coalition, an early election before March 2021 is probable

There is an elevated risk of an early parliamentary election before the scheduled vote in March 2021. Cabinet reshuffles and government changes are a regular occurrence in Bulgaria's politics.

Since 2009, Bulgaria has had seven governments, including three interim cabinets and three elected governments led by current Prime Minister Boyko Borissov. The November 2016 resignation of the second Borissov government resulted in an early election in March 2017 that produced another governing coalition led by Borissov's Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB).

Protests initiated by civil society and environmental groups over corruption or influence-peddling scandals involving prominent politicians or members of the judiciary or over environmental issues are probable. Such demonstrations are likely to lead to ministerial resignations, and encourage policy reversals but protests alone are unlikely to cause the government to resign. In August 2018, Borissov asked for and received the resignations of three government ministers, all members of his ruling Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), following a coach crash earlier that month. In March 2019, Tsvetan Tsvetanov, the deputy chairman of GERB, and three GERB ministers, all of whom deny wrongdoings, resigned over allegations of buying apartments from the same company below the market price. Those resignations were damage-control measures, clearly indicating that Borissov acknowledges the weaknesses of his coalition government but wants to avoid an early parliamentary election.

A source of instability is the inclusion of the nationalist parties in the government coalition. Following the March 2017 early election GERB formed a coalition government with the nationalist coalition, the United Patriots (UP). The UP comprises three smaller nationalist parties, all of which participated in the previous parliament. UP frequently suffers from internal disputes and inconsistent voting patterns in parliament. Internal disagreements over policies, including related to environmental issues, or leadership battles in the parties that are part of the ruling coalition are likely. They have the potential to result in the withdrawal of support for the government by one or more of the three small nationalist parties.

The opposition Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), perceived as pro-Russian, has 79 out of the 240 seats in parliament as opposed to the 94 seats of GERB. Together GERB and UP control 114 seats, insufficient for a majority, but BSP's initiated no-confidence votes are unlikely to be successful as they would be improbable to be supported by other opposition parties. Only very rarely BSP is likely to work together with the opposition Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS, 25 MPs). Moreover, the DPS is likely to occasionally support GERB on proposals favourable to large businesses.

2020-01-14

Party Data

Parliament Summary

Party abbr.	Party name	Seats
National Assembly		
CEDB	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	95

BSP	BSP for Bulgaria alliance (led by the Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP)	80
UP	United Patriots (alliance of IMRO – Bulgarian National Movement (IMRO–BNM), National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB) and Attack)	27
MRF	Movement for Rights and Freedoms	26
W	Will	12
Data reflects seat distribution following last election Source: IHS and CIRCA People in Power		

2019-11-04

Opposition Prospects and Programme

Opposition no-confidence motions are likely to be unsuccessful; opposition likely to attempt blocking legislative process in parliament

For three months from February to May 2019, the largest opposition party, the left-leaning Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), did not participate in parliamentary hearings, making it harder to get the required quorum to approve legislation. BSP is likely to occasionally employ measures aimed at obstructing passage of legislation initiated by the government. This is also because BSP proposed bills in most cases are very unlikely to get the support of ruling coalition MPs to be passed. BSP also is likely to continue initiating no-confidence motions against the government. However, even if BSP is supported by the second and third opposition parties, the ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) and Will (Volya), such votes are most likely to be unsuccessful.

The BSP doubled its voter support at the March 2017 early election. Under its leader, Korneliya Ninova, elected in May 2016, BSP has sought to position itself as the clear "left" choice, despite also adopting populist anti-immigration messages. The BSP was unable to win over GERB at the early election and to trade on the presidential success of President Rumen Radev. Radev was backed by the BSP at the November 2016 presidential vote but attracted support from a broad range of voters. The BSP's relative failure could be partly attributed to the strong pro-Russian and anti-EU rhetoric expressed by Ninova, which did not manage to win over moderate voters in the centre ground. The BSP is mainly supported by an elderly base and has proven unable to appeal to a broader segment of the population, including higher-income urban voters. The party lost significant support following mass anti-government protests in 2013. The BSP has 80 MPs in the current parliament compared with 39 seats after the 2014 election.

The DPS was again isolated from the government-formation process following the 2017 election. At the October 2014 general and 2016 presidential vote, the party managed to consolidate its support base and gather a sound number of votes, primarily from the Turkish and Roma minorities. However, in 2017 the DPS lost voters, obtaining 26 parliamentary seats (currently 25) compared with 38 in 2014. The party would continue to oppose legislation perceived as discriminatory towards the Turkish or Roma minority. Will (Volya) is a young, centre-right, nationalist-leaning

party established by businessman Veselin Mareshki. Mareshki came fourth in the first round of the November 2016 presidential race with 11% of the vote, managed to enter parliament, gaining 12 seats. Will is also not soundly in opposition, as it occasionally supports the GERB-led government in its initiatives or opposition-proposed motions.

2019-06-19

Political Parties

Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (Grazhdani za Evropeysko Razvitie na Balgariya: GERB)

- **Political stance:** Founded in 2006 by Borissov, then-mayor of Sofia, the centre-right GERB is economically liberal and socially conservative, promoting business- and investment-friendly policies. GERB behaves like a leader-centered party shaped around Borissov's figure. On paper, the party has vowed to fight crime and corruption, although in reality this has been very patchy. While GERB orientation is generally pro-Western, co-operation with Russia on an ad-hoc basis is not viewed negatively. In the past, GERB showed unwillingness and inability to implement its reform promises, including its December 2015 refusal to support a bill of constitutional amendments proposing judicial reform prepared by former justice minister Hristo Ivanov. This led to a diluted version of the bill being passed, which critics claim was unable to eradicate political interference in the judiciary or enhance legal transparency.
- **Support base:** GERB is popular among business and industry. It did well among more educated sections of the population and in urban areas, as well as among voters abroad. However, this support base has shrunk in recent years, as the party has grown more populist. Borissov's image as a straightforward 'man of the people' has also gained him support among the working class.
- **Recent history:** Borissov founded GERB in December 2006. The party established itself as a new power on the Bulgarian political scene in the May 2007 European election and the October 2007 local elections, before coming to power in 2009. Borissov's government was forced to resign en masse in February 2013 following widespread public protests over low living standards and high energy prices. Despite winning the subsequent election, the party fell well short of a parliamentary majority and found itself in opposition. At the October 2014 early election, GERB won twice as many votes as second-placed BSP, but fragmentation of the vote prevented an absolute majority in parliament. In the early election held in March 2017, GERB again came first, winning 95 of the 240 parliamentary seats. The party gained 11 seats compared with the 2014 parliamentary election, but did not manage to enhance its support base. GERB formed a coalition government, this time with the nationalist OP, for a third time in May 2017.
- **Potential future leaders:** GERB is synonymous with Borissov. Two of his ministers are the most likely potential replacements in the longer term: minister for the Bulgarian presidency of the Council of the European Union 2018, Lilyana Pavlova, and deputy PM responsible for European funds management and economy, Tomislav Donchev.

UnitedPatriots (Obedineni Patrioti: OP)

- **Political stance:** The OP coalition of patriotic, nationalistic, and far-right parties is vocal against the Roma and Turkish minorities in the country, the ethnic Turkish DPS, and Turkish accession to the EU. The parties comprising the current coalition insisted on a number of nationalistic priorities, such as the construction of a wall along the Turkish border, the deployment of missiles along the border to tackle the refugee influx, compulsory military services, and obligatory Bulgarian language exams for all children of school age. Borissov, in order to ensure the OP's support, introduced a number of these in his cabinet programme. One the parties included in the OP coalition is openly pro-Russian.
- **Support base:** The support for the OP comes mainly from the ethnic Bulgarian majority.
- **Recent history:** The OP comprises three smaller nationalist parties, all of which participated in the previous parliament, with the Patriotic Front (PF) constituting its largest part. The three-party coalition has 27 seats in the current 240-seat parliament, compared with 30 seats previously. The OP appointed four ministers to the government, among which two deputy prime ministers.
- **Potential future leaders:** The chairpersons of the coalition are Valeri Simeonov, Krasimir Karakachanov, and Volen Siderov. No short-term leadership changes are likely.

Will(Volya)

- **Political stance:** Will (Volya) is a nationalist-leaning populist party of businessman Veselin Mareshki. The party is likely to support nationalist proposals put forward by the OP or business-favourable proposals drafted by GERB.
- **Support base:** Volya's support base comes predominantly from Varna, the third-largest city in Bulgaria, and the surrounding area.
- **Recent history:** Will was created by Mareshki from Varna and named Volya in 2016. The party managed to pass the 4% threshold, gaining 12 parliamentary seats out of 240. Mareshki came fourth in the first round of the November 2016 presidential race.
- **Potential future leaders:** Mareshki is the current chairman. The party is synonymous with Mareshki. No short-term leadership changes are likely.

Bulgarian Socialist Party (Bulgarska Sotsialisticheska Partiya: BSP)

- **Political stance:** The BSP is on the centre-left of the political spectrum and sits with the Party of European Socialists in the European Parliament. On paper, the party is pro-EU and NATO, although it has supported various policies which benefit the Russian political elite or business interests in Bulgaria. The party announced in 2017 that it was against Bulgaria joining the eurozone.
- **Support base:** The BSP is strongest in rural regions and smaller towns and among older voters.

- **Recent history:** The BSP was slow to reform and denounce its Communist past and is burdened by its dismal management of the country during its spells in power in the 1990s, which inflicted serious economic pain on Bulgarians. The party was in power in 2005–09, when it led a coalition with the centrist National Movement Simeon II and the ethnic DPS. More recently, the party formed a government with the DPS following the election in May 2013. The unpopularity of this government exposed divisions within the BSP between supporters of previous leaders Parvanov and Sergey Stanishev. A significant number of BSP members joined Parvanov's new ABV party, which supported the second GERB-led government. The BSP strives to reform itself to appeal to traditional leftist voters, amid internal fights and numerous corruption allegations. Under its new leader Korneliya Ninova, the party increased its support base, taking a clearly pro-Russian and anti-EU stance. Currently, the BSP has 80 MPs in parliament, compared with its 39 seats after the 2014 election.
- **Potential future leaders:** Stanishev resigned in July 2014 after 13 years at the party's helm, being replaced by former Parliament Speaker Mihail Mikov. In 2016, the leadership was transferred to a more vocal and influential leader – Ninova.

Movement for Rights and Freedoms (Dvizhenie za Prava i Svobodi: DPS)

- **Political stance:** The DPS allegedly represents the interests of the country's ethnic-Turkish minority. However, while the party presents itself as pro-EU and centre-right, it is regarded by civil society and national media as close to pro-Russian political and business interest. Various Bulgarian journalists and activists claim the DPS is covertly funded by Russian businessmen and politicians to lobby for their economic interests in Bulgaria.
- **Support base:** The DPS has a stable support base, including most of Bulgaria's ethnic Turks, who represent just fewer than 9% of the population, as well as the Roma community. Although many of its followers are Muslims, it is not a religious party. The DPS is trying to expand its electoral base by giving ethnic Bulgarians positions in its political structure. In addition, the party has been successful in mobilising supporters who work abroad, assisting them with voter registration and even offering transport to polling stations in some foreign cities with significant Bulgarian Turk minorities.
- **Recent history:** In 2001, the DPS went into government as the junior coalition partner, marking its first time in power. It was part of a coalition with the BPS after the 2005 election, and once again supported a BSP-led government after the May 2013 poll. Following significant anti-governmental protests, external diplomatic pressure and strong EU election presentations, DPS withdraw its support, triggering an early election in October 2014. DPS is often a kingmaker in Bulgarian parliaments. In late 2015, the party congress resulted in a public dispute between the then leader Lyutvi Mestan and the party founder and honorary chairman Ahmet Dogan, allegedly because of Mestan's strong pro-Turkish rhetoric (as opposed to pro-Russian). The former was then dismissed and created a new party, which could attract some of the DPS's ethnic Turkish support base. Following the March 2017 early election, DPS has 26 members of parliament, compared with 38 in 2014.

- **Potential future leaders:** Following Mestan's public ouster, Dogan was reinstated as a chairman. Even if a new chairman is installed, Dogan will maintain a strong grip on power.

2018-09-04

Historical Context

Historical context

Date	Event
1396–1878	Bulgaria under Ottoman rule.
1878–1944	Third Bulgarian State
1946	Bulgaria was declared a People's Republic.
1990	Communist party monopoly abolished; renamed the BSP. First free election held resulting in victory of BSP (June).
1991	New Constitution adopted (July).
1996	Ex-King Simeon II returned to Bulgaria and received a rapturous welcome (May). Assassination of former premier Lukanov (October).
1999	Bulgaria pegged the lev to the euro (January). Bulgaria opened its airspace for NATO overflights during the Kosovo crisis (April).
2001	Former child king Simeon Saxecoburggotski set up the NDSV (April). NDSV won a decisive victory in the parliamentary election (June). Saxecoburggotski became prime minister (July). The NDSV and the DPS formed a coalition (July). The BSP's Georgi Parvanov won presidential election (November).
2004	Bulgaria joined NATO (April).
2006	Parvanov re-elected as president (October). First president since 1989 to serve two consecutive terms.

2007	<p>Janko Jankov, mayor of Elin Pelin, was killed (January).</p> <p>Dimitar Jankov, businessman and chairman of the Varna municipal council killed (May).</p> <p>Alexander Tassev, businessman and chairman of Lokomotiv Plovdiv football club, killed (May).</p> <p>Bulgaria joined the EU (January).</p>
2009	<p>European parliamentary election (June).</p> <p>GERB win parliamentary election and forms a government (July).</p>
2011	<p>Rosen Plevneliev (GERB) elected president (October).</p>
2013	<p>GERB government resigned over popular protests (February).</p> <p>GERB secured plurality at the early parliamentary election (May).</p> <p>BSP formed government with DPS; GERB moved to opposition. Plamen Oresharski (BSP) became prime minister (May).</p> <p>Popular protests erupted in June 2013 over nomination of Delyan Peevski as the head of the national security agency.</p>
2014	<p>The BSP-led government of Oresharski resigns after a year of popular protests (July).</p> <p>GERB wins most of the vote in the early election (October).</p> <p>GERB forms a government with the right-leaning Reformatorski bloc (November).</p>
2016	<p>The GERB-led government resigns on the ground of not winning the October presidential election (November).</p>
2017	<p>Rumen Radev(supported by BSP) becomes president (January).</p> <p>GERB wins most of the seats in the early election (March).</p> <p>GERB forms a government with the nationalist formation United Patriots(May).</p>

The occupation of Bulgaria by Soviet troops in the closing stages of the Second World War led to Bulgaria's absorption into the Soviet camp. In 1946, Bulgaria was proclaimed a People's Republic. During the late 1940s, industry was nationalised and agriculture collectivised along Soviet lines. Within the general framework of détente, Bulgaria mended fences with Western Europe in the 1970s, signing an economic agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1973. The country was also able to run up increasing debts to the West in the 1980s in an attempt to finance hi-tech growth and prevent popular discontent by financing domestic consumption. In 1989, the communists' monopoly was extinguished and a free, multi-party election was held in June 1990.

The transition to market economy in Bulgaria has been difficult and arguably not very successful, featuring the creation of powerful organised crime circles, promotion of shady politicians, as well as compromised and corrupt privatisation in the 1990s.

In April 1999, the National Assembly adopted the new military doctrine of the Republic of Bulgaria, which reflected the changing security needs and the desire to become a member of NATO. In December 1999, Bulgaria was invited to join talks on accession to the EU. Bulgaria started EU talks in the spring of 2000. In May 2000, the Bulgarian parliament adopted a resolution calling for full NATO membership. Bulgaria joined NATO in 2004 and the European Union in 2007.

2019-09-05

Major Pressure Groups

Trade union activity

There are two main trade unions: the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria, which is the successor of the tame unions of Communist times; and the smaller Podkrepa (Support), which started as a rather pale imitation of Poland's Solidarity. The two have emerged from a period of antagonism and hostility, and now often join forces in criticising the government. Trade union activity in Bulgaria is limited to a few sectors, is not known for violence, and lacks the militant tendencies of the trade unions in neighbouring Romania.

Civil society organisations

Although the influence and number of non-governmental organisations and civil society groups in the country has gradually increased, most remain seriously understaffed and underfunded, limiting their capability and scope of work. Even though some of the major international NGOs keep offices in Sofia, their effectiveness is often doubted. In 2010, Bulgaria's first national internet portal providing information about the NGOs in the country was presented by the then-chair of the Bulgarian Parliament. Ever since, consequent governments and politicians have started consulting NGOs more intensively on various issues, including during political crisis. However, these consultations have often been accused of featuring only "government-approved" organisations and restricting access for the most critical and vocal ones. For various reasons, civil society organisations are rarely accessible to minority groups and rarely tackle ethnic and exclusion issues, such as the integration of the Roma population or disabled citizens into society. Among the most influential civil society groups are the Protest Network (Protestna Mrezha) and recently Justice for All (Pravosude za vseki), both of which call for robust judicial reform.

Media freedom

Since 2003, increased pressure on the media from the government and criminal organisations has been the main cause of a decline in media freedom in Bulgaria. More libel suits have been launched against journalists and the use of violence against them has also contributed to the trend. Bulgaria's international ratings in media freedom have deteriorated and much media content is purchased partisan coverage. Many of the most influential media outlets are closely linked to particular parties or political leaders or belong to media moguls who often interfere with the political processes in the

country. Freedom House's Freedom of Press Index rates Bulgarian media as "partially free".

Human rights record

Bulgaria has had several cases of alleged police abuse. In January 2009, in two separate incidents, suspects arrested by the police died in detention; investigations did not result in convictions. In the same month, police were criticised for excessive use of force in dealing with a demonstration in Sofia involving around 2,000 participants. Similar concerns also emerged during the 2013 anti-government protests and again in the 2014 demonstrations. According to Bulgaria's Helsinki Human Rights Committee, police brutality often goes unpunished. Allegations of inhumane treatment of Syrian refugees by the police have appeared in the social media and media outlets and prompted a response by Human Rights Watch, calling on the Bulgarian government to investigate the allegations of abuse and put a stop of summary returns of asylum seekers from Bulgaria to Turkey. Bulgarian authorities have been accused by the Council of Europe commissioner on human rights of breaching the refugees' human rights through improper conditions in camps and inadequate treatment. Jailed illegal immigrants have allegedly been subject to beatings, hunger, and humiliation.

2019-08-29

Constitution

The former 1971 Communist constitution was replaced on 12 July 1991 by a new one designed to ease the country's transformation from a totalitarian communist state into a liberal parliamentary democracy, dividing the power of the state between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Aspects of the constitution were amended as part of the process of harmonising Bulgarian law with the EU's *acquis communautaire* and Bulgaria's joining the EU in 2007 – including, for example, laws on foreigners acquiring property in Bulgaria. Changes to the constitution can be adopted by a majority of three-quarters of all members of the National Assembly (parliament) - 180 out of 240. Only a Grand National Assembly can adopt a new constitution.

2019-09-02

Executive

The directly elected president is head of state and may serve no more than two five-year terms. The president is commander-in-chief of the armed forces and has certain powers in a state of national emergency or political crisis. The president cannot initiate legislation, but can return legislation to the National Assembly for further consideration, although this can in turn be overruled. The president previously controlled the National Intelligence Service (*Nacionalna Razuznavatelna Sluzhba*: NRS), which is the country's foreign intelligence service – now under the Council of Ministers. The current president Rumen Radev wants the NRS back under the presidential institution.

The executive is headed by a Council of Ministers led by the prime minister, who is nominated by the largest group in parliament (or, failing that, the next largest) and must then be approved by a parliamentary majority. In addition to the prime minister, the council is composed of deputy prime

ministers and ministers heading the various agencies within the government. The council's responsibilities include managing the state budget, maintaining law and order, and implementing state policy. If the National Assembly passes a vote of no-confidence in the council or prime minister, the council must resign.

2019-09-02

Legislature

The Narodno Sobranie (National Assembly) is a single chamber of 240 seats, with MPs elected by proportional representation, subject to their party's passing a threshold of 4% of the vote. Elections must be held at least once every four years. Suffrage is universal from the age of 18.

The National Assembly is responsible for the enactment of laws; budget approval; scheduling of presidential elections; selection and dismissal of the prime minister and other ministers; declaration of war; deployment of troops outside the country; and ratification of international treaties and agreements. Amendments to the electoral code are often called for by civil society groups and opinion leaders. However, negotiations on the new code in parliament are usually slow and complicated, resulting in inconsistency and contradictions to the Electoral Law. In May 2017, the ruling centre-right Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) party tabled in parliament a draft bill aimed at introducing a majoritarian electoral system. The introduction of such a system is unlikely in the one-year outlook.

2019-09-02

Judiciary

Bulgaria has a relatively independent judiciary in terms of commercial dispute resolutions. Parliament and the presidency share the appointment of the top judicial bodies. The three tiers of the judicial system consist of first, appellate, and cassation courts. Some 28 provincial courts and 113 regional courts operate at lower levels. There are also independent military courts.

The Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), which manages the judiciary and is responsible for appointing judges, prosecutors, and investigating magistrates, comprises 25 legal professionals serving five-year terms. The SJC is divided into two colleges – the Judges' College and the Prosecutors' College. Parliament elects 11 members of the SJC, six for the Judges' College and five for the Prosecutors' College. Judges elect from among their number six members for the Judges' College. Prosecutors and investigating magistrates elect from among their number five members of the Prosecutors' College. The president of the Supreme Court of Cassation, the president of the Supreme Administrative Court, and the Prosecutor General are also members of the SJC.

The Supreme Court of Administration and the Supreme Court of Cassation are the highest appellate courts and determine the application of all laws. Judges in these courts are appointed for life.

A Constitutional Court, elected by the government and other members of the judiciary, interprets the constitution and the constitutionality of laws and treaties.

2019-09-02

Regional and Local Institutions

Bulgaria is divided into 28 regions and 265 municipalities for local administrative purposes. At municipal level, mayors and councils are elected by the population. At regional level, governors and administrators are appointed by the Council of Ministers. The powers and the revenue base of local government are relatively limited. The capital city is Sofia.

External Affairs

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2019-12-04

Outlook

Since 1997, Bulgaria has made substantial progress in moving closer to the West, with the majority of the political elite and the wider public supporting membership of the EU (January 2007) and NATO (April 2004). Relations with NATO and the US have been largely smooth, with Bulgarian troops participating in various overseas peacekeeping operations. However, economic dependence on Russia, particularly in energy imports, persists and is often influencing the country's political course. Relations between Bulgaria and China have started intensifying in the past few years, with Sofia attempting to attract Chinese investors and increase exports to China.

2019-09-10

Bilateral: United States

Relations with the United States

Bulgaria's location at the crossroads between Europe and the Middle East has attracted US attention in the post-2001 security environment. Since then Sofia has sought to position itself as a reliable partner of the United States, hoping that co-operation in the war on terrorism would bring US assistance on its anti-trafficking agenda. The United States has taken advantage of the relationship to open small military bases in Bulgaria - the Novo Selo training range and Bezmer air base (both near Bulgaria's border with Turkey), and the Graf Ignatievo air base in central Bulgaria as well as Aitos logistics base near the Black Sea. An estimated 2,500 US forces are stationed in the country at any one time. As a result of the Montreux Convention of 1936, which prevents permanent US presence in the Black Sea, some US Navy ships sail under the Bulgarian flag as part of Operation Active Endeavour. US forces continue to take part in various aerial and naval exercises with Bulgaria in the Black Sea. In 2003, Bulgaria was one of the non-permanent members at the UN Security Council and one of the few countries that firmly backed the US-led attack on Iraq. Responding to a request from Washington, Bulgaria's parliament approved a government proposal to open its airspace, and offered the Burgas airport and the Sarafovo military base to the US in support of preparations for the military operation in Iraq. The same military base was used by US troops during the Afghanistan operation in 2001. The majority of Bulgarian troops returned from Afghanistan in February 2014, with about 100 troops remaining there as part of Operation Resolute Support.

2019-09-10

Bilateral: Europe and CIS

Relations with the Russian Federation

Bulgaria is dependent on Russia for its energy supplies and was badly affected by Russia's decision to cut off gas deliveries through Ukraine in January 2009 over a pricing dispute. Relations remains cordial but have been somewhat strained, following Crimea's annexation in 2014 and the cancellation of a Russian-backed South Stream gas pipeline project later that year, with the pipeline meant to go through Bulgaria. The cancellation caused friction in the parliament between pro-Russian and pro-Western parties. It was blamed on Bulgarian policy inconsistency by Russian president Vladimir Putin and the inability of Sofia to stand up against Brussels and defend its national interests. In reality, it is more likely that the project was cancelled due to the poor financial situation in Russia and the rouble depreciation, following EU economic sanctions on Russia and non-compliance of the project with the Third Energy Packet of the EU. Previously, Bulgaria has cancelled contracts with Russian firms, such as the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline and the nuclear station Belene. Russia is wary of Bulgaria's membership of NATO. Under the current government and despite the participation of pro-Russian ministers in the cabinet, Sofia is likely to remain pro-Western with a pragmatic view on Russia as a trade partner, but also with an awareness of the country's historic and cultural ties, and affiliations with the Russians. The majority of the Bulgarian population is supportive of friendly and even deeper relations with Russia. This is mainly motivated by the closeness of the Bulgarian and Russia languages, religions and ties before and during Soviet times. Russian business interests often infiltrate policy-making in parliament, with parliamentary parties allegedly funded by businesses close to the Russian regime. Many Western and Bulgarian politicians and activists have blamed Russia for waging information warfare against Bulgaria, including propaganda and funding for far-right parties, agents and provocateurs.

2018-08-09

Historical Context

Historical context

Date	Event
1946	Bulgaria was declared a People's Republic.
1973	Economic agreement signed with the Federal Republic of Germany.
1990	Communist Party monopoly ended.
1999	<p>Bulgaria opened its airspace for NATO overflights during the Kosovo crisis. Several stray NATO missiles exploded in Bulgaria (April).</p> <p>Human Rights Watch implicated Bulgaria in arms sales to war zones and to countries under arms embargoes (April).</p> <p>Then US president Bill Clinton visited Bulgaria, the first ever visit by US head of state (November).</p>
2000	Parliamentary commission concluded there was no proof that Bulgaria broke UN arms embargo against Angola (May).
2002	<p>Bulgaria began a two-year mandate as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (January).</p> <p>US approved USD55.5 million in military assistance to Bulgaria (June).</p> <p>Bulgaria was officially invited to join NATO along with six other countries (November).</p>
2003	Bulgaria lent support to the US-led military action in Iraq in the UN Security Council (March)
2004	<p>Bulgaria became a member of NATO (April).</p> <p>Bulgaria concluded accession negotiations with the EU (June).</p>
2005	<p>The European Commission urged Bulgaria to speed up implementation of reforms in order to be able to join the EU on schedule (October).</p> <p>Most Bulgarian troops returned from Iraq (December).</p>
2006	European Commission issued a critical intermediate report on Bulgarian accession (May) but gave a green light (September).

2007	Bulgaria joined the EU (January).
2008	European Commission suspended funds to Bulgaria, citing failure to tackle organised crime and corruption (July).
2009	Some frozen European Commission funds were released (May).
2013	BSP formed a coalition government with DPS, following the May early election caused by the resignation of the GERB-led cabinet (May).
2014	<p>BSP-led government resigns following one year of popular protests (August).</p> <p>GERB wins most of the votes in the early election, with BSP coming second (October).</p> <p>GERB forms a coalition government with the right-leaning Reformatorski block (November).</p>
2016	PM Borissov (GERB) tables his resignation following the presidential election where his party's candidate lost to the BSP nominee (November).
2017	<p>GERB wins most of the votes in the early election, with BSP coming second (March).</p> <p>GERB forms a coalition government with the nationalist formation United Patriots (May).</p>

The wars in former Yugoslavia

Bulgaria adopted a policy of non-interference in the Yugoslav conflict of the early 1990s and opposed the participation of any Balkan country in the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) peacekeeping mission. However, after the Dayton accords were implemented in 1995–96, Bulgaria sent officers to the police regiments of the UN Implementation Force (IFOR) and to IFOR's successor, the Stabilisation Force (SFOR).

Instability in the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) Macedonia

As the crisis in FYR Macedonia erupted into violence in March 2001, Bulgaria initially offered to send troops into the country. Following an unfavourable reaction from the international community, including Greece, then prime minister Ivan Kostov reversed his decision and announced that troops would not be sent, limiting the offer to non-personnel military aid.

Fighting between government forces and ethnic Albanian insurgents in FYR Macedonia during 2001 was viewed by the Bulgarian government as its foremost national security concern. Government officials adopted contingency plans for a possible influx of refugees from FYR Macedonia, and the government warned against the danger of a full-blown civil war in FYR Macedonia during the six-month insurgency. The government also noted that the army had been conducting exercises in the vicinity of the Bulgaria-FYR Macedonia border.

Geography

Date Posted: 01-Oct-2018

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NEW ENTRY

2018-10-01

Data

Geography: Bulgaria

Location	Southeastern Europe
	Bordering the Black Sea
	Between Romania and Turkey
Total area (sq km)	110,879 sq km
Land area (sq km)	108,489 sq km
Water area (sq km)	2,390 sq km
Land boundaries (km)	1,806 km
Coastline (km)	354 km
Total renewable water resources (cu km)	NA
Water supply and sanitation access (% of population)	49
Border countries and border length (km)	
Greece	472 km
Macedonia	162 km

Romania	605 km
Serbia	344 km
Turkey	223 km
Highest point	
Location	Musala
Height (m)	2,925 m
Land use - agricultural	
Arable land	29.9%
Permanent crops	1.5%
Permanent pasture	15.5%
Terrain	Mostly mountains with lowlands in north and southeast.
Natural resources	Bauxite, copper, lead, zinc, coal, timber, arable land.
Climate	Temperate; cold, damp winters; hot, dry summers.
Natural disasters	Earthquakes; landslides.
Environmental issues	Air pollution from industrial emissions; rivers polluted from raw sewage, heavy metals, detergents; deforestation; forest damage from air pollution and resulting acid rain; soil contamination from heavy metals from metallurgical plants and industrial wastes.
Environment – international agreements	Party to: Air Pollution, Air Pollution-Nitrogen Oxides, Air Pollution-Persistent Organic Pollutants, Air Pollution-Sulfur 85, Air Pollution-Sulfur 94, Air Pollution-Volatile Organic Compounds, Antarctic-Environmental Protocol, Antarctic-Marine Living Resources, Antarctic Treaty, Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Wetlands. Signed, but not ratified: none of the selected agreements.
Source: IHS Markit, CIA World Factbook, World Bank	

NATURAL RESOURCES

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UPDATED

Resources Data

Energy

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Oil (Thousand b/d)					
Production	0	0	1	1	0
Consumption	145	127	131	131	126
Natural gas (Billion cubic feet)					
Production	6	1	3	0	0
Consumption	120	89	100	115	84
Coal (Thousand short tonnes)					
Production	8,099	7,664	8,349	7,530	6,845
Consumption	12,484	10,679	11,315	11,746	10,642
Electricity (Thousand megawatt hours)					
Production	44,592	42,391	44,930	49,685	43,580
Consumption	29,107	27,282	26,450	27,820	28,521
Source: IHS					

Overview

Bulgaria's natural resource base is rather limited. Particularly, there are only meager reserves of low-grade hydrocarbons. Bulgaria's metal ore resources include copper, iron, lead, zinc, and manganese, as well as some gold reserves. There are lignite resources for mining - these are suitable only for power generation in the coal fields as their quality makes the coal uneconomical to transport - and some bauxite reserves. There are around 600 natural mineral springs, with

temperatures ranging from 20 to 60 degrees celsius. There are small natural gas deposits, and the nation has the potential for oil exploitation offshore in the Black Sea as well as further development of hydropower potential. Perhaps the country's most valuable resources are its mountains and seashore, which have tremendous unrealized potential for tourism. The tourism infrastructure was originally geared for East Bloc visitors, although foreign investors have now begun to be active in developing resorts.

Demography

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UPDATED

2020-01-07

Demographic Data

Demography: Bulgaria

Population (mil.)	7.05
Population growth rate (%)	-0.63
Life expectancy at birth (years)	Male - 71.5, Female - 78.3
Population density	64.05 per sq km
Urbanisation (% of total population)	75.3
Health spending as % GDP	8.2
No. doctors/1,000 people	3.99
Internet users (% of population)	59.8
Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people)	120
Adult literacy rate (% ages 15+)	Male - 98.7, Female 98.1
Major urban areas - population	
Sofia	1.277 mil.
Ethnic groups (by % population)	
Bulgarian	76.9
Turkish	8.0
Romani	4.4

Other	0.7
Unknown	10.0
Religions (by % population)	
Eastern Orthodox	59.4
Muslim	7.8
other	1.7
none	3.7
unspecified	27.4
Languages (by % population)	
Bulgarian	76.8
Turkish	8.2
Romani	3.8
other	0.7
unspecified	10.5
Source: IHS Markit consumer markets, CIA World Factbook, World Health Organization	

Infrastructure

Date Posted: 01-Apr-2019

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NEW ENTRY

2019-04-01

Overview

Infrastructure: Bulgaria

Roads	
Total road network length (km)	19,512
Paved (km)	19,235
Unpaved (km)	277
Railways	
Total rail network length (km)	5,114
Standard gauge (mm)	1,435
Waterways	
Navigable waterways length (km)	470
Airports	
Number of commercial airports	4
Ports	
Number of ports	5
Name of all ports	Burgas, Varna, Nessebar, Balchik, Ruse.
Communications	
Telephones: Fixed lines (mil.)	1.204

Subscriptions per 100 inhabitants	44
Telephones: Mobile cellular (mil.)	10.255
Subscriptions per 100 inhabitants	146
Telephones: International country code	359
Internet country code	.bg
Broadband subscribers (mil.)	1.863
Subscriptions per 100 inhabitants	68
Internet users per cent of population (%)	
Source: IHS Markit, International Telecommunications Union, CIA World Factbook	

Economy

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Economic Outlook

Data

Data

2020-01-16

Economic Outlook

- We expect growth of 3.0% in 2020, mostly driven by domestic demand. Downside risks include a slowdown in the eurozone, renewed crisis in Turkey, and a disorderly Brexit. Bulgaria entering the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II), the euro area waiting room, in early 2020 presents an upside risk.
- We expect domestic inflationary pressures to remain subdued in the near term, with consumer price inflation at around 2.5% in 2020.
- Fiscal policy will remain conservative, as required by Bulgaria's currency board arrangement. Public debt will decline below 20% of GDP in the near term.
- As a response to the European Central Bank (ECB) stress tests, which revealed some capital shortfalls, the Bulgarian central bank will build up more capital, which will strengthen overall financial stability in the near term.

2019-10-30

Data

Bulgaria: Top-10 sectors ranked by value added

	2018 level	% change	% GDP
	(Billion USD)	(2019, real)	(Nominal)

1. Real estate activities(L)	5.9	6.0	10.8
2. Public admin & defense, other services (O,S,T,U)	4.0	2.2	7.4
3. Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles(G45)	3.7	2.8	6.7
4. Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding(K64)	3.6	4.6	6.6
5. Construction(F)	2.3	4.1	4.1
6. Agriculture, forestry and fishing(A)	2.3	2.5	4.1
7. Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles(G47)	2.3	2.9	4.1
8. Education(P)	2.2	2.1	4.0
9. Human health and social work activities(Q)	2.2	2.1	3.9
10. Telecommunications(J61)	1.9	4.9	3.5
Top-10 Total	30.2		55.2
Updated: 28 October 2019			
Source: Comparative Industry Service, IHS Markit			

2019-10-29

Data

Bulgaria: Major Trading Partners, 2018

EXPORTS			IMPORTS		
Country	Billion USD	Share (%)	Country	Billion USD	Share (%)
Germany	5.0	15.0	Germany	4.7	12.4
Italy	2.9	8.6	Russia	3.6	9.6
Romania	2.9	8.6	Italy	2.9	7.5
Turkey	2.5	7.6	Romania	2.6	6.9

Greece	2.2	6.7	Turkey	2.3	6.1
France	1.4	4.2	Spain	1.8	4.8
Belgium	1.1	3.3	Greece	1.7	4.4
Netherlands	0.9	2.8	China	1.5	4.1
China	0.9	2.6	Netherlands	1.4	3.8
Spain	0.8	2.5	Hungary	1.3	3.5
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade					

Bulgaria: Major Trading Partners, 2010

EXPORTS			IMPORTS		
Country	Billion USD	Share (%)	Country	Billion USD	Share (%)
Germany	2.2	10.7	Russia	4.1	16.3
Italy	2.0	9.7	Germany	3.0	11.6
Romania	1.9	9.1	Italy	1.9	7.4
Turkey	1.7	8.5	Romania	1.8	7.0
Greece	1.6	7.9	Greece	1.5	5.9
France	0.8	4.1	Turkey	1.4	5.4
Belgium	0.8	3.7	Ukraine	1.1	4.2
Serbia	0.7	3.5	Austria	0.9	3.5
Russia	0.6	2.8	France	0.8	3.3
Spain	0.5	2.7	Hungary	0.8	3.1
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade					

Bulgaria: Major Trading Partners, 2000

EXPORTS			IMPORTS		
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Country	Billion USD	Share (%)	Country	Billion USD	Share (%)
Italy	0.7	2.1	Russia	1.5	23.2
Turkey	0.5	1.5	Germany	0.9	13.9
Germany	0.4	1.3	Italy	0.6	8.5
Greece	0.4	1.1	Greece	0.3	4.9
Belgium	0.3	0.9	France	0.3	4.9
France	0.2	0.7	Romania	0.2	3.6
United States	0.2	0.6	Turkey	0.2	3.3
Russia	0.1	0.4	United States	0.2	2.9
United Kingdom	0.1	0.3	Ukraine	0.2	2.8
Macedonia	0.1	0.3	Austria	0.1	2.2
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade					

Bulgaria: Major Trading Partners, 1990

EXPORTS			IMPORTS		
Country	Billion USD	Share (%)	Country	Billion USD	Share (%)
Germany	0.3	0.8	Germany	0.9	25.8
Romania	0.2	0.6	Italy	0.3	8.1
Italy	0.1	0.4	Libya	0.3	7.7
Greece	0.1	0.3	Austria	0.1	3.9
China	0.1	0.3	France	0.1	3.7
France	0.1	0.2	Romania	0.1	3.5
Hungary	0.1	0.2	Poland	0.1	3.3
United Kingdom	0.1	0.2	Iran	0.1	3.0

Iran	0.1	0.2	Switzerland	0.1	3.0
United States	0.0	0.1	United States	0.1	2.7
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade					

Bulgaria: Top-12 Commodities

Exports					Imports			
		Share of	2019	2018		Share of	2019	2018
		2018 (%)	(Mil. USD)	(Mil. USD)		2018 (%)	(Mil. USD)	(Mil. USD)
1.	Nonferrous metals	14.7	4,577	5,189	Mining of metals & stone	8.2	2,826	3,204
2.	Agriculture	7.8	2,489	2,760	Motor vehicles	6.5	2,428	2,531
3.	Wearing apparel	6.7	2,302	2,354	Oil & gas mining	3.9	2,407	1,527
4.	Food Products	6.1	1,956	2,134	Iron & steel	4.8	2,006	1,883
5.	Refined petroleum products	5.3	1,756	1,883	Food Products	5.2	1,903	2,031
6.	Iron & steel	3.8	1,299	1,344	Textiles	4.3	1,582	1,694
7.	Pharma: drugs & medicines	3.6	1,207	1,257	Pharma: drugs & medicines	4.4	1,561	1,740
8.	Electric motors & electricity distribution	3.3	1,099	1,166	Nonferrous metals	4.0	1,460	1,587
9.	Batteries & accumulators	3.2	934	1,117	Fire & safety, brushes, other nec	4.5	1,443	1,777

10.	Weapons & ammunition	2.5	854	873	Agriculture	3.6	1,300	1,416
11.	Plastics products	2.4	824	862	Plastics products	2.6	917	1,010
12.	Furniture	2.1	718	730	Semiconductors, CBs, & LCDs	2.2	842	855
Top-12 total		61.4				54.2		
All commodities		100.0	32,619	35,270		100.0	37,637	39,229
Last updated: 28 October 2019								
Source: Comparative Industry Service, IHS Markit								

Non-state Armed Groups

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UPDATED

Group Profiles

The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) has been present in Bulgaria for decades. The group's presence in Bulgaria has been limited to endeavours to gain political representation.

DEFENCE BUDGET OVERVIEW

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SUMMARY - DEFENCE BUDGET AND MANPOWER

Total Defence Budget	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Constant 2019 USD billion	0.697	0.870	0.928	2.088	1.105	1.110	1.238	1.426
Constant 2019 local billion	1.224	1.528	1.631	3.668	1.941	1.951	2.175	2.505
Total Regular Forces	26,700	26,700	26,700	26,700	26,700	26,700	26,700	26,700
Budget per manpower (Constant 2019 USD)	26,096	32,567	34,772	78,196	41,375	41,581	46,369	53,396
% GDP	1.237%	1.487%	1.538%	3.353%	1.714%	1.666%	1.803%	2.022%

DEFENCE BUDGET TRENDS

Volatile defence funding

Defence budget movements in Bulgaria over the last decade have been incredibly volatile. Following strong increases in 2007 and 2008 of 27% and 10% respectively that brought the Bulgarian defence budget up to BNG1.2 bn, the defence budget plummeted by 24% in 2009 down to BGN1.2 billion where it remained in 2010. In September 2010, the then Bulgarian Minister of Defence, Anyu Angelov, announced budget cuts for the period 2011-2015 that would see the size of the Bulgarian Armed Forces reduced by up to 20%. Budget cuts would result in a strength reduction of around 6,000 troops and 1,200 civil servants, according to the 2010 defence white paper. Consequently, the 2011 was cut by 20% down to BGN991 million.

Despite cuts, in September 2010, Angelov called on parliament to maintain defence spending at a level of at least 1.5% of GDP until 2014. This compared with 2.96% in 2000, 2.24% in 2005 and 2.1% in 2008. The 2010 White Paper argued that, if needs and means are balanced, then in practice it was necessary to secure "a relatively constant share of GDP for the Ministry of Defence budget for the next four years - no less than 1.5%,

Minister Angelov insisted that modernisation, particularly of the Air Force, remained a key goal, with the critical task being the acquisition of a new multirole fighter. In November 2012, Bulgaria outlined a USD400 million budget for an estimated eight aircraft however, the procurement proved controversial in Europe at the time given Bulgaria's apparent avoidance of an open competition. In June 2013, then Defence Minister Angel Naydenov announced that the multirole right aircraft procurement would be frozen in the short term, deeming the acquisition "highly inappropriate" given the economic challenges facing Bulgaria.

On 8 February 2013, Bulgaria outlined capital expenditure plans valued at BGN2 billion for the period to 2020, and a defence budget of BGP1.08 billion (USD670 million) for 2013 accounting for 1.3% of GDP. The 2013 budget was a 10% increase over the static 2012 defence budget of BGN981 million and the Bulgarian MoD said that the majority of 2013 spending would continue to be directed to personnel costs (73%) with 20% assigned to operations and maintenance and 5% to capital expenditure.

Annexation of Crimea

The 2014 budget saw defence funding drop to BGP1.02 billion, a 7.5% cut from 2013. The 2014 budget was released in December 2013, prior to the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea by Russia. As a result, the MoD called for a reversal of the post-recession cuts. Then Bulgarian Defence Minister, Velizar Shalamov, drove the publication of a new policy document in September 2014 - entitled "Bulgaria in NATO and in European Defence 2020" - which criticised defence spending over the previous 10 years, stating that the BGN2 billion that was spent on defence over the period yielded minimal combat capabilities. The paper also called for an increase in the capital spending portion of the defence budget; up from the 2014 level of 5% to 15-20% by 2020 in order to "invest in modern technologies...to develop a modern army".

Despite the recommendations, the government - elected on 5 October 2014 - passed a 2015 budget that allocated BGP0.955 billion to the Ministry of Defence, a 9% cut from the 2014 budget. In

December 2014, the Government voted to add BGN0.012 billion to the defence budget bringing the final settlement for 2015 up to BGN0.979 billion, a smaller nominal cut of 4% compared to 2014 levels.

The "Programme for the Development of the Defence Capabilities of the Bulgarian Armed Forces 2020", released 30 September 2015, outlined long-term procurement and modernisation aspirations. The 2015 strategy stated a far less ambitious spending plan than the September 2014 policy document, merely making a commitment that the percentage of GDP spent on defence out to 2018 would not fall below 2014 levels. Spending would then increase out to 2024 if economic conditions allow. Therefore, the drive towards spending 2% of GDP on defence by 2020 appeared to have been rethought in light of an assessment of Bulgarian government resources.

2016 Recovery and 2018 National Security Strategy

The 2016 Draft Budget allocated BGN1.16 billion to defence, a 19% nominal increase compared to 2015 levels (16% in real terms). According to the budget, BGN1.0 billion was allocated to core defence with a further BGN0.16 billion added specifically for the purchase of Naval and Air Force military hardware. Even within the core defence budget, the increase appears to have been geared towards investment given extraordinary meetings called at the time to discuss cuts in the remuneration packages of the armed forces.

The 2017 budget - approved October 2016 - added just BGN75 million to the 2016 core budget bringing the core 2017 budget up to BGN1.08 billion. The Bulgarian parliament again approved supplementary spending to be sought from the Central Budget rather than the MoD budget. For 2017, Parliament approved a further BGN420 million for equipment modernisation and personnel recruitment as part of a wider BGN1.6 billion fund available to the MoD out to 2020. Thus, the *total* 2017 defence budget grew to BGN1.5 billion, a 26% increase over total 2016 spending and accounting for 1.5% of GDP.

The 2018 Budget projected that spending on core defence would increase by BGN0.113 billion over 2017 levels to reach BGN1.19 billion while the 2019-2021 Medium Term Budget Forecast (MTBF) outlined flat core defence budgets to 2021 for Bulgaria to which JDB added estimates for supplemental funds taken from the BGN1.6 bn central government fund available to the MoD out to 2020.

In March 2018, the government approved a National Security Strategy (NSS) that outlined more aggressive spending plans than under the draft 2019-2021 MTBF. According to the NSS, the 2018 budget should increase to BGN1.64 billion with additional annual increases of 10% on average in order to reach 2% of GDP by 2024. The strategy also highlighted cyber security, transport security, crisis management and the protection of national archives as priorities for Bulgarian defence.

2019 budget and outlook

In light of the NSS, the 2019-2021 Medium Term Budget Forecast was accordingly updated in October 2018. The MTBF agreed with the NSS assessment of the 2018 budget and implements strong increases of 12%, 9% and 9% in 2019, 2020 and 2021 respectively reaching BGN2.2bn by 2021. The MTBF assessed that these increases equated to a defence budget equal to 1.64% of GDP by 2021.

The 2020-22 draft MTBF, released April 2019, was largely in line with the former MTBF with defence funding reaching BGN2.353 billion by 2022. However, the 2020 budget indicated a very different growth path. Funding for the acquisition of fighter aircraft was removed from future years' allocations and added to the 2019 budget given the "one-time initial deposit made in 2019 for the full amount of contracts related to the acquisition of a new type of combat aircraft". As such, Bulgarian defence budget figures exhibit a huge 124% spike in 2019 followed by a 47% contraction in 2020. The final 2019 budget came to BGN3.7 billion accounting for 3.4% of GDP. While the 2020 budget is expected to come to BGN1.941 billion, dropping to 1.7% of GDP. The plan to 2022 projects a static 2021 budget followed by a 12% increase in 2022 to BGN2.2 billion or 1.8% of GDP.

JDB expects the budget to then follow the 2018 NSS recommendations. The outlook for the Bulgarian defence budget is therefore positive with the defence budget accounting for 2.02% of GDP by 2023. Beyond 2024, growth will need to average between 4-5% annually in order to maintain spending at 2% of GDP. According to the JDB longer term outlook, Bulgarian defence spending will exceed USD2 billion by 2031.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
FMF (USD billion)	0.013	0.009	0.009	0.007	0.007	0.005	0.005	0.005	-	-

ARMED FORCES

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2019-12-09

Military capabilities

	Total strength	Army	Air force	Navy
Active personnel	26,700	16,000	6,500	3,500

Reserves

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

- The Bulgarian armed forces have struggled to maintain capable, modern, NATO-standard forces in the face of severe budget constraints and political and social divisions that tend to undermine progress. Like other regional powers, Russian aggression in Ukraine and the militarisation of the Black Sea since 2014 have energised the armed forces to renew national defence capabilities after more than a decade of focusing on support to multinational operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, during which conventional skills atrophied and remaining stocks of Soviet-era weapons and equipment reached obsolescence. However, increasingly urgent procurement programmes and further professional development may finally enjoying substantial support from the government. Nonetheless, despite targeted assistance from allies to bridge gaps and the regular deployment of NATO forces into the region to help secure the eastern flank and deter Russia, the Bulgarian armed forces face major hurdles in developing required capabilities and professionalism.
- Contingents of about 160 Bulgarian troops continue deployments to Afghanistan in support of the NATO 'Resolute Support' mission to train, advise, and support Afghan security forces. Bulgarian troops also serve with multinational missions in Bosnia Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, and Mali. The Bulgarian Navy is required to be able to deploy the "equivalent" of a frigate for three to six months every year, while the air force should be able to provide a helicopter detachment for at least six months per year and one C-27J airlifter as required. Joint logistics capacity is under development to support Bulgarian forces on multinational operations abroad. Plans also call for further investment in C4ISR systems and a build-up in cyber defence capability for national and coalition operations.
- In September 2015 the government approved the 'Programme for the Development of the Defence Capabilities of the Bulgarian Armed Forces 2020'. A May 2018 annual report by the Council of Ministers stated that by the end of 2018, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) will be focused on implementation of the 2020 Programme; development of a roadmap for a new long-term 'Programme for the Development of the Armed Forces until 2032'; full implementation of the National Plan for increasing the Defence Budget to 2% of GDP by 2024; launch of the three major modernisation projects – for the land forces, the air force, and the navy; and the development of cyber defence and effective strategic communications capabilities.
- The bulk of the armed forces are maintained at minimal Manning and readiness levels due to funding, equipment, and recruiting constraints. However, the government and the armed forces leadership are committed to improvement and there is reason for some optimism, particularly regarding Bulgarian participation in the increasing frequency of NATO exercises taking place in the Black Sea region, which affords valuable training and exposure. These include near continuous deployments of US land forces training in Bulgaria and Romania.

2019-04-04

Threat environment

While Bulgaria faces no immediate military threat, escalating tensions between NATO and Russia could increase the likelihood of confrontation in the region, either in the Black Sea or along the borders between fellow NATO ally Romania with Moldova and Ukraine. Similarly, the tense situation in Syria could prove problematic, with most Russian material bound for the war there passing the Bulgarian coast before entering the Dardanelles. Closer political and military co-operation between Russia and Turkey in the face of NATO concerns is another potential source of concern for Bulgaria.

Other long-standing regional issues also remain relevant, such as transnational terrorism and illegal trafficking in arms, people, and drugs in concert with the growing influence of organised crime.

Along with Romania, Russia, Turkey, Georgia and Ukraine, Bulgaria shares the Black Sea littoral. In addition to fallout from the Russia-Ukraine crisis, which includes the introduction of ever more capable Russian naval and air capability into the Black Sea and the transit of Russian Navy units to and from the Mediterranean, Bulgaria must be mindful of other potential regional disputes between Greece and Turkey, and Georgia and Russia. Bulgaria is also the eastern anchor of the volatile Balkans region that includes Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina Northern Macedonia , and Kosovo.

2019-04-04

Doctrine and strategy

National and regional developments since the fall of communism have produced a defence strategy based on multilateral co-operation centred on the Black Sea region and the Balkans, along with solid support for NATO and the European Union.

2019-04-04

Evaluation of strategy

Bulgarian military doctrine recognises that security is directly related to wider regional conditions, with the main sources of military risk for the foreseeable future being active and potential conflicts in the eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea littoral, and the wider Middle East. Regional concerns gained new emphasis as a result of the Ukraine crisis with Russia, prompting consideration of how Bulgaria can best contribute to a collective NATO response. As the situation has evolved through the end of 2018, the Bulgarian armed forces continue to shift to a renewed emphasis on joint combined conventional force operations, including maritime operations and special operations forces (SOF), while maintaining the ability to provide forces for limited coalition operations in distant lands.

As comprehensive reforms continue, the Bulgarian armed forces have achieved basic NATO interoperability, with further advances expected in the medium term. However, hurdles remain in the form of ageing Soviet-era equipment and weapon systems and the need to improve individual unit proficiency to the levels required for effective NATO combined operations.

Military capability assessment

2019-04-04

Capability assessment

- After a decade of delays and reversals caused by political disagreements and inadequate funding, the government announced on 1 October 2018 the receipt of four offers to replace Soviet-era fighter aircraft. This follows the selection in April 2017, later withdrawn, of refurbished Saab JAS-39 C/D Gripens. This latest round of fighter offers finally resulted in selection of the Lockheed Martin F-16V Fighting Falcon by early in July 2019, when Defence Minister Krasimir Karakachanov signed four international agreements totalling nearly USD1.3 billion for the US Foreign Military Sale (FMS) procurement of eight F-16 Block 70 fighters – six single-seat and two twin-seat aircraft. To conclude the deal, parliament had to override a presidential veto based on procedural objections. Deliveries are expected to commence in 2023. The F-16V beat out of the same field of previously considered candidates – newbuild Gripens from Sweden, new Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, and upgraded tranche 1 Eurofighter Typhoons from Italy.
- Meanwhile, the air force relies on 15 MiG-29 fighters – 12 single-seat MiG-29As and three MiG-29UB trainers, that depend heavily on Russian logistics support. Some could remain in service until 2030, but may be phased out earlier if plans proceed to introduce 16+ new multirole fighters in the late 2020s. To establish a credible multirole fighter capability, Bulgaria requires about 24 new jets.
- Given the low serviceability rates of Bulgaria's existing Soviet-era MiG-29s, in August 2016 an agreement was concluded with the US for the periodic deployment of fighters to Bulgaria to conduct joint QRA missions. This follows a comprehensive 2014 bilateral agreement with Greece to share air policing of Bulgarian airspace. Italy has also deployed Typhoons to Bulgaria.
- Naval requirements are another area of concern, with the government promising to support a 2020 budget that includes funding for two new multirole corvettes, with additional funding programmed through planned delivery in 2022. These are likely to be Gowind-class helicopter-capable corvettes completed in Bulgaria.
- Meanwhile, the land forces lack the weapons and systems to effectively conduct conventional combined arms manoeuvre warfare, specifically modern armoured vehicles, main battle tanks (MBT), modern artillery with digital fire control systems, secure digital command-and-control (C2) systems, and effective logistics capability. A hopeful indicator is the August 2019 release of an RFI for acquisition of about 150 new armoured vehicles with the intent to eventually outfit the entire 2nd Mechanised Brigade.

Joint forces interoperability

2019-11-05

Joint Forces Interoperability

In May 2019 approval was granted for the establishment of a Joint Special Operations Command directly subordinate to the Chief of Defence, built around the existing 68th Special Forces Brigade. The new command will be operational by October 2019.

2019-04-04

Multinational interoperability

The Bulgarian armed forces have gained some worthwhile operational experience since joining NATO in 2004, although generating sufficiently trained and equipped forces remains challenging. This is due to a small force pool from which to draw, limited funding for new equipment and training, the poor quality of many service members, and the generally poor training they receive. As a result, Bulgaria historically restricted deployments to small numbers of individually selected and specifically trained and equipped personnel formed into ad hoc units for specific tasks, such as peacekeeping in Kosovo or training the Afghan National Army (ANA). This is changing as properly trained and equipped company battlegroups from standing infantry battalions participate in training exercises with NATO forces in Bulgaria and Romania, and as far afield as Germany and the Baltic States. Bulgarian special forces receive more training and better equipment than other elements and regularly work closely with US and other NATO SOF.

Bulgaria has been an active member of the South-East Europe Defence Ministerial (SEDM) process, which began with a meeting of regional defence ministers in 1996. The then Bulgarian deputy defence minister Avgustina Tzvetkova chaired the organisation from 2009 to 2011. The 14 member states include all of the Balkan countries, along with Italy, Turkey, Ukraine, and the US. A prominent SEDM initiative is the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE), also known as the South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG), which involves a multinational brigade structure that maintains an operational core staff and can mobilise quickly when required.

SEEBRIG's capabilities were expected to advance rapidly, but this is now on hold due to multilateral tensions in the Black Sea region, particularly the Russia-Ukraine conflict and deteriorating relations between NATO and Turkey.

Beyond SEEBRIG, the regional exercise series 'Danube Guard', involving Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia, has taken place every summer since 2007 on the Danube River. The three countries mount air, naval, and land operations simulating combined action in a crisis situation along their common border and action against a terrorist attack. On a multinational level, the exercise is designed to check whether the authorities in charge of national security in the three countries have the capacity to combine forces to deal with crisis situations on their borders.

As a result of increasing security concerns stemming from the Russia-Ukraine crisis, the tempo of multinational exercises in Bulgaria and involving Bulgarian forces has increased dramatically since 2014. These have included NATO sponsored multinational land and air exercises in Bulgaria and elsewhere in Europe, and combined naval exercises in the Black Sea.

2019-04-04

Defence structure

Bulgaria has focused on sustainable multinational deployments and interoperability with NATO and EU forces for the past decade. Plans call for maintaining a force of 3,000 to 5,000 for international missions of up to six months, with more than half of the army reconfigured to support this role. In light of new concerns for regional security along NATO's eastern and southern flanks, this expeditionary outlook is changing to reflect more conventional, combined arms operations in a national and regional security context. Specific initiatives include forming a standing, high readiness contingency battalion battlegroup for the regional framework brigade and the NATO Response Force, comprising light infantry, nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) reconnaissance, and engineers. However, the limited number of properly trained and equipped high readiness units means these units constitute the effective core of the armed forces in response to any contingency situation.

In January 2016 the latest iteration of the EU Balkan Battlegroup was formally established in Greece under Greek command for a six-month period, with subordinate units from Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, and Romania. Bulgaria provides a mechanised infantry company to the 1,200-strong force, which activated in the second half of 2007, the first half of 2009, the second half of 2011, the first half of 2014, and the first half of 2018.

Armed forces units have served in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1997, first with the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and now with the EU Force (EUFOR). This contribution has now been reduced to just 10 personnel assigned to EUFOR Headquarters (HQ) in Butmir near Sarajevo airport. Another 10 personnel are assigned to Kosovo, split between Kosovo Force (KFOR) HQ in Pristina and the NATO training group.

2019-04-04

Command and control

Commander-in-Chief:	President Rumen Radev
Minister of Defence:	Krasimir Karakachanov
Chief of Defence Staff:	Lieutenant General Andrey Botsev
Commander, Joint Operations Command:	Lieutenant General Lyubcho Spasov Todorov
Land Forces Commander:	Major General Mihail Dimitrov Popov
Air Forces Commander:	Major General Tsanko Ivanov Stoykov
Navy Commander:	Rear Admiral Mitko Alexandrov Petev

2019-04-04

National Military Command Centre

As part of the extensive restructuring necessitated by Bulgaria's entry into NATO a National Military Command Centre (NMCC) was established in Sofia. The NMCC is responsible for operational planning and the C2 of Bulgarian armed forces units deployed on operations inside the country and abroad, thereby ensuring the joint employment of forces from all three services. When national units deploy on NATO, EU, UN, or other coalition operations, the NMCC co-ordinates the national administrative and logistical support effort following the transfer of operational control to the multinational command. The NMCC is also responsible for the co-ordination of all civil-military emergency response operations within and outside Bulgaria.

The individual service HQ are responsible for recruitment, manning, training, and providing units and sub-units to the NMCC for joint training and participation in operations. They are also responsible for the recovery of personnel and units that have participated in an operation.

The NMCC is equipped with a C2 system supplied by Northrop Grumman, which became fully operational in 2004.

Army

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Main battle tanks

M117 Guardian armoured security vehicle

Field artillery

Unmanned aerial vehicles

Equipment in service

Small arms and light weapons

Unmanned aerial vehicles

2019-10-31

Summary

Strength	16,000
Primary combat units	2nd Mechanised Brigade 61st Mechanised Infantry Brigade 3rd Separate Mechanised Battalion 4th Artillery Regiment
Armoured vehicles	T-72 tanks M1114 HMMWV BRDM-1 reconnaissance vehicle
Artillery	152 mm D-20 self-propelled howitzer
Ground-based air defence	ZU-23-2 ZPU-2 ZPU-4

2019-05-03

Executive summary

- Efforts under way since 2010 are continuing to build a small, mobile, moderately well-trained and equipped land forces component of the Bulgarian armed forces. A fully professional army was achieved with the end of conscription in January 2008. The army has steadily gained significant skills and experience in regional and international missions while continuing to fulfil constitutionally mandated territorial defence roles. Nonetheless, systematic under-financing continues to negatively affect modernisation. Combined with problematic personnel recruiting, training, and retention, the cumulative effects over the past 10 years continue to restrain readiness and the ability to confront emerging security challenges.
- The bulk of the army is dedicated to national territorial defence, training, and mobilisation missions, but the proportion considered at higher readiness for operations will rise from 3% to 8% by 2020. The army is focusing considerable resources on building meaningful contributions to international efforts across the spectrum of requirements, from combat operations to peacekeeping. Expanded roles include countering terrorist activities, defending strategic facilities, and assisting national security agencies in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and illegal armaments trafficking.
- After many years of concentrating on the training and deployment of small contingents to multinational operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the Russia-Ukraine conflict that erupted in 2014 and escalating tensions with Russia along NATO's eastern flank have triggered a renewal of interest in conventional, combined arms capabilities in a NATO context. Fortunately, efforts to restore conventional capability predated the Ukraine crisis. Transforming the 2nd Mechanised Brigade into a deployable Brigade Combat Team (BCT) on a US Army model was defined in April 2011 as one of 13 major procurement and modernisation goals of the Bulgarian armed forces for the period up to 2020, with a cost estimated to exceed BGN100 million (USD59 million).
- The greatest impediment to modernising Bulgarian Land Forces capabilities is the increasingly urgent need to replace obsolescent Soviet-era weapons and equipment. The September 2015 government-approved 'Programme for the Development of the Defence Capabilities of the Bulgarian Armed Forces 2020' restates procurement priorities for all three components, including enhanced mobility, independence, and levels of protection for the land forces and building a high readiness battalion battlegroup within the 2nd Mechanised Brigade. In 2018 the Ministry of Defence (MoD) released a long-awaited tender for up to 150 modern armoured vehicles to eventually fully equip the brigade, which should see a contract concluded by the end of 2019. This is a major step forward, but to be fully effective the brigade also requires modern tube and rocket field artillery systems, and MBTs to replace obsolete Soviet-era inventory.
- Budget limitations and personnel cuts since 2011 have seen the armed forces shrink by more than 20% with reductions of about 6,000 troops and 1,200 civil servants. In October 2010 the parliament adopted a draft resolution further downsizing the country's armed forces to about

32,000 military and civil personnel by 2013. Limited budgets and more reorganisation could see the army reduce even further to about 13,800 soldiers. Nonetheless, the army will remain the core of the Bulgarian armed forces at about 50% of overall personnel.

Deployments and operations

2019-05-03

Force distribution

The army's force structure is stabilised around two mechanised brigades in Pleven and Stara Zagora, and various independent support regiments. In May 2019 Parliament approved changes in the Defence and Armed Forces law to enable establishment of a Joint Special Operations Command in October that will be directly subordinate to the Chief of Defence. The core of the new command will be the existing 68th Special Forces Brigade in Plovdiv. Establishment of the Joint Special Operations Command is a response to NATO requirements for member states to unify armed forces structure and shows the importance of special forces in the Alliance

NATO Response Force: The first year-long NATO Response Force (NRF) rotation activated in January 2012 with a Bulgarian infantry battalion among the 13,000 NATO troops assigned. At the 2014 Wales Summit, the NATO allies agreed to enhance the NRF in order to adapt and respond to emerging security challenges posed by Russia, as well as risks emanating from the Middle East and North Africa. The result was establishment of a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) within the overall NRF structure, increasing the size of the NRF to 40,000, and providing NATO with a highly capable and flexible air, land, maritime, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) package capable of deploying at short notice.

SEEBRIG: Bulgaria is an active member of the South-Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial (SEDM) process, which began with a meeting of defence ministers in 1996. Former Bulgarian deputy defence minister Avgustina Tzvetkova chaired the organisation from 2009 to 2011. The 14 member states include all of the Balkan countries, along with Italy, Turkey, Ukraine, and the US. A prominent SEDM initiative is the South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG), which involves a multinational brigade with an operational core staff that can mobilise quickly if required.

During the October 2015 meeting, defence ministers of contributing countries concluded a plan for the period 2015–35, having achieved consensus on a SEEBRIG HQ location after 2017 based on a rotation among Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey for a six-year period. Through 2017, SEEBRIG HQ remained in Larissa, Greece, where it functioned since 2011.

The 'Balkan brigade', as it is known, officially numbers around 4,000 soldiers, with Greece, Italy, and Turkey each contributing a mechanised infantry battalion, while Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Romania allocate a company each. Units remain at their permanent home bases when not committed to SEEBRIG task forces for training or operations.

Regional High Readiness Brigade: NATO declared initial operational capability (IOC) for the Romanian-led Multinational Brigade South East (MN BDE-SE) in Craiova, Romania, in April 2017, with nine NATO allies participating, including Bulgaria. Built around the 2nd Rovine

Infantry Brigade, MN BDE-SE will eventually include a significant Bulgarian contribution, up to a complete battalion battlegroup. Other contributing countries include Germany, Italy, Poland, and Portugal, with others expected to join later.

2019-05-03

Recent and current operations

As of August 2019, Bulgarian troops were involved in the following operations:

- Operation 'Resolute Support' in Afghanistan: 159 troops
- Kosovo Force (KFOR): 10 staff officers
- EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia: 12 experts
- EU Force (EUFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina: 120 personnel
- EU Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali: four-person medical team with mission HQ in Bamako, the capital of Mali

2019-05-03

'Resolute Support' Afghanistan

NATO 'Resolute Support' mission is the training and restructuring mission led by NATO that replaced the combat mission International Security and Assistance Force in Afghanistan. The mission began December 2014 and consists of 17,000 troops and 39 NATO allies and partners, as of March 2019. Bulgaria has 159 personnel from the 68th SF Brigade and the Bulgarian army, as of March 2019. The Bulgarian forces have been involved in a specialised training mission to provide the necessary skills for CT and COIN operations to the Afghan defence and security forces.

2019-05-03

EUFOR's Operation 'Althea'

The EU Force's (EUFOR's) Operation 'Althea' is a mission to support the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina by providing combined training and support in their progression towards achieving NATO standards. The mission began in December 2004 with 18 contributing countries. Bulgaria began participating in the mission in 2012. The army has a light infantry security company at force HQ in Sarajevo, a National Support Element, a Liaison and Observation Team (LOT), and staff officers at HQ.

Organisation

2019-11-27

Order of battle

Unit hierarchy	Base	Type	Primary role (General)	Primary role (Specific)	Primary equipment	Notes
Bulgarian Army		Service Support	Command and Control			
Joint Forces Command	Sofia-Vrazhdebna International Airport	Combat Support	Command and Control			
Logistics Brigade	Sofia-Vrazhdebna International Airport	Combat Support	Logistics			
Movement Control HQ	Sofia-Vrazhdebna International Airport	Combat Support	Command and Control			
Land Forces Command	Sofia-Vrazhdebna International Airport	Service Support	Command and Control			
101st Mountain Battalion	Smolyan	Combat Arms	Infantry			
110th Logistics Regiment	Plovdiv	Combat Support	Logistics			
1st Reconnaissance Battalion	Blagoevgrad Barracks	Combat Support	ISTAR			
2nd Mechanised Brigade	Stara Zaragoza	Combat Arms	Infantry			

4th Artillery Regiment	Asenovgrad	Combat Arms	Artillery
55th Engineer Regiment	Belene	Combat Support	Engineer
61st Mechanised Infantry Brigade	Karlovo	Combat Arms	Infantry
CBRN Battalion	Musachevo	Combat Support	NBC Defence
CIMIC Geographical Information Support and PsyOps battalion	Sofia-Vrazhdebna International Airport	Combat Support	Psychological Operations
Special Mechanised Battalion	Plovdiv	Combat Arms	Infantry

2019-05-03

Bases

Name	Latitude	Longitude	Notes
Chirpan Camp	42.2643602	25.403502	
Karlovo	42.640131	24.796132	
Plovdiv	42.143638	24.773097	
Asenovgrad	42.019912	24.887257	
Kazanlak Barracks	42.627896	25.371326	
Musachevo	42.675462	23.57744	

Sliven Barracks	42.670076	26.341211
Haskovo Barracks	41.939793	25.5473113
Plovdiv Logistics Barracks	42.11417	24.778881
Smolyan	41.585606	24.674276
Belene	43.63904	25.119373
Blagoevgrad Barracks	42.009581	23.099205
Sumen Barracks	43.2871949	26.9613719
Stara Zaragoza	42.439884	25.625571

2019-05-03

Personnel

- The Bulgarian Land Forces is a professional all-volunteer force. On paper, reserve forces equal about 25% of the active Bulgarian Land Forces, consisting of enhancement forces and territorial defence forces. However, in reality, this trend was accelerated by the ending of conscription, which previously had no viable reserve formations and had a lack of personnel and matériel resources to draw on for rapid mobilisation.
- The armed forces, particularly the officer corps, tend to be overwhelmingly composed of ethnic Bulgarians. This is despite the presence of large ethnic Turkish and Roma communities, as well as smaller communities of ethnic Armenians, Macedonians, and several other groups in the country.
- Prior to the global economic crisis, the chronically underpaid armed forces had to compete with a growing private sector and the lure of reasonably well paid jobs elsewhere in Europe. Combined with a lack of access to modern training in electronics, computers, and other technical trades, the army faced an uphill struggle to recruit educated and motivated soldiers that could be trained to operate modern equipment in a fluid, multinational operational environment. While the economic situation may make military service more attractive to some, the lack of opportunities for personal growth and long-term job satisfaction will continue to dissuade many potential recruits.

2019-05-03

Training

- Initial recruit training lasts 90 days and takes place in 36 local centres. Bulgaria has greatly reduced the number of basic training centres as part of its defence reform process. Continuation training takes place at three regional training centres.

- There are higher education and qualification requirements for those who apply to be career NCOs. Priority is given to career soldier candidates with secondary education and specific qualifications, particularly foreign language and advanced computer skills.
- The education, qualification, and professional training of officers for the armed forces is conducted in military and civilian colleges and academies as well as training centres and covers three main areas: military qualification, higher military education, and higher civilian education.
- Officers are sent to military academies in fellow NATO member states, notably France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the US. Turkey assists with officer training in-country. Since November 2003 Greece has provided training and assistance to meet NATO standards. The agreement covers 29 programmes focused on information transfer and assistance to upgrade operational procedures. Bulgarian personnel train in peacekeeping operations at the Greek Army Multinational Training Centre at Kilkis in northern Greece.
- Turkey assists with officer training in-country. Since November 2003 Greece has provided training and assistance to meet NATO standards. The agreement covers 29 programmes focused on information transfer and assistance to upgrade operational procedures. Bulgarian personnel train in peacekeeping operations at the Greek Army Multinational Training Centre at Kilkis in northern Greece.
- The main training centres are located in Plovdiv, Sofia, Sliven, Pleven, Shumen, Veliko Tarnovo, and several other sites in northern Bulgaria. Major training ranges are located at Koren, Novo Selo, and Slivnitsa.

2019-05-03

Military exercises

Bulgarian and US troops regularly conduct joint exercises at Novo Selo, in eastern Bulgaria, under the auspices of bilateral agreements that underpin US European Command's Joint Task Force-East (JTF-E). Training at Novo Selo includes urban warfare, countering roadside bombs, live-fire exercises, and high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) crew training.

Novo Selo also accommodates joint Bulgarian-US training exercises in conjunction with the Black Sea Rotational Force (BSRF). The objective of BSRF is to increase the capabilities of participants to conduct tasks in joint combined operations – such as patrolling, escorting, and checkpoint operations; counter-IED procedures; and medical evacuation. Exercises include marksmanship and live-fire training with small arms and vehicle-mounted weapons.

‘Danube Guard’: The annual regional exercise series 'Danube Guard', involving Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia, has taken place every summer since 2007 on the Danube River. The three countries mount air, naval, and land operations simulating combined action in a crisis situation along their common borders and action against a terrorist attack. On a multinational level, the exercise is designed to test the ability of authorities in the three countries to combine forces to deal

with crisis situations along their mutual borders.

‘Strike Back’: Multinational Exercise Strike Back 2019 took place in June at the Novo Selo. Bulgarian participants included the 38th Mechanized Battalion with a battery of self-propelled mortars and a mixed anti-tank platoon; 20th self-propelled artillery battalion of 2nd Mechanized Brigade; and a tank company from the Center for training of specialists. US Army Europe participated with a mechanized company. The Hellenic Republic provided a tank platoon with Leopard 2 tanks and AH-64 Apache helicopters. The armies of Albania and the Republic of North Macedonia contributed infantry platoons.

‘Swift Response’: Annual exercise Swift Response 2019 is an airborne exercise sponsored by US Army Europe across Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania from 13 June to 25 June 2019. The exercise demonstrated strategic employment of high readiness airborne forces, the Global Response Force, focused on seizure of key terrain. The exercise also provided opportunities for joint planning and the development of capabilities for command and control of special operations simultaneously from dispersed locations. The exercise involved some 5600 personnel from eight countries, of which 1495 were paratroopers.

‘Shabla’: Joint/Combined air-defense live fire exercise Shabla 2019 was conducted 10-14 June. Highlights included live firing of air defense missile firing systems by the Bulgarian Army, Air Force and Navy, along with elements from the US and Serbia. The BuAF deployed S-300, S-125, 2K12, and 9K32M Strela 2M MANPADS, supported by MIG-29 fighters, SU 25 attack jets, and Mi-24 attack helicopters also conducting live fire. Army air defense units employed 9K33 mobile missile system, 2A13 ZU 23-2 guns, and 9K32M Strela 2M MANPADS. Rocket and artillery units also fired 9K79 (SS-21 Scarab) and tube artillery. Serbia performed live fires with S-125, 2K12, and 9K32M Strela 2M. US Army air defence elements also participated with Avenger systems. More than 1400 servicemen from the three countries participated.

‘Saber Guardian’: Bi-annual US Army Europe-led, multinational exercise ‘Saber Guardian 2019’ was conducted 3-24 June in Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary, involving 27,000 personnel. ‘Saber Guardian 2017’ took place from 11 to 20 July 2017 in the same three countries. involving some 25,000 personnel from 23 NATO allied and partner nations. The ‘Saber Guardian’ series was conducted annually from 2013 to 2017 as part of US European Command’s (USEUCOM) Joint Exercise Program, but became biannual from 2019. The aim of the exercise was to enhance the interoperability of participating nations and demonstrate commitment and readiness for action in support of security and stability in the Black Sea region. The Bulgarian armed forces contributed approximately 4,000 personnel to ‘Saber Guardian’ in 2017 and 2019.

2019-05-03

Core assets and procurement initiatives

In September 2015 the government approved a ‘Programme for the Development of the Defence Capabilities of the Bulgarian Armed Forces 2020’, which builds on the original version released in 2011 and supersedes the ‘White Paper on Defence and the Armed Forces’ that expired in 2014. Important elements of the programme in terms of land forces procurement include prioritising improved C2 systems and continued joint SOF evolution. At the same time the need to renew conventional combined arms capabilities gives new impetus to the acquisition of modern armoured

combat vehicles and artillery in order to equip a complete mechanised Brigade Combat Team (BCT).

2019-05-03

Armoured vehicles

Armoured vehicle acquisition project

Following multiple delays, the MoD announced on 5 August 2019 the release of requests for proposals (RfPs) to four companies for the procurement of 150 wheeled armoured vehicles to equip a mechanised brigade. The four companies – Rheinmetall-Krauss-Maffei Wegmann joint venture ARTEC, Patria, Nexter, and General Dynamics European Land Systems-Mowag – have until 31 October to submit bids. An interdepartmental task force then has until 20 December to complete its analysis and evaluation of the bids. The task force will then submit a report to the Defence Minister, leading to selection of a winner. Time frame for implementation is 12 years, with an estimated value of BGN1.464 billion (USD838 million), including value-added tax, according to the MoD.

On 16 May 2018 the Council of Ministers approved acquisition of 150 armoured combat vehicles and special support vehicles under the Battalion Battle Group (BBG) acquisition project to equip three battalion battlegroups in the 2nd Mechanised Brigade. The BGN1.224 billion project calls for BGN810 million to acquire at least 90 armoured combat vehicles, and BGN414 million for at least 60 specialised support vehicles. In addition, BGN240 million is planned for the acquisition of related equipment, documentation, personnel training, training and simulation equipment, automated fire control system (FCS) for a self-propelled mortar battery, and related communication and information systems.

2019-05-03

Main battle tanks

The MoD is investing BGN13.6 million (USD8 million) in the overhaul of 13 T-72M1 main battle tanks (MBTs), including refurbishment of 60 TPD-K1 day laser range finder gunner's sights for BGN2.9 million. The Bulgarian state-controlled TEREM EAD holding company was the preferred contractor. Its subsidiary, TEREM-Khan Krum in Targovishte, will perform the tank and sight work. The Land Forces has only one tank battalion based in Sliven. The 13 MBTs receiving the general overhaul in 2019–21 will be enough to equip one tank company.

An option under consideration is a proposal by German armoured vehicle producer KMW for the creation of a European MBT fleet that could see the introduction of refurbished second-hand Leopard 2s to satisfy an urgent requirement for modern MBTs. The company proposes upgrading Leopard 2 MBTs withdrawn from service by various countries to a common EU standard and leasing them to nations with requirements. The proposal follows a project by the European Defence Agency (EDA) to optimise existing European MBT capabilities. The EDA issued a request for information to EU defence industry associations on 22 September 2017 to elaborate a business case for upgrading existing EU-wide Leopard 2A4s to a common A7 version.

The proposal targets surplus Leopard 2A4s from countries such as Austria, Finland, Greece, and Spain for overhaul and upgrade to a proposed Leopard 2A7 EU version, based on the current A7V in service with the German Army. After modernisation, Leopard 2A7 EUs could be leased by KMW to nations such as Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Baltic states. The leasing package would include training, logistics, and maintenance for 10 years. The first Leopard 2A7 EUs could be delivered two years from contract signature.

M117 Guardian armoured security vehicle

Bulgaria's USD23.5 million contract for 13 Textron M1117 Guardian armoured security vehicles (ASV) was suspended in March 2016 after an unknown number of deliveries, but it was probably completed after a contract review. Follow-on orders are expected to meet a requirement for up to 60 Guardians, which have proven popular with the army.

In the second half of 2014, the US provided 10 M117 ASVs to the Bulgarian contingent in Afghanistan. The donation included nine Guardian troop-carrying vehicles and an ambulance at a total cost of USD25.6 million.

In September 2014 Bulgaria ordered 10 M117s under a USD15.2 million contract awarded by the US Army Contracting Command to Textron Systems, with delivery completed by December 2014. The buy comprised seven personnel carriers, two command posts, and one ambulance.

Bulgaria previously purchased seven Guardian ASVs in 2009, with six going to the contingent in Afghanistan and one to the 61st Mechanised Brigade in Karlovo for crew training. This was subsequently joined by the 10 new vehicles. The 61st now has a core capability building towards the equipping of one or two high readiness infantry battalions with ASVs.

The standard M117 ASV is outfitted as an infantry carrier and is designed for maximum protection with a V-shaped hull to help deflect blast. Armament consists of 12.7 mm and 7.62 mm MGs. Three Commando Select variants were included in the latest delivery, equipped with turret-mounted 40 mm Mk-19 and .50-calibre MGs. The CP variant integrates Textron Systems' Remote Video Terminal delivering real-time situational awareness and targeting from a variety of unmanned and manned aerial systems.

The Bulgarian company Kripto is the main local industrial partner and direct offset is focused on in-service support and training related to the procurement.

2019-05-03

Field artillery

The land forces require enough modern, NATO-compatible 155 mm field artillery systems with digital fire control and advanced munitions to equip two to three battalions. These would replace two battalions of increasingly obsolescent Soviet-era 2S1 self-propelled systems in service. The first priority is to equip the direct support artillery battalion in the high readiness 2nd Mechanised Brigade, which is the focus of land forces modernisation efforts. Equipping two direct support

battalions and a third general support battalion and a training unit would require a total of about 60 systems.

The general support battalion is equipped with Soviet-era BM-21 rocket systems, also in need of replacement. Funding availability will determine when and how artillery procurement proceeds.

Potential solutions include buying new systems or obtaining excess material from NATO allies such as France or the US, or from trusted sources such as Israel. New options include the popular BAE Systems towed M777, the Caesar truck-mounted system from Nexter in France, or the truck-mounted Atmos system from Soltam in Israel. Second-hand options include upgraded towed M198 howitzers or self-propelled M109s from the US, or similar offers from France, Israel, or other sources. Bulgaria is also thought to be interested in procuring a number of American M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS).

2019-05-03

Unmanned aerial vehicles

In November 2015, Bulgaria's biggest defence company, Vazovski Mashinostroitelni Zavodi (VMZ), signed an agreement with the Israeli firm Aeronautics Group on co-operation and technology transfer related to unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) production. The agreement is expected to result in an assembly line to produce tactical UAVs in Bulgaria.

It was confirmed in December 2014 that Bulgaria received four UAV Solutions Phoenix 30 UASs under a US Foreign Military Sales contract.

The Phoenix 30 is a quad-rotor UAS that is designed to provide a close ISR capability.

The exact capabilities of the payloads with which the aircraft will operate cannot be detailed due to customer confidentiality; however, it was revealed that bespoke solutions were developed for the Bulgarian platforms rather than use systems that equip the Phoenix 30 as standard.

Also outlined in the requirements document are the need for assembly and deployment without the need for tools, all-weather and day/night operation, autonomous flight stability in wind gusts of up to 90 km/h, a hover-and-stare capability, operational flight control hardware and software that can support four aircraft flying missions concurrently, and the ability to operate in temperatures ranging from -25 to 60°C at altitudes of up to 30,000 ft above sea level.

2019-05-03

Equipment in service

System name	Family name	Running gear	Mobility	Role general	Role specific	Total delivered	In service	Year of initial delivery	Notes
BRD M-2	BRD M-1	Wheeled	Self-propelled	C4ISTAR	Reconnaissance	unknown	12	unknown	
ZPU-4	ZPU	Wheeled	Towed	Combat/offensive	Air defence	unknown	unknown	unknown	
ZPU-2	ZPU	Wheeled	Towed	Combat/offensive	Air defence	unknown	unknown	unknown	
ZSU-2 3-4	ZSU-2 3-4	Tracked	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Air defence	unknown	unknown	unknown	
ZU-23 -2	ZU-23 -2	Wheeled	Towed	Combat/offensive	Air defence	unknown	128	unknown	
Tochka	Tochka			Combat/offensive	Area attack, Anti-structure	18	18	unknown	
VAB	VAB	Wheeled	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Armoured personnel carrier	unknown	unknown	unknown	
Commando Advanced ASV	Commando	Wheeled	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Armoured personnel carrier	27	17	2008	
MT-LB	MT-LB	Tracked	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Armoured personnel carrier	unknown	100	unknown	
D-30	D-30	Wheeled	Towed	Combat/offensive	Gun	380	50	unknown	

BM-21	BM-21	Wheeled	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Rocket	225	225	unknown	
D-20	D-20	Wheeled	Towed	Combat/offensive	Gun	206	206	unknown	
2S1 Gvozdika	2S1 Gvozdika	Tracked	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Gun	686	48	unknown	Unknown numbers in storage.
MT-LB 120 mm Mortar	MT-LB	Tracked	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Gun	unknown	50	unknown	
BMP-23	BMP-23	Tracked	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Infantry fighting vehicle, Reconnaissance	unknown	110	unknown	
T-72	T-72	Tracked	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Tank	433	80	unknown	
Strela-1	Strela-1	Wheeled	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Transporter erector launcher, Radar	unknown	unknown	unknown	
BTR-60	BTR-60	Wheeled	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive, Logistics/support	Gun	850	unknown	unknown	
M1115	HMMVV	Wheeled	Self-propelled	Logistics/support	Tactical/light utility	50	unknown	2008	
G-Class	G-Class	Wheeled	Self-propelled	Logistics/support	Tactical/light utility	100	100	2009	

M115 2	HMM WV	Whe eled	Self- prop elled	Logistics/s upport	Tactical/l ight utility	50	unkn own	2008
M111 4	HMM WV	Whe eled	Self- prop elled	Logistics/s upport	Tactical/l ight utility, Reconnai ssance	52	50	2007

2019-05-03

Small arms and light weapons

Man-portable air defence systems

Type	Role
9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 'Gaskin')	Man-portable surface-to-air missile
9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7a 'Grail')	Man-portable surface-to-air missile
9K32M Strela-2M (SA-7b 'Grail')	Man-portable surface-to-air missile
9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 'Gremlin')	Man-portable surface-to-air missile
9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 'Gimlet')	Man-portable surface-to-air missile
9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 'Gopher')	Man-portable surface-to-air missile
9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 'Gopher')	Man-portable surface-to-air missile

Infantry support weapons

Type	Role
9K11 Malyutka (Baby) (AT-3 'Sagger')	Anti-tank missile
9K111 Fagot (AT-4 'Spigot')	Anti-tank missile
82 mm B-10	Recoilless rifle
RPG-7V/D	Rocket-propelled grenade

SPG-9 (ATGL-H / ATGL-H1 / ATGL-H2)	Anti-tank rocket
40 mm UBGL-M1	Under-barrel grenade launcher
40 mm Avalanche	Grenade launcher
5.45 mm PSM	Pistol
9 mm Makarov	Pistol
9 mm P-M01	Pistol
5.45 mm AR series (AK74/AKS 74U)	Rifle
5.56mm M4	Rifle
7.62 mm AR series (AK47/AKM)	Rifle
7.62 mm SVD	Rifle
7.62 mm SKS	Rifle
9 mm Shipka	Sub-machine gun
5.45 mm LMG (RPK74 series)	Machine gun
7.62 mm LMG (RPK series)	Machine gun
7.62 mm MG (PK series)	Machine gun
12.7mm M2	Machine gun
12.7 mm DShK	Machine gun
12.7 mm NSV	Machine gun
40 mm UBGL-M1	Close support weapon
40 mm Avalanche	Close support weapon

2019-05-03

Unmanned aerial vehicles

Type	Manufacturer	Role	Original total	In service	First delivery
Phoenix 30	UAV Solutions	Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance	4	4	2014

Air Force

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
Training aircraft

Tactical helicopters

Equipment in service

2019-05-06

Summary



Bulgaria – Air Force ()

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Strength	6,500
Fixed-wing multirole combat aircraft	MiG-29
	Su-25
Fixed-wing transport aircraft	A319-100
	PC-12M
	Falcon 2000
	C27J
	An-2

Fixed-wing trainer aircraft	Su-25UBK
	PC-9M
	MiG-29UB
Rotary-wing logistics aircraft	206B-3
	AS 532AL
	Mi-24V

2019-08-30

Executive summary

- The Bulgarian Air Force (Bulgarski Voenno Vazdushni Sili: BuAF) was forced to refocus on fundamental combat capabilities due to the escalating regional tensions between NATO and Russia since 2014. The foremost challenge facing the BuAF is to effectively secure national airspace with a declining fighter force of around four serviceable MiG-29s, pending the introduction of new Lockheed Martin F-16V Fighting Falcons in 2023. Since 2016 this has only been accomplished by sharing responsibility with NATO allies Greece, Italy, and the United States. In December 2018, the Bulgarian Ministry of Defence (MoD) declared its preference for eight new-build F-16V Block 70 fighters, leading to a period of intense political wrangling before a USD1.3 billion Foreign Military Sale (FMS) package was finally concluded with the US in July 2019.
- Principal BuAF missions are air defence of national airspace within the context of the NATO air defence system, along with battlefield co-operation with land forces. Secondary tasks include air traffic control and general aid to civil authorities, including medical evacuation, firefighting, government transport, and SAR.
- Due to lack of deployable combat assets, since 2016 the BuAF has welcomed fighter detachments deployed to Bulgaria by Italy and the US, and Hellenic Air Force jets flying from Greece, to execute effective air sovereignty Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) operations. The MoD has also initiated an overhaul program for a number of BuAF MiG-29 fighters as an interim measure pending arrival of the F-16Vs.
- Most of the 14 Su-25 ground attack aircraft are also grounded, but will also be the subject of an overhaul and upgrade program that will keep this ground attack force in service through the 2020s. Plans call for their eventual replacement by a new multirole lead-in fighter training (LIFT)/light attack jet. More positively, the small Alenia C-27J Spartan-equipped airlift force is steadily gaining experience, and the Cougar-equipped tactical helicopter force is expanding into new mission areas such as combat search and rescue (CSAR) and special operations force (SOF) support and regularly participates in multinational exercises.

- The Bulgarian Ministry of Defence published a BGN5.8 million (USD3.3 million) tender on 29 July for the modernisation of Bezmer Air Base, 250 km east of Sofia, under the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP). The project involves the construction of facilities for personnel, cargo, ground equipment, parking, and engineering networks for the reception, staging, and onward movement of units on Bulgarian territory. Bezmer is the BuAF's Su-25 base and was previously modernised in 2016.

Deployments and operations

2019-05-06

Force distribution

Principal BuAF missions are air defence of national airspace within the context of the NATO air defence system, along with battlefield co-operation with land forces. Secondary tasks include air traffic control and general aid to civil authorities, including medical evacuation, firefighting, government transport, and SAR.

2019-05-06

Recent and current operations

Prime Minister Boyko Borisov confirmed on 14 June 2019 that the BuAF will assume the air policing of North Macedonian airspace around 2023, following the delivery of new F-16V fighters. North Macedonia is in the process of becoming a NATO member, expected to happen by the end of 2019. The country has no fighters so another NATO member has to conduct the air policing of its airspace within the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS). Greece currently performs the air policing mission over North Macedonia.

Organisation

2019-12-02

Order of battle

Unit hierarchy	Base	Type	Primary role (General)	Primary role (Specific)	Primary equipment	Notes
Bulgarian Air Force		Service Support	Command and Control			
Air Force Command	Sofia-Vrazhdebna International Airport	Service Support	Command and Control			

16 Transport Air Base	Sofia-Vrazhdebna International Airport	Fixed Wing	Logistics	
16 Transport Squadron	Sofia-Vrazhdebna International Airport	Fixed Wing	Logistics	PC-12, C-27J, An-30
24th Helicopter Air Base	Krumovo	Rotary Wing	Logistics	
1/24th Helicopter Squadron	Krumovo	Rotary Wing	Logistics	Mi-17, AS 532AL, Ranger
3 Fighter Air Base	Graf Ignatievo	Fixed Wing	Combat	
1/3 Fighter Squadron	Graf Ignatievo	Fixed Wing	Combat	MiG-29, MiG-29UB
Command, Control and Surveillance Base	Sofia-Vrazhdebna International Airport	Mixed Wings	ISTAR	
Forward Operations Base	Bezmer	Fixed Wing	Combat	
Attack Squadron	Bezmer	Fixed Wing	Combat	Su-25K, Su-25UBK

2019-05-06

Bases

Name	Latitude	Longitude	Number of Runways	Notes
Sofia-Vrazhdebna International Airport	42.694722	23.412778	1	
Graf Ignatievo	42.291389	24.719722	1	

Krumovo	42.070837	24.845438	1
Dolna Mitropoliya	43.451389	24.512222	1
Bezmer	42.455	26.352222	1

2019-05-06

Personnel

- The BuAF is a professional all-volunteer force. While the country contains significant Turkish and Roma populations, as well as ethnic Armenian, Macedonian, and Tatar minorities, the armed forces tend to be overwhelmingly composed of ethnic Bulgarians. This is particularly true of the officer corps.
- The armed forces face several obstacles to the recruitment of adequate numbers of skilled personnel. These include the availability of more highly paid positions in the private sector throughout the European Union. The armed forces cannot offer competitive salaries or benefits and service in the military is largely unattractive to the population segments that contain the best potential recruits.
- High levels of professionalism can be found within the helicopter force and air transport elements, both of which are more active and enjoy greater opportunities to interact with NATO allies than other sections of the BuAF. While there is constant improvement, the air force remains hampered by an insufficiently large cadre of trained and experienced personnel, constrained funding, and a lack of coherence in terms of doctrine and planning.

2019-05-06

Training

- Under the latest air force reorganisation in July 2017, the Training Aviation Group 'Georgi Benkovski' was detached from 3rd Air Base Graf Ignatievo and designated as a separate air force training base reporting directly to the head of the BuAF. Georgi Benkovski specialises in flight training at Dolna Mitropoliya Air Base, near Pleven in northern Bulgaria, with five Pilatus PC-9M turboprop trainers and six Aero L-39ZA Albatros single-engine jet trainers.
- The BuAF has struggled to recruit and retain pilots, and to develop and maintain the modern training system needed to generate the aircrew and technicians required to maintain and operate modern aircraft already in the inventory, such as Cougar helicopters and C-27J airlifters. It will be hard pressed by the eventual delivery of new multirole fighters.
- Officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are trained at Dolna Mitropoliya Air Base. Air defence personnel are trained at the Shoumen Air Defence and Artillery Training Base.
- Officers receive further training for higher command posts at the Georgi Rakovski Military Academy in Sofia. A few officers destined for higher-level assignments and command

postings attend military academies in the UK, the US, and other European countries, with the most frequented foreign training opportunity being the US Air Force (USAF) Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama.

- Six Pilatus PC-9M aircraft were delivered from Switzerland in 2004 to provide transport pilot training in addition to light aircraft duties. Advanced fast jet training is conducted on the Aero L-39 Albatros, but serviceability is problematic, which affects fast jet pilot output. Helicopter pilots train on the Bell 206B-3 Jet Ranger.
- **Training areas:** Bulgaria is a large country with a relatively small population. This allows it to maintain several major combined arms training areas and weapons ranges in close proximity to the major airbases at Graf Ignatievo and Krumovo. These are also extensively used by US forces, as well as those of France, Greece, and other NATO countries and include areas of restricted/controlled airspace. Supersonic flight and other air activities are also conducted over the Black Sea.
- Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, and Slovenia signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on 4 October 2018 to create a new Special Operations Aviation (SOA) aircrew centre at Zadar airbase in Croatia in 2019. The intent is to maximise skills and knowledge required to boost interoperability and help fulfil NATO Defence Planning Process targets for SOA Task Unit capabilities. The programme is designed to expand training opportunities over time and will be open to all allies and NATO partners.

2019-05-06

Military exercises

‘Thracian Star’: Annual Multinational Exercise Thracian Star 2019 took place 8-17 May in Bulgaria, with participation by air forces from Greece, Romania and Italy. Bulgarian participation involved MiG-29 fighters flying from Graf Ignatievo Air Base, L-39ZA from the military air training base Georgi Benkovski, AS-532AL Cougar and Mi-24 helicopters from Krumovo Air Base, along with BuAF air defence units. Greece participated with F-16 Block 50s, Romania with MiG-21 LANCER and F-16 MLUs, and Italy with Eurofighter Typhoons.

‘European Spartan’: Exercise European Spartan 2019 took place in Romania 13-24 May, 2019, with the BuAF deploying a C-27J Spartan detachment. The multinational training event within the framework of the EATF (European Air Transport Fleet) program is part of a series planned and organized by the C-27J SPARTAN community with the support of the European Defense Agency (EDA). Other participants included Romania, Italy, Lithuania, and Slovakia, with observers from Australia, Greece, and the US.

‘Thracian Eagle’: The annual joint training exercise between Bulgaria and US forces was held in Graf Ignatievo airbase for four months in May 2018. Nearly 260 airmen from the Oregon Air National Guard deployed with the aircraft as the 123rd Expeditionary Fighter Squadron (EFS), a Theatre Security Package (TSP) in support of Operation ‘Atlantic Resolve’. Approximately 40 airmen from the 52nd Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, supported the 123rd EFS. The TSP was funded by the European Deterrence Initiative, designed to increase the capability and

readiness of US forces and partner nations, allowing for a faster response in the event of any aggression by a regional adversary against NATO sovereign territory.

2019-10-30

Core assets and procurement initiatives

Since 2010, the BuAF has successfully addressed two core requirements: the acquisition of new helicopters, themodernisation of those already in service,the procurement of new airlift aircraft, and modern multirole fighters to eventually replace Soviet-era MiG-29s and SU-25s.

2019-05-06

Multirole fighters

On 11 July 2019 Defence Minister Krasimir Karakachanov signed four international agreements totaling nearly USD1.3 billion for the US Foreign Military Sale (FMS) procurement of six single-seat and two twin-seat F-16 Block 70 fighters, following Council of Ministers' approval on 10 July. The agreements are for the acquisition of the F-16s and associated support. President Rumen Radev symbolically vetoed the deal on 23 July over procedural issues, which was overturned by parliament on 26 July, allowing it to proceed. On 12 August the MoD announced the transfer of USD1.2 billion to the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) on 8 August for procurement of the F-16 Block 70 combat aircraft.

Specific equipment and weapons requested by Bulgaria include 4 Lockheed Martin AN/AAQ-33 Sniper targeting pods; 16 Raytheon AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs); 24 Raytheon AIM-9X Sidewinder short-range air-to-air missiles; 15 GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II kits; 15 GBU-54 Laser Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) kits; 28 Boeing GBU-39 Small-Diameter Bombs (SDB)-1s; 24 Mk 82 bombs; 9 AN/ALQ-211 Harris Advanced Integrated Defensive Electronic Warfare Suites (AIDEWS); and nine AN/ALE-47 countermeasure dispensers. Deliveries are expected by 2023.

On 1 October 2018 Bulgaria received offers from three countries to replace the BuAF's Soviet-era fighter aircraft. Italy offered used tranche 1 Eurofighter Typhoons in conjunction with Leonardo. Sweden offered new-build Saab JAS-39C/D Gripen. The US offered either newBoeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets or the Lockheed Martin F-16V Fighting Falcon.

In December 2018, the MoD declared intent to acquire eight F-16V Block 70s . According to an MoD report on the evaluation of offers, Sweden's offer of eight Gripen C/Ds got the highest score under the 'operational effectiveness' criteria, while the US offer of F-16 Block 70s was ranked second . The F-16, however, was placed first under the 'expected service life' criteria, overtaking the Gripen. The Italian offer received the lowest score.

Bulgaria ultimately requires about 24 jets to establish a credible multirole fighter capability, , with eight F-16Vs considered the minimum number needed to maintain effective national air sovereignty QRA capability alongside continued deployment of NATO fighter detachments to Bulgaria. Existing plans call for a follow on order of 16+ additional multirole fighters later in the

2020s. Whether these will be more F-16Vs, F-35As, or another type are yet to be determined.

MiG-29 overhaul and Su-25 overhaul

The Bulgarian government outlined plans on 28 November 2018 to invest BGN128.3 million (USD74.5 million) in the long-term maintenance support of the MiG-29 and Su-25. MiG-29 maintenance will cost BGN45.7 million, complemented by another BGN26 million already allocated in the MoD budget. Maintenance will be conducted by original equipment manufacturer Russian Aircraft Corporation (RSK MiG) under a framework agreement inked in March 2018. According to the government, funds are sufficient to cover the continued operation of six MiG-29A single-seat and two MiG-29UB twin-seat fighters flying 900 hours a year through 2020. The government chose increasingly costly investment in MiG-29 maintenance to keep the Russian-made fighters viable as Bulgaria's principal contribution to NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence until the new F-16Vs enter service.

The Bulgarian government also approved funding for the overhaul and service life extension of surviving Su-25s, amounting to BGN82.5 million. Belarusian company 558 ARZ won the tender in November 2018 and will undertake the overhaul, small-scale upgrade and service life extension through the late 2020s of eight Su-25s: six Su25K single-seaters and two Su-25UBK twin-seaters.

2019-10-30

Multirole attack training aircraft

Bulgaria is exploring options to replace the Su-25 Frogfoot force with an affordable new aircraft capable of attack and tactical ISR roles while potentially serving as a lead-in fighter trainer (LIFT). However, this acquisition is unlikely to advance until the first stage of multirole fighter procurement is resolved from 2023, when funding can be identified for potential procurement - around the mid-2020s

Meanwhile, in order to build up the F-16V force, the BuAF is likely to follow Romania's example by training fast jet pilots for the F-16 force in the US. This would involve training new pilots at the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training (ENJPT), conducted by the 80th Flying Training Wing at Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas. F-16 conversion and operational training for both ENJPT graduates and existing Mig-29 and SU-25 pilots would take place with the International Training Unit of the 162nd Fighter Wing of the Arizona Air National Guard at Tucson Air National Guard Base, Arizona. The 162 FW has trained foreign F-16 pilots since 1992, including those from the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Oman, The Netherlands, Poland, Israel, Italy, Chile and Taiwan.

From the mid-2020s a likely LIFT procurement scenario has the BuAF eventually operating 12-18 multirole attack/ISR/training aircraft. At this point candidates include Leonardo's M-346FA (Fighter Attack) jet, and the Boeing/Saab T-X advanced jet trainer, selected by the US Air Force for the Advanced Pilot Training System (T-X) program to replace the Northrop T-38 Talon

2019-05-06

Training aircraft

In April 2018 the MoD cancelled a tender for the acquisition of four twin-seat piston-engine light training aircraft for ab initio and basic training of BuAF pilots. Karakachanov ended the procurement because of shortcomings in tender documentation and related technical specifications.

The BGN2.53 million tender included visual flight rules day/night and instrument flight rules (IFR) training, an IFR-capable simulator, and logistics for at least 400 flying hours per aircraft in the first year.

2019-05-06

Tactical helicopters

In June 2019 BuAF officially resumed Mi-17 flight operations when the first of three helicopters completed life extension work at the TEREM-Letets aircraft repair plant in Sophia. With 200 additional flight hours before its next scheduled general overhaul, the helicopter can remain operational until February 2020. Two more Mi-17s are undergoing the same general overhaul at TEREM-Letets. The type is primarily used for aerial firefighting and other civil support missions. A fourth surviving Mi-17 was lost in a crash in June 2018.

On 30 July 2018 the MoD published a tender for the general overhaul of the Mi-17s and four Mi-24V combat helicopters. . The procurement is valued at BGN37.3 million: BGN11.3 million for the Mi-17s and BGN26 million for the Mi-24Vs.

The BuAF returned a second Mi-24 attack helicopter to service in January 2018. The 1986-produced Mi-24V rejoined the 24th Helicopter Air Base at Krumovo following heavy maintenance at the Sofia-based TEREM-LETETS aircraft repair plant. With time between overhauls (TBO) reset to 1,000 flight hours or seven years, the aircraft can now remain operational until January 2021.

The Bulgarian defence ministry and Airbus Helicopters signed an agreement in May 2018 to settle a long-standing dispute over an unfulfilled offset obligation valued at an estimated EUR20 million (USD23 million) related to Bulgaria's 2005 procurement of AS 532AL Cougar and AS 565MB Panther helicopters. The agreement calls for the establishment in Bulgaria by Airbus Helicopters of a factory to produce aircraft components.

2019-05-06

Equipment in service

System name	Family name	Type	Manufacturer	Role general	Role specific	Total delivered	In service	Year of initial delivery	Notes
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L 410U VP-E	L 410	Fixed-wing	Manned		Transport	8	7	unknown	Only 2 might be fully operational following overhauls.
An-30	An-30	Fixed-wing	Manned	C4ISTAR		1	1	1975	
L-39ZA	L-39	Fixed-wing	Manned	C4ISTAR, Combat/offensive	Attack, Surveillance/recognition	36	12	1986	Only two aircraft are operational, with the remaining four in storage at Katunitsa, pending overhaul in anticipation of returning to service in 2013–14.

Su-25 K	Su-25	Fixed-wing	Manned	Combat/offensive	Attack	36	10	1986	
MiG-29	MiG-29	Fixed-wing	Manned	Combat/offensive	Fighter	18	12	1988	Only four are said to be flight-worthy.
Falcon 2000	Falcon 2000	Fixed-wing	Manned	Commercial/civil, Logistics/support	Transport	1	1	2007	
PC-12M	PC-12	Fixed-wing	Manned	Commercial/civil, Logistics/support	Transport	1	1	2003	
A319-100	A319	Fixed-wing	Manned	Commercial/civil, Logistics/support	Transport	1	1	2010	

C-27J	G2 22	Fixed-wing	Manned	Logistics/support	Transport	3	3	2007	The fleet is grounded due to lack of logistical support and damage. All three air frames in storage
An-2	An-2	Fixed-wing	Manned	Logistics/support, Commercial/civil	Utility, Transport	3	1	unknown	
PC-9M	PC-9	Fixed-wing	Manned	Training	Trainer	6	6	2004	
MiG-29UB	MiG-29	Fixed-wing	Manned	Training	Trainer	4	3	1988	
Su-25UBK	Su-25	Fixed-wing	Manned	Training	Trainer	4	4	1986	
Mi-24V	Mi-24	Rotary-wing	Manned	Combat/offensive, Logistics/support	Attack, Transport	45	5	unknown	

AS 532A L	AS 332	Rot ary - win g	Mann ed	Logistics/s upport	Utility	12	12	200 6	
Bell 206B- 3	Bel l 206	Rot ary - win g	Mann ed	Logistics/s upport	Utility, Transport	6	6	199 9	
Mi-17	Mi- 8	Rot ary - win g	Mann ed	Logistics/s upport	Transport	25	5	198 5	Total includ es at least two in storag e

Navy

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2019-06-03

Summary

Strength	3,500
Frigate	Wielingen class Koni class
Corvette	Tarantul II class Reshitelni (Pauk I) class
Fast attack craft – missile	Osa (Project 205) class
Mine-warfare vessels	Flower (Tripartite) class Briz (Sonya) class Iscar (Vanya) class Yevgenya class Olya class PO 2 (501) class

2019-06-03

Executive summary

- The Bulgarian Navy has done moderately well at transforming into a small, professional service focused on Black Sea security in a NATO context despite years of funding issues and uncertain political support. As of August 2019 it appears the government is finally proceeding with the procurement of two urgently required new corvettes to replace obsolete

Soviet-era vessels, with a contract likely by early 2020.

- One consequence of NATO-Russia tensions has been an increase in NATO warship operations in the Black Sea, which has afforded the navy new opportunities to participate in multinational security exercises and operations. The Bulgarian Navy has also deployed units into the Mediterranean, though this is increasingly problematic given declining readiness of the frigates. Overall, growing concerns over Russian belligerence in the region has strengthened Bulgarian resolve and significantly enhanced NATO interoperability.
- The Bulgarian Navy has successfully employed three second-hand frigates acquired from Belgium since 2006, but they require modernisation to remain effective and to realise their full potential. Bulgaria is already a participant in the Turkish-led 'Black Sea Naval Force' ('BLACKSEAFOR'), alongside Georgia, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. However, in light of tensions with Russia, the future of 'BLACKSEAFOR' is uncertain, even as US Navy and other NATO warships continue regular deployments into the Black Sea, building on what is essentially an evolving regional maritime force.
- With the exception of the frigates and a mine countermeasures (MCM) vessel acquired from Belgium, the balance of the navy's mostly laid up warships are elderly Warsaw Pact-era vessels inadequate for operations, particularly in light of Russia's Black Sea fleet build-up. Bulgaria's sole remaining Romeo-class submarine, already non-operational, was formally retired in 2011.
- Driving the decision to proceed with major naval expenditures are concerns over tensions between NATO and Russia since the eruption of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2014, particularly the introduction of new warships and submarines into the Russian Black Sea Fleet and modern long-range weapons, sensors, and naval aviation assets into Crimea. There has also been a marked increase since 2015 of powerful Russian naval units transiting the Bulgarian coast as they pass into and out of the Mediterranean in support of operations in Syria.

Deployments and operations

2019-06-03

Force distribution

The Bulgarian Navy is centred on two major Black Sea bases – Varna and Burgas – each with a dedicated area of responsibility. Burgas controls the southern zone and Varna the northern zone. Officially, each zone headquarters has a patrol craft division, a minehunter/minelayer division, and a support division. In reality, the low availability of seaworthy vessels and a lack of trained crews make tasking more ad hoc.

2019-06-03

Recent and current operations

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The Bulgarian Navy has officially earmarked two ships to the NATO 'pool' of vessels and a third to the European Security and Defence Policy 'pool', though fleet serviceability precludes effectively meeting these commitments. Navy ships and new shore-based helicopters also provide on-call SAR services in the Black Sea.

Operation Sea Guardian

The navy has also deployed one vessel for the newly launched Operation 'Sea Guardian', directed at maritime security requirements in the Mediterranean Sea. The development of the 'Sea Guardian' operational concept highlights NATO's evolving approach to dealing with changing challenges at sea. 'Sea Guardian' replaces Operation 'Active Endeavour', launched in 2002, providing a broader scope of maritime security focus, including situational awareness, capacity building, and migration operations – as well as sea control, if required – while retaining the counter-terrorism emphasis of 'Active Endeavour'. 'Active Endeavour' and 'Sea Guardian' deployments are performed by the Wielingen-class frigates.

Organisation

2020-01-02

Naval aviation order of battle

Unit hierarchy	Base	Type	Primary role (General)	Primary role (Specific)	Primary equipment	Notes
Bulgarian Navy		Service Support	Command and Control			
Naval Command	Varna	Service Support	Command and Control			
Coastal Missile and Artillery Squadron	Varna	Combat Arms	Coastal Defence			
First Patrol Ship Squadron	Varna	Surface	Combat			
Helicopter Naval Base		Rotary Wing	Logistics			

Maritime Intelligence Squadron	Burgas	Support (Ashore)	ISTAR
Naval Electronic Warfare and Reconnaissance Squadron	Burgas	Support (Ashore)	ISTAR
Special Reconnaissance Squadron	Burgas	Support (Ashore)	ISTAR

2019-06-03

Bases

Name	Latitude	Longitude	Notes
Varna	43.192253	27.913206	Navy HQ and Southern Zone base.
Burgas	42.450848	27.578685	Northern Zone base.

2019-06-03

Personnel

- The Bulgarian Navy is a professional, all-volunteer force. The armed forces, particularly the officer corps, tend to be overwhelmingly composed of ethnic Bulgarians. This is despite the presence of large ethnic Turkish and Roma communities, as well as of smaller communities of ethnic Armenians, Macedonians, and several other groups in Bulgaria.
- Prior to the 2008 global economic crisis, the bloated, ill-equipped, and chronically underpaid armed forces competed with a growing private sector and the lure of attractive jobs across the European Union. Combined with a lack of access to modern training in electronics, computers, and other technical trades, the navy faced an uphill struggle to recruit educated and motivated personnel that could be trained to operate modern equipment. While recruiting challenges remain, developments since 2008 such as downsizing and professionalising the force, procuring new ships and aircraft, and enhanced professional development, combined with the promise of increased defence spending are incrementally improving recruiting.
- The navy enjoys an excellent reputation for professionalism among NATO allies. However, problems remain, including insufficient training and a lack of exposure to contemporary weapons, systems, and doctrine. One bright area is English language skills, which are fairly well advanced among young recruits. Professionalism will further improve with continuing integration with NATO forces as the Russian threat increases deployments.

2019-06-03

Training

- New recruits receive six months of basic training at Varna, with operational conversion carried out at bases on deployment. The main naval training centre is the Nikola Vapzarov Higher Naval School, located at Varna, where officer training lasts five years. Annual enrolment is about 20 cadets.
- Higher education for division and brigade commanders was conducted at the St Petersburg Naval Academy. However, since 1994 command courses have taken place at the Georgi Rakovski Military Academy in Bulgaria.
- **Training areas:** Training is usually undertaken in the Black Sea. Nikola Vapzarov Higher Naval School, Varna is the main training centre for the navy as well as merchant marines.

2019-06-03

Military exercises

‘Sea Breeze’: The 19th iteration of the annual US and Ukraine co-hosted multinational maritime exercise Sea Breeze 2019 (SB19) was conducted in the Black Sea 1-12 July 2019. The exercise focused on a range of security and stability scenarios in land, sea, and air, including maritime interdiction operations, air defence, special forces operations, anti-submarine warfare, damage control, search and rescue, and amphibious warfare. More than 3,000 personnel and 32 vessels from 18 nations participated, including the Bulgarian corvette Bodri.

‘BLACKSEAFOR’: Since 2001, Bulgaria has regularly participated in annual 'BLACKSEAFOR' activation exercises, which seek to deepen co-operation between participating countries and strengthen security in the region. The last activation was to take place in early 2014 but was postponed due to the Russian invasion of Crimea and the ongoing conflict with Ukraine. Since then the future of the group is in doubt, with Ukraine proposing the expulsion of Russia. The last activation of a 'BLACKSEAFOR' contingent was from 14 August to 3 September 2013 in Ukraine. Bulgaria deployed the minesweeper BGS *Priboy* to the exercise, which focused on anti-submarine and air defence warfare, as well as SAR operations.

Core assets and procurement initiatives

2019-06-03

Corvettes

On 29 May 2019 the MoD requested proposals from bidders in the tender for two modular patrol ships, with announcement a contract likely in early 2020, leading to launch of the first ship in 2021 and the second in 2022. The three bidders for the BGN820 million (USD472 million) tender are Lürssen, Fincantieri, and Bulgarian shipbuilder MTG Delfin. The new ships will replace two Project 12412 (Pauk-class) small patrol corvettes purchased second-hand from Russia in 1989.

Navy requirements are for modular multirole corvettes capable of anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, air defence, patrol, and search-and-rescue missions for national missions, and in support NATO and European Union-led multinational operations. Armament requirements include a 76 mm main gun, close-in weapon system, surface-to-air missiles, and lightweight torpedoes. Sensors include Link 11, hull-mounted sonar, and a baseline electronic warfare system. Each ship will be able to operate an AS565MB Panther helicopter.

2019-06-03

Frigates

Between 2006 and 2009 Bulgaria took delivery of three former Belgian Maritime Component Wielingen-class frigates, which enabled the Bulgarian Navy to expand participation in NATO exercises and operations. The frigates perform surveillance missions in the Black Sea, maritime interdiction operations, and contribute to international peace-support operations.

Although the oldest of the frigates was commissioned into Belgian service in 1978, all three underwent a life-extension modernisation programme in 2003 and 2004. The RIM-7M Sea Sparrow missile system was upgraded to RIM-7P specification and the Signaal (now Thales Nederland) WM25 surface search-and-fire control radar, sonar system, electro-optical, identification friend or foe (IFF) systems, and communications suite were also updated. New navigation radar systems were installed.

The Bulgarian Navy had planned to modernise the frigates from 2014, but budgetary pressures delayed the programme. Funding is required for the frigates to obtain upgraded command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) facilities, the ability to conduct helicopter deployments onboard, and to install improved air defence and ASW capability.

2019-06-03

Patrol boats

2020-01-02

Naval aviation

The MoD and Airbus Helicopters signed an agreement in May 2018 to settle a long-standing dispute over an unfulfilled offset obligation valued at an estimated EUR20 million related to Bulgaria's 2005 procurement of AS 532AL Cougar and AS 565MB Panther helicopters. The agreement calls for establishing factory by Airbus Helicopters to produce aircraft components.

On 6 December 2019, the Bulgarian Navy accepted into service an Airbus Helicopter AS365N3+ Dauphin multipurpose rotorcraft. The Dauphin helicopter will replace Airbus Helicopters AS565MB Panther that crashed into the Black Sea on 9 June 2017.

Apart from the latest acquisition, the Bulgagrian Navy has two AS565MB helicopters (901 and 903) tasked with coastal patrol and SAR from the naval helicopter base at Chayka, near Varna. On 12 July 2019, the Bulgarian Ministry of Defence (MoD) issued a tender for supporting the aircrafts and their engines. The government is currently in talks with Airbus Helicopters Romania and Safran Helicopter Engines Germany for the same.

Equipment in service

2019-06-03

Surface fleet

Class	Manufacturer	Role	Original total	In service	Commissioned
Wielingen	Various	Frigate	3	3	2005
Koni	n/a	Frigate	1	1	1980
Tarantul II	Volodarski	Corvette	1	1	1989
Reshitelni (Pauk I)	n/a	Corvette	2	2	1989
Osa (Project 205)	n/a	Fast attack craft - missile	6	6 ¹	1965
Flower (Tripartite)	Beliard	Minehunter	1	1	2007
Briz (Sonya)	n/a	Minesweeper - coastal	4	4	1981
Iscar (Vanya)	n/a	Minesweeper - coastal	6	3	1970
Yevgenya	Kolpino	Minesweeper - coastal	2	2	1977
Olya	n/a	Minesweeper - inshore	6	6	1988
PO 2 (501)	n/a	Minesweeper - inshore	24	2	1950

Vydra (Project 106K)	n/a	Landing craft utility	n/a	6	1970
Polnochny A	n/a	Landing ship medium	2	2	1986 ²
Vydra	n/a	Minelayer	6	n/a	1992

2019-06-03

Auxiliaries

Class	Manufacturer	Role	Original total	In service	Commissioned
Type 215	n/a	Torpedo recovery vessel	2	2	n/a
<i>Proteo</i>	Cantieri Navali Riuniti, Ancona	Salvage ship	1	1	1951 ¹
Bereza	n/a	Degaussing ship	1	1	n/a ²
n/a	n/a	Diving tenders	1	1	n/a
n/a	Burgas Shipyards, Burgas	Support tanker	2	2	1994
Mesar	n/a	Support tanker	1	1	1987
Project 245	n/a	Diving tender	2	2	n/a ³
421	n/a	Survey vessel/training ship	n/a	1	n/a
224	n/a	Firefighting vessel	n/a	1	n/a
321	n/a	Firefighting vessel	n/a	1	n/a
312	n/a	Tug	n/a	1	n/a
313	n/a	Tug	n/a	1	n/a

2020-01-02

Naval aviation

System name	Family name	Type	Manned-unmanned	Role general	Role specific	Total delivered	In service	Year of initial delivery	Notes
AS365 N3+	Dauphin	Rotary-wing	Manned	C4ISTAR, Law enforcement/security	Transport, Search/rescue, Medical	1	1	2019	
AS565 MB	AS565 Panther	Rotary-wing	Manned	Logistics/support	Search/rescue, Maritime patrol	3	2	unknown	

DEFENCE PRODUCTION AND R & D

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Executive overview

Summary

Bulgaria - a Soviet satellite state prior to the fall of communism in Europe at the end of the 1980s - has been a member of the European Union (EU) since 2007 and NATO since 2004. It is the poorest member of the EU.

Efforts to modernise inventories of Warsaw Pact-era materiel to ensure interoperability with NATO allies have been attempted, but progress has been slow as a result of funding constraints and political instability which has hampered long-term planning.

Defence investment

Bulgaria's defence budget is among the lowest in the EU at BGN1.53 billion (or approximately 1.5% of GDP) as of 2018.

National defence investment has been on a modest upward trajectory. The 2015 strategic planning document "Programme for the Development of the Defence Capabilities of the Bulgarian Armed Forces 2020" (see later in this section) stated that defence investment "in the mid-term" should not fall below the level of 2014 spending as a percentage of GDP (circa 1.3% of GDP), and Bulgaria managed to adhere to this objective in both 2016 and 2017.

There is also a target (most recently enshrined in the National Security Strategy paper of 2018) to gradually increase defence spending to 2% of GDP by 2024.

The outlook for the remainder of this decade is positive although the trajectory is shallow.

Defence industry

Bulgaria's defence industry is formed of 15 core companies with an estimated combined payroll of around 15,000 workers. Capabilities are limited and largely relate to the maintenance, repair and overhaul of land, sea and air systems; small arms, ammunition and munitions production; the development of military optical systems; and the production and development of radar and radio communication systems. Ownership is divided between the state and the private sector as a result of a long-running privatisation programme. Industrial development in the state-sector in particular has been hampered by burdensome levels of debt; bloated payrolls; limited industrial investment and a long history of loss-making activities.

Defence exports

Bulgaria's profile in world defence markets belies the ostensibly small-scale of the domestic defence industrial base.

The country completed defence exports valued at EUR2.5 billion between 2012 and 2016, with sales having increased 363% from EUR220 million to EUR1.3 billion over the period.

Bulgaria has found a niche as a supplier of non-NATO standard munitions, supplying users of Soviet-era military systems; either directly or via providers of military aid such as the United States. The country's largest markets by some margin in recent years have been Iraq and Afghanistan.

Procurement requirements

Bulgaria's principal procurement requirements to 2020 were outlined in 2011 in a strategy planning document that was subsequently updated in 2013, 2014 and 2015. The highest profile requirements are replacement combat aircraft; the modernisation of the navy's Drazki (ex-Wielingen)-class frigates; the acquisition of armoured vehicles; the acquisition of 3-D radar systems; and the purchase of multirole offshore patrol vessels.

Procurement practices

Bulgarian defence procurement is ostensibly subject to long-term planning and political oversight (procurement of BGN50 million or more are subject to the approval of the Council of Ministers, while those estimated at BGN100 million or more require parliamentary approval).

Procurement is conducted by the Defence Acquisition Directorate of the Ministry of Defence, and is guided by national legislation which was amended from 2011 to ensure compliance with the European defence procurement directive (2009/81/EC). Bulgaria reserves the right to apply offset obligations to procurement conducted under Article 346 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union TFEU (see sections: Procurement procedures and Offset policies).

Economy

Bulgaria's economy suffered as a result of the wider global financial crisis. The economy was nearly stagnant in 2010 and has returned to only modest growth since then. Austerity measures intended to stabilise the economy triggered waves of anti-government protests. In addition to lacklustre economic conditions, Bulgaria faces challenges such as organised crime and very high levels of corruption.

Political stability

Bulgaria's political environment has been volatile since the first post-communism democratic elections of 1990. Economic austerity made the period 2013 to 2014 particularly turbulent, with a total of four prime ministers and five defence ministers having served between 2013 and 2015. This has made long-term planning in the defence domains particularly challenging.

Bulgaria: Market Potential Index (MPI)

Factor/ris k	Score	Rating
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Defence investment:	1.07	Very low appeal
Procurement spending - land:	1.00	Very low appeal
Procurement spending - naval:	1.33	Very low appeal
Procurement spending - air:	1.04	Very low appeal
Defence industrial capabilities score:	1.13	Very low appeal

Pro cur em ent env iro nm ent sco re:	4.25	High appeal
Su ppl ier rel atio ns sco re: (cre dit reli anc e, inte rnat ion al em bar go stat us and deg ree of hist oric sin gle sup plie r reli anc e)	3.40	Moderate appeal

Market status score: (based on political and economic stability, the internal and external security environment, ease of doing business and transparency)	3.42	Moderate appeal
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Final market rating:	2.63	Lower appeal
<p><i>Note:</i> 1 = high risk/low appeal. 5 = very low risk/very high appeal. <i>Source:</i> Jane's Market Potential Index. Full methodology available on request.</p>		

National defence companies

Arms and munitions

Arcus

Summary: Arcus is a producer of munitions (medium-calibre, mortars and grenades); fuzes for artillery and tank munitions; and small arms (pistols and revolvers). It employs 2,800 people.

Ownership: Privatised in 2000

Web: www.arcus-bg.com

Arsenal

Summary: Arsenal is a producer of small arms (sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns) plus mortars and man-portable air defence and anti-tank systems. It employs 7,000 people and exports 90% of its output (2017).

Ownership: Privatised in 2011

Web: www.arsenal2000.com

Dunarit

Summary: A producer of artillery munitions (81 mm to 122 mm), aerial bombs, grenades, and industrial explosives

Ownership: Privatised in 2005, although the Bulgarian Ministry of Economic commenced moves in late 2017 to take the venture back into state control. This was because an indictment had been filed against directors of Dunarit which led the government to move to suspend the company's military production licence; a move stayed because of what the MoE described as the potential for "disturbances affecting the whole military-industrial complex". The government therefore sought to take control of Dunarit by acquiring its debt. As of 2018 it was listed for re-privatisation by the Bulgarian Agency for Privatisation and Post-privatisation Control.

Web: www.dunarit.com

Institute of Metal Science, Equipment and Technologies (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences)

Summary: A research organisation active in the development of systems including underwater grenades; sea mines; anti-tank mines; and explosives detection technologies.

Ownership: State owned

Web: www.ims.bas.bg

Maxam Bulgaria

Summary: Maxam is a provider of demilitarisation services and a producer of explosives. It is a subsidiary of a Spanish parent company.

Ownership: Privately owned by Maxam of Spain

Web: www.maxam.net

NITI-SHC

Summary: A producer of anti-tank mines; fuzes; and small arms cartridges.

Ownership: State-owned, but was identified for privatisation in 2007. It remains listed as of 2018 for privatisation by the Bulgarian Agency for Privatisation and Post-privatisation Control

Web: nitibg.com

Vazovski Mashinostroitelni Zavodi (VMZ)

Summary: VVMZ-Sopot is Bulgaria's largest defence production complex (with a staff of around 3,000 people). It is a producer of anti-tank guided missiles (notably 9M14M Malyutka, 9M115M Metis, 9M111-2 Fagot, and 9M111-M Faktoria); anti-tank unguided missiles, warheads, and propellants for RPG-7, SPG-9, RPG-22; and 100 mm, 122 mm, 130 mm, and 152 mm artillery munitions. Jane's reported in November 2018 that VMZ had signed an agreement with Israel's Aeronautics Group for co-operation in relation to the production of unmanned aerial vehicles, indicating a new direction for VMZ.

Ownership: State owned. VMZ was placed in the hands of the Bulgarian Privatisation and Post-Privatisation Control Agency in 2011, and privatisation efforts were launched in both 2011 and 2013. Privatisation plans were announced again in 2016 with a view to a sale in 2018. It remains listed for privatisation as of 2018.

Web: vmz.bg

C4

Electron

Summary: Electron is a producer of communication systems for the Bulgarian armed forces plus meteorological radars.

Ownership: Previously state-owned

Web: www.electron-bg.eu

Opticoelectron

Summary: A developer and producer of optical systems (gun sights and night vision systems) for military and civilian applications. It has 700 employees and looks to export markets for 97% of sales.

Ownership: Privatised 1999

Web: www.opticoel.com

Optixco

Summary: A producer of optical systems (gun sights and binoculars) for military and civilian applications

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.optixco.com

Samel90

Summary: The company is a producer of communications systems for military applications. It produces field telephones and radio jammers. Samel90 employs 400 people and exports 70% of its products.

Ownership: State owned. Listed for privatisation as of 2018.

Web: www.samel90.com/en

Tchernomore

Summary: A radar systems specialist which produces radars for land and marine applications

Ownership: Privately owned (previously subject to privatisation in 2000)

Web: www.tchernomore.com

Maintenance, repair and overhaul

Avionams

Summary: A provider of aerospace maintenance, repair and overhaul services relating to Mi-8/17 and Mi-24 rotary wing-aircraft and Sukhoi, MiG and L39 fixed wing aircraft

Ownership: Avionams had reportedly been privatised between 2008 and 2012, but the Bulgarian government stated in August 2016 that it had reverted back to state control. It remains under state control as of 2018.

Web: www.avionams.com

Terem

Summary: Terem is a state-owned maintenance and repair network covering aviation repair, ship repair, and land vehicles maintenance and repair. Organisations within the group are Terem Letets (a helicopter repair and overhaul centre); Terem OEvech (a vehicle and armoured equipment overhaul centre); Terem Khan Krum (an armoured vehicles spare parts producer); Terem KRZ Flotsi (ship repair and overhaul); Terem Ivailo (repair and overhaul of artillery and weapons systems and demilitarisation work); and Terem Tzar Samuil (ammunition services). Terem holds 26% of radar and communications maintenance and repair facility General Vladimir Zaimov.

Ownership: State owned, although it was identified for partial privatisation and placed under the Privatisation and Post-Privatisation Control Agency in 2007. It remains in state hands as of 2018.

Web: www.terem.bg

Shipbuilding

MTG Dolphin

Summary: MTG Dolphin is a privately owned provider of ship repair, conversion and construction services. Although primarily geared towards commercial craft, it offers construction services in relation to naval corvettes and patrol boats and in December 2017 was selected to supply two patrol boats to the Bulgarian Navy (prior to withdrawing from the competition on cost grounds).

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: dolphin1.bg

Other

Kintex

Summary: Kintex is a Bulgarian state-owned defence materiel trading company responsible for foreign equipment sales

Ownership: State-owned. The Bulgarian Finance Ministry announced in April 2016 that it would pursue the privatisation of Kintex in 2019.

Web: www.kintex.bg

Strategic Weapon Systems

Date Posted: 01-Aug-2019

Publication: Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - The Balkans

UPDATED

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Assessment

Bulgaria has no known strategic weapon systems or capability.

2019-02-18

Ballistic missiles

Bulgaria does not possess ballistic missile capability.

2019-02-18

Missile defence

In May 2012 NATO declared that it had achieved an interim ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability and operational readiness of its missile defence system on the territory of its European member states, including Bulgaria.

Bulgaria is taking part in the NATO-wide anti-ballistic missile programme, which calls for establishment of BMD capability to protect alliance's members.

The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) was to be undertaken in four phases. Phase One, which achieved full operational capability (FOC) in 2011, called for the deployment of Aegis ships equipped with Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors. Notionally the patrols were intended to involve three Aegis ships in the Mediterranean and the North Sea with additional ships on call. Phase Two upgraded the ships' missiles to SM-3 Block II standard. It also added around 20 land-based SM-3 Block IB interceptors – land-based SM-3 capability called Aegis Ashore – in Romania in 2015. Part of Phase Three SM-3 Block IIAs are scheduled to be deployed to Poland by 2018. According to the initial plan, Block IIA missiles in Poland were to be replaced by Block IIB interceptors as part of Phase Four in mid-2020. However, this phase was cancelled by the US government in mid-March 2013 amid technical and economic concerns. It is also understood that some of the Block IIB missiles will now be deployed to Alaska to provide increased protection of US territory from possible North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

2019-02-18

Information warfare

Bulgaria has no known defensive or offensive information warfare (IW) capability. However, many observers suspect that the Bulgarian intelligence service, diplomatic service, and elements of the military may still have links to Russia. This might have an impact on the government's ability to control information dissemination and make Bulgaria susceptible to serving knowingly or unknowingly as a conduit or platform for Russian IW, particularly co-ordinated disinformation campaigns directed against NATO or EU policy initiatives.

In addition, while Bulgarian public websites were hacked in June 2012, little is known about any attacks against government entities or the extent of any official cyber warfare efforts.

On 12 June 2012 the EU parliament approved plans to better protect Europe's critical information infrastructure from malicious cyber attacks. In the report Bulgarian Social-Democrat and Member

of the European Parliament (MEP) Ivailo Kalfin examined the challenges to Europe's cyber security and how to overcome them without specifically discussing Bulgaria. To protect national and European critical information infrastructures, minimum resilience standards for preparedness and reaction against attacks and disruptions should be regularly updated. There should also be ways of totally cutting off access to a critical infrastructure if a direct cyber attack poses a severe threat to its proper functioning.

As cyber warfare represents a threat to the critical infrastructure of all countries, Kalfin underlined in his report the need for international co-operation, calling on the European Commission and the European External Action Service to start a constructive dialogue with all like-minded countries in order to develop a common understanding and policies to protect critical infrastructure. He also urged member states to establish well-functioning national Computer Emergency Response Teams and develop national cyber security strategies. In addition the MEP stressed that the vast number of ongoing activities by national, European Union, and global bodies required co-ordination in order to avoid duplication.

National Security Strategy 2018 also highlighted cyber security, transport security, crisis management and the protection of national archives as priorities for Bulgarian defence.

2019-02-18

Space warfare

Bulgaria has no space warfare capability.

Nuclear capabilities

2019-02-18

Stated government policy

Bulgaria ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1969.

2019-02-18

Actual capabilities

Bulgaria has no offensive chemical, biological or nuclear weapons capabilities.

Biological capabilities

2019-02-18

Stated government policy

Bulgaria ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1972.

2019-02-18

Actual capabilities

Bulgaria has no offensive biological weapons capabilities.

Chemical capabilities

2019-02-18

Stated government policy

Bulgaria signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on 13 January 1993 and ratified it on 10 August 1994.

2019-02-18

Actual capabilities

Bulgaria has no offensive chemical weapons capabilities.



Boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative.

BACKGROUND

Land and Climate

Bulgaria is slightly larger than Cuba or the U.S. state of Tennessee. Much of the terrain is mountainous; the Rila Mountains in the south are the highest on the Balkan Peninsula, with the highest point being Mount Musala, at 9,596 feet (2,925 meters). Plains dominate the northern and central regions. To the east lies the Black Sea. The Danube River constitutes the northern border, which separates Bulgaria from Romania.

The climate is similar to that of the Midwest region of the United States, with cold, snowy winters and hot, dry summers. Northern regions tend to be colder than southern regions, and snowfall is heavy in the mountains. Weather on the coast, however, is quite mild. The average annual temperature is 51°F (11°C) in northern Bulgaria and 56°F (13°C) in southern Bulgaria.

History

Thracians and Early Kingdoms

Several tribes known as Thracians are the oldest known inhabitants of the area now called Bulgaria. They founded the Odrisaw Kingdom in the fifth century BC. Several hundred years later, Slavic tribes began migrating to the area. In the seventh century AD, Bulgars (a central Asian people) came and mixed with the Slavs and Thracians. Asparuh, the ruler of a Bulgar tribe, is considered the founder of the Bulgarian Empire; he ruled in the second half of the seventh century. A Bulgarian state was recognized by the Byzantine Empire in

681. Two Bulgarian kingdoms, sometimes known as the First Bulgarian Empire and the Second Bulgarian Empire, existed before Bulgaria was conquered by the Ottoman Turks in 1396.

Ottoman Rule

The period of Ottoman rule that followed is known in Bulgaria as the “Turkish yoke.” The struggle for political and religious independence gave rise to a cultural renaissance at the end of the 18th century. Still, the Ottomans continued to rule until 1878, when Bulgaria became independent as a result of the Russian-Turkish War. It was briefly divided into the Kingdom of Bulgaria (to the north) and Eastern Romelia (to the south). Eastern Romelia remained part of the Ottoman Empire until it was reunited with Bulgaria in 1885. The Third Bulgarian Kingdom lasted from 1885 to 1944. Although allied with Germany in World Wars I and II, Bulgaria was not always compliant with the military power. In 1943, the protests of the people, clergymen, politicians, and king prevented the country's 50,000 Jews from being relocated to Nazi concentration camps in Poland.

Communist Era

After World War II, Communists seized control of Bulgaria and consolidated power. The monarchy was abolished by a rigged referendum in 1946. Georgi Dimitrov, who had been a national hero against the Nazis in World War II, made major reforms as the Bulgarian Communist leader. The 1947 constitution was named after him.

In 1956, Todor Zhivkov came to power, first as Communist Party chief and later as prime minister. His authority remained unquestioned until a 1989 coup removed him as democratic reforms swept through Eastern Europe.

The Communists (renamed Socialists) won free elections in 1990 but struggled to form a stable government. A new constitution was approved in 1991; subsequent elections established a multiparty parliament. In 1992, Zhelyu Zhelev, a popular former dissident, became the first directly elected president. His government worked to privatize industry, liquidate collective farms, and return property confiscated in 1948 to its owners or heirs. Amid economic turmoil, Petar Stoyanov of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) was elected president in November 1996.

End of Socialism and the European Union

In 1996, mass protests against the government's failed economic policies forced Socialist prime minister Zhan Videnov to resign more than a year early. UDF leader Ivan Kostov became prime minister in 1997, ending years of Socialist rule. In 1999, Bulgaria settled a long dispute with Macedonia over official recognition of Macedonian as a distinct language (Bulgarian and Macedonian are closely related, but Macedonia wanted its language recognized by Bulgaria as separate). The settlement has opened up the way for economic, political, and military cooperation between the two countries.

Membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came in 2004. Bulgaria undertook substantial economic and political reform before joining the European Union (EU) in January 2007. Nevertheless, organized crime and corruption remain serious problems, periodically straining Bulgaria's relations with the EU. Critics have argued that Bulgaria has not done enough to address these problems, and the EU continues to closely monitor the Bulgarian government to ensure that Bulgaria is working to meet EU norms and regulations.

Political Instability

In recent years, Bulgarian politics has been plagued by protests and resignations. Austerity measures, corruption, and cronyism led to violent protests in 2013, a year marked by the worst unrest Bulgaria had seen since the fall of communism. A series of public demonstrations, triggered by political, financial, and environmental issues, continued until 2014. Widespread public discontent has led to multiple resignations of prime ministers. Prime Minister Boyko Borisov, who has resigned twice, was sworn in to his third term in May 2017. Today, Bulgaria continues to face many challenges, including political instability, widespread corruption, and economic issues.

THE PEOPLE

Population

Most of Bulgaria's population (77 percent) is ethnic Bulgarian. Another 8 percent is Turkish, and over 4 percent is Roma (Gypsy). Macedonians, Armenians, Jews, Russians, and other groups also inhabit Bulgaria in small numbers. Sofia, the capital, has nearly 1.3 million residents. Other large cities include Plovdiv, Varna, and Burgas.

Language

The official language is Bŭlgarski (Bulgarian), and nearly all

inhabitants speak it. Bulgarian is a Slavic language that uses the Cyrillic alphabet, which was developed in the ninth century by Christian priests Cyril and Methodius. About 8 percent of the population is ethnic Turkish and speaks Turkish, but most also speak Bulgarian. The Roma speak Roma.

Russian was previously a required subject in school, so many people can speak it, but Bulgarian is the language of instruction. English, German, and French are the most popular languages to study.

Common Bulgarian Phrases

English	Bulgarian
Please	Molya
Thank you	Blagodarya
You're welcome	Njama zašto
Yes	Da
No	Ne
Excuse me	Izvinete
I'm sorry	Sāžaljavam
I love you	Običam te
Happy birthday!	Čestit rožden den!
Numbers 1–10	Edno, dve, tri, chetiri, pet, shest, sedem, osem, devet, deset

Religion

About 59 percent of Bulgarians are Eastern Orthodox. Orthodox monasteries are held in high regard for their religious and artistic significance. Many monasteries and churches contain frescoes and icons of significant historical value. Muslims comprise about 8 percent of the population. Muslims often attend prayer services at mosques.

While religious worship was discouraged during the communist era, it is relatively unrestricted today. Religious holidays are openly celebrated. Traditional religious organizations registered with the government enjoy broad freedoms, though animosity toward outside groups has led to some restrictions on the existence and activities of foreign sects. Rural people and the older generation tend to be more devout in attending services, but young people in urban areas are also showing an interest in religion. Still, many people see religion as a matter of tradition, rather than one of strong faith.

General Attitudes

Bulgarians generally respect those who are open, strong, capable, gregarious, good-humored, forthright, and loyal to family and friends. Group and family concerns are considered very important, and education is highly valued. Many

Bulgarians take pride in their heritage and culture, which have been preserved despite centuries of foreign domination. They are particularly sensitive about Ottoman rule.

Although Bulgarians faced many challenges during the transition to democracy, democracy has always been important to them. In fact, the 1879 constitution was one of the most progressive in Europe. Many people are interested in politics, both domestic and international, and try to be well-informed. They are often hopeful about their political leaders but sometimes skeptical about their motives.

Most people are cautious about the future because of current economic hardships. Young people generally view the United States as a wealthy and fortunate country and may also look to Western Europe as a model for their own development. At the same time, many older adults are wary of foreign influences in Bulgaria and oppose non-Bulgarian ideas.

An entrepreneurial spirit is emerging, but businesspeople are not always admired on a personal level. In the past, people could only become wealthy through corruption and organized crime, so negative attitudes toward the rich still exist. Honest private businesspeople must often work hard to gain respect and be regarded in a positive light. Most Bulgarians take pride in being hard workers and are rebuilding a work ethic weakened by years of guaranteed employment. Careers and professional skills are becoming more important.

Bulgarian Saying

Kakvoto pochukalo, tova otgovorilo. ("However you knock on the door, that is how it will be answered.") This saying means that your actions will reflect back on you, or "what you put into something is what you'll get."

Personal Appearance

Fashions from Europe and the United States are popular, but foreign clothing is often expensive. Women generally make an effort to be well dressed and well groomed in public, but they may wear something more casual at home to keep nicer clothing in good condition. Professional women usually wear a skirt, a blouse or sweater, and high heels to work. Clothing is neatly pressed; wrinkled items are rarely seen in public. Sneakers may be worn with jogging suits or other outfits. Young women wear blue jeans and either a sweater or a shirt with buttons. Older, rural women often wear a house dress, sweater, scarf, and conservative shoes.

Professional men wear suits and ties to work, although older men prefer trousers and sweaters. Young men wear jeans, denim or sport jackets, flannel shirts, and sneakers or loafers. Young children are considered the best-dressed people in the country, wearing imported clothing and newly hand-knit items. Hats, boots, scarves, gloves, and winter jackets or fur coats are worn during the cold winters.

CUSTOMS AND COURTESIES

Greetings

When meeting, Bulgarians usually shake hands. The

handshake might be accompanied in formal situations by Kak ste? (How are you?) or Zdraveĭte (Hello). Friends, relatives, and colleagues use the informal terms for these greetings: Kak si? and Zdrasti or Zdravei. People do not shake hands when saying Dobro utro (Good morning), Dobār den (Good afternoon), Dobār večer (Good evening), or Leka nošt (Good night). Close female friends might kiss on the cheek. Dovizhdane (Until we meet again) is a common parting phrase. Friends might also say Vsichko hubavo (All the best) or Ciao (Good-bye).

Bulgarians use first names in informal settings but otherwise address others by title and family name. Gospodin (Mr.), Gospozha (Mrs.), and Gospozhitsa (Miss) are common titles, but professional titles are used also. When one joins a small gathering, it is polite to greet each person individually, beginning with the women or the elderly. Urban people do not usually greet strangers passing on the street, but this is considered polite in rural areas.

Common Bulgarian Greetings

English	Bulgarian
Hello	Zdraveĭte / Zdrasti / Zdravei
Good-bye	Ciao / Vsichko hubavo / Dovizhdane
Good morning	Dobro utro
Good afternoon	Dobār den
Good evening	Dobār večer
Goodnight	Leka nošt
How are you?	Kak ste? / Kak si?
Good, thanks	Dobre blagodarya
Good to meet you	Radvam se da te vidya
My name is . . .	As se kazvam . . .

Gestures

Among older Bulgarians, "yes" is often indicated by shaking the head from side to side, and "no" is expressed with one or two nods. One might shake the index finger from side to side to emphasize the "no" and even add a "tsk" sound to express displeasure. In conversation, people generally do not use hand gestures, but they often touch each other. School-age female friends might walk arm-in-arm down the street.

Pointing with the index finger is rude. It is impolite for men to cross an ankle over the knee or for anyone to put feet on furniture. One should ask permission of other passengers before lowering a bus or train window.

Visiting

Na gosti (visiting) is considered an important part of Bulgarian life. Friends and neighbors commonly drop by for a

short visit without prior arrangement, but more typically, invitations are extended. Hosting friends for afternoon coffee and cake is popular, as is inviting them over for dinner. In addition to visiting at homes, people often socialize at cafés. Outdoor cafés provide opportunities to spend warm summer evenings chatting with friends.

Female guests usually enter the home before men. Many Bulgarians remove their shoes upon entering, unless the hosts object. If slippers are not offered, guests wear their socks or stockings. Hosts usually offer refreshments and a drink; alcohol is rarely served without food. Invited guests often bring chocolates, an odd number of flowers for the hostess (even numbers are for funerals), or a bottle of alcohol for the host.

Evening visits usually start after 8 p.m. and may last until after midnight for special occasions. Bulgarians enjoy showing hospitality to guests and having long conversations, so leaving early is rude.

Eating

In addition to three meals a day, Bulgarians might have a midmorning snack and afternoon coffee. Breakfast is usually light, consisting of coffee, tea, hot chocolate, or milk (for children) and a cheese-filled pastry or some other bread item (sweet roll, toast, etc.). Boza (a malt-based drink) is a traditional breakfast beverage enjoyed mostly by elderly people in rural areas.

Traditionally, the largest meal was eaten at midday and consisted of soup and/or salad, a main course, and dessert. Today, most Bulgarians have a light lunch during their work hours—at a fast-food establishment, kiosk, café, or office—and eat their main family meal after 7 p.m. If dinner is not the main meal, it is light and consists of some of the same foods as lunch, but not soup or dessert. Salads are eaten from a common platter with individual forks.

The continental style of eating is most common, with the fork in the left hand and the knife in the right. An empty plate and glass will usually be refilled, and it is polite for guests to accept second helpings. A small amount of food left on the plate (usually after second helpings) indicates that one is full. Conversation is expected, and everyone waits for all to finish before leaving the table. Meals for special occasions can include several courses and may last many hours. Nazdrave (toasting) occurs throughout a meal; people maintain eye contact when clinking glasses during a toast.

Rural Bulgarians generally eat at home, but people in cities often dine out. Bills are paid at the table and either split among everyone or, for a special occasion, paid by the host. Mehana, a traditional Bulgarian eating establishment, is still common throughout the country; it features traditional food, folk music, and dancing. Fast-food establishments are uncommon in Bulgaria except in major cities.

LIFESTYLE

Family

Structure

The Bulgarian family unit is strong and supportive of its

members. Most families do not have more than one or two children, though some ethnic groups, such as Turks and the Roma, often have three or more children per family.

Traditionally, extended families lived under the same roof, but as a result of urbanization, nuclear families are more common today. The extended family continues to be involved in raising children; children with working parents are often looked after by their grandparents. Grandparents living in a different city may have their grandchildren live with them until they are old enough to attend school.

Parents and Children

In general, parents are expected to provide for their children's education, and a child's main responsibility is getting good grades at school. However, chores like taking out the trash, washing dishes, going grocery shopping, or helping to fix the car are common.

Children are only expected to contribute to the family income after they have graduated high school or college, but some take on jobs during their summer holidays. Adult children live with their parents until they marry. Young couples often live with one set of parents until they are able to get housing for themselves.

Children typically respect their parents, often caring for them in old age. Many Bulgarians continue working after the age of retirement, which is gradually being raised to age 65 over the course of the next two decades. Pensions are meager, and it is difficult for elderly people to live without support from their children.

Gender Roles

Within the home, men are usually responsible for household repairs, maintenance, or yard work. Women take care of household responsibilities such as cooking and cleaning; they also are more likely to be involved child-rearing.

Though both men and women are granted equal rights by law, gender discrimination still exists in the form of a gender pay gap. It is common for both parents to work full-time jobs outside the home. Women are given 410 days of paid maternity leave. An additional year of leave may be taken with pay equal to minimum wage. Leave time can also be transferred to the father or a grandparent if needed. Fathers receive 15 days of paternity leave.

Housing

Urban

Most urban families live in apartments; only wealthy families can afford houses in the cities. Apartments are typically constructed of concrete. Furniture is typically ready-made, and one or two pictures are hung on the walls of a room. Homes usually have at least one or two television sets. Bulgarians take great pride in being educated and well-read, so there is almost always a bookshelf in the living room.

Walls are often painted or wallpapered in different colors. Some Bulgarian rooms feature wall-to-wall carpets; others have smaller, decorative carpets placed on wooden or parquet floors. Floors in rural homes are often covered with a long, handwoven carpet, called a *cherga*, which is usually striped and multicolored.

Rural

In rural areas, it is not uncommon for a young married couple

to take over a floor in the home of one of their parents. Rural houses typically have more than two bedrooms and are made of cement and brick; walls are usually painted white. Smaller attachments to the main house, called summer kitchens, are also common, and people may live in them during the summer to keep the main house clean from the dirt of farm work. Dishwashers and air conditioners are considered a luxury.

Most Bulgarians still feel tied to their agricultural heritage; almost every house in a village has a garden, where tomatoes, potatoes, cucumbers, and strawberries are grown. In dry areas, private wells are built to provide water for orchards and gardens. Many urban families own village homes, often a childhood home, which they use for summer retreats, for retired parents, or for keeping family gardens or farms. Big houses near the seaside are often turned into private hotels during the summer.

Ownership

Homeownership is highly valued in Bulgaria, and many people own their own homes. Buying a new home can be expensive; parents often save money to help their children buy their own apartments.

Dating and Marriage

Dating and Courtship

Socializing primarily takes place in groups, but older teenagers also date one-on-one. Favorite activities include meeting at a café to drink and talk, going to a movie, dancing at a club, or relaxing in a park. Dating couples do not face many restrictions from their parents or from society.

Engagement

Traditionally, a relative of the prospective husband would speak with the prospective wife first, and relatives of the groom would then officially visit the family of bride to ask for her hand in marriage. Today, a boyfriend plans for the right moment to invite his girlfriend somewhere private to give her a ring and propose marriage to her. The length of engagement depends on the couple's schedule.

Marriage in Society

Most Bulgarians expect to marry and have children, but they may wait to marry until they are financially stable. On average, men and women marry in their early thirties. Roma are more likely to marry at a younger age. Cohabitation is widespread; common-law marriage does not exist, so people usually live together and do not marry until they are ready to have children. Same-sex marriage is not legal, and social tolerance for same-sex couples is low.

Weddings

Weddings involve big celebrations and can be very expensive. A civil ceremony is required and must be performed in the presence of an authorized legal servant and two other witnesses. During the communist regime, religious ceremonies were discouraged by the government. Today, most Christian families prefer to have a church wedding either before or after the legal ceremony. These weddings usually take place on Sunday and cannot take place during certain holidays in the Orthodox calendar—during the Great Lent (40 days before Easter), during the Holy Mother Lent (1–5 August), during the first and last week of Christmas

Lent, and on Saturdays, which are considered days for remembering the dead.

Traditionally, the family of the groom gathers on the morning of the wedding, and after giving presents (usually of wine or food) to the best man and best woman, they noisily proceed to the house of the bride. Then all the participants proceed to the church together in cars decorated with white ribbons and flowers. The bride usually wears a long white dress, and the groom wears a formal suit. The ceremony is conducted by a priest, who puts a crown on the head of each newlywed. The young couple holds large candles. A church choir sings Orthodox hymns, and afterward, the newlywed couple greets their guests, who wish them happiness and offer advice.

A big wedding reception is held in the evening. The bride and groom may enter the reception hall by walking down an aisle covered with a long white cloth while girls throw flowers in their path as a symbol of health and happiness in their future life. Folk music, dancing, and eating are common at the reception.

Many old traditions are still kept by some families. For example, on the day of the wedding, the groom and his family come to the house of the bride, and a member of the bride's family opens the door and gives the groom the bride's empty shoe. The groom must fill the shoe with money, and the bride's family refuses to give the bride away until he has filled the shoe with what they decide to be enough money. Another tradition involves the bride and groom pulling on opposite ends of a loaf of bread; whoever gets the largest piece is said to be the future boss of the family.

Life Cycle

Birth

Many women believe that if they do not satisfy their cravings when pregnant, their child may be born with a birthmark. After a baby is born, the father gathers with his friends to toast the mother and baby. Family and relatives gather at the parents' home to celebrate the newborn. When visiting the parents of a newborn baby, people bring only odd numbers of gifts (even numbers bring bad luck). Naming a baby after a grandparent is very common, and the first child usually takes the name of one of his or her father's parents.

About a year after the birth of a child, when the child has begun to walk, a ritual called *proshtapulnik* is held. This is a celebration in which the child is offered a number of items such as crayons, money, books, and sports equipment. What the child picks is thought to be an indication of a future career path.

Milestones

Legally and traditionally, most Bulgarians are considered adults at 18. They can work, drive, marry, and vote. In some cultures, such as the Roma, adulthood comes earlier.

Death

In the countryside, when a person dies at home, his or her relatives come to prepare the body by washing and dressing it. Friends and relatives visit the house to show respect for the deceased. On the day of the funeral, people gather at the house to witness the body leaving on its last journey; they usually bring flowers, which must only be given in even

numbers.

Burial is more common than cremation. At funerals, mourners typically honor the memory of the deceased; they drink wine and eat boiled wheat covered with cinnamon and nuts. Forty days after the funeral and every year on the *Zadushnica* holidays (memorial days), family and friends visit the grave.

Diet

Bulgarians eat pork, chicken, fish, or lamb with most main dishes. Dairy products such as yogurt and cheese are common ingredients. Popular main meals include moussaka (a casserole with pork or lamb, potatoes, tomatoes, and yogurt) and nadenitsa (stuffed pork sausage). Skara (grilled meat), such as shishcheta (a pork shish kebab), is also popular, especially in restaurants. Sarmi is a pepper or cabbage stuffed with pork and rice. Kufteta is a fried meat patty mixed with bread crumbs, onions, and spices.

Shopska salata is a salad made with sirene (Bulgarian feta cheese), cucumbers, and tomatoes. A favorite cold soup is tarator, which includes cucumbers, yogurt, garlic, dill, walnuts, and oil. A cheese-filled banitsa (layered pastry) may be eaten as a snack or for breakfast, while pumpkin-filled *banitsas* are a popular dessert. Various cakes and baklava (a thin, flaky pastry with a syrup-and-nut filling) are also enjoyed for dessert. Meals usually are accompanied by a soft drink, alcohol, or coffee. Espresso and Turkish-style coffee are popular.

Recreation

Sports

Soccer is the most popular spectator and participatory sport. Volleyball and basketball are also well liked. Swimming is popular in the big cities and along the coast. Bulgaria has a number of modern ski resorts, which many Bulgarians and foreigners like to visit.

Urban children have access to recreation centers, but they are too expensive for some. Children play soccer, basketball, and volleyball during their physical education classes. Wealthier children may also take up another sport, like swimming or tennis, outside of school. Children in rural areas do not have the same resources available and are less likely to participate in swimming, skiing, skating, or tennis.

Leisure

Most Bulgarians enjoy being out in nature, hiking, walking, or touring in the countryside. In urban areas, families enjoy the outdoors at parks and playgrounds. Going to the movies is a popular recreational activity; attending the theater is somewhat popular among urban adults. Many children spend their leisure time playing video games. Visiting with friends and neighbors is less common than it used to be. Men usually socialize by fixing things together, telling jokes, or drinking together at clubs. Women often bring pies or cookies to visit with each other and knit or embroider.

One traditional children's game is called "Guards and Thieves." One child counts from one to ten with his or her eyes closed while the other children find random objects (such as stones, balls, or pens). When the counting is over, the leader announces which objects represent a "guard" or a

"thief," and each child reveals which object belongs to him or her. The leader then counts from one to ten again as the "thieves" run and hide while the "guards" wait with their eyes closed. Then all the guards start chasing the thieves. When a thief is caught by the guard, he or she becomes a guard and starts chasing after thieves. The game continues until all the thieves are caught.

Vacation

August is the favorite time to visit the Black Sea. Summer vacations also typically include a trip to the mountains. In the past, many professional organizations, schools, and local governments owned lodges in the mountains where their members could stay for minimal cost, but this is less common today. Vacations are increasingly difficult to afford.

The Arts

Many Bulgarians enjoy folk music. Traditional instruments include the *kaval* (a type of flute) and the *gaida* (a bagpipe). A relatively new pop-folk style called *Chalga*, a mix of Turkish, Roma, and Serbian music, is becoming popular in Bulgaria. Bulgarian musicians are popular among most young Bulgarian listeners.

Festivals throughout the year highlight aspects of traditional Bulgarian culture. Most cities sponsor performing arts, and even small towns have a local theater. Pottery, woodworking, and leatherworking are prominent art forms. Government and educational institutions often encourage fine arts, especially opera, and commercial arts.

Holidays

Public holidays include New Year's Day (1 January), *Baba Marta* Day (1 March), National Day of Freedom and Independence (3 March), Easter, the Day of Bulgarian Culture and Science (24 May), and Christmas Day (25 December). On their immen den (name day), Bulgarians commemorate the saint after whom they are named by having a special meal with their families; they are also visited by friends and relatives, who bring presents.

Christmas and New Year's Day

The most celebrated season stretches from Christmas Eve to New Year's Day. On Christmas Eve, which is the last day of the Christmas Lent, only produce is eaten; it represents a successful past harvest and the wish for a successful future harvest. On New Year's Day, people eat a large meal and exchange presents. They often decorate a tree. Children go door-to-door, wishing good fortune to friends and relatives. The children carry *survachka* (a small decorated stick) with which they tap people they visit on the back in exchange for candy and money.

Baba Marta

At the beginning of March, Bulgarians celebrate spring with *Baba Marta* Day (Grandma March Day). People exchange braided red-and-white yarn designs called *martenitsa*, a white male doll called *Pizho*, and a red female doll called *Penda* to symbolize health. Bulgarians may wear the yarn designs on their clothing until they see a stork or a blossoming tree. They then either put the *martenitsa* on a tree branch to bring on spring or hide it under a rock to represent the wish that the evil spirits in nature will go to sleep.

Spring Holidays

Lazaritsa and Cvetnitsa, which are celebrated on the last Saturday and Sunday before Easter, respectively, are known as the spring holidays. Lazaritsa is the day of fields and forests. Traditionally, young girls would dress up in regional costumes and go around the village singing songs; people gave the girls eggs, flowers, and bread made in the shape of dolls. The girls would go to the river and prepare small boats from willow bark in which to float their bread dolls. Today, these traditions are only kept in some small villages.

Cvetnitsa is the day of flowers. People bring flowers with them to church and, after the service, bring home willow branches that have been blessed. Cvetnitsa is also a popular name day for many Bulgarians.

A popular Easter tradition is to go to church at midnight, light candles, and walk around the church three times. Another is to decorate hard-boiled eggs and knock them against each other to see which egg will last the longest without breaking.

Alphabet and Culture Day

The 24th of May is the most important of Bulgaria's school holidays; it celebrates Bulgarian language and culture. The Christian saints Cyril and Methodius are honored for developing the Cyrillic alphabet, and the country's accomplishments in science and culture are also celebrated. In the morning, children gather to decorate their school with flowers. They also sing songs while marching or walking in a parade that includes all the schools in the city as parents gather to watch.

SOCIETY**Government****Structure**

Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic and a multiparty democracy. The president is head of state and is elected to a five-year term by popular vote. A two-round system ensures that the president is elected by an absolute majority. The president's role is mostly ceremonial. The prime minister, who is usually the leader of the largest parliamentary party or coalition, is chosen by the Narodno Sabranie (National Assembly) and serves as head of government. Members of the 240-seat National Assembly are elected through proportional representation to four-year terms. Bulgaria is divided into 28 regions, each headed by a regional governor.

Political Landscape

Bulgaria's multiparty system includes parties with ideologies across the political spectrum, which sometimes results in coalition governments. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, power in Bulgarian politics has gone back and forth between socialist and conservative groups. The center-right Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), which formed in 2006 in opposition to the center-left Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), is the ruling party. GERB's main agenda is fighting corruption and organized crime. GERB support comes primarily from the upper and middle classes and larger urban areas. The BSP finds its support in the working class and among many older people who remember

communist rule fondly. As this population ages, the BSP is struggling to reinvent itself to appeal to younger voters.

Government and the People

Religious minorities, especially Muslims, have suffered some discrimination, though the constitution specifically allows for religious freedom. The media also faces political pressures. Corruption and organized crime are serious concerns in Bulgaria. Overall, though, the government generally respects civil rights and political freedoms. Elections are also generally free and fair. Voter turnout has been relatively low in the past two decades. Slightly more than half of registered voters have voted in recent elections. All citizens are eligible to vote at age 18.

Economy

Bulgaria's transition to a market economy has been difficult. A severe devaluation of Bulgaria's currency, the lev (BGN), and hyperinflation (300 percent) led the economy to the brink of collapse in early 1997. With the support of international lenders, the government undertook a strict monetary policy to curb inflation and stabilize its currency. Bulgaria joined the European Union in 2007. However, large public debts, a lack of foreign investment, and a small private sector remain challenges. Most people struggle to meet their basic needs.

Bulgaria exports clothing, shoes, iron, steel, and machinery. Bulgaria imports much of its oil and natural gas from Russia. Increasing foreign investment and finding new markets for Bulgarian goods are essential to progress. Tourism is an increasing source of foreign capital but is still underdeveloped.

Transportation and Communications

Many Bulgarians use the reliable public transportation system, which consists of buses, trams, trolleys, and trains. Most families own one car, although many roads are in poor shape. Taxis are plentiful in urban areas.

Freedom of the press has deteriorated in recent years. Major media outlets often report inaccurate information to promote the political agendas of their owners, and journalists who are critical of political and business leaders sometimes face threats and assault. A number of daily newspapers are published in Bulgaria. Television broadcasts are changing rapidly, as programming from Europe and the United States is becoming more popular. The country's main networks include the Bulgarian National Television (public) and the popular bTV (private). Most Bulgarians have a cellular phone, including very young children, elderly people in rural areas, and people with low incomes. Internet is available in most places, but computers remain a luxury item unaffordable for some.

Education**Structure**

Primary school is for students ages 6–14, and secondary school is for students ages 14–18. Most schools are public; a very small percentage of Bulgarian students attend private schools. Schooling is compulsory to age 16. Measures of enforcement may include tying a student's attendance to

financial assistance from the government for his or her family.

Access

Education is highly valued, and Bulgarians generally sacrifice for their children's education; some work extra jobs to provide for school clothes, textbooks, or college tuition. Public primary and secondary education is free at all levels, but students are responsible for providing their own books, uniforms, and supplies after the seventh grade.

Barriers to education include lack of access to schools in rural areas, where winter weather conditions sometimes prevent students from traveling long distances to school, and lack of language training for minority groups such as Roma and Turks. Almost all Bulgarian schoolchildren complete primary education.

School Life

Entrance to secondary schools is determined by competitive exam, and urban students often can choose from five types of schools, each offering a different focus (such as math and science or foreign languages). The main subjects of study in secondary schools are Bulgarian language, math, history, geography, physics, chemistry, biology, and foreign languages (especially English).

Science and technical training are emphasized in school, but the lack of modern equipment hampers advanced training. Collaborative assignments are common in the classroom and for homework, which typically takes more than two hours a day to complete. Individual tests are used to assess how successfully a student has learned a certain unit. Cheating is common, but teachers try to prevent it by assigning additional homework as a punishment.

Higher Education

A number of universities and three-year training institutions offer higher education; most of them have admission exams. Some of the best-known universities in Bulgaria are Sofia University, the American University in Bulgaria, the University of National and World Economy, and the National Academy of Arts.

Health

A national healthcare system provides nearly free medical care to all citizens who have health insurance. Virtually all employed Bulgarians contribute to the state health insurance funds, which entitles them to free treatment and medicines at reduced prices. Those without health insurance have to pay for all medical care, tests, and medicines. Medical facilities often are not well equipped. Private doctors offer better care to those who can pay for it. The major health problems affecting Bulgarians are cardiovascular and respiratory diseases. Bulgaria has one of the highest infant mortality rates in Europe. Bulgarians also have a lower life expectancy than most other Europeans.

AT A GLANCE

Contact Information

Embassy of Bulgaria, 1621 22nd Street NW, Washington, DC 20008; phone (202) 387-0174; web site

www.bulgaria-embassy.org

Country and Development Data

Capital	Sofia
Population	7,057,504 (rank=103)
Area (sq. mi.)	42,811 (rank=103)
Area (sq. km.)	110,879
Human Development Index	50 of 188 countries
Gender Inequality Index	46 of 188 countries
GDP (PPP) per capita	\$21,800
Adult Literacy	99% (male); 98% (female)
Infant Mortality	8 per 1,000 births
Life Expectancy	71 (male); 79 (female)
Currency	Bulgarian Lev

Bulgaria country profile

22 May 2018



Bulgaria, situated in the eastern Balkans, has been undergoing a slow and painful transition to a market economy since the end of Communist rule.

A predominantly Slavonic-speaking, Orthodox Christian country, Bulgaria was the birthplace of the Cyrillic alphabet, which was created there towards the end of the 9th century AD.

It was long influenced by Byzantine culture then was part of the Ottoman Empire for 500 years before gaining its independence in the 19th century.

After the Second World War it became a satellite of the Soviet Union, but is now a member country of the EU and NATO.

- Read [more country profiles](#) - Profiles by **BBC Monitoring**

FACTS

Republic of Bulgaria

Capital: Sofia

Population 7.4 million

Area 110,994 sq km (42,855 sq miles)

Major language Bulgarian

Major religion Christianity

Life expectancy 71 years (men), 78 years (women)

Currency lev

UN, World Bank

Getty Images

LEADERS

President: Rumen Radev



AFP

Rumen Radev became Bulgaria's fifth democratically elected president when he was sworn in for a five-year term in January 2017.

A former air force commander, Mr Radev is a relative newcomer to politics who ran as an independent candidate with the backing of the opposition Socialists.

His victory in the presidential election led to the resignation of Prime Minister Boyko Borisov and early parliamentary elections.

Mr Radev has pledged to maintain Bulgaria's position as a member of the European Union and NATO while also improving historically important ties with Russia.

In his inauguration speech, Mr Radev highlighted the need for continuity and pledged to work for a "united society in the name of democracy".

Prime minister: Boyko Borisov



GETTY IMAGES

Boyko Borisov became prime minister for the third time in May 2017 following the victory of his GERB party in the April snap parliamentary election.

Mr Borisov, who is the founder of GERB, first became prime minister in July 2009. Mr Borisov's GERB party has formed a coalition with the United Patriots - an anti-immigrant grouping.

He is a former bodyguard who rose through the ranks in the Sofia police department and in the interior ministry. He was mayor of Sofia from 2005 to 2009.

MEDIA



GETTY IMAGES

Global media giants have a stake in Bulgaria's lively broadcasting market. TV is the most popular medium.

International media group CME runs bTV, Bulgaria's most-watched channel. Scandinavian company MTG operates national station Nova TV.

There are several private regional TVs and many private radio stations. Cable and satellite are the main distribution platforms. Media ownership is concentrated among a handful of individuals.

- Read [full media profile](#)

TIMELINE

Some key dates in Bulgaria's history:

1018-1185 - Bulgaria is part of Byzantine empire.

1396 - Ottoman Empire completes conquest of Bulgaria. Next five centuries are known as era of the "Turkish yoke".



GETTY IMAGES

1876 - Nationwide uprising against Ottoman rule is violently suppressed.

1878 - Treaty of San Stefano - signed by Russia and Turkey at the end of their war of 1877-78 - recognises an autonomous Bulgaria.

1908 - Bulgaria declares itself an independent kingdom. Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha assumes title of tsar.

1914-18 - First World War. Bulgaria allies itself with Germany. Some 100,000 Bulgarian troops are killed, the most severe per capita losses of any country involved in the war.

1939-45 Second World War - Soviet army invades German-occupied Bulgaria in 1944. Soviet-backed Fatherland Front takes power.

1947 - New constitution along Soviet lines establishes one-party state.




AFP/GETTY IMAGES

1954 - Todor Zhivkov becomes Communist Party general secretary. Bulgaria becomes staunch USSR ally.

1971 - Zhivkov becomes president.

1989 - Reforms in the Soviet Union inspire demands for democratisation. Zhivkov ousted.

1991 New constitution proclaims Bulgaria a parliamentary republic and provides broad range of freedoms.



Denmark

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ARMED FORCES

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UPDATED

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Command and control

2019-07-01

Executive summary

	Total strength	Army	Air force	Navy
Active personnel	17,100	10,500	3,400	3,200
Reserves	62,000 ¹	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown

- The Kingdom of Denmark has a relatively small military force. Although it has modern equipment, its size means that it has limited bandwidth and several capability gaps. The Royal Danish Army (Hæren: HRN), for example, has a modest inventory of tanks and

armoured vehicles but has retired its ground-based air defence (GBAD) and guided anti-tank weapons. The HRN also lacks a large-calibre indirect fire capability. Its conventional warfighting capability is thus limited and its posture is tilted in favour of low-intensity operations. In the air domain, the Royal Danish Air Force (Flyvevåbnet: FLV) operates 44 F-16 Fighting Falcon multirole combat aircraft. The FLV also operates maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), naval helicopters, and tactical and battlefield transport aircraft. In the maritime domain, the Royal Danish Navy (Søværnet: SVN) has a fairly new fleet that includes three Iver Huitfeldt-class frigates, two Absalon-class command-and-support ships, and three arctic patrol vessels, as well as four older frigates.

- The Danish Defence (Forsvaret) force make regular contributions to multinational expeditionary operations. Its largest and most long-standing contribution has been to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Smaller deployments have been made to operations in Iraq and Mali. Most naval missions are maritime security operations conducted through NATO's standing naval groups. The 2018–23 Defence Agreement reaffirmed Denmark's willingness to aid in international deployments and peacekeeping missions, increasing by 50% the funding for such missions. However, the Danish government has stated that international ambitions for air operations will be limited from 2022 to 2026 due to availability of combat aircraft.
- The 2018–23 Defence Agreement calls for the creation a deployable 4,000-strong brigade with its own command structure, combat units, and combat support by 2024. This will be based on the HRN's existing capabilities reinforced with new units and enhanced capabilities (including more tanks, GBAD systems, anti-tank weapons, reconnaissance assets, and artillery). In addition, a light infantry battalion is being established, for national or international use, and tactical transport aircraft capacity is to be increased by 20% through adding flight crews. The 2018–23 Defence Agreement also prioritises the rebuilding of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability, which has been rudimentary since the SVN's submarines were decommissioned in 2004.
- The HRN has ordered 309 Piranha 5 8×8 armoured vehicles to replace its M113 armoured vehicles. Delivery started in 2019 and is expected to run into 2023. The HRN is also procuring 15 CAESAR 155 mm self-propelled howitzers (SPHs), with delivery due to start in 2019. The new howitzers will have a longer range, greater accuracy, and a higher rate of fire than any previous HRN artillery systems. Meanwhile, in the maritime domain, ASW capability is being boosted through the procurement of dipping sonars and torpedoes for the FLV's MH-60R Seahawks and variable depth sonars and anti-torpedo systems for the SVN. Looking beyond ASW, the SVN frigates are also to receive SM-2 air defence missiles (and possibly the SM-6 in the long term). Lastly, Denmark is procuring the Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II to replace its F-16s from 2021 to 2026. It had previously stated a desire for up to 48 aircraft, but now plans to acquire only 27. This number may fall below the level needed to carry out all required national defence tasks.

2019-07-01

Threat environment

There are no direct existential threats to Danish territory and security. However, Denmark depends on collective security and regional and global stability to secure its interests. With this in mind, the most pressing conventional threat comes from Russia via the country's NATO commitments. Danish security is also impacted by general conflict and instability (complex emergencies) that upset the world order. This has prompted the country to support peacekeeping missions as well as more robust expeditionary multinational operations against non-state actors (albeit not with kinetic capabilities).

2019-07-01


Doctrine and strategy

The primary role of the Forsvaret is to enforce the sovereignty and security of the Kingdom of Denmark. NATO is at the cornerstone of Danish defence and security policy, although engagement with the United Nations is also important. The Forsvaret is mandated to be able to participate in the full spectrum of military operations, including collective deterrence, assurance measures, counter-terrorism, stabilisation and conflict prevention efforts, as well as increased presence in the Arctic.

A secondary mission is supporting Danish national requirements in close co-operation with civilian authorities. This includes response to terrorist attacks and major natural disasters.

2019-07-01

Military capability assessment



Denmark capability assessment (IHS Markit)

1745704

The HRN is relatively small, having only three standing mechanised infantry battalions and a reconnaissance battalion. In addition, the army has two cadres of mechanised infantry battalions and one cadre of armoured battalion that can be brought up to full strength in the event the army

needs to deploy for a prolonged period of time. In terms of equipment, the HRN has a relatively modest inventory of armoured assets, especially when compared with its past holdings. The HRN has about 38 Leopard 2A5 tanks (although additional tanks are in storage), 44 CV 9035 infantry fighting vehicles, 83 Piranha 3C armoured vehicles (being replaced by Piranha 5), and about 100 Eagle IV and V armoured patrol vehicles.

The HRN's conventional warfighting capability is limited as it has retired its ground-based, man-portable air defence and tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) anti-tank assets. Furthermore, the army also lacks a large-calibre indirect fire capability, having retired all of its artillery systems. That said, a new SPH is being procured.

The FLV has a fighter fleet comprising 33 F-16AM and 11 F-16BM aircraft. The F-16s are mid-life upgrade (MLU) standard and thus have a good multirole combat capability, but the low number of aircraft limits the FLV's operational effectiveness as a whole. Beyond the fighter capability, the FLV has a well-balanced fleet and thus is well equipped to support the needs of the HRN and SVN. The fixed-wing fleet includes four CL-600 Challenger 604 MPA and four C-130J-30 Super Hercules transports. Rotary-wing assets include 13 AW101 Merlins, which undertake search-and-rescue (SAR) and troop transport tasks, 12 AS 550C2 Fennecs for scout duties, and 9 MH-60R Seahawks for naval support. However, the Fennec is no longer used for international operations, which has reduced the FLV's capability to provide observation, reconnaissance, and fire support for ground forces. Also of note, the Seahawks were not procured with an ASW capability, although this is being added.

The SVN has completed its transition from a defensive posture based on a fleet comprising many small combatants to a fleet that is numerically smaller but more flexible and capable of expeditionary operations. At the heart of this fleet are three Iver Huitfeldt-class frigates, which reached full operational capability in March 2015, and two Absalon-class command-and-support ships, which were at full capability by mid-2008. Of note, although technically a support ship, the Absalon class is also combat capable, being fitted with missiles, torpedoes, and a 5-inch gun. The navy also has four Thetis-class frigates, six Diana (SF Mk II)-class patrol vessels, and three Knud Rasmussen-class Arctic patrol vessels. These ships primarily carry out national tasks, although they are capable of conducting other missions. This is possible because SVN ships are designed using the standard flex (Stanflex) concept, which allows ships to carry out a range of roles by fitting different containerised systems. This makes the Danish fleet highly adaptable.

Joint forces interoperability

2019-07-01

Triservice interoperability

Domestically, the Danish army, air force, and navy have each moved to introduce capabilities that increase interoperability with other services. Dedicated anti-tank helicopter units have been disbanded and re-established as light utility and light transport units, often deploying abroad with

army units to support exercises and operations. The air force has also acquired larger Merlin transport helicopters in order to provide added tactical mobility for the army and MH-60Rs to replace the Super Lynx helicopters it uses to support the navy. For its part, the navy's command-and-support ships have a roll-on flex-deck, which among other things is reinforced to enable it to carry the army's Leopard 2A5 tanks.

2019-07-01

Multinational interoperability

The Forsvaret has made great efforts to ensure its interoperability with allied countries and all international missions are conducted as part of multinational forces. Interoperability has, in general, been an important factor in procurement decisions. For example, in 2008 Denmark abandoned the procurement of a tactical C4 system (known as DACCIS) due to concerns over its interoperability with similar allied systems. In contrast, it has procured Link 16 advanced tactical datalinks for its F-16s to help ensure information can be shared with allied forces.

2019-07-01

Defence structure

Danish Defence Command is Denmark's primary military authority underneath the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The command includes the army, navy, air force, Special Operations Command, and Joint Arctic Command, as well as the defence staff. In addition, the Defence Medical Service, Defence Academy, and Defence Main Workshops fall under the armed forces as separate entities.

Organisations outside Danish Defence Command but within the MoD include the Home Guard, Danish Defence Acquisition and Logistics Organisation, and Defence Intelligence Service, among others.

2019-07-01

Command and control

Minister of Defence:	Trine Bramsen
Chief of Defence:	General Bjørn Ingemann Bisserup
Chief of Army Staff:	Major General Kenneth Pedersen
Chief of Air Staff:	Major General Anders Rex
Chief of Navy Staff:	Rear Admiral Torben Mikkelsen

The chief of defence is the head of the Danish Defence Command and through this exercises control of the armed services. The chief of defence, in turn, reports to the minister of defence.

Executive Summary

Date Posted: 16-Jan-2020

Publication: Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Western Europe

UPDATED

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- Inflation will accelerate slightly to 1.1% in 2020, driven by higher taxes on tobacco and plastics. However, positive real wage growth will continue to be underpinned by a tight labour market.
- Mette Frederiksen and her Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokraterne) won the June 2019 general election and later secured the backing of three other leftist parties, ensuring a parliamentary majority. The alliance was made possible by Socialdemokraterne backing

down from its electoral pledge to adopt anti-immigration policies. The government has pledged to reverse the austerity cuts of the previous Venstre-led government, pledging increased spending on health and elderly care and cutting greenhouse gas emissions by 70% before 2030. Denmark's low public debt gives the government sufficient fiscal space to implement these measures.

- Danish participation in the US-led campaign against the Islamic State and the presence of Danish troops in Afghanistan make the country a symbolical target for attacks by jihadist militants. Small-arms attacks by self-radicalised individuals or small groups with criminal connections are most likely throughout 2020.

2019-11-26

Political

Danish politics is characterised by consensus-driven co-operation. Minority governments requiring broad policy compromises are common. Following the June 2019 parliamentary election, the Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterne) formed a coalition with five other left-leaning parties; the Social Liberals (Radikale Venstre), the Socialist People's Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti), the Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne), the Faroese Social Democratic Party (Javnaðarflokkurin), and the Greenlandic Siumut. The coalition controls 93 out of 179 parliamentary seats and is likely to remain stable through 2020. Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has committed to a more moderate migration policy and tax increases for high-income earners.

2019-11-27

External Relations

Denmark has advocated maintaining strong EU sanctions against Russia over its role in the Ukraine conflict and its suspected use of nerve agents against a former Russian intelligence officer in the UK in March 2018. It has retained this stance despite the substantial negative impact on Denmark's farmers as a result of Russia's retaliatory ban on EU food imports. The country maintains close relations with the EU, but retains aversion towards further integration.

2019-11-27

Military Conflict

Denmark's geographic position at the mouth of the Baltic Sea and its NATO membership puts it at risk in the unlikely event of direct conflict between Russia and NATO. In such a scenario, Denmark would become a likely target for Russian airspace and marine incursions, posing risks of disruption to commercial air and sea traffic. Similar to Canada and Russia, Denmark has asserted its own sovereignty over the Arctic. However, disputes with these two countries are unlikely to escalate into armed conflict.

2019-11-27

Terrorism

Jihadist intent to target Danish assets is high because of the Prophet Muhammad cartoons and Denmark's military involvement against the Islamic State. Given capability constraints and surveillance, firearm attacks by radicalised individuals or small groups against soft targets are more probable than co-ordinated IED attacks, similar to the February 2015 Copenhagen shootings at a cafe and a synagogue. Individuals and buildings associated with cartoon publications or satire of Islam, transportation hubs, Jewish assets, crowded public spaces in major cities such as Copenhagen and Aarhus, and government buildings and officials, are likely targets.

2019-11-29

Social Unrest

The influx of refugees in the past few years and the debate over contentious immigration laws considered or introduced by the previous government have raised the risk of pro- and anti-immigrant protests in Denmark, although these are set to decrease with the ruling pact between the Social Democrats and five parliamentary allies, which foresees the reversal of some of these measures. Although these protests tend to be peaceful, there is a moderate risk of violence, involving scuffles between protesters and security personnel.

2019-11-27

Operational

Denmark has a transparent regulatory system, excellent infrastructure, and efficient bureaucracy. The labour market is highly skilled and mobile. The government strongly supports the open economy and encourages foreign investment. Bribe requests or other corrupt practices are extremely rare and unlikely to affect commercial operations. Denmark is consistently ranked among the least corrupt countries in the world by civil society anti-corruption groups. The primary operational risks to investment stem from well-organised environmental activists and trade unions.

2019-11-29

Crime

The April 2019 gun battle between two criminal gangs in the Copenhagen suburb of Rungsted resulted in one fatality and four injuries. The shootout highlights the potential for deadly gang violence in Denmark, and the conflict between these specific gangs has persisted. However, this incident notwithstanding, criminal violence has been on a downward trend since a previous peak in shootings in Copenhagen and Zealand in 2013. Since the introduction of the EU Schengen border regime in 2001, the free movement of people throughout the EU has made it easier for transnational criminals to smuggle illicit goods into Denmark. To combat this, Denmark and Sweden imposed stricter border control in 2019.

2019-11-29

Risks to Individuals

The risk of violence to individuals is generally moderate throughout Denmark. Although Islamist terrorist groups remain intent on conducting attacks similar to the February 2015 Copenhagen

shootings, these are likely to be infrequent and involve lone actors using firearms to attack specific individuals rather than indiscriminate IEDs or co-ordinated attacks. The refugee influx and contentious debates over the proper policy response have increased the likelihood of pro- and anti-refugee protests, which run the risk of turning violent, similar to the 14 April 2019 riots in Nørrebro Copenhagen, which were triggered by a rally held by the far-right party Stram Kurs.

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- Mette Frederiksen and her Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokraterne) won the June 2019 general election and later secured the backing of three other leftist parties, ensuring a parliamentary majority. The alliance was made possible by Socialdemokraterne backing

down from its electoral pledge to adopt anti-immigration policies. The government has pledged to reverse the austerity cuts of the previous Venstre-led government, pledging increased spending on health and elderly care and cutting greenhouse gas emissions by 70% before 2030. Denmark's low public debt gives the government sufficient fiscal space to implement these measures.

- Danish participation in the US-led campaign against the Islamic State and the presence of Danish troops in Afghanistan make the country a symbolical target for attacks by jihadist militants. Small-arms attacks by self-radicalised individuals or small groups with criminal connections are most likely throughout 2020.

2019-11-26

Political

Danish politics is characterised by consensus-driven co-operation. Minority governments requiring broad policy compromises are common. Following the June 2019 parliamentary election, the Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterne) formed a coalition with five other left-leaning parties; the Social Liberals (Radikale Venstre), the Socialist People's Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti), the Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne), the Faroese Social Democratic Party (Javnaðarflokkurin), and the Greenlandic Siumut. The coalition controls 93 out of 179 parliamentary seats and is likely to remain stable through 2020. Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has committed to a more moderate migration policy and tax increases for high-income earners.

2019-11-27

External Relations

Denmark has advocated maintaining strong EU sanctions against Russia over its role in the Ukraine conflict and its suspected use of nerve agents against a former Russian intelligence officer in the UK in March 2018. It has retained this stance despite the substantial negative impact on Denmark's farmers as a result of Russia's retaliatory ban on EU food imports. The country maintains close relations with the EU, but retains aversion towards further integration.

2019-11-27

Military Conflict

Denmark's geographic position at the mouth of the Baltic Sea and its NATO membership puts it at risk in the unlikely event of direct conflict between Russia and NATO. In such a scenario, Denmark would become a likely target for Russian airspace and marine incursions, posing risks of disruption to commercial air and sea traffic. Similar to Canada and Russia, Denmark has asserted its own sovereignty over the Arctic. However, disputes with these two countries are unlikely to escalate into armed conflict.

2019-11-27

Terrorism

Jihadist intent to target Danish assets is high because of the Prophet Muhammad cartoons and Denmark's military involvement against the Islamic State. Given capability constraints and surveillance, firearm attacks by radicalised individuals or small groups against soft targets are more probable than co-ordinated IED attacks, similar to the February 2015 Copenhagen shootings at a cafe and a synagogue. Individuals and buildings associated with cartoon publications or satire of Islam, transportation hubs, Jewish assets, crowded public spaces in major cities such as Copenhagen and Aarhus, and government buildings and officials, are likely targets.

2019-11-29

Social Unrest

The influx of refugees in the past few years and the debate over contentious immigration laws considered or introduced by the previous government have raised the risk of pro- and anti-immigrant protests in Denmark, although these are set to decrease with the ruling pact between the Social Democrats and five parliamentary allies, which foresees the reversal of some of these measures. Although these protests tend to be peaceful, there is a moderate risk of violence, involving scuffles between protesters and security personnel.

2019-11-27

Operational

Denmark has a transparent regulatory system, excellent infrastructure, and efficient bureaucracy. The labour market is highly skilled and mobile. The government strongly supports the open economy and encourages foreign investment. Bribe requests or other corrupt practices are extremely rare and unlikely to affect commercial operations. Denmark is consistently ranked among the least corrupt countries in the world by civil society anti-corruption groups. The primary operational risks to investment stem from well-organised environmental activists and trade unions.

2019-11-29

Crime

The April 2019 gun battle between two criminal gangs in the Copenhagen suburb of Rungsted resulted in one fatality and four injuries. The shootout highlights the potential for deadly gang violence in Denmark, and the conflict between these specific gangs has persisted. However, this incident notwithstanding, criminal violence has been on a downward trend since a previous peak in shootings in Copenhagen and Zealand in 2013. Since the introduction of the EU Schengen border regime in 2001, the free movement of people throughout the EU has made it easier for transnational criminals to smuggle illicit goods into Denmark. To combat this, Denmark and Sweden imposed stricter border control in 2019.

2019-11-29

Risks to Individuals

The risk of violence to individuals is generally moderate throughout Denmark. Although Islamist terrorist groups remain intent on conducting attacks similar to the February 2015 Copenhagen

shootings, these are likely to be infrequent and involve lone actors using firearms to attack specific individuals rather than indiscriminate IEDs or co-ordinated attacks. The refugee influx and contentious debates over the proper policy response have increased the likelihood of pro- and anti-refugee protests, which run the risk of turning violent, similar to the 14 April 2019 riots in Nørrebro Copenhagen, which were triggered by a rally held by the far-right party Stram Kurs.

Security

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2019-11-27

Major Threats: Conflict snapshot

Denmark's geographic position at the mouth of the Baltic Sea and its NATO membership puts it at risk in the unlikely event of direct conflict between Russia and NATO. In such a scenario, Denmark would become a likely target for Russian airspace and marine incursions, posing risks of disruption to commercial air and sea traffic. Similar to Canada and Russia, Denmark has asserted its own sovereignty over the Arctic. However, disputes with these two countries are unlikely to escalate into armed conflict.

2019-11-27

Major Threats: Interstate conflict

Russian military activity in the Baltic Sea region poses risks of aviation and marine incidents in Danish airspace and territorial waters

The principal foreign threat to Denmark stems from Russia's assertive military activity in the Baltic region. There was a significant increase in Russian aerial activity in 2014–15, including on 3 March and 12 December 2014, when Russian military aircraft came close to colliding with a civilian airliner taking off from Copenhagen Airport. In June 2014, armed Russian aircraft appeared to simulate an attack on the Danish island of Bornholm, south of Sweden. However, such activities have decreased drastically in recent years.

As a NATO member situated at the western end of the Baltic Sea, Denmark is likely to be affected by similar such incidents in the event of an escalation of Russian-NATO hostilities over the conflict in Ukraine, and potentially also as a result of rivalry with Russia over competing territorial claims in the Arctic. However, military conflict on Danish territory is very unlikely.

2019-11-27

Major Threats: Terrorism snapshot

Jihadist intent to target Danish assets is high because of the Prophet Muhammad cartoons and Denmark's military involvement against the Islamic State. Given capability constraints and surveillance, firearm attacks by radicalised individuals or small groups against soft targets are more probable than co-ordinated IED attacks, similar to the February 2015 Copenhagen shootings at a cafe and a synagogue. Individuals and buildings associated with cartoon publications or satire of Islam, transportation hubs, Jewish assets, crowded public spaces in major cities such as Copenhagen and Aarhus, and government buildings and officials, are likely targets.

2019-12-17

Major Threats: Terrorism hotspots and targets

The most likely assaults are shooting attacks by self-radicalised individuals against government, Jewish, and Islam-satirical persons or assets

The publication of the controversial Prophet Muhammad cartoons in 2005 and Denmark's involvement in the US-led anti-Islamic State coalition in Iraq, where it committed four planes for airstrikes against the group, has made the country a target for jihadist terrorism. This risk was confirmed by the shooting attacks in Copenhagen against a cafe hosting a debate on religion and

free speech with Swedish Muhammad cartoonist Lars Vilks in attendance and against a synagogue on 14-15 February 2015, in which two people were killed.

The most probable form of attacks by jihadists are low-capability shooting or stabbing attacks by an individual or a small group of attackers, intended and likely to cause casualties rather than property damage. Both the Paris and Copenhagen attacks indicate that connections to criminal underground elements may be important in acquiring firearms. Individuals and buildings associated with cartoon publications or satire of Islam, as well as transportation hubs, crowded public spaces in Copenhagen, government buildings and officials, are at the greatest risk of attack from jihadist militants.

In September 2018, a large area around Copenhagen was cut off by police as they engaged in a manhunt. Afterward, it transpired that police had allegedly foiled a plan by Iranian agents to assassinate members of the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz, an Arab separatist movement that advocates for an independent Arab state in southwestern Iran. If confirmed, the case highlights the risk of foreign intelligence services executing political assassinations on Danish soil. In 2019, a problem arose regarding foreign fighters in Syria returning to Denmark, potentially increasing risk of terrorist attacks. On 11 December 2019, the police arrested 20 people in a major nationwide anti-terrorism raid. The police suspected that the perpetrators were preparing a terrorist attack with "militant, Islamist motive".

2019-11-29

Major Threats: Social stability and unrest snapshot

The influx of refugees in the past few years and the debate over contentious immigration laws considered or introduced by the previous government have raised the risk of pro- and anti-immigrant protests in Denmark, although these are set to decrease with the ruling pact between the Social Democrats and five parliamentary allies, which foresees the reversal of some of these measures. Although these protests tend to be peaceful, there is a moderate risk of violence, involving scuffles between protesters and security personnel.

2019-11-29

Major Threats: Protests and riots

Agreement between the newly elected Social Democrats and five parliamentary allies on the left reduces risk of riots in immigrant-dense neighbourhoods

The risk of rioting by urban immigrant youths declined substantially under the rule of the centre-left government that governed between 2011 and 2015, a trend that was augmented by the gradual recovery from the economic crisis of previous years. This trend was reversed, however, by the electoral victory of Venstre, which, supported as it was by the far-right Danish People's Party (Danske Folkeparti), adopted many anti-immigrant policies, including a controversial 'ghetto' law that subjects people who commit crimes in low-income and immigrant-dense neighbourhoods to double punishment. The Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterne) who won the June 2019 general election initially promised to continue pursuing anti-immigrant policies, adopting much of the rhetoric of DF. Socialdemokraterne's strategy to win back working class votes from DF was

premised on a simultaneous move to the left on economic issues and to the right on migration policy. However, Socialdemokraterne only command a minority of seats in parliament and rely on five parties on the left to pass legislation and govern effectively. The five parties in question have pledged parliamentary support on the condition that Socialdemokraterne abandon most of their controversial proposals. If Socialdemokraterne commit to these concessions it has made on migration policy, it would serve to reduce the risk of rioting in immigrant-dense neighbourhoods.

In the city of Aarhus, skirmishes between left-wing groups and right-wing football hooligans are likely. Fighting is likely to involve small-scale street brawls between the groups, who are likely to cause only minor damage to private and public assets.

Environmental groups are well organised and capable of causing substantial disruption to company operations, but the majority of these organisations are focused on raising awareness and damaging the reputation of companies rather than causing property damage to physical assets.

2019-11-29

Major Threats: Risks to individuals snapshot

The risk of violence to individuals is generally moderate throughout Denmark. Although Islamist terrorist groups remain intent on conducting attacks similar to the February 2015 Copenhagen shootings, these are likely to be infrequent and involve lone actors using firearms to attack specific individuals rather than indiscriminate IEDs or co-ordinated attacks. The refugee influx and contentious debates over the proper policy response have increased the likelihood of pro- and anti-refugee protests, which run the risk of turning violent, similar to the 14 April 2019 riots in Nørrebro Copenhagen, which were triggered by a rally held by the far-right party Stram Kurs.

2019-11-29

Crime Overview

The April 2019 gun battle between two criminal gangs in the Copenhagen suburb of Rungsted resulted in one fatality and four injuries. The shootout highlights the potential for deadly gang violence in Denmark, and the conflict between these specific gangs has persisted. However, this incident notwithstanding, criminal violence has been on a downward trend since a previous peak in shootings in Copenhagen and Zealand in 2013. Since the introduction of the EU Schengen border regime in 2001, the free movement of people throughout the EU has made it easier for transnational criminals to smuggle illicit goods into Denmark. To combat this, Denmark and Sweden imposed stricter border control in 2019.

2019-11-29

Organised Crime

Organised crime is a limited but increasing problem in Denmark. Since the introduction of the EU Schengen border regime in 2001, the free movement of people throughout the EU makes it easier for transnational criminals to operate, especially in the trafficking of illicit goods. To combat this, Denmark and Sweden enforced stricter controls on the Øresund Bridge in 2019. Denmark is often used as a transit country for such smuggling given its geographic position bridging Germany and

the Nordic states. Organised crime groups in Denmark take part in a variety of criminal activities, including forging passports and credit cards, tax fraud and evasion, people trafficking (particularly of women), and cigarette smuggling.

The biker community represents a worldwide network and has a particularly strong representation in Denmark. Rivalry between different biker gangs in Denmark has previously resulted in extreme violence, including use of weapons such as hand grenades, car bombs, and even anti-tank rockets. A truce between rival biker gangs, the Hells Angels and Bandidos, has been in effect since 1997, leading police to speculate that the country has been divided into spheres of interest. Both groups have about 150 permanently affiliated individuals and their membership is fairly stable, although their support groups mean that their influence is spread over a large part of the country. The support gangs, such as the 450-strong Red & White Support Crew of the Hells Angels or the 350-strong Support X-Team of the Bandidos, tend to be more violent than the mother gangs, due to their members' need to prove their credentials, and are expected to play a more prominent role in coming years.

A conflict between Denmark's ethnic minority gangs and the Hells Angels broke out in 2008 after the death of a young Turkish man, which many people believe was caused by a Hells Angels support group. This later escalated into pitched street battles, which resulted in injuries and fatalities that peaked in 2013. The police and government have attributed the violence to a crime war over the control of narcotics and other illicit goods, while some academics see it primarily as a conflict that has its roots in Denmark's failed integration process. The violence led the government to introduce stricter gun laws and legislation that makes it easier to expel immigrants involved in gangs, but critics argue this has made the problem worse by increasing the sense of alienation.

Local politicians have used a range of strategies to combat the influence of biker gangs. In some cases dialogue has been used to discourage acts of vandalism while local authorities investigate fraud and other economic criminal activity. Some local politicians have therefore sought permission to analyse various public service registers to determine whether biker gang members have illicit sources of income. Increasingly, the authorities have begun to target bikers using taxation legislation. Evidence of excessive consumption unmatched by a biker's income has been used to convict bikers of taxation fraud.

To combat crime committed by biker gangs, the Folketing (parliament) passed a law to facilitate convictions and to increase witness protection. This law was extended in 2005 to cover other groups engaging in criminal activities, including drug and people trafficking, prostitution, smuggling, violence, and money laundering, and the production of counterfeit goods and currency. The Folketing has also decided to end the existence of Christiania, a self-declared "free town" commune, social experiment, and the principal location in Denmark for cannabis sales. The traders in Christiania and their suppliers in the biker gangs have been partially dispersed by a series of actions, such as occurred in May 2018, to close down prominent locations of cannabis vendors.

2019-11-29

Trafficking

The use of cannabis and amphetamine has decreased over the period 2013–17, according to official data presented by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA). The

same report from 2019 also claimed the use of other illicit drugs, particularly cocaine, had increased over the same period. Amphetamine produced in Poland is often trafficked to Denmark. Ecstasy tends to come in from the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, and Belgium.

2019-11-29

Financial Crime

The Danish Financial Supervisory Agency (Finanstilsynet) oversees the application of financial markets regulations. The EU's Third Money Laundering Directive has been in force in Denmark since 2006. Denmark has been a member of the Financial Action Task Force since 1991. In October 2018, the largest lender in Denmark, Danske Bank (Danske), revealed that it was facing a criminal investigation from the US Department of Justice over alleged money laundering by the bank's Estonian branch. A testimony by a whistleblower from Danske suggests that up to USD230 billion of potentially illicit funds, originating primarily from Russia, were laundered by Danske's Estonian branch, implicating other large European lenders as well. In February 2019, the European Banking Authority (EBA) opened a formal investigation against Finanstilsynet over its alleged failure to comply with EU law and prevent the laundering scheme at Danske's Estonian branch. The Danish authorities are likely to tighten the scope and enforcement of anti-money laundering and financial crime laws in response to this development.

Political Leadership

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Leadership

Leadership

Title	Name	Appointed
Queen of Denmark	MARGRETHE II	26312
Crown Prince of Denmark	FREDERIK	26312
Prime Minister	Mette FREDERIKSEN	43643
Minister of Taxation	Morten BØDSKOV	43643
Minister of Finance	Nicolai WAMMEN	43643
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Jeppe KOFOD	43643
Minister of Defence	Trine BRAMSEN	43643
Minister of Justice	Nick HÆKKERUP	43643
Minister of Employment	Peter HUMMELGAARD	43643
Minister of Transport	Benny ENGELBRECHT	43643
Minister of Health and Senior Citizens	Magnus HEUNICKE	43643
Minister of Development Co-operation	Rasmus PREHN	43643
Minister for Children and Education	Pernille ROSENKRANTZ-THEIL	43643
Minister of Business	Simon KOLLERUP	43643
Minister of Higher Education and Science	Ane HALSBOE-JØRGENSEN	43643

Minister of Social and Internal Affairs	Astrid KRAG	43643
Minister of Climate, Energy and Utilities	Dan JØRGENSEN	43643
Minister of the Environment	Lea WERMELIN	43643
Minister of Culture; Ecclesiastical Affairs	Joy MOGENSEN	43643
Minister of Food, Fisheries and Equal Opportunities; Minister for Nordic Co-operation	Mogens JENSEN	43643
Source: IHS and CIRCA People in Power		

2019-11-27

Political Profiles

Leader of the Social Democrats and prime minister Mette Frederiksen

Frederiksen has led the Socialdemokraterne since 2015, and became the youngest Prime Minister in Danish history in June 2019, when the party assumed power. Frederiksen graduated as a social scientist and has been an MP since she was elected in 2001. After the Social Democrats won the 2011 election, Frederiksen served as minister of employment, and from 2014-15 she served as minister of justice. After the Socialdemokraterne were defeated in the 2015 elections, Frederiksen was appointed as party leader, succeeding Helle Thorning-Schmidt. Early in her career, she was a clear left-wing voice within the party, but has moved more towards the centre in recent years. As minister of employment, she also showed a talent for compromise and bringing through broad reforms. She has expressed her opposition to the de-industrialisation of Denmark and Europe, and called for the maintenance of industrial production. She has been also vocal about anti-immigrant sentiments. This caused some conflict with the radical left who accused her of xenophobia, and Frederiksen and the Socialdemokraterne were forced to tone down the anti-immigration aspect of their party programme in order to form a left-wing coalition in 2019.

Leader of the Danish People's Party Kristian Thulesen Dahl

Thulesen Dahl has led the right-wing populist Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti: DF) since 2012, when he replaced his fellow party co-founder and long-time leader Pia Kjaersgaard. He has revived the party after a period of stagnation under Kjaersgaard by leading it to victory in the 2014 European Parliament elections and its best-ever parliamentary election result in 2015, coming second. Despite his and his party's controversial anti-immigration and anti-EU positions, including opposition to more Muslim immigration to Denmark, Thulesen Dahl has become very popular. He was the preferred choice for prime minister over Venstre's Lars Løkke Rasmussen, but opted to keep his party out of government, most likely for fear of the loss of support that normally results. Thulesen Dahl is a lawyer by training and has been a parliamentarian since 1994, initially for DF's predecessor party, the Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet).

Venstre leader Jakob Ellemann-Jensen

Ellemann-Jensen has been leader of Venstre since September 2019, when he replaced Lars Løkke Rasmussen following the party's defeat in the 2019 general elections. Ellemann-Jensen was first elected into parliament in 2011, and he served as minister for environment and food in 2018-19. He also served as the political spokesperson for Venstre in 2015-18, and 2019 onwards.

Ellemann-Jensen has a background in Business Economics and Law, and he served in the Danish army from 1993-94. He has worked as a legal advisor for PricewaterhouseCoopers, one of the largest auditing and consulting services in the world, and later he was employed as a jurist for IBM Denmark, and GN Store Nord.

Ellemann-Jensen had a brief absence from the Venstre in 2007-09, but returned upon the appointment of Løkke Rasmussen as party leader, and has stayed in the party ever since.

Internal Affairs

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Political Summary

Political summary

Presidential elections	Next contest: N/AP; Last contest: N/AP
Legislative elections	Next contest: June 2023; Last contest: 5 June 2019.
Head of State	Margrethe II (since 14 January 1972)
Crown Prince of Denmark	Frederik (since 14 January 1972)
Prime Minister	Mette Frederiksen (since 27 June 2019)
Finance	Nicolai Wammen (since 27 June 2019)
Finance	Morten Bødskov (since 27 June 2019)
Foreign Affairs	Jeppe Kofod (since 27 June 2019)
Defence/Security	Trine Bramsen (since 27 June 2019)
Justice/Attorney General	Nick Hækkerup (since 27 June 2019)
Source: IHS and CIRCA People in Power	

2019-11-26

Political Outlook

Danish politics is characterised by consensus-driven co-operation. Minority governments requiring broad policy compromises are common. Following the June 2019 parliamentary election, the Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterne) formed a coalition with five other left-leaning parties; the Social Liberals (Radikale Venstre), the Socialist People's Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti), the Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne), the Faroese Social Democratic Party (Javnaðarflokkurin), and the Greenlandic Siumut. The coalition controls 93 out of 179 parliamentary seats and is likely to remain stable through 2020. Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has committed to a more moderate migration policy and tax increases for high-income earners.

2019-11-26

Government Stability

Ruling minority government dependent on leftist parties to govern, but the administration is likely to be stable

The Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterne) won the June 2019 general election, defeating the previous government coalition led by Venstre. However, with only 48 out of 179 parliamentary seats, Socialdemokraterne were forced to reach out to five parties on the left to secure a solid parliamentary majority. In return for their support, the minority government headed by Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has made concessions on migration policy, abandoning some of the

party's more draconian anti-immigration measures that allowed it to win back working class votes from the far-right Danish People's Party (Danske Folkeparti). The new government's political programme will focus on reversing the welfare cuts introduced by the previous government and achieving a 70% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2030. Together with its three parliamentary allies, the government has the numbers to govern effectively.

2020-01-14

Party Data

Parliament Summary

Party abbr.	Party name	Seats
Parliament		
S	Social Democrats	48
V	Venstre (Left – Liberal Party of Denmark)	43
RV	Radical Left (Danish Social Liberal Party)	16
DF	Danish People's Party	16
SF	Socialist People's Party	14
E	Unity List (Red–Greens)	13
KF	Conservative People's Party	12
Å	Alternative	5
NB	New Right	4
F & G	Faeroe Islands and Greenland send two members each	4
LA	Liberal Alliance	4
Data reflects seat distribution following last election Source: IHS and CIRCA People in Power		

2019-11-27

Opposition Prospects and Programme

Far-right opposition greatly diminished by the adoption of anti-immigration policies by mainstream parties

The Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterne), who were formerly in opposition, won the June 2019 general election, defeating the former centre-right government led by Venstre. The greatest loser in the election were the far-right Danish People's Party (Danske Folkeparti: DF), who only won 8.7% of the vote compared to 21.1% in 2015. Part of the reason is that the far-right vote has been fragmented by the emergence of smaller, nationalist parties. Another reason is that anti-immigration policies have stopped being the sole preserve of DF: many of their flagship policies were adopted by Venstre and supported by Socialdemokraterne, allowing the latter especially to win back many working class votes previously lost to the DF. Socialdemokraterne entered an agreement with three left-leaning parties that allows it to govern with a parliamentary majority in exchange for it backing down from a number of anti-immigration policies. This potentially allows DF to once again monopolise the issue of migration.

Although the liberal Venstre lost the election, its performance was not so dismal: nor was it expected that it would perform so strongly in the 2019 European Parliament elections where it emerged as the largest party. Venstre would be likely to benefit from any surge in pro-EU sentiment among the Danes produced by the fallout from Brexit.

2019-11-27

Political Parties

Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokraterne)

- **Political stance:** The Socialdemokraterne was founded in 1871 and had a profound influence on the development of the Danish welfare state through several periods in government in the 20th century. The party has moved to the left on economic issues and to the right on migration policy under the leadership of Mette Frederiksen. It advocates increased spending on health and elderly care, and a more restrictive migration policy.
- **Support base:** The party's main support base is the working class, as well as the urban upper-middle class. By moving to the left on economic issues and aligning its migration policy with the far-right parties, Socialdemokraterne has been able to win back many of the working-class voters that had defected to the far-right Danish People's Party.
- **Recent history:** After being relegated to the opposition in 2015, Socialdemokraterne won the 2019 election, forming a minority single-party government with support from five other left-leaning parties.
- **Potential future leaders:** Mette Frederiksen became party leader in 2015. Her popularity became evident when she led Socialdemokraterne to victory in the 2019 general election, becoming Denmark's youngest prime minister. She is very unlikely to be ousted from this position before and beyond her current premiership. In the event of her resignation, she is likely to be replaced with deputy head Frank Jensen.

The Liberal Party (Venstre: V)

- **Political stance:** Venstre, the full name of which is "Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti" ("Left, Denmark's Liberal Party"), is despite its name a centre-right party. With its liberal

outlook, Venstre has traditionally sought to challenge the Danish social democratic welfare model, favouring greater individual freedom of choice and privatisation of some public services, as well as advocating lower taxes. However, under former party leader Anders Fogh Rasmussen and his replacement, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, the party has pursued a more centrist line, and, in the run-up to the general election in June 2019, Venstre pledged to increase welfare spending. During the 2019 election campaign, Løkke Rasmussen expressed that he would be open to coalition talks with the Social Democrats. This was quickly shot down both by the Social Democrats, and the centre-right bloc. Following this, internal issues in the party ensued, eventually causing Løkke Rasmussen to resign. Jakob Ellemann-Jensen replaced Rasmussen as party leader. Venstre is strongly committed to the EU and NATO.

- **Support base:** Historically, Venstre was an alliance between agrarians and urban liberals in the 19th century. It retains connections to its rural base, although this bond has weakened considerably in modern times. Its main support base at present can be found among the middle class in urban centres.
- **Recent history:** Venstre's move to the centre has enabled it to grow and vie for the position of Denmark's largest party with Socialdemokraterne. However, in recent years, it has experienced a relative decline, losing power to Socialdemokraterne during the June 2019 general election.
- **Potential future leaders:** The party is led by Jakob Ellemann-Jensen, who replaced Løkke Rasmussen after the party's electoral defeat in 2019 and the internal party conflict that ensued. He is unlikely to be ousted, but one of his potential future replacements could be Kristian Jensen, who served as finance minister in Løkke Rasmussen's government and also incumbent party leader between Løkke Rasmussen's resignation and Ellemann-Jensen's appointment. Another potential candidate is likely to be Inger Støjberg, who serves as vice-chairman for the party.

Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti: DF)

- **Political stance:** DF was formed in 1995 as a splinter party of the Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet), an anti-tax and anti-bureaucracy party that in the 1980s also developed an opposition towards immigration from Muslim countries. DF has retained a similar, right-wing populist stance. It is Eurosceptic and anti-immigration, but favours a strong welfare state for the Danish population.
- **Support base:** DF's support for the Danish welfare state has, in combination with its opposition to immigration, enabled it to win over working-class voters from Socialdemokraterne. However, with the adoption of many of its controversial policies by the mainstream parties, the party's popularity has waned, reversing this trend.
- **Recent history:** From 2001–11 and 2015–19, DF served as a parliamentary support party for centre-right governments, playing a central role in the introduction of restrictive immigration laws that had a negative effect on Denmark's international reputation. The party became the third-largest party in parliament in the 2011 election, winning 12.3% of the vote and 22 seats, and in the 2015 general election it increased its voter share to 21.1%, securing 37 seats and

becoming the second-largest party in Denmark. However, in June 2019, DF's voter share plummeted to 8.7% of the total, and the party lost 21 seats in parliament. This was mainly due to mainstream parties on both sides of the political spectrum adopting anti-immigration ideas and policies, thereby depriving DF of its signature issue.

- **Potential future leaders:** Kristian Thulesen Dahl will remain party leader despite DF's poor performance in the June 2019 election. However, he is likely to be replaced before the next election. Potential candidates include Peter Skaarup, the leader of DF's parliamentary group, or Søren Espersen, deputy leader of the party.

2018-11-02

Historical Context

Denmark and Faroese/Greenlandic aspiration for independence

In February 2001, then-prime minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen triggered a political crisis by announcing that the Faroe Islands would lose their DKK1 billion (USD125 million) annual subsidy if voters backed a gradual move towards secession from the Danish Kingdom at a May 2001 referendum. In March 2001, after intense negotiations, the Faroese coalition government decided to continue the secession process although the scheduled referendum was postponed until further notice. The Danish government had suggested that the subsidy be phased out over a period of four years, whereas the Faroese were arguing that between 10 and 15 years would be necessary. Another proposed referendum on planned constitutional reforms that would increase the islands' autonomy was also suspended in April 2018 due to internal disagreements over the new constitution's wording.

Greenland voted for increased autonomy in a 2008 referendum, a major factor behind this being the expected deposits of hydrocarbons and other minerals in Greenland. In June 2009 Greenland officially assumed self rule. This has meant that the local government has assumed control of the police and the courts, and that Greenlandic (Kalaallisut) has become the official language.

Immigration issues in Danish politics

Following intense negotiations after the 2001 parliamentary election, the Liberal-Conservative government secured a parliamentary majority with an agreement with the anti-immigrant, far-right Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti: DF). In return for its support, the party achieved a tightening of what other opposition parties saw as a restrictive immigration package: immigrants who are given a six-month prison sentence cannot acquire permanent residence for a further 10 years. They must also pass a test, requiring a level of proficiency in the Danish language equivalent to nine years of schooling before being given Danish citizenship, and their automatic entitlement to a "suitable home" within three months following their departure from an asylum centre has been removed. The right to permanent residence will be acquired after seven years instead of three years.

Other opposition parties, including the Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokraterne: S), accused the government of "bloc politics". The other Nordic countries expressed concern that they may be receiving a higher number of asylum seekers as a result of the Danish initiatives. However, Malmö in Sweden has benefited at the expense of Copenhagen as virtually all of those who move are in

paid employment and hence contribute to increased tax revenue.

Apart from the issue of immigration being hotly contested on the political stage, the debate itself, the language used, and the tone in general has become a focal point of debate. Some feel that the issue is being debated too hotly and that the language used conflicts with political correctness. This "debate about the debate" took a new turn when the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* published 12 cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in 2005. The newspaper claimed its reason for publishing these 12 cartoons was that artists hired to illustrate a textbook about the history of Muhammad had received death threats from extremists in the Muslim community, and the paper wanted to strike a blow in favour of freedom of speech.

These 12 cartoons became a part of the ongoing debate in Denmark. But in early 2006, their existence became known abroad as well. Some in Denmark claim this was due to a group of immigrant imams from Denmark who toured the Middle East with the cartoons. In the wake of their tour, a group of ambassadors from Muslim countries in Denmark demanded a meeting with the prime minister. They wanted to discuss the cartoons and the debate regarding immigrants in general, in particular with regards to Muslim immigrants. Then prime minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen rejected their demand, citing Danish law and the fact that a Danish prime minister cannot sanction a Danish newspaper.

Thereafter the crisis unfolded quickly. Several Danish embassies and consulates were stormed by angry mobs in the Middle East. Danish companies were subjected to a consumer boycott, and Danes, as well as other Westerners, living or travelling in the Middle East and the Muslim world in general, were threatened. The protests died down within weeks, but the effects in Denmark were significant.

There was next to no violence and very little disorder of any kind in Denmark itself. There were sporadic clashes between youths from the extreme right and left, and these also involved a few second generation immigrant youths. However, no one was seriously injured, and these groups tend to clash whenever they get the opportunity.

The Danish Police Intelligence stated in the wake of the crisis that Denmark's profile has been heightened considerably and that as a consequence the crisis has had an adverse effect on Danish security. In economic terms, the boycott has led to a 15.5% drop in total exports to Muslim countries, costing Danish companies an estimated EUR134 million. Most companies reported by 2007 that the crisis was over. The republishing of one cartoon in early 2008 failed to spawn a "second crisis".

Since Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt (S) came to power in September 2011 she has pushed through reforms aimed at relaxing the stringent immigration laws. Immigration still remains a contentious issue in Denmark and if the numbers of asylum applications increases as a result of the relaxation, immigration will rise to the top of the political agenda, with the incumbent centre-left coalition government unlikely to gain widespread support.

Historical context

Date	Event
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1945	Denmark was liberated from Nazi rule by Allied troops.
1949	Denmark joined NATO.
1973	Denmark joined the European Communities; "earthquake election" doubled the number of political parties represented in parliament.
1979	Home Rule for Greenland.
1985	Greenland left the EEC
1988	Election was called over Denmark's continued NATO membership.
1992	Maastricht Treaty was rejected in referendum; Danish government negotiated limited exemptions from the treaty at EU Edinburgh Summit.
1993	Second referendum on Maastricht Treaty with opt-outs in four areas was endorsed; anti-EU riots in Copenhagen followed. Centre-right government resigned following a political scandal over misadministration of asylum applications. Social Democrat Nyrup Rasmussen formed his first government.
1999	Major independent research project concluded that integration of immigrants and refugees into the labour market was failing. Clashes between police and second-generation immigrants.
2002	Anders Fogh Rasmussen's centre-right government, formed in 2001, concluded a new package of immigration legislation with the anti-immigrant, populist right-wing Danish People's Party.
2005	Fogh Rasmussen's Liberal-Conservative government was returned to office with a slightly reduced minority. It continued to enjoy the parliamentary support of the Danish People's Party.
2006	When the Danish newspaper <i>Jyllands-Posten</i> published cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in late 2005, violent reactions erupted across Danish interests in the Middle East and Danish companies faced a consumer boycott. The "cartoon crisis" saw the right-wing Danish People's Party and Radikale Venstre gain in the polls. Seven suspected terrorists arrested on suspicion of preparing terrorist attacks within Denmark (September).
2007	Eight people were arrested in Copenhagen on charges of plotting a major terrorist attack within Denmark (September).
2011	Helle Thorning-Schmidt formed a three-party, centre-left coalition.

2014 The left-wing Socialist People's Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti: SF) resigned from Thorning-Schmidt's government, leaving it as a two-party coalition.

2019-11-26

Constitution

The current constitution, which also applies to the Faroe Islands and Greenland, dates from 5 June 1953 and establishes the Kingdom of Denmark as a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarchy. It states that both men and women have the right of succession to the Danish throne from March of the same year in accordance with the Act of Succession, although male heirs are given preferential treatment. The protection of human rights has been maintained and expanded together with the defence of personal freedom. The 1953 constitution also established the post of Folketing (parliament) ombudsman for the purpose of keeping a special check on the administration.

There is a separation of powers, with legislative power resting jointly with the government and the Folketing, the executive power with the government, and the judicial power with the courts. Any changes or additions to the constitution must first be passed by the Folketing with the endorsement repeated after a general election. Following that, a referendum must be held with at least 40% of all those entitled to vote being in favour.

2019-11-27

Executive

Although the queen, who is the head of state, has no real political power, she formally has the right to appoint the prime minister and cabinet ministers. However, she must determine the will of the people by consulting with parliamentary leaders, as the cabinet may be dismissed by a simple majority in the Folketing. Cabinet members are occasionally appointed from outside parliament. One of the powers assigned to the government in the constitution is to lead the country's foreign policy, although, when making major decisions, the government must consult the Foreign Policy Committee, and, before entering into treaties, get the Folketing's approval. The Danish government is responsible for defence, foreign relations, and the monetary affairs of Greenland and the Faroe Islands while the home-rule governments remain in control of most of their domestic affairs. Denmark has also accepted that the Faroe Islands have authority over the resources in the sea around the islands.

2019-11-27

Legislature

Legislative powers are vested in the unicameral Folketing. Its 179 deputies, including two each from the Faroe Islands and Greenland, are elected for a four-year term by a system of proportional representation with a 2% threshold to enter parliament. 135 deputies represent constituency seats. A pool of additional 40 compensatory seats is allocated to ensure proportionality between a party's national share of votes and seats in parliament. To enter the pool of compensatory seats, a party must pass any one of three threshold criteria: winning a constituency seat; obtaining, in two of the

three major electoral regions, a number of votes corresponding to the regional votes/seat ratio; or winning at least 2% of the national vote.

A major reform was implemented at the local levels of government in 2007, which also affects electoral regions. The number of constituencies has been reduced from 17 large constituencies to 10; and from 103 standard constituencies to 92.

While elections must be held at least every four years, the prime minister can call an election at any time. As most Danish governments have been minority governments consisting of one or more parties, this power has often been used when compromises unacceptable to the government are required to obtain a majority. Alternatively, a parliamentary majority can topple the government at any time. There is universal suffrage over the age of 18 and turnout rates at public votes are normally very high, with an 84.6% turnout registered in 2019.

2019-11-26

Judiciary

The highest court in Denmark is the Supreme Court (Højesteret), which exclusively presides over cases that have already been dealt with by one of the two high courts. It consists of 15 judges appointed by the monarch on the recommendation of the government. Cases are usually dealt with in the first instance by one of the 100 or so local or city courts, with appeals then submitted to a high court. No provision is made for administrative cases that are dealt with by ordinary courts. Denmark does not have a constitutional court, although the Supreme Court has handled a few cases related to the constitution in recent years. The independence of judges, who are officially appointed by the queen, is guaranteed under the constitution.

External Affairs

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2019-11-27

Outlook

Denmark has advocated maintaining strong EU sanctions against Russia over its role in the Ukraine conflict and its suspected use of nerve agents against a former Russian intelligence officer in the UK in March 2018. It has retained this stance despite the substantial negative impact on Denmark's farmers as a result of Russia's retaliatory ban on EU food imports. The country maintains close relations with the EU, but retains aversion towards further integration.

2019-11-27

Bilateral: Europe and CIS

Relations with the European Union (EU)

Denmark became a member of the EU (originally the European Economic Community: EEC) in 1973. Following the Danish population's rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, Denmark was exempted from participation in EU common defence policy, supranational decision-making in areas of justice and home affairs, EU citizenship, and the third phase of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Following the rejection of the proposed European constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands in mid-2005, Denmark postponed its own ratification of the treaty.

Although most Danes remain in favour of the EU, previous governments have failed to gain support for further integration with the union. In a September 2000 referendum, proposals to end Denmark's opt-out from the third phase of the EMU and replace the Danish krone with the euro failed to gain sufficient support. These exemptions continue to undermine Denmark's influence in areas such as EU common defence policy as well as on asylum and immigration issues. Another referendum proposal, to opt in to the EU's justice and home affairs policy, was defeated at a later referendum in November 2015. Such setbacks mean further ballots on increased EU integration are unlikely under the current government's term.

Denmark is unique in the way that its national parliament relates to the EU, with its Committee on Relations with the Common Market scrutinising European legislation and instructing its representatives in the Council of Ministers which way to vote.

2019-11-27

Multilateral: Global Organisations

Relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Denmark's membership of NATO has proved divisive ever since the country joined the alliance as one of its founding members in 1949.

The centrist Social Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre), the Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokraterne), and various leftist parties, have all traditionally been more sceptical of US foreign policy, and thus to the NATO alliance, than have the parties to the right of the centre.

After maintaining a moderate policy of détente during the Cold War, Denmark embarked on a more activist and interventionist policy in the 1990s, participating in NATO operations such as the UN-supported action in former Yugoslavia, including the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, and the NATO peace-keeping mission in Kosovo in 1999. Denmark also contributed to the NATO-led International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and its successor the Resolute Support Mission (RSM). Denmark was one of the largest contributors to ISAF per capita, and also suffered the highest number of casualties per capita. Denmark also joined the US-led aerial campaign against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq during 2014. Criticism from the US Trump administration that Denmark, and other nations, were failing to live up to their NATO commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence, led the government to approve new spending plans in January 2018. This will slowly increase the country's defence expenditure from 1.17% of GDP in 2017 to 1.3% by 2023.

2019-11-27

Multilateral: Regional Organisations

Relations with the Nordic Council

The Nordic Council was formed in 1952 by Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway. In 1955 Finland joined the council following negotiations with Moscow, which still maintained leverage over Finnish politics because of the 1948 Finnish-Soviet Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Nordic prime ministers agreed to meet before European Council meetings

to discuss and potentially co-ordinate policies in an effort to exert greater influence over the direction of EU proceedings. Sub-regional blocs are not allowed within the EU framework. Instead, the meetings of the council aim to make the Nordic EU states more aware of each other's positions before these major EU meetings. The utility of this approach is limited by the fact that the Nordic member states appear to have contradictory approaches to the EU, while Norway and Iceland are not even members. Furthermore, while Sweden and Denmark remain outside the Eurozone, Finland is a member and is keen to place itself at the core of all EU developments.

Geography

Date Posted: 01-Oct-2018

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UPDATED

2018-10-01

Data

Geography: Denmark

Location	Northern Europe
	Bordering the Baltic Sea and the North Sea
	On a peninsula north of Germany (Jutland); also includes several major islands (Sjaelland, Fyn, and Bornholm)
Total area (sq km)	43,094
Land area (sq km)	42,434
Water area (sq km)	660
Land boundaries (km)	140
Coastline (km)	7,314
Total renewable water resources (cu km)	NA
Water supply and sanitation access (% of population)	93
Border countries and border length (km)	
Germany	140
Highest point	

Location	Mollehoj/Ejer Bavnehoj
Height (m)	171
Land use - agricultural	
Arable land	58.9%
Permanent crops	0.1%
Permanent pasture	4.4%
Terrain	Low and flat to gently rolling plains.
Natural resources	Petroleum, natural gas, fish, arable land, salt, limestone, chalk, stone, gravel and sand.
Climate	Temperate; humid and overcast; mild, windy winters and cool summers.
Natural disasters	Flooding is a threat in some areas of the country (e.g., parts of Jutland, along the southern coast of the island of Lolland) that are protected from the sea by a system of dikes.
Environmental issues	Air pollution, principally from vehicle and power plant emissions; nitrogen and phosphorus pollution of the North Sea; drinking and surface water becoming polluted from animal wastes and pesticides; much of country's household and industrial waste is recycled.
Environment – international agreements	Party to: Air Pollution, Air Pollution-Nitrogen Oxides, Air Pollution-Persistent Organic Pollutants, Air Pollution-Sulfur 85, Air Pollution-Sulfur 94, Air Pollution-Volatile Organic Compounds, Antarctic Treaty, Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Marine Life Conservation, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Tropical Timber 83, Tropical Timber 94, Wetlands, Whaling. Signed, but not ratified: none of the selected agreements.
Source: IHS Markit, CIA World Factbook, World Bank	

NATURAL RESOURCES

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UPDATED

Resources Data

Energy

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Oil (Thousand b/d)					
Production	290	264	248	245	189
Consumption	155	155	145	168	158
Natural gas (Billion cubic feet)					
Production	372	311	295	316	316
Consumption	168	161	181	156	161
Coal (Thousand short tonnes)					
Production	0	0	0	0	0
Consumption	6,686	6,683	6,568	5,792	6,018
Electricity (Thousand megawatt hours)					
Production	36,645	36,371	38,575	34,919	36,145
Consumption	33,693	32,020	32,655	31,755	31,180
Source: IHS					

Overview

Denmark has some reserves of both oil and natural gas. Oil reserves are estimated at 1.35 billion barrels and gas at 84.9 billion cubic meters. Recent finds have helped reduce dependency on petroleum imports. Crude oil production peaked at around 120 million barrels annually during 2000-05, but it has declined steadily in the following years, to about half that amount by 2011. Denmark remains a net exporter of crude oil. Energy conservation efforts in the country are

impressive and there has been a drive in recent years to convert coal stations to domestic natural gas.

Demography

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UPDATED

2020-01-07

Demographic Data

Demography: Denmark

Population (mil.)	5.8
Population growth rate (%)	0.59
Life expectancy at birth (years)	Male - 79.1, Female - 83.1
Population density	130.09 per sq km
Urbanisation (% of total population)	88
Health spending as % GDP	10.4
No. doctors/1,000 people	4.46
Internet users (% of population)	97
Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people)	124
Adult literacy rate (% ages 15+)	NA
Major urban areas - population	
Copenhagen (capital)	1.334 mil.
Ethnic groups (by % population)	
Danish (includes Greenlandic (who are predominantly Inuit) and Faroese)	86.3
Turkish	1.1

Other(largest groups are Polish Syrian, German Iraqi and Romanian)	12.6
Religions (by % population)	
Evangelical Lutheran (official)	74.7
Muslim	5.5
Other (denominations of less than one each , includes Roman Catholic, Jehovah's Witness, Serbian Orthodox Christian, Jewish, Baptist and Buddhist)	19.8
Languages (by % population)	
Danish, Faroese	NA
Greenlandic (an Inuit dialect)	NA
German (small minority)	NA
Source: IHS Markit consumer markets, CIA World Factbook, World Health Organization	

Infrastructure

Date Posted: 01-Apr-2019

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UPDATED

2019-04-01

Overview

Infrastructure: Denmark

Roads	
Total road network length (km)	74,558
Paved (km)	74,558
Unpaved (km)	
Railways	
Total rail network length (km)	3,476
Standard gauge (mm)	1,435
Waterways	
Navigable waterways length (km)	400
Airports	
Number of commercial airports	13
Ports	

Number of ports	90
Name of all ports	Aabenraa, Aalborg, Aarhus, Aeroskobing, Assens, Bandholm, Copenhagen, Ebeltoft, Ensted, Esbjerg, Faaborg, Frederikshavn, Frederiksvaerk, Graasten, Grenaa, Gulfhavn, Elsinore, Hirtshals, Horsens, Kalundborg, Koge, Kolding, Korsoer, Kyndby, Lemvig, Marstal, Naskov, Nyborg, Nykobing (Falster), Nykobing (Mors), Nykobing (Sjaelland), Odense, Orehoved, Randers, Ringkobing, Rodbyhavn, Ronne, Rudkobing, Sakskoebing, Samso Island, Skaelskor, Skagen, Stege, Holstebro-Struer, Svendborg, Thisted, Vordingborg, Dania, Hvide Sande, Stigsnaesvaerkets Havn, Gedser, Vejle, Allinge, Hadsund, Hammerhavn, Hanstholm, Hobro, Asnaesvaerkets Havn, Middelfart, Naestved, Nekso, Skaerbaekvaerket Havn, Stubbekobing, Studstrup, Stevns Pier, Skive, Fredericia, Hals, Thyboron, Langor, Ballen, Marup, Kolby Kaas, Saelvig, Aggersund, Akzo Nobel Salt, Avedoere, Glatved Lasteanlaeg, Hundested Havn, Vestero Havn, Osterby Havn, Soby Havn, Fakse Ladeplads, Romo, Loegstoer, Fynshav, Gilleleje, Havnso, Kragenaes, Sejero.
Communications	
Telephones: Fixed lines (mil.)	1.186
Subscriptions per 100 inhabitants	49
Telephones: Mobile cellular (mil.)	9.732
Subscriptions per 100 inhabitants	169
Telephones: International country code	45
Internet country code	.dk
Broadband subscribers (mil.)	2.683

Subscriptions per 100 inhabitants	110
Internet users per cent of population (%)	97.10%
Source: IHS Markit, International Telecommunications Union, CIA World Factbook	

Economy

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UPDATED

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Economic Outlook

Data

Data

2020-01-13

Economic Outlook

- We expect Danish growth to decelerate from 2.1% in 2019 to 1.5% in 2020. Net exports, which have proven resilient in 2019, are likely to remain the main growth driver.
- After a spectacular 2019 led by pharmaceuticals and machinery, Danish industry contracted in November. Leading confidence indicators remain soft.
- Consumer price inflation remains subdued, averaging just 0.7% in 2013–19. We forecast a mild uptick to 1.1% in 2020 owing to higher taxes on tobacco.
- Given the krone's tight peg to the euro, the Danish central bank reacts to the European Central Bank's actions. The krone's exchange rate versus the US dollar mirrors patterns in the euro/US dollar exchange rate.
- We expect that Denmark's growth will decelerate from an average of 2.0% in the last five years to 1.5% in the next decade. We explore the drivers of Danish resilience in the special topics section.

2019-10-30

Data

Denmark: Top-10 sectors ranked by value added

	2018 level	% change	% GDP
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	(Billion USD)	(2019, real)	(Nominal)
1. Human health and social work activities(Q)	32.7	0.1	10.8
2. Real estate activities(L)	29.8	1.9	9.9
3. Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles(G46)	26.4	2.0	8.8
4. Public admin & defense, other services (O,S,T,U)	21.9	-0.1	7.3
5. Education(P)	19.2	-0.1	6.4
6. Construction(F)	14.4	2.5	4.8
7. Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding(K64)	12.7	-0.5	4.2
8. Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations(C21)	12.0	16.7	4.0
9. Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles(G47)	10.3	0.9	3.4
10. Legal, accounting, consultancy (M69,M70)	8.5	2.7	2.8
Top-10 Total	188.0		62.4
Updated: 28 October 2019			
Source: Comparative Industry Service, IHS Markit			

2019-10-29

Data

Denmark: Major Trading Partners, 2018

EXPORTS			IMPORTS		
Country	Billion USD	Share (%)	Country	Billion USD	Share (%)
Germany	15.6	14.6	Germany	22.7	22.4
Sweden	11.3	10.5	Sweden	11.9	11.7

United Kingdom	6.7	6.2	Netherlands	7.7	7.6
Norway	6.3	5.9	China	7.2	7.1
United States	4.7	4.4	Norway	5.2	5.1
Netherlands	4.6	4.3	Poland	4.0	3.9
France	3.3	3.1	United Kingdom	3.7	3.6
China	3.2	2.9	Italy	3.3	3.2
Poland	3.0	2.8	France	3.0	3.0
Italy	2.4	2.2	Belgium	3.0	2.9
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade					

Denmark: Major Trading Partners, 2010

EXPORTS			IMPORTS		
Country	Billion USD	Share (%)	Country	Billion USD	Share (%)
Germany	16.3	16.9	Germany	17.0	20.5
Sweden	12.9	13.4	Sweden	11.1	13.3
United Kingdom	7.8	8.1	China	6.2	7.4
United States	5.9	6.2	Netherlands	5.9	7.1
Norway	5.8	6.0	United Kingdom	5.0	6.0
Netherlands	4.5	4.6	Norway	4.8	5.8
France	4.3	4.5	Italy	2.9	3.4
Italy	2.8	2.9	France	2.7	3.2
Spain	2.4	2.5	Belgium	2.7	3.2
China	2.3	2.4	United States	2.5	3.1
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade					

Denmark: Major Trading Partners, 2000

EXPORTS			IMPORTS		
Country	Billion USD	Share (%)	Country	Billion USD	Share (%)
Germany	9.8	9.1	Germany	9.4	20.8
Sweden	6.5	6.0	Sweden	5.5	12.1
United Kingdom	5.1	4.7	United Kingdom	3.8	8.4
United States	3.1	2.8	Netherlands	3.3	7.3
France	2.8	2.6	Norway	3.2	7.0
Netherlands	2.6	2.4	France	2.3	5.0
Norway	2.6	2.4	United States	1.9	4.3
Japan	1.8	1.7	Italy	1.9	4.2
Italy	1.7	1.6	Belgium	1.5	3.2
Finland	1.7	1.6	China	1.3	2.9
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade					

Denmark: Major Trading Partners, 1990

EXPORTS			IMPORTS		
Country	Billion USD	Share (%)	Country	Billion USD	Share (%)
Germany	6.7	6.3	Germany	7.2	23.0
Sweden	4.4	4.1	Sweden	3.6	11.5
United Kingdom	3.7	3.4	United Kingdom	2.4	7.5
France	2.1	1.9	United States	1.9	6.2
Norway	1.9	1.8	Netherlands	1.8	5.9
United States	1.7	1.6	France	1.7	5.3

Italy	1.7	1.6	Norway	1.5	4.7
Netherlands	1.6	1.5	Italy	1.3	4.1
Japan	1.1	1.1	Japan	1.3	4.1
Finland	0.9	0.8	Finland	0.9	3.0
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade					

Denmark: Top-12 Commodities

Exports					Imports			
		Share of	2019	2018		Share of	2019	2018
		2018 (%)	(Mil. USD)	(Mil. USD)		2018 (%)	(Mil. USD)	(Mil. USD)
1.	Pharma: drugs & medicines	15.1	16,635	16,644	Food Products	9.1	9,134	9,454
2.	Food Products	14.2	15,191	15,604	Motor vehicles	6.4	6,451	6,654
3.	Agriculture	4.8	5,137	5,302	Agriculture	6.2	6,222	6,376
4.	Iron & steel	4.1	4,598	4,516	Wearing apparel	4.8	4,956	4,953
5.	Engines & turbines	3.0	3,963	3,322	Pharma: drugs & medicines	4.7	4,735	4,833
6.	Wearing apparel	3.6	3,646	3,915	Iron & steel	4.5	4,543	4,658
7.	Other specialty chemicals	3.0	3,256	3,346	Shipbuilding	2.5	3,997	2,593
8.	Lifting & handling	2.9	3,021	3,144	Computers & related equipment	2.9	3,075	2,983

9.	Refined petroleum products	2.9	2,774	3,228	Plastics products	2.8	2,892	2,944
10.	Furniture	2.5	2,732	2,798	Refined petroleum products	2.9	2,757	3,014
11.	Parts and accessories	2.4	2,586	2,637	Transmitters, routers, telephony	2.6	2,725	2,727
12.	Plastics products	2.2	2,384	2,452	Fire & safety, brushes, other nec	2.6	2,632	2,672
Top-12 total		60.9				52.1		
All commodities		100.0	107,145	109,926		100.0	102,171	103,460
Last updated: 28 October 2019								
Source: Comparative Industry Service, IHS Markit								

Non-state Armed Groups

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UPDATED

Group Profiles

There are no known non-state armed groups operating in Denmark.

MAPS

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UPDATED

Infrastructure

Map of Denmark

Map of Denmark

0102941

This map released by the University of Durham's International Boundaries Research Unit in August 2008 of the Arctic territorial disputes demonstrates the difficulties in finding a diplomatic solution to the issue.

This map released by the University of Durham's International Boundaries Research Unit in August 2008 of the Arctic territorial disputes demonstrates the difficulties in finding a diplomatic solution to the issue.

1303900

DEFENCE BUDGET OVERVIEW

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UPDATED

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SUMMARY - DEFENCE BUDGET AND MANPOWER

Total Defence Budget	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Constant 2019 USD billion	3.283	3.322	3.414	3.645	3.950	4.111	4.277	4.491
Constant 2019 local billion	21.954	22.217	22.828	24.375	26.413	27.490	28.603	30.032
Total Regular Forces	17,100	17,100	17,100	17,100	17,100	17,100	17,100	17,100
Budget per manpower (Constant 2019 USD)	191,996	194,290	199,638	213,167	230,989	240,407	250,140	262,635
% GDP	1.021%	1.011%	1.032%	1.081%	1.161%	1.193%	1.225%	1.270%

DEFENCE BUDGET TRENDS

Financial Crisis and Defence Agreement Updates

Long before the financial crisis led to a near 5% drop in GDP in 2009, Danish defence spending was declining. The budget fell from DKK21.1 bn in 2005 to DKK20.1 billion in 2008, dropping to just 1.15% of GDP. Despite the increasingly negative economic outlook, the 2009 budget did not implement any cuts to defence and the 2010 budget actually implemented a 15% increase in funding. The total defence budget in 2010 came to DKK24.3 billion and funding was effectively held steady in real terms for the next two years.

The 2012 defence budget of DKK24.1 billion was approved and adopted on 20 January 2012. The budget was based on the Danish Defence Agreement 2010-2014 and the Danish Emergency Management Act.

In light of the changing economic and security situation since 2009, a new Defence Agreement was released in 2013 to replace the final two years of the previous 2010-2014 agreement. The previous Danish Defence Agreement 2010-14 had focused on the transition of Danish forces from a Cold War territorial defence posture to one which is focused on crises management and international co-operation. The updated plan, the Danish Defence Agreement 2013-2017, noted that Denmark was facing a time of economic challenges, and that therefore continuity of public finances must be secured. The new agreement outlined plans for annual defence spending to be reduced by DKK 2.5 billion in 2015, DKK 2.6 billion in 2016, and by DKK 2.7 billion in 2017.

2014-2015 - severe cuts

The defence budget was maintained in nominal terms in 2013, with a mild reduction to DKK24.3. However, the 2014 budget incorporated the reductions outlined in the 2013-2017 defence plan as well as the Danish Emergency Management Act 2013-2014 and funding was reduced by 5% to DKK23 billion. Consequently, as a percentage of GDP, defence spending fell to 1.16% from 1.26% in 2013.

The 2014 budget projected another significant cut for 2015 to DKK21.7 billion (a 6% reduction) with defence spending expected to fall to DKK21.4 billion by 2017. Denmark's drawdown in Afghanistan was not an immediate source of savings, despite the mission previously costing the state around DKK1 billion a year, as this spending had already been earmarked for development initiatives and training within Afghanistan itself.

The 2015 Budget - released August 2014 - proposed a 7% cut to defence. The MoD budget was expected to drop by DKK1.7 billion to DKK21.33 billion. The outlook for 2016-2018 was similar to the forecasts given in the 2014 budget with funding dropping to DKK21 billion by 2018 in real terms.

The final 2015 budget, signed into law 18 December 2014, enacted an even more severe cut of 8% to the defence budget to DKK21.3 billion. Nominally, this was comparable to the 2005 defence budget but in real terms it was around USD500 million lower. Furthermore, the 2015 budget outlined a more pessimistic outlook for the defence budget, with the 2017 and 2018 budget around USD0.1 billion lower than previous proposals.

A new agreement

The 2016 budget, signed December 2015, held the defence budget for 2016 steady with a mild increase projected for 2017 followed by a decrease in 2018 and 2019. The defence budget was then expected to stabilise between USD2.7 billion and USD2.9 billion until the end of the decade. The 2017 budget and short term spending plan was in line with the 2016 forecast where a strong increase in 2017 is followed by cuts in 2018 and 2019.

In October 2017, the government proposed a new defence agreement titled "A Strong Defence of Denmark - Proposed Defence Agreement 2018-2023". The plan contradicted the previous spending plan and outlined steady increases to defence annually to 2023 when spending would reach a level that is DKK4.8 billion higher than in 2017. According to the proposal, the 2018 and 2019 budget would be DKK0.8 billion higher than the 2017 budget.

The extra funding, which equated to a 20% rise in spending from 2017 levels, was prompted by a threat environment which the Danish Ministry of Defence described as "more serious ... than in any other period following the fall of the Berlin Wall". Russia was identified as a primary security concern facing the country while the main focus of the spending increase was on four strategic priorities; strengthening NATO's collective deterrence, participation in international operations, the armed forces' contribution to maintenance of national security, and improving cyber defence.

According to the plan, a new brigade of 4,000 soldiers will be formed, equipped with new tanks, ground-based air defences, and artillery. The proposal also highlighted a 50 percent increase in special operations patrol units and a capacity for anti-submarine warfare. Furthermore, the budget for international operations will increase to DKK750 million by 2023 while a new cyber situation centre will be established with an allocation of DKK500 million in reserve dedicated to handling future cyber challenges.

The Danish Government (Venstre (the Liberal Party), the Liberal Alliance and the Conservatives) and the Social Democrats, the Danish People's Party and the Social-Liberal Party finalised the agreement in January 2018 which confirmed the spending increases outlined in the October proposal. The table below reflects the new proposed uplifts for annual defence spending as compared to the 2017 budget.

Proposed Defence Agreement 2018-2023

	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Annual Uplifts DKK billions	0.8	0.8	1.7	1.9	2.8	4.8

Outlook

The 2018 budget for defence was slightly short of the agreement, coming to DKK22.7 billion in total or DKK700 million higher than the total 2017 budget of DKK22.0 billion - representing a 3% increase. The 2019 Budget - proposed August 2018 - made up for the slight shortfall by implementing a 7.5% increase up to DKK24.4 billion. Core defence expenditure rose by more than DKK600 million to DKK20.6 billion, but it was the DKK1.1 billion uplift in capital spending that really drove the overall increase. The increase in capital funding is almost entirely due to increased funding for combat aircraft ("*kampfly*") which grew from DKK299 million in 2018 to DKK1.3

billion in 2019.

The defence agreement was updated in January 2019 to state that additional funding of DKK1.5 billion would be added to the budget in 2023. With the addition of wider funding that falls into the NATO definition of defence expenditure, the budget would reach 1.5% of GDP in 2023. According to the supplemental agreement, the parties will initiate a process to determine the specific allocation of additional funding. As and when JDB has clarity on the value and direction of this funding, it will be added to Denmark's figures.

The 2020 budget went further than the defence agreement, implementing a 9% increase to DKK26.6 billion and bringing the budget up to 1.16% of GDP. Core defence expenditure rose by DKK650 but it was again a DKK1.6 billion uplift in capital spending that was drove the increase.

According to official projections given in the 2020 Budget proposal, overall defence spending will increase by a further 2% in 2020, remain flat in 2022, and surge by 11% (9% in real terms) to reach DKK30.2 billion by 2023. The 2023 value is in line with the supplemental defence agreement but allocations still do not include wider funding that falls within the NATO definition. Increases are again driven by fighter programme funding which is projected to reach DKK3.5 billion by 2023. Figures in JDB reflect official estimates out to 2023 beyond which point, annual increases should stabilise to between 3 and 4% out to 2030. Within the budget, funding should shift from procurement to O&M once the fighter programme is paid off and the focus moves to training and operations.

ARMED FORCES

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2019-07-01

Executive summary

	Total strength	Army	Air force	Navy
Active personnel	17,100	10,500	3,400	3,200
Reserves	62,000 ¹	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown

- The Kingdom of Denmark has a relatively small military force. Although it has modern equipment, its size means that it has limited bandwidth and several capability gaps. The Royal Danish Army (Hæren: HRN), for example, has a modest inventory of tanks and

armoured vehicles but has retired its ground-based air defence (GBAD) and guided anti-tank weapons. The HRN also lacks a large-calibre indirect fire capability. Its conventional warfighting capability is thus limited and its posture is tilted in favour of low-intensity operations. In the air domain, the Royal Danish Air Force (Flyvevåbnet: FLV) operates 44 F-16 Fighting Falcon multirole combat aircraft. The FLV also operates maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), naval helicopters, and tactical and battlefield transport aircraft. In the maritime domain, the Royal Danish Navy (Søværnet: SVN) has a fairly new fleet that includes three Iver Huitfeldt-class frigates, two Absalon-class command-and-support ships, and three arctic patrol vessels, as well as four older frigates.

- The Danish Defence (Forsvaret) force make regular contributions to multinational expeditionary operations. Its largest and most long-standing contribution has been to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Smaller deployments have been made to operations in Iraq and Mali. Most naval missions are maritime security operations conducted through NATO's standing naval groups. The 2018–23 Defence Agreement reaffirmed Denmark's willingness to aid in international deployments and peacekeeping missions, increasing by 50% the funding for such missions. However, the Danish government has stated that international ambitions for air operations will be limited from 2022 to 2026 due to availability of combat aircraft.
- The 2018–23 Defence Agreement calls for the creation a deployable 4,000-strong brigade with its own command structure, combat units, and combat support by 2024. This will be based on the HRN's existing capabilities reinforced with new units and enhanced capabilities (including more tanks, GBAD systems, anti-tank weapons, reconnaissance assets, and artillery). In addition, a light infantry battalion is being established, for national or international use, and tactical transport aircraft capacity is to be increased by 20% through adding flight crews. The 2018–23 Defence Agreement also prioritises the rebuilding of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability, which has been rudimentary since the SVN's submarines were decommissioned in 2004.
- The HRN has ordered 309 Piranha 5 8×8 armoured vehicles to replace its M113 armoured vehicles. Delivery started in 2019 and is expected to run into 2023. The HRN is also procuring 15 CAESAR 155 mm self-propelled howitzers (SPHs), with delivery due to start in 2019. The new howitzers will have a longer range, greater accuracy, and a higher rate of fire than any previous HRN artillery systems. Meanwhile, in the maritime domain, ASW capability is being boosted through the procurement of dipping sonars and torpedoes for the FLV's MH-60R Seahawks and variable depth sonars and anti-torpedo systems for the SVN. Looking beyond ASW, the SVN frigates are also to receive SM-2 air defence missiles (and possibly the SM-6 in the long term). Lastly, Denmark is procuring the Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II to replace its F-16s from 2021 to 2026. It had previously stated a desire for up to 48 aircraft, but now plans to acquire only 27. This number may fall below the level needed to carry out all required national defence tasks.

2019-07-01

Threat environment

There are no direct existential threats to Danish territory and security. However, Denmark depends on collective security and regional and global stability to secure its interests. With this in mind, the most pressing conventional threat comes from Russia via the country's NATO commitments. Danish security is also impacted by general conflict and instability (complex emergencies) that upset the world order. This has prompted the country to support peacekeeping missions as well as more robust expeditionary multinational operations against non-state actors (albeit not with kinetic capabilities).

2019-07-01


Doctrine and strategy

The primary role of the Forsvaret is to enforce the sovereignty and security of the Kingdom of Denmark. NATO is at the cornerstone of Danish defence and security policy, although engagement with the United Nations is also important. The Forsvaret is mandated to be able to participate in the full spectrum of military operations, including collective deterrence, assurance measures, counter-terrorism, stabilisation and conflict prevention efforts, as well as increased presence in the Arctic.

A secondary mission is supporting Danish national requirements in close co-operation with civilian authorities. This includes response to terrorist attacks and major natural disasters.

2019-07-01

Military capability assessment



Denmark capability assessment (IHS Markit)

1745704

The HRN is relatively small, having only three standing mechanised infantry battalions and a reconnaissance battalion. In addition, the army has two cadres of mechanised infantry battalions and one cadre of armoured battalion that can be brought up to full strength in the event the army

needs to deploy for a prolonged period of time. In terms of equipment, the HRN has a relatively modest inventory of armoured assets, especially when compared with its past holdings. The HRN has about 38 Leopard 2A5 tanks (although additional tanks are in storage), 44 CV 9035 infantry fighting vehicles, 83 Piranha 3C armoured vehicles (being replaced by Piranha 5), and about 100 Eagle IV and V armoured patrol vehicles.

The HRN's conventional warfighting capability is limited as it has retired its ground-based, man-portable air defence and tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) anti-tank assets. Furthermore, the army also lacks a large-calibre indirect fire capability, having retired all of its artillery systems. That said, a new SPH is being procured.

The FLV has a fighter fleet comprising 33 F-16AM and 11 F-16BM aircraft. The F-16s are mid-life upgrade (MLU) standard and thus have a good multirole combat capability, but the low number of aircraft limits the FLV's operational effectiveness as a whole. Beyond the fighter capability, the FLV has a well-balanced fleet and thus is well equipped to support the needs of the HRN and SVN. The fixed-wing fleet includes four CL-600 Challenger 604 MPA and four C-130J-30 Super Hercules transports. Rotary-wing assets include 13 AW101 Merlins, which undertake search-and-rescue (SAR) and troop transport tasks, 12 AS 550C2 Fennecs for scout duties, and 9 MH-60R Seahawks for naval support. However, the Fennec is no longer used for international operations, which has reduced the FLV's capability to provide observation, reconnaissance, and fire support for ground forces. Also of note, the Seahawks were not procured with an ASW capability, although this is being added.

The SVN has completed its transition from a defensive posture based on a fleet comprising many small combatants to a fleet that is numerically smaller but more flexible and capable of expeditionary operations. At the heart of this fleet are three Iver Huitfeldt-class frigates, which reached full operational capability in March 2015, and two Absalon-class command-and-support ships, which were at full capability by mid-2008. Of note, although technically a support ship, the Absalon class is also combat capable, being fitted with missiles, torpedoes, and a 5-inch gun. The navy also has four Thetis-class frigates, six Diana (SF Mk II)-class patrol vessels, and three Knud Rasmussen-class Arctic patrol vessels. These ships primarily carry out national tasks, although they are capable of conducting other missions. This is possible because SVN ships are designed using the standard flex (Stanflex) concept, which allows ships to carry out a range of roles by fitting different containerised systems. This makes the Danish fleet highly adaptable.

Joint forces interoperability

2019-07-01

Triservice interoperability

Domestically, the Danish army, air force, and navy have each moved to introduce capabilities that increase interoperability with other services. Dedicated anti-tank helicopter units have been disbanded and re-established as light utility and light transport units, often deploying abroad with

army units to support exercises and operations. The air force has also acquired larger Merlin transport helicopters in order to provide added tactical mobility for the army and MH-60Rs to replace the Super Lynx helicopters it uses to support the navy. For its part, the navy's command-and-support ships have a roll-on flex-deck, which among other things is reinforced to enable it to carry the army's Leopard 2A5 tanks.

2019-07-01

Multinational interoperability

The Forsvaret has made great efforts to ensure its interoperability with allied countries and all international missions are conducted as part of multinational forces. Interoperability has, in general, been an important factor in procurement decisions. For example, in 2008 Denmark abandoned the procurement of a tactical C4 system (known as DACCIS) due to concerns over its interoperability with similar allied systems. In contrast, it has procured Link 16 advanced tactical datalinks for its F-16s to help ensure information can be shared with allied forces.

2019-07-01

Defence structure

Danish Defence Command is Denmark's primary military authority underneath the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The command includes the army, navy, air force, Special Operations Command, and Joint Arctic Command, as well as the defence staff. In addition, the Defence Medical Service, Defence Academy, and Defence Main Workshops fall under the armed forces as separate entities.

Organisations outside Danish Defence Command but within the MoD include the Home Guard, Danish Defence Acquisition and Logistics Organisation, and Defence Intelligence Service, among others.

2019-07-01

Command and control

Minister of Defence:	Trine Bramsen
Chief of Defence:	General Bjørn Ingemann Bisserup
Chief of Army Staff:	Major General Kenneth Pedersen
Chief of Air Staff:	Major General Anders Rex
Chief of Navy Staff:	Rear Admiral Torben Mikkelsen

The chief of defence is the head of the Danish Defence Command and through this exercises control of the armed services. The chief of defence, in turn, reports to the minister of defence.

Denmark - Army

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Armour

Leopard 2A5 DK tank

CV9035DK (Mk III) infantry fighting vehicle

Piranha 5 (M113 replacement)

Piranha 3C armoured vehicle

Artillery

CAESAR 155 mm self-propelled howitzers

Fire-control systems

Unmanned aerial vehicles

RQ-11B Raven

Puma AE

Equipment in service

Small arms and light weapons

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2019-07-22

Summary

Strength	Regular: 10,500 Reserve: 20,000
Primary combat units	3 Mechanised infantry battalions 1 Reconnaissance battalion 2 Mechanised infantry battalions (cadre/minimally manned) 1 Armoured battalion (cadre/minimally manned) 1 Light infantry battalion (still building up to full strength)
Armoured vehicles	Leopard 2A5 tanks CV9035 Mk III infantry fighting vehicles Piranha 3C armoured personnel carriers Eagle IV armoured patrol vehicles

2019-09-10

Executive summary

- The Royal Danish Army (Hæren: HRN) is relatively small, having only three standing mechanised infantry battalions and a reconnaissance battalion. In addition, the army has two cadre mechanised infantry battalions and one cadre armoured battalion. These have only a small staff but can be brought up to full strength in the event the army needs to deploy for a prolonged period of time. In terms of equipment, the HRN has a relatively modest inventory of armoured assets, especially when compared with its past holdings. This inventory includes Leopard 2A5 tanks, CV 9035 IFVs, Piranha 3 armoured vehicles, and Eagle IV armoured patrol vehicles. Denmark's defence posture is heavily tilted in favour of low-intensity operations. The country places a high priority on the ability to deploy rapidly in support of international peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Meanwhile, its conventional warfighting capability is limited, even more so as it has retired its air defence and guided anti-tank assets. Furthermore, the army also lacks a large-calibre indirect fire capability (although it has a few M109s for training purposes).
- The primary role of Danish Defence (Forsvaret) is to enforce the sovereignty and security of the Kingdom of Denmark. The HRN is tasked to contribute to the defence of Danish territory and adjacent areas; international conflict prevention, crisis management, and collective security; national emergency preparedness; humanitarian operations; and overall force training.

- The HRN makes regular contributions to multinational operations. Its largest and most long-standing contribution has been to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Smaller deployments have been made to operations in Iraq and Mali.
- The HRN has ordered 309 Piranha 5 8×8 armoured vehicles to replace its M113 armoured vehicles. Delivery started in 2019 and is expected to run into 2023. In addition, Denmark is procuring 15 CAESAR 155 mm SPHs, with delivery due to start in 2019. The new howitzers will have a longer range, greater accuracy, and a higher rate of fire than any previous HRN artillery systems. Also of note, the HRN is upgrading its Leopard 2A5s to 2A7V standard, which includes an increase in lethality and survivability.
- The 2018–23 Defence Agreement calls for the creation a deployable brigade. This brigade will be based on the HRN's current capabilities reinforced with new units and enhanced capabilities, including more tanks, ground-based air defence systems, anti-tank weapons, reconnaissance assets (including UAVs), EW systems, and artillery. This would allow Denmark to deploy roughly 4,000 personnel as an independent unit with its own command structure, combat units, and combat support by 2024. However, the brigade would be deployed within the framework of NATO. The HRN has also established a 500-strong light infantry battalion although it will not be at full strength until 2024.

Deployments and operations

2019-07-22

Force distribution

The majority of large HRN units are concentrated at Holstebro in northcentral Jutland and Høvelte and Slagelse on the island of Zealand (where Copenhagen is located). A battalion is also based on Bornholm. Given the low threat of invasion and the focus on expeditionary operations, there is no specific rationale for the distribution of forces. That said, given the ease at which the Jutland peninsula could be cut off from Zealand, the presence of combat units in both locations is strategically sound.

There are smaller units spread across the country, but none located in the constituent countries of the Faroe Islands and Greenland.

Meanwhile, the Danish Home Guard (Hjemmeværnet: HJV) is widely distributed across Denmark, with home defence companies in every municipality.

2019-07-22

Recent and current operations

As of April 2019 the HRN contributes to the following missions:

- Operation 'Inherent Resolve' (Middle East): 200 personnel
- Operation 'Resolute Support' (Afghanistan): 160 personnel

- Kosovo Force: 35 personnel
- NATO's Enhanced Force Presence (Estonia): staff officers
- Operation 'Unifier' (Ukraine): 5 officers
- Operation 'Orbital' (Ukraine): 1 staff officer and training teams
- Peace Support School and East African Standby Forces HQ (Kenya and Ethiopia): officers and advisers
- UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA): 1 staff officer at Bamako
- UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS): 11 staff officers at Juba
- UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) (Middle East): 11 experts on mission
- UN Command Military Armistice Commission - South Korea (UNCMAC): 3 personnel
- United Nations Mission to support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) (Yemen): 2 experts on mission
- EU border agency support (Greece): 2 vehicles with personnel

Operation 'Resolute Support' (Afghanistan)

The Danish contribution to the international effort in Afghanistan was scaled back with the conclusion of the International Security Assistance Force mission, but it continues to contribute to the 'Resolute Support' mission. The total contribution is about 160 personnel, who are located in Kabul at four installations: Camp Qargha, New Kabul Compound, 'Resolute Support' HQ, and Hamid Karzai International Airport. The force includes trainers and advisers to the Afghan National Army, a force protection/security team, staff officers, and a national support element.

Operation 'Inherent Resolve' (Iraq and wider Middle East)

Denmark has supported the multinational effort to combat the Islamic State since 2014. Its contribution as of 2019 stands at about 230 personnel from across the Forsvaret. Of these, 180 (largely from the HRN) are tasked to train, advise, and assist Iraqi and Kurdish security forces. In addition, 20 personnel are assigned to the international staff in Baghdad. Furthermore, the Royal Danish Air Force (RDAF) provides a radar unit with 30 personnel at Al Asad Air Base, Iraq, and Al Dhafra Air Base, the UAE.

NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (Estonia)

In 2017 Denmark provided a small number of staff officers to the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup in Estonia. At the start of 2018, Denmark boosted its contribution through the deployment of a mechanised infantry company with CV9035 IFVs and support elements. This brought the number of Danish troops in Estonia to about 200. In 2019 the Danish contribution is

once again restricted to only staff officers. Deployment of operational forces is planned again for 2020.

Mediterranean

Denmark routinely provides support to the EU border agency's mission to aid migrants and combat human trafficking. The HRN contribution is limited to two vehicles with thermal observation equipment based on Kos, Greece. This commitment will continue through at least the first half of 2020.

2019-07-22

Organisation

The Army Command is at the top of the HRN's organisation. Subordinate to it is the Multinational Division North and two combat brigades, in addition to a range of support regiments.

2019-07-22

Order of battle

Unit hierarchy	Base	Type	Primary role (General)	Primary role (Specific)	Primary equipment	Notes
Royal Danish Army		Service Support	Command and Control			
Army Command	Karup	Service Support	Command and Control			
1 Brigade, Army International Centre	Dragoon Barracks	Combat Armies	Infantry	Mechanised Infantry with Gun		
1 Armoured Engineer Battalion, Engineer Regiment	Skive Barracks	Combat Support	Engineer	Combat Engineer		

1 Artillery Departm ent, Danish Artillery Regiment	Oksbol Camp	Com bat Arm s	Artillery	Self-Propelled Howitzer	
1 Comman d Support Battalion	Ryes Barracks	Servi ce Supp ort	Command and Control		
1 Intelligen ce Surveilla nce and Reconnai ssance Battalion , Intelligen ce Regiment	Varde Barracks	Com bat Supp ort	ISTAR	Reconnaissan ce	
1 Logistics Battalion , Logistics Regiment	Aalborg Barracks	Com bat Supp ort	Logistics		
1 Mechanis ed Infantry Battalion , Guard Hussar Regiment	Guard Hussar Barracks	Com bat Arm s	Infantry	Mechanised Infantry	Piranha 5, CV903 5 Mk III

1 Mechanised Infantry Battalion , Royal Life Guards	Guard Barracks	Com bat Arm s	Infantry	Mechanised Infantry with Gun	
2 Mechanised Infantry Battalion , Jutland Dragoon Regiment	Dragoon Barracks	Com bat Arm s	Infantry	Mechanised Infantry with Gun	
2 Brigade, Army Combat Centre	Guard Hussar Barracks	Com bat Arm s	Combined Arms		
1 Armoured Battalion , Jutland Dragoon Regiment	Dragoon Barracks	Com bat Arm s	Armour	Tank	
3 Reconnai ssance Battalion , Guard Hussar Regiment	Almegår ds Barracks	Com bat Supp ort	ISTAR	Wheeled Armoured Reconnais sance	Eagle V
5 Training Battalion , Guard Hussar Regiment	Guard Hussar Barracks	Com bat Supp ort	Training		

5 Training Battalion, Jutland Dragoon Regiment	Dragoon Barracks	Combat Support	Training		
8 Light Infantry Battalion, Schleswig Foot Regiment	Haderslev Barracks	Combat Arms	Infantry	Light Infantry	Established in 2019. Working up to full strength, which is expected to be achieved in 2024.
Command Support Regiment	Ryes Barracks	Combat Support	Signal		
2 Command Support Battalion	Ryes Barracks	Service Support	Command and Control		
3 Computer and Information Support Operations Battalion	Ryes Barracks	Combat Support	Signal		
Danish Artillery Regiment	Oksbol Camp	Combat Arms	Artillery		

Engineer Regiment	Skive Barracks	Combat Support	Engineer	
2 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Battalion	Skive Barracks	Combat Support	Engineer	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
3rd Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense and Construction Battalion	Skive Barracks	Combat Support	NBC Defence	
Guard Hussar Regiment	Guard Hussar Barracks	Service Support	Command and Control	
Horse Squadron	Guard Hussar Barracks	Service Support	Ceremonial/Public Duties	
Intelligence Regiment	Varde Barracks	Combat Support	Military Intelligence	
2 Military Intelligence Battalion	Varde Barracks	Combat Support	Military Intelligence	Counterintelligence

Jutland Dragoon Regiment	Dragoon Barracks	Service Support	Command and Control	
Logistics Regiment	Aalborg Barracks	Combat Support	Logistics	
2 Logistics Battalion	Aalborg Barracks	Combat Support	Logistics	
3 Maintenance Battalion	Aalborg Barracks	Combat Support	Logistics	Maintenance
4 National Support Battalion	Vordingborg Barracks	Combat Support	Logistics	
Military Police Battalion	Aalborg Barracks	Combat Support	Military Police	
Multinational Division North	Karup	Service Support	Command and Control	Also located in Adazi, Latvia.
Royal Life Guards	Guard Barracks	Service Support	Command and Control	
2 Training Battalion	Guard Barracks	Combat Support	Training	

Security Company	Rosenborg Barracks	Combat Support	Security		
Schleswig Foot Regiment	Haderslev Barracks	Combat Arms	Infantry	Light Infantry	Established in 2019. Working up to full strength, which is expected to be achieved in 2024.

2019-07-22

Danish Home Guard

During peacetime, the HJV is primarily tasked with providing assistance in case of national natural disasters and carrying out SAR operations. There are about 15,000 members of the HJV active structure, with about 1,500 of these part of the Danish Home Guard Standby Force. The active structure is made up of personnel with an adequate training level, which is to be evaluated annually. The passive structure consists of the remaining 30,000 personnel, who are not issued equipment and weapons.

Of note, according to the 2018–23 Defence Agreement the possibility of increasing the recruitment to the home guard with conscripts after their completion of national service will be explored.

2019-07-22

Bases

Name	Latitude	Longitude	Notes
Varde Barracks	55.605868	8.470203	
Guard Barracks	55.859121	12.404939	
Vadum	57.103885	9.851982	
Sjaelsmark Barracks	55.875065	12.430897	

Roskilde Barracks	55.638669	12.070885
Vordingborg Barracks	55.018648	11.912123
Karup	56.29725	9.104199
Aalborg Barracks	57.088613	9.945843
Skive Barracks	56.53876	9.042646
Brodeskov Army Depot	55.890021	12.312807
Haderslev Barracks	55.268517	9.488028
Ryes Barracks	55.584403	9.774869
Oksbol Camp	55.62029321	8.23845988
Jaegerspris Camp	55.857294	11.988416
Hadeslev Secondary	55.255752	9.490052
Hjooring Barracks	57.442792	9.989743
Dragoon Barracks	56.346473	8.600049
Aalborg	57.092778	9.849167
Rosenborg Barracks	55.684672	12.575898
Defence Supply, Distribution, and Depot	56.153586	10.094989
Guard Hussar Barracks	55.378606	11.382207
Almegårds Barracks	55.121732	14.719079

2019-07-22

Personnel

- The Forsvaret is a largely professional force, but conscripts are still used to some extent especially in the HRN. Some conscripts serve in the active force while others receive training before being designated as reserves.
- There is a lingering shortage of personnel, including within the active element of the HJV. The army has so far been able to maintain its obligations despite this shortage, but key

personnel have suffered under the pressure of repeated deployments, which do not allow for sufficient time for retraining and rest.

2019-07-22

Training

- Conscripts receive four months of training.
- The NATO Enhanced Forward Presence mission is providing an extended opportunity to train with allies for conventional operations.

Army schools

Name	Latitude	Longitude	Notes
Artillery School	55.605868	8.470203	
Engineer and NBC School	56.53876	9.042646	
Army Combat School	55.62029321	8.23845988	
Army Logistic School	57.092778	9.849167	
Army Signals School	55.67183100	12.52509600	
Army Sergeant School	54.91606100	9.78359000	

Training areas

Name	Latitude	Longitude	Notes
Oksbol Exercise Area and Firing Range	55.5805306	8.1632722	Oksbøl, at 6,500 hectares, is the largest training area in Denmark. It includes the Army Combat School, a military operations in built-up areas complex, the Army Tactical Trainer (a command training simulator), and the Kallesmærsk Heath firing ranges, which can support artillery, tank, and aircraft firing events. The area hosts about 300 exercise days a year and 250 shooting days.
Varde Exercise Area	55.58883100	8.46953100	

Jaegerspris Exercise Area and Firing Range	55.89269800	11.94281900
Hevring Firing Range	56.52494600	10.41624400
Finderup Exercise Area	56.42563000	9.24125000
Hojstrup Exercise Area	55.39936400	10.32789200
Almegårds Training Area	55.12399100	14.74055100
Hyby Fælded Exercise Area	55.59225700	9.78464700
Kulsbjergvej Exercise Area	55.00250300	12.00594900
Vorgod Firing Range	56.07423500	8.71882100

2019-07-22

Military exercises

'Joint Warrior 18-1': 'Joint Warrior 18-1' took place across the UK from 21 April to 3 May 2018. It included approximately 12,000 troops from the naval, air, and land forces of 17 countries. Denmark led a 675-strong infantry battlegroup that included 150 Lithuanian and Latvian soldiers. The exercise focused on 'high-end' warfighting.

'Trident Juncture 18': NATO's 'Trident Juncture 18' exercise was held from 25 October to 7 November 2018. The event took place primarily in Norway but also included locations in the Baltic Sea, North Atlantic, Finland, and Sweden. It involved about 50,000 soldiers, 10,000 vehicles, 250 aircraft, and 65 naval vessels, making it the largest NATO exercise since the end of the Cold War. The HRN sent an 850-strong battalion that operated with a British Army brigade; 60 chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defence specialists; and a 40-strong heavy transport element.

Core assets and procurement initiatives

2020-01-21

Armour

Leopard 2A5 DK tank

The HRN has operated variants of the Leopard tank since the 1970s and today has 44 Leopard 2 variants (although some are in the upgrade pipeline and thus not in operational service). These tanks were part of a batch of 51 Leopard 2A4s procured from the German Army between 1998 and 2000. They were upgraded to A5 DK (or A5+) standard from 2002 to 2004, and six additional tanks in the same configuration were procured around the same time. However, in mid-2010 it was announced that the inventory would be reduced.

The HRNs Leopards are armed with a L44 120 mm smoothbore gun. The upgrade to A5 DK standard added additional armour to the turret and chassis, thermal imaging for the commander's sights, crew compartment air conditioning, a driver's rear view camera, and auxiliary power unit.

In 2006 the HRN procured Rheinmetall's 120 mm Penetrator with Enhanced Lateral Effect (PELE) rounds. The PELE round is designed to give the tanks a precision-fire capability against urban targets while minimising collateral damage, an imperative in many modern operations.

Denmark is conducting a mid-life upgrade of its tanks, bringing them up to a capability level broadly equivalent to the Leopard 2A7V standard (to be called the Leopard 2A7DNK). This is intended to maintain the tanks' capability until 2035. The first six upgraded tanks were delivered in December 2019, and work should conclude about 2022.

The upgrade will significantly boost firepower, survivability, and mobility. Work includes the replacement of the main gun with the L55A1, which offers a 20% increase in penetration as well as a 1,500 m increase in range over the L44.

Mission systems will be improved by the installation of the HRN's HTK digital tactical communications network. Survivability improvements include a new armour package that upgrades the existing modules and adds a belly armour protection plate. How the upgrade will improve mobility has not been stated, but it could include the installation of the MTU EuroPowerPack.

CV9035DK (Mk III) infantry fighting vehicle

The HRN has 43 CV9035DK (Mk III) IFVs out of an original fleet of 45. These entered service from 2007 to 2009. The CV9035s were procured based on an urgent operational requirement for a more survivable and lethal armoured vehicle in Afghanistan. The CV9035s provide increased firepower, protection, and mobility compared with the M113s they replaced.

New features on the CV9035 Mk III compared with other CV90s include improved survivability through a new armour package, providing improved protection against top-attack weapons and mines.

The Danish CV9035 are armed with an ATK 35 mm/50 mm Bushmaster III cannon and a 7.62 mm co-axial MG. In addition to a crew of three, the vehicle can carry seven infantry personnel.

At least 10 Danish CV9035s were upgraded with theatre entry equipment for deployment to Afghanistan. Specifically, they have been fitted with BAE Systems L-ROD aluminium bar armour

to provide a higher level of protection against rocket propelled grenades; Barracuda thermal mats, which have proven to be effective at reducing internal temperatures and thermal signatures; extra electric power capability for counter-improvised explosive device systems; and thermal cameras to provide 360-degree situational awareness for all crew members.

Piranha 5 (M113 replacement)

Denmark in December 2015 ordered 309 Piranha 5 8×8 armoured vehicles to replace the M113-series of armoured vehicles in HRN service. The vehicles are being procured in six variants: infantry combat; command; ambulance; engineering; mortar carrier; and repair. Entry into service took place in early 2019. Delivery of 60–70 Piranha 5s annually is expected until the final vehicle is handed over in early 2023. Denmark's M113 replacement requirement ran to up to 450 vehicles and the production contract includes options that could take the total Piranha 5 buy up to this figure.

The HRN plans to arm at least some of its Piranha 5 vehicles with a Remote Controlled Weapon Station (RCWS). According to a tender lodged in July 2017, Denmark will initially procure 48 RCWS.

Meanwhile, the mortar carriers will be fitted with ESLAIT's 120 mm Advanced Automated Autonomous Mortar Systems armed with Cardom 10 mortars, 15 of which have been ordered with an option for an additional 6 systems. The latest Cardom 10 is fitted with a load-assist device to reduce crew fatigue and increase rate of fire. The systems is expected to be operational by 2020.

The selection of the wheeled Piranha 5 means that the HRN's tanks and IFVs will be tracked and its APCs and other combat support vehicles will be wheeled. However, HRN mobility trials demonstrated that the wheeled vehicles have adequate mobility to keep up with the tracked vehicles offroad.

Piranha 3C armoured vehicle

Denmark has about 70 Piranha 3C vehicles in service in a range of roles. The army received its Piranha 3Cs from 1999 to 2007. The Piranhas are heavily used on expeditionary operations and often fitted with the Lemur RCWS. Prior to operating the Piranha 3C, the HRN used the Piranha 3H.

2019-07-22

Artillery

All towed artillery and multiple launch rocket systems have been phased out of service, as have most of the M109A3 155 mm/39-calibre tracked SPHs. Those M109A3s still in the HRN inventory are used only for training in order to keep indirect fire skills within the service. The only operational indirect fire capability within the HRN at this time comes from 120 and 60 mm mortars.

CAESAR 155 mm self-propelled howitzers

In March 2017 Denmark announced that it is procuring 15 CAESAR 155 mm/52-calibre SPHs to replace the M109A3. Delivery is to start in 2019. The procurement process for a M109A3 replacement had been cancelled in early 2015, with the government citing financial pressures, but it was restarted in November that same year. In the original tender, Denmark was looking for 21 systems and the current contract does have an option for an additional six systems.

Regardless of the final number procured, the new howitzers represent a step change in capability as they have a longer range, greater accuracy, and a higher rate of fire than any previous HRN artillery systems. The Danish CAESAR will be mounted on a Tatra 8×8 T-8 truck chassis (compared to the 6×6 versions in service with other armies). The Tatra 8×8 has improved cross-country mobility, a fully protected four-person forward control cab, carries a total of 36 projectiles and charges, and is fitted with a semi-automatic ammunition handling system.

Of note, Denmark had considered tracked systems. However, the wheeled system has lower operating and through-life cycle costs and can be more easily transported by air. This comes at the expense of carrying less ready-use ammunition and the crew having to leave the cab to load and fire the weapon.

Fire-control systems

Denmark has awarded Systematic a contract to deliver a new fire support capability for the HRN's latest artillery systems. The new capability enables fire mission data generated by a forward observer and passed to the gun crew to be digitally transferred into an artillery FCS. This significantly shortens the sensor-to-shooter engagement cycle. Systematic is scheduled to deliver a solution to the field in the 2020 time frame. The new capability will be deployed on the CAESAR 155 mm SPHs and CARDOM 10 120 mm mortars.

2019-09-09

Unmanned aerial vehicles

RQ-11B Raven

In 2007 Denmark purchased 12 AeroVironment RQ-11B Raven mini UAVs for use in Afghanistan. These systems were deployed in 2008, reportedly with special forces units and artillery units.

Puma AE

In June 2012 Denmark confirmed an order for AeroVironment Puma AE mini UAVs to enhance the HRN's ISR capabilities. Delivery of 48 UAVs has been confirmed.

2019-09-16

Equipment in service

System name	Family name	Running gear	Mobility	Role general	Role specific	Total delivered	In service	Year of initial delivery	Notes
Eagle V	Eagle V	Wheeled	Self-propelled	C4ISTAR	Reconnaissance	36	36	2018	
Eagle IV	Eagle IV	Wheeled	Self-propelled	C4ISTAR	Reconnaissance	91	82	2006	
M113 G3	M113	Tracked	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Armoured personnel carrier	256	118	2002	Also serves in roles other than APC.
M113 G4	M113	Tracked	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Armoured personnel carrier	65	65	2012	
Piranha 5	Piranha 5	Wheeled	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Armoured personnel carrier	83	83	2018	
M109A3	M109	Tracked	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Gun	76	4	1989	Used for training only.
CARDOM 120 mm	CARDOM 120 mm			Combat/offensive	Gun	20	20	2010	
CV903 5DK	CV9030	Tracked	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Infantry fighting vehicle	45	43	2007	

Leopard 2A5	Leopard 2	Tracked	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive	Tank	57	16	2002	To be upgraded to the Leopard 2A7 DNK
Piranha 3C	Piranha 3C	Wheeled	Self-propelled	Combat/offensive, C4ISTAR	Armoured personnel carrier, Command/information, Combat engineer	113	70	2000	
Pionier panzer 2	Leopard 1	Tracked	Self-propelled	Logistics/support	Combat engineer	2	2	unknown	
Leopard 1 LEGUAN	Leopard 1	Tracked	Self-propelled	Logistics/support	Mechanised bridge	10	10	1994	
DURO IIP 6 x 6 Ambulance	DURO IIP 6 x 6	Wheeled	Self-propelled	Logistics/support	Medical	29	27	2009	
PNMIRK	WISENT 1	Tracked	Self-propelled	Logistics/support	Mine clearance	4	4	unknown	
Wisent 1	Leopard 1	Tracked	Self-propelled	Logistics/support	Recovery	10	10	unknown	

2019-07-22

Small arms and light weapons

Infantry support weapons

Type	Role
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84 mm Carl Gustaf M3	Recoilless rifle
120 mm Cardom	Mortar
60 mm light mortar	Mortar

Small arms

Type	Role
9 mm FN 35	Pistol
9 mm SIG P210	Pistol
C8 IUR	Rifle
5.56 mm C7	Rifle
5.56 mm C7A1	Rifle
5.56 mm M16A1	Rifle
7.62 mm G3	Rifle
12.7 mm Barrett M82A1	Rifle
9 mm Hovea M49	Sub-machine gun
9 mm H&K MP5A3	Sub-machine gun
7.62 mm MG42	Machine gun
7.62 mm MG59	Machine gun

2019-09-16

Army aviation

Syst em na me	Fa mil y na me	Ty pe	Mann ed- unma nned	Role gener al	Role specific	Total delive red	In serv ice	Year of initia l deliv ery	No tes
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Pum a AE	Pum a AE	Fix ed- win g	Unman ned	C4IS TAR	Surveillance/detection /targeting	unkno wn	48	unkn own
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Air Force

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Missiles

2019-06-06

Summary



Denmark – Air Force ()

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Strength	Regular: 3,400
Fixed-wing multirole combat aircraft	F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon
Fixed-wing transport aircraft	C-130J-30 Hercules
Fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft	Challenger 604
Rotary-wing multirole logistics aircraft	Merlin Joint Supporter
Rotary-wing surveillance/reconnaissance aircraft	AS 550C2 Fennec
Rotary-wing maritime patrol aircraft	MH-60R Seahawk

2019-12-26

Executive summary

- The Royal Danish Air Force (Flyvevåbnet: FLV) fighter fleet is comprised of 44 F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft. The F-16s are mid-life upgrade (MLU) standard and thus have a good multirole combat capability. However, the low number of aircraft limits the FLV's bandwidth. Beyond the fighter capability, the FLV has a small but balanced fleet and thus is well equipped to support the needs of the Danish army and navy. The FLV's fixed-wing fleet

includes Challenger 604 maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) and C-130J-30 Super Hercules transports. Rotary-wing assets include AW101 Merlins, which undertake SAR and troop transport tasks, and AS 550C2 Fennecs for observation. However, the Fennec is no longer used for international operations, which has reduced the FLV's capability to provide reconnaissance and fire support for ground forces. In addition, Denmark has procured MH-60R Seahawks to replace the out of service Super Lynx, with the last delivered in May 2018. The new helicopters have extended the reach and combat capability of the naval vessels on which they are embarked.

- The primary role of Danish Defence (Forsvaret) is to enforce the sovereignty and security of the Kingdom of Denmark. The FLV's role is to provide monitoring and a quick reaction capability within national airspace and to support land and maritime forces, as well as the police and special forces. The air force also undertakes environmental and maritime surveillance, SAR, and VIP transport. In addition, the FLV has an international role.
- The FLV regularly contributes to collective security and crisis management efforts. This includes contributions to the multinational missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Mali, although as of the end of 2019 aircraft are only deployed to Mali. Looking ahead, the government has stated that international ambitions will be limited from 2022 to 2026 due to availability of combat aircraft.
- The 2018–23 Defence Agreement announced that dipping sonars and torpedoes will be procured for the Seahawks, significantly boosting anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. Looking further ahead, Denmark is procuring the Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II to replace its F-16s. It had previously stated a desire for up to 48 aircraft, but will plan to acquire only 27. Denmark expects the F-35A to be phased into service from 2021 to 2026.
- While transitioning from the F-16 to the F-35A, there will be a period from 2022 to 2024 in which there will be no international operations for FLV combat aircraft. Even once all the F-35As are in service, the low number of aircraft will leave no attrition reserve and may fall below the level needed to carry out all required national defence tasks, an observation that has been made by the Danish national audit agency.

Deployments and operations

2019-06-06

Force distribution

The FLV's two combat squadrons are based at Skrydstrup in south Denmark, but the country's small size means that they can respond quickly to events across Danish airspace. Meanwhile, transport aircraft and MPA operate from Aalborg in northern Denmark. In addition, one MPA is usually deployed to Kangerlussuaq, Greenland, for surveillance and fisheries protection. Lastly, the helicopter forces are based at Karup in central Denmark, very near one of the Royal Danish Army's (Hæren: HRN) primary bases at Holstebro. However, the Seahawk helicopters are often embarked

on Royal Danish Navy (Søværnet: SVN) vessels while the AW101s engaged on SAR standby duty are deployed in Roskilde, Skrydstrup, and Aalborg.

Also of note, there are radar sites at Skagen, located at the northern tip of Denmark, and at Bornholm, which is Denmark's most eastward island. These help to extend the nation's radar coverage.

2019-12-26

Recent and current operations

According to the 2013–17 Defence Agreement, the FLV must be able to make three simultaneous contributions of air assets at short notice, and maintain some of these for longer missions. However, the 2018–23 Defence Agreement did not outline the ambitions and announced that international ambitions will be limited from 2022 to 2026.

As of the end of 2019, the FLV is deployed for the following:

- UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali: 1 C-130J transport and 65 personnel
- Operation 'Barkhane' (Mali): 2 Merlin helicopters and 70 personnel
- Operation 'Inherent Resolve' (Middle East): Personnel only
- Operation 'Resolute Support' (Afghanistan): Personnel only

Operation 'Inherent Resolve' (Iraq and wider Middle East)

In order to support the multinational effort to combat the Islamic State the FLV deployed seven F-16AMs to Ahmed Al Jaber Air Base, Kuwait, for one year commencing in October 2014. During a year of action, they logged 5,700 flight hours, completed 547 missions, and expended 503 precision guided munitions against a variety of targets.

The FLV F-16s returned to support the mission in June 2016 with seven aircraft again deployed, but this time based at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. The mission ran for six months.

In addition, the FLV in January 2016 began supporting allied air operations with a radar element based at Al Asad Air Base in Iraq and an operator element at Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE. The contribution was planned to run for one year but has been extended and ran through the end of 2019. At that time the Iraq deployment ended but the UAE deployment is ongoing.

The FLV has in the past deployed a C-130J to Al Asad Air Base to support operations, the first time in 2016 and the second time for six months in late 2018 and early 2019.

Operation 'Resolute Support' (Afghanistan)

The Danish contribution to the international effort in Afghanistan has been scaled back with the conclusion of the International Security Assistance Force mission, but it does contribute to the 'Resolute Support' mission. The FLV's most significant contribution was the deployment of three

AW101 helicopters (although one was badly damaged in October 2014). The helicopters supported the German-led regional command in Mazar-e-Sharif. However, the helicopters returned to Denmark in December 2015.

Denmark's contribution largely comes from the HRN. The FLV's contribution is limited to about five personnel: dog handlers, security personnel, and mentors for the Afghan Air Force.

UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali and Operation 'Barkhane' (Mali)

Denmark rotates with Belgium, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden to provide transport aircraft to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali. As part of this, the FLV deployed a C-130 detachment to Mali for six months starting in mid-November 2019. The previous deployments were in 2017 and 2014.

In addition, in February 2019 Denmark announced that it would deploy two AW101 Merlin helicopters to support the French-led Operation 'Barkhane'. The helicopters became operational as part of the Desert Tactical Group – Air Combat (GTD-A) at Gao, Mali, in December 2019. They are not to be directly involved in combat operations but will instead perform reconnaissance and transport tasks. They may operate throughout the Sahel but are expected to fly primarily in Mali. The mission is slated to run one year.

NATO air policing

Denmark routinely participates in the NATO Baltic Air Policing and Icelandic Air Policing missions. Its most recent contribution began in September 2019, when the FLV deployed four F-16AMs to Siauliai Air Base in Lithuania. The mission ran until the end of 2019. This was the seventh time that Denmark had contributed to the mission since 2004. For some of these rotations, the FLV operated out of Ämari Air Base in Estonia.

Anti-piracy operations

Since 2011 the FLV has routinely deployed a Challenger aircraft to the Seychelles in order to gather intelligence on pirate activities. The aircraft are usually deployed two to three months.

In addition, Danish staff officers are still provided to the US-led Combined Maritime Forces and Combined Task Force 151, which carries on the 'Ocean Shield' anti-piracy mission.

Mediterranean

Since 2015 the FLV has about twice a year deployed a Challenger MPA to the Mediterranean Sea to support the EU border agency's mission to aid migrants and combat human trafficking. The deployments run about one month. This commitment will continue through at least early 2020. In addition, from August to October 2020 the FLV will deploy a Fennec helicopter to Greece.

2019-06-06

Organisation

The FLV is organised under a central Air Command at Karup with overall responsibility for the direction of aviation-related activity. Operational assets are grouped into task-orientated wings and then further into squadrons. There are three flying wings – fighter, helicopter, and transport – plus an air control wing and an operations support wing.

Of note, according to the 2018–23 Defence Agreement the Merlin and Fennec squadrons are to be merged although it is unclear when this might happen.

2019-06-06

Order of battle

Unit hierarchy	Base	Type	Primary role (General)	Primary role (Specific)	Primary equipment	Notes
Royal Danish Air Force		Service Support	Command and Control			
Air Command	Karup	Service Support	Command and Control			
Air Control Wing	Karup	Support (Ground-based)	Ground-based Air Control			
515 Squadron	Copenhagen Airport	Support (Ground-based)	Ground-based Air Control			

Control and Reporting Centre	Karup	Support (Ground-based)	Ground-based Air Control				Operates three radar stations: one at Skrydstrup (TPS-77 radar), one at Skagen (RAT-31 DL radar), and another at Bornholm (S-723 radar).
Mobile Air Control Centre	Karup	Support (Ground-based)	Ground-based Air Control				Can deploy with TPS-77 or RAC-3D radars.
Air Transport Wing Aalborg	Aalborg	Fixed Wing	Command and Control				
721 Squadron	Aalborg	Fixed Wing	Logistics	Transport	C-130J-30		
721 Squadron, Air Group North Detachment	Kangerlussuaq	Fixed Wing	Maritime	Maritime Patrol	Challenger 604		
Base Liaison Flight	Aalborg	Fixed Wing	Logistics	Utility	Supporter		
Fighter Wing Skrydstrup	Skrydstrup	Fixed Wing	Command and Control				

727 Squadron	Skrydstrup	Fixed Wing	Combat	Multirole Combat	F-16AM , F-16BM	
730 Squadron	Skrydstrup	Fixed Wing	Combat	Multirole Combat	F-16AM , F-16BM	
Base Liaison Flight	Skrydstrup	Fixed Wing	Logistics	Utility	Supporter	
Helicopter Wing Karup	Karup	Rotary Wing	Command and Control			
722 Squadron	Karup	Rotary Wing	Logistics	Search and Rescue	Merlin Joint Supporter	Also maintains helicopter detachments at Aalborg, Roskilde, and Skrydstrup for SAR and at Bornholm when required by weather conditions.
723 Squadron	Karup	Rotary Wing	Maritime	Maritime Patrol	MH-60R	Operated from Royal Danish Navy vessels.
724 Squadron	Karup	Rotary Wing	ISTAR	Reconnaissance	AS 550C2	

Flying School	Karup	Service Support	Training	Supporter	Falls under the administrative authority of Helicopter Wing Karup.
Operations Support Wing	Karup	Support (Ground-based)	Combat Support		
Base Protection Squadron	Karup	Support (Ground-based)	Military Police	Military Security	
Mission Support Squadron	Karup	Support (Ground-based)	Combat Support		
Tactical Support Squadron	Aalborg	Support (Ground-based)	Medical	Medical Evacuation	Also responsible for survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training and Tactical Air Control training.

2019-06-06

Danish Air Force Home Guard

The Danish Air Force Home Guard primarily has an airfield security role. However, it does operate two civil-registered BN-2B Defenders from Aalborg. Assigned to 270 Squadron, both aircraft are leased from CAE Aviation and are fitted with Wescam MX-15 electro-optical/infrared sensor

systems for engaging in homeland security and SAR tasks.

2019-06-06

Bases

Name	Latitude	Longitude	Number of Runways	Notes
Copenhagen Airport	55.617683	12.655885	3	
Karup	56.29725	9.104199	4	
Skagen	57.7428	10.6025	0	Radar station.
Skrydstrup	55.220963	9.267323	2	
Aalborg	57.092778	9.849167	2	
Roskilde Airport	55.585556	12.131389	2	
Bornholm	55.063056	14.759444	1	Radar station.

2019-06-06

Personnel

- The Forsvaret is a largely professional force. Although conscription still exists and individuals can be compelled to serve, the vast majority of conscripts who actually serve are volunteers. Denmark requires 4,200 conscripts or volunteers annually.

2019-06-06

Training

- The FLV aims to have its pilots achieve the NATO standard of 180 flight hours annually.
- The FLV in December 2018 received a newly developed combined F-16 aircraft simulator and Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) trainer.

Air schools

Name	Latitude	Longitude	Notes
Royal Danish Air Force Academy	55.71743000	12.57267700	
Air Force Sergeant School	56.28768000	9.12033800	
Flying School	56.29725	9.104199	

FLV pilots also attend a range of international schools for advanced, lead-in, and conversion training.

Training areas

Name	Latitude	Longitude	Notes
Tranum Shooting Range	57.185621	9.488703	
Romo Shooting Range	55.182933	8.531706	
Oksbol Exercise Area and Firing Range	55.5805306	8.1632722	

2019-06-06

Military exercises

Although the FLV routinely participates in a number international training exercises, its contributions are generally limited to a small number of staff personnel. That said, Danish F-16s in the past have participated in the 'Red Flag' and 'Frisian Flag' exercises.

'Trident Juncture 2018': NATO's 'Trident Juncture 18' exercise was held from 25 October to 7 November 2018. The event took place primarily in Norway but also included locations in the Baltic Sea, North Atlantic, Finland, and Sweden. It involved about 50,000 soldiers, 10,000 vehicles, 250 aircraft, and 65 naval vessels, making it the largest NATO exercise since the end of the Cold War. The FLV sent two AW101 helicopters, a movement control unit, and a forward aeromedical evacuation team.

Core assets and procurement initiatives

2019-06-06

Combat aircraft

F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon

The FLV's fighter fleet comprises 33 F-16AMs, although only 29 have an operational capability, and 11 F-16BM for training. These are assigned to two fighter squadrons based at Skrydstrup. All have been upgraded to MLU standard and thus have a good multirole combat capability, although the low number of aircraft limits operational bandwidth. The Danish F-16s have been used in combat operations in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Libya, and against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

Denmark was among the first international customers for the F-16 and purchased 77 aircraft. The first order was for 46 F-16As and 12 F-16Bs, with the first delivery in January 1980. A follow-on order for eight F-16As and four F-16Bs was placed in 1984. In addition, Denmark received three

attrition aircraft in 1994 and another four in 1997, including a single F-16B. The F-16 replaced the F-104 Starfighter, which was reaching the end of its operational life.

For air superiority missions, Denmark's F-16s can be armed with AIM-9 Sidewinders (including the latest variant with look locking and high off-boresight capability) and AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs). For ground attack, the aircraft can carry AGM-65G Maverick air-to-surface missiles (ASMs), as well as LAU-3 rocket launchers and Mk 82/84 bombs, GBU-12 and GBU-24 weapons, and GBU-31 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM).

As part of the MLU, the Danish F-16s received Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System and a night-vision cueing as well as a display aviator's night-vision imaging system, providing the pilot with better situational awareness and night attack capability.

Of note, the FLV was the first air force outside the USAF to be supplied with the Litening G4 targeting pod, which it received from 2013. The pods allow the F-16s to detect, identify, and track targets at long ranges for precision weapon delivery or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions.

Danish F-16s are expected to remain in service until 2024, at which point the airframes will be at the end of their useful life and their operational effectiveness will be inadequate to confront modern threats.

F-35A Lightning II (future fighter)

In May 2016 Denmark announced that it had selected the Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II to replace the F-16. However, Denmark will procure only 27 F-35As, giving its air force a very small fleet that at best will be just sufficient to carry out required defence tasks. Low availability for any reason or the loss of one aircraft would put at risk the country's ability to patrol its own skies and simultaneously contribute to collective security efforts.

Denmark had previously stated that it aimed to procure 48 aircraft to replace the F-16 but affordability became a driving concern, leading to the lower ambition. It also remains possible that the number ultimately procured may be even lower. This is because the government agreement on the acquisition mandates a review of the programme before the last six aircraft are ordered. If the price has gone up or deliveries are delayed, Denmark could decide to purchase fewer aircraft.

Denmark expects the F-35A to be phased into service from 2021 to 2026, allowing the last F-16 to be removed from the inventory by the end of 2024.

Danish F-35A delivery schedule

Year	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
Number of aircraft to be delivered	4	6	7	4	3	3

Plans call for the F-35A to be able to assume responsibility for all national tasks (defence of national airspace) from 2024. Meanwhile, it may be able to undertake limited international operations in 2025. However, it is expected to be 2027 before the F-35A is capable of fully supporting all defence tasks at home and abroad.

2019-06-06

Logistics aircraft

C-130J-30 Super Hercules

The FLV has four C-130J-30 tactical transports. These are assigned to 721 Squadron at Aalborg. The first three entered service in early 2004. In late 2004 an option for a fourth aircraft was exercised and this was handed over in 2007. The aircraft replaced the country's 1970s-era C-130Hs. The C-130J has longer range, greater speed, and a greater payload capacity than the C-130Hs.

The C-130J-30s are used for a range of transport tasks and have a medevac capability that includes a small intensive care unit. The Danish aircraft feature an FLV-specific tailored electronic warfare suite, a strengthened cargo ramp, and an improved airdrop system, which allows airdrops at 250 kt so as to reduce exposure to anti-aircraft fire. In addition, they have an enhanced cargo handling system that features flip-over rollers and facilitates the carriage of varying types of cargo, including palletised items.

Of note, the 2018–23 Defence Agreement announced plans to add two C-130 flight crews and thus increase potential flight hours by 20%.

AW101 Merlin

Denmark has 14 AW101 Merlin Joint Supporter helicopters. Eight are configured for SAR while the remaining six are troop transports, although the aircraft are designed for rapid role change. The Merlins entered service in 2006–07 and are operated by 722 Squadron at Karup, although SAR detachments are maintained at Aalborg, Roskilde, and Skrydstrup (and Bornholm when required by weather conditions).

When deployed to Afghanistan the helicopters received theatre entry standard equipment, including ballistic protection, defensive aids, door guns, and night-vision-compatible cockpits.

2019-06-06

Maritime aircraft

Challenger 604

The FLV has four Challenger 604 aircraft in service, all of which are assigned to 721 Squadron at Aalborg, although one is deployed to Greenland for as many as 120 days a year. The Challengers are primarily MPA but can also carry out a range of logistics roles. The Challenger has been

heavily used to support anti-piracy missions off the Horn of Africa and anti-human trafficking in the Mediterranean. They also contribute to NATO reassurance measures by patrolling the Baltic Sea on a regular basis.

Three Challenger aircraft were delivered between 1999 and 2001 to replace the Gulfstream IIIs, and were upgraded to multimission aircraft (MMA) configuration beginning in 2004. An additional Challenger was taken on strength in 2014.

MH-60R Seahawk

In late 2012 Denmark selected the MH-60R Seahawk to replace the Super Lynx Mk 90B helicopter (which had entered service as Lynx variants in 1980). Nine Seahawks have been procured. The first three were delivered in May 2016 and initial operational capability (IOC) was achieved in 2017. The fleet reached full strength at the end of 2018, although it will be some time before full operational capability (FOC) is attained.

Compared with the Super Lynx, which saw its last flight in December 2017, the Seahawk has greater endurance and ultimately will be fitted with a better weapons suite.

Denmark did not procure the Seahawk in full multimission configuration but instead focused on surface surveillance, utility operations, and SAR. This omitted the ASW capability. However, the 2018–23 Defence Agreement has approved procurement of active dipping sonar and lightweight torpedoes for the helicopters, enabling them to undertake ASW operations. No IOC and FOC dates have not been announced.

2019-06-06

Equipment in service

System name	Family name	Type	Manned-unmanned	Role general	Role specific	Total delivered	In service	Year of initial delivery	Notes
Challenger 604	Challenger 600	Fixed-wing	Manned	C4ISTAR	Maritime patrol	4	4	1998	

F-16 AM	F-16	Fixed-wing	Manned	Combat/offensive	Attack, Fighter	53	33	1980	Twenty-nine in active service.
F-16 BM	F-16	Fixed-wing	Manned	Combat/offensive, Training	Attack, Fighter, Trainer	13	11	1980	
C-130J-30	C-130	Fixed-wing	Manned	Logistics/support	Transport	4	4	2004	
BN2B Defender	BN2	Fixed-wing	Manned	Logistics/support	Utility, Transport, Search/rescue	2	2	2015	Civil - registered aircraft operated on lease and manned by volunteer personnel.
Supporter	Safari	Fixed-wing	Manned	Training, C4ISTAR	Trainer, Communications	32	27	1975	
MH-60R	S-70A	Rotary-wing	Manned	C4ISTAR, Logistics/support	Search/rescue, Surveillance/reconnaissance, Transport	9	9	2016	

Merlin Joint Supporter	AW101	Rotary-wing	Manned	Logistics/support	Search/rescue, Transport	20	14	2006
AS550C2	AS350	Rotary-wing	Manned	Logistics/support, C4ISTAR	Utility, Transport, Surveillance/reconnaissance	12	11	2003

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Missiles

System variant	Manufacturer	Primary role (general)
AIM-9J Sidewinder	Lockheed Martin	Air-to-air
AIM-9L Sidewinder	Raytheon	Air-to-air
AIM-9X Sidewinder	Raytheon	Air-to-air
AIM-120A AMRAAM	Raytheon	Air-to-air
AIM-120B AMRAAM	Raytheon	Air-to-air
AGM-65 Maverick	Raytheon	Air-to-surface

Navy

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Summary

Strength	Regular: 3,200
Frigates	Iver Huitfeldt class Thetis class
Command-and-support ships	Absalon class
Arctic patrol ships	Knud Rasmussen class

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Executive summary

- The Royal Danish Navy (Søværnet: SVN) has completed its transition from a defensive posture based on a fleet comprising many small combatants to a fleet that is numerically smaller, but more flexible and capable of expeditionary operations. At the heart of this fleet

are 3 Iver Huitfeldt-class frigates, which reached full operational capability (FOC) in March 2015, and 2 Absalon-class command-and-support ships, which were at FOC by mid-2008. Although technically a support ship, the Absalon class is combat capable, being fitted with missiles, torpedoes, and a five-inch gun. The SVN also has 4 Thetis-class frigates, 6 Diana (SF Mk II)-class patrol vessels, and 3 Knud Rasmussen-class arctic patrol vessels. These ships primarily carry out national tasks, although they can conduct other missions. This is possible because all SVN combatants are designed using the standard flex (Stanflex) concept, which allows ships to carry out a range of roles by fitting different containerised systems. This makes the Danish fleet highly adaptable.

- The SVN's national tasks include maritime surveillance, SAR, countering maritime pollution, and fisheries protection in Danish waters, the North Atlantic, and Arctic around Greenland and the Faroe Islands. In the event of a major war that directly threatens national territory, the SVN's main task would be control of the Danish straits. The 2018–23 Defence Agreement emphasised participation in area air defence and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in particular.
- The SVN regularly contributes to collective security and crisis management efforts. Most missions are maritime security operations conducted through NATO's standing naval groups.
- There are no major procurement programmes in the pipeline until the Thetis-class frigates need to be replaced in the late 2020s. This makes sense in light of the resources dedicated to bringing the Iver Huitfeldt- and Absalon-class vessels into service. That said, some upgrade works are planned. The 2018–23 Defence Agreement calls for the SVN frigates to receive SM-2 air defence missiles (and possibly the SM-6 in the long term). In addition, three ships will receive new variable depth low-frequency active/passive sonar (the Thetis-class frigates had such systems but they were removed) and anti-torpedo systems will be procured for all major vessels. The SVN is also receiving a capability boost through the Royal Danish Air Force's (RDAF's) MH-60R Seahawk, the last of which was delivered in May 2018. The Seahawks have significantly greater reach and combat capability compared with the legacy Super Lynx Mk 90Bs that previously supported the SVN. The 2018–23 Defence Agreement also calls for the helicopters to receive active dipping sonars and lightweight torpedoes.
- According to comments by the chief of navy staff in 2018 and plans outlined in the 2018–23 Defence Agreement, the SVN is prioritising rebuilding its ability to conduct ASW operations. The SVN's ASW capability has been rudimentary since its submarines were decommissioned in 2004.

Deployments and operations

2019-06-06

Force distribution

The SVN fleet is largely split between Naval Station Korsør on the Great Belt in southern Denmark and Naval Station Frederikshavn at the north tip of the country where the Skagerrak meets the Kattegat. These two locations leave the navy well positioned to monitor and control the entrance to the Baltic Sea.

In addition, the SVN's vessels are routinely deployed for extended periods to the waters of Greenland and the Faroe Islands. This region is strategically important due to the opening up of Arctic waters and the increasing Russian Navy presence in the Arctic and North Atlantic.

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Recent and current operations

The 2013–17 Defence Agreement mandates that the SVN be able to deploy up to 2 major units on short notice or maintain 1 large unit on a sustained mission. The 2018–23 Defence Agreement did not outline ambitions. The SVN as of early 2019 has deployed ships to:

- Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1: one frigate
- French Carrier Battle Group (Groupe Aéronaval): one frigate

Standing NATO Maritime Groups/Operation 'Sea Guardian'

The SVN has a long history of contributing to Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGs) and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups (SNMCMGs). Ships assigned to these groups often support Operation 'Sea Guardian' (and previously Operation 'Active Endeavour' and Operation 'Ocean Shield'). Of note, an SVN ship in 2010 served as a flagship of SNMG1 for the first time and other Danish vessels have since taken up that role for further rotations. Denmark commanded SNMG1 for all of 2018 and SNMCMG1 for all of 2019.

Operation 'Ocean Shield'/Combined Task Forces

The SVN has participated extensively in counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa since 2008. These contributions for a time were most commonly made to NATO's Operation 'Ocean Shield' and took place within the context of an SNMG. The Danish government's counter-piracy strategy stated that the SVN should deploy 1 ship for 6 months every year, and this level of commitment was generally maintained. However, the deployment of HDMS *Absalon* in 2015 was the last Danish contribution and the NATO mission has since ended. Denmark has also commanded the anti-piracy missions and task forces.

Denmark now contributes a staff officer to Combined Task Force 151, a multinational force established in 2009 to confront piracy. It also contributes staff to Combined Task Force 150, which has a maritime security and anti-terrorism mandate.

Aircraft carrier support

From 4 March to 27 April 2019 the frigate HDMS *Niels Juel* provided protection and airspace control to the French aircraft carrier *Charles de Gaulle*. During this time the ships operated in the

eastern Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Persian Gulf. An SVN frigate in 2017 provided similar support to the US Navy *George H W Bush* carrier strike group while undertaking operations against the Islamic State.

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Organisation

At the top of the SVN organisation is the Navy Command, led by the chief of navy staff and based at Karup. Subordinate to Navy Command are 3 surface squadrons and 2 operational logistics support centres (at the primary SVN bases of Korsør and Frederikshavn). The Navy School was eliminated on 1 January 2019, and the centres are now subordinate to the squadrons.

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Order of battle

Unit hierarchy	Base	Type	Primary role (General)	Primary role (Specific)	Primary equipment	Notes
Royal Danish Navy		Service Support	Command and Control			
Navy Command	Karup	Service Support	Command and Control			
1 Squadron	Naval Station Frederikshavn	Surface	Combat	Patrol		
2 Squadron	Naval Station Korsør	Surface	Combat	Surface Combat		
3 Squadron	Naval Station Frederikshavn	Surface	Combat	Coastal Patrol		
Coastal Rescue Service	Naval Station Frederikshavn	Surface	Logistics	Search and Rescue		

Navy Surveillance Unit	Naval Station Korsor	Support (Ashore)	ISTAR	Includes coastal observation stations in Drogden, Hammer Odde, Kegsnæs, Røsnæs, and Skagen, as well as marine observation stations in Føllesbjerg and Hellebæk.
Operational Logistic Support Center Frederikshavn	Naval Station Frederikshavn	Support (Ashore)	Logistics	
Operational Logistic Support Center Korsor	Naval Station Korsor	Support (Ashore)	Logistics	

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Naval Home Guard

Denmark has a Naval Home Guard that primarily focuses on surveillance and SAR in Danish waters, as well as force protection/security. The Naval Home Guard has 30 small patrol vessels.

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Bases

Name	Latitude	Longitude	Notes
Hellebæk Lookout Station	56.078178	12.542849	

The Navy School	57.416412	10.505554
Naval Depot	57.528823	10.387397
Naval Station Frederikshavn	57.434339	10.54886
Karup	56.29725	9.104199
Nyholm	57.567427	10.364842
Royal Danish Naval Academy	55.6862	12.6066
Naval Station Korsør	55.33221	11.129264
Kongsøre	55.825333	11.733719
Føllesbjerg Lookout Station	54.746495	10.736444
Centre for Weapons	56.006473	11.280901

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Personnel

- Danish Defence (Forsvaret) is a largely professional force. Although conscription still exists and individuals can be compelled to serve, the vast majority of conscripts who actually serve in the military are volunteers. Denmark requires 4,200 conscripts annually.

2019-06-06

Training

- SVN vessels spend a good number of days at sea, which provides plenty of training opportunities. Training is well rounded between maritime security and conventional operations. A significant portion of training is multinational and undertaken while serving with NATO maritime groups.
- The SVN has several bridge simulators in order provide training without needing to use active ships.

Naval schools

Name	Latitude	Longitude	Notes
Royal Danish Naval Academy	55.71743000	12.57267700	

Centre for Sergeant and Maritime Education	57.416424	10.506190	
Centre for Diving	55.684031	12.605948	To move to Naval Station Korsor.
Centre for Marine Safety	57.568038	10.364149	
Centre for Tactics	57.432308	10.531905	
Centre for Naval Technology	55.684031	12.605948	To move to Naval Station Korsor.
Centre for Weapons	56.00647300	11.28090100	

Training areas

Name	Latitude	Longitude	Notes
Sjællands Odde	56.010153	11.277803	

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Military exercises

‘Baltic Operations’ (‘BALTOPS’): The SVN is a regular participant in the annual ‘BALTOPS’ exercise that takes place in the Baltic Sea and surrounding region. In 2018 the SVN provided the frigate HDMS *Niels Juel*, which was leading SNMG1 at the time, as well as the frigate HDMS *Iver Huitfeldt*, transport ship HDMS *Sleipner*, diving support vessel HDMS *Søløven*, and the containerised mine countermeasures (MCM) Denmark system, which was deployed with SNMCMG1.

‘Northern Coasts’: The SVN is a regular participant in the annual ‘Northern Coasts’ exercise, and occasionally hosts and leads the event. The 2018 iteration, held in November of that year, was hosted by Finland. The SVN provided two frigates. Training included conventional scenarios involving anti-surface, AAW, and ASW tasks as well as training to counter asymmetric threats.

‘Trident Juncture 2018’: NATO’s ‘Trident Juncture 18’ exercise was held from 25 October to 7 November 2018. The event took place primarily in Norway but also included locations in the Baltic Sea, North Atlantic, Finland, and Sweden. It involved about 50,000 soldiers; 10,000 vehicles; 250 aircraft; and 65 naval vessels, making it the largest NATO exercise since the end of the Cold War. The SVN sent HDMS *Esbern Snare* and the sfrigate HDMS *Hvidbjørnen*.

Core assets and procurement initiatives

2019-06-06

Stanflex

The SVN has built its fleet around the Stanflex concept, which uses standardised containers to enable the rapid interchange of role-specific weapons and equipment. These Stanflex containers are fitted into wells in each ship that has interface connections to provide access to the ship's services. Changing the complete mission payload (and therefore the role) of a Stanflex-based ship can be done in 8–12 hours with a crane. This allows SVN ships to carry out a range of roles and accept a variety of weapon fits. Specifically, the containers allow for ships to carry out nine different roles: ASW, environmental protection, hydrographic survey, MCM, minelaying, oceanographic research, signals intelligence (SIGINT), surface warfare, and surveillance. In total, the SVN owns more than 100 Stanflex containers of 11 different types.

2019-06-06

Surface combatants

Iver Huitfeldt-class frigates

At the core of the SVN fleet are three Iver Huitfeldt-class frigates that were commissioned between 2012 and 2014, although it was March 2015 before the class reached FOC. The Iver Huitfeldt-class frigates replaced three Niels Juel-class corvettes, which were well suited for the country's Cold War defence posture but had limited seakeeping and a narrow range of capabilities. The frigates, in contrast, have a broad spectrum of expeditionary warfighting capability and are thus much more appropriate for Denmark's current security requirements and defence posture.

Denmark had originally wanted four new frigates, but lowered its ambition for budgetary reasons. In addition, the navy maintains only 2 full crews for the 3 frigates. This makes some sense given that one ship is always in maintenance, but it also lowers the endurance of the class since crew swapping is limited.

The Iver Huitfeldt class is based on the same hullform as the Absalon-class command-and-support ship, and there is about an 80% commonality between the two classes. However, the frigates lack the vehicle/cargo 'flex deck'. The frigates also have a different underwater hullform to increase propeller thrust and larger engine rooms to accommodate additional prime movers (both features give the frigates a greater speed than the command ships).

The Iver Huitfeldt-class ships are optimised for the AAW role, but have 4 Stanflex positions (1 forward and 3 amidships) and can thus deploy with a range of weapon fits and/or additional equipment. That said, the ships do have a standard configuration.

The frigates' local air defence capability is provided by four 8-cell Mk 41 VLSs that carry ESSM. In addition to the Mk 41 VLS, the frigates also can be fitted with 2 containerised Mk 56 launchers with 12 cells for 24 additional ESSMs. To support these air defence weapons, the ships are fitted with active phased-array radar (APAR) and Signal Multibeam Acquisition Radar for Targeting – Long range (SMART-L) radar. The APAR can control the simultaneous engagement of up to 4 targets, manage up to 8 missiles in flight, and track more than 200 targets at one time. Meanwhile, the SMART-L radar can achieve detection ranges out to 400 km (249 miles) and is able to track up

to 1,000 air targets and 100 surface targets.

The Stanflex container infrastructure also enables the frigates to be fitted with Harpoon Block II missiles. Each Stanflex Harpoon container can carry 8 missiles, and the ships are usually fitted with 2 modules for a total of 16 ready-to-fire missiles. Compared with the legacy missile, the Harpoon Block II has better performance in crowded littoral environments and offers a limited coastal attack capability.

The ships are also usually armed with two Oto Melara 76 mm/62 Super Rapid guns ahead of the bridge. The A position can also accept an Mk 45 Mod 4 127 mm gun if additional firepower is required (procurement of additional 127 mm guns for the frigates is on the list of long term but thus far unfinanced projects). Meanwhile, close-in defence is provided by a single 35 mm Millennium revolver cannon fitted above the hangar, although another could be fitted in place of the B position 76 mm gun.

An ASW capability is provided by two twin-torpedo tubes armed with the Eurotorp MU90 Impact lightweight torpedo. However, the ships have only hull-mounted sonar. Looking ahead, some ships will receive variable depth low-frequency active/passive sonar.

Lastly, the flight deck on the frigates can operate a 20-tonne helicopter, allowing heavy army helicopters to land, while the hangar provides sufficient space for a medium-sized aircraft (including the Seahawk).

The 2018–23 Defence Agreement will allow for the procurement of a stock of SM-2 missiles. This will give the ships area air defence capability. Denmark is also planning to upgrade at least one frigate's SMART-L radar with an extended long-range mode to enable ballistic missile detection and tracking.

A surface ship torpedo defence system is also being acquired for all major SVN vessels.

Thetis-class frigates

The SVN has four Thetis-class frigates (considered by some to be ocean patrol vessels) that are tasked to carry out sovereignty patrol, fishery protection, surveillance, air-sea rescue, anti-pollution, and ice reconnaissance missions. The SVN has five crews for the vessels.

The Thetis class, which entered service in 1991 and 1992, are optimised for long deployments (up to 60 days) in the arctic waters off Greenland and the Faroe Islands. To this end, the frigates have an ice-breaking bow and double-skinned ice-reinforced hulls that allow them to break through 80 cm (31 inch) of ice. The ships also have an enclosed search radar antennae, and the main mast and deck equipment are positioned so as to reduce icing. In addition, the hull is about 30 m longer than that of the Hvidbjørnen class that it replaced. This improves seakeeping in the rough North Atlantic.

The Thetis-class frigates have relatively limited armament, with one Oto Melara 76 mm Super Rapid main gun and a rail for depth chargers. That said, the frigates have a number of Stanflex

positions, another benefit of being longer than the legacy ships they replaced. The Stanflex infrastructure allows the frigates to sail with heavier armament or carry out other roles. They can also embark and hangar a single medium helicopter.

Procurement plans call for a Thetis-class replacement in the late 2020s.

Absalon-class command-and-support ships

The SVN has two Absalon-class command-and-support ships. HDMS *Absalon* was commissioned in 2004 and sister ship HDMS *Esbern Snare* in 2005, although it was not until mid-2008 that both were at full operational readiness. The ships are the largest ever to serve with the SVN and are a key element of the navy's expeditionary capability. The Absalon-class ships act primarily as a command-and-logistics platform, but are also capable of carrying out seabasing, sealift, humanitarian relief, and a range of other tasks, including maritime security, sea control, and land attack.

The ships feature a 900 m² roll-on/roll-off flexible central cargo deck that can carry everything from a task force staff, a fully equipped infantry company, 50 vehicles, 7 Leopard 2 tanks, 300 sea mines, and field hospitals. In addition to the 100-person crew, each ship can provide accommodation for up to 200 personnel if the flex deck is used.

The weapon deck amidships has five Stanflex container positions, which enables the ships to be fitted with a range of weapons systems and other special mission equipment. The standard configuration includes 3 modules with 12-cell Mk 56 vertical launchers – enabling up to 36 ready-to-fire ESSMs to be carried – and 2 modules for Harpoon Block II missiles (with 16 rounds total). The ship has also received two twin tubes for Eurotorp MU 90 lightweight torpedoes. Of note, no gun systems can be installed in the amidship Stanflex positions.

Standard armament also includes a 127 mm Mk 45 gun that is capable of engaging targets ashore. The ships also have two Oerlikon-Contraves GDM-008 Millennium 35 mm revolver cannon for close-in defence (a fairly larger calibre weapon for the task, which enables it to achieve more than just operational kills).

The Absalon-class deck has a hangar for two medium-sized helicopters, although the flight deck is capable of accommodating larger aircraft if required. The vessels also usually embark two SRC 90E fast insertion craft, which can be launched and recovered from a retractable gantry on the port side. These are used for special forces visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS); force protection; surveillance; and medical evacuation missions.

Knud Rasmussen-class arctic patrol vessels

The SVN has three Knud Rasmussen-class arctic patrol vessels in service. The vessels were commissioned in 2008, 2009, and 2016. They are operated by the 1 Squadron based at Frederikshavn. However, the ships spend most of their time carrying out missions in the Arctic waters off Greenland. To facilitate extended operations, each ship has two crews that are rotated.

The vessels are primarily engaged in sovereignty patrols although they can carry out other roles, including acting as a command-and-control (C2) platform for a small force.

The Knud Rasmussen class replaced Denmark's Agdlek-class cutters on a one-for-one basis, and the last of the old cutters left service in late 2017. Although this means there is no numerical increase in the SVN fleet, these vessels are significantly larger and more capable than their predecessors. The size makes the Knud Rasmussen ships more stable in bad weather and provides them with more than twice the endurance of the old cutters (25 days compared with 8–10 days), allowing the SVN to increase its presence in the Arctic.

Bespoke Arctic features on the Knud Rasmussen ships include an ice keel, 'ice knife' stem, ice-strengthened rudder and propeller, and de-icing equipment (heaters) in the superstructure and open decks. The ships have a flight deck that can embark a medium helicopter, although there is no hangar space. The vessels can also deploy a high-speed SAR craft, ice-strengthened Combat Boat 90E, from a heated stern hanger.

As is standard for SVN vessels, the Knud Rasmussen class is designed to operate in accordance with the Stanflex concept, having four positions for modularised systems. This enables it to take on significant armament, including anti-air and anti-ship missiles and torpedoes. That said, the ships are typically armed with only one 76 mm gun.

2019-12-17

Mine countermeasures

Having retired the last of its Flyvefisken-class (Stanflex 300) minehunters in 2010, the SVN now operates a containerised MCM system called MCM Denmark. The system is housed in two containers and can be embarked on a range of SVN and allied vessels.

The MCM Denmark system uses unmanned Holm-class multirole vessels (MSDs) to carry a C2 module as well as a Saab Double Eagle Mk II remotely operated vehicle (ROV) with a disposable charge. The C2 system is used to control one or two minor standard vessel (MSF) drones, equipped with side scan sonar to perform a sweep on an area before deploying the Double Eagle Mk II ROV.

While the RDN has four MSFs and two MSVs, manning constraints limit capability to some extent.

Plans call for the procurement of new autonomous unmanned vehicles with updated side scan sonar. This would improve performance and enable the system to be completely containerised for operation from any ship. The navy is also considering acquiring a C2 system that will enable remote control of the MSF drones over a greater distance, moving from 6–8 n miles to 16–20 n miles (11–15 km to 30–37 km) and, in the long term, over the horizon.

2019-06-06

Naval aviation

All of Denmark's military aircraft are operated by the RDAF. Aircraft that operate specifically to support the SVN in the maritime domain include

- Challenger 604 maritime patrol aircraft
- AW101 Merlin
- MH-60R Seahawk

For complete profiles of these assets, see the Denmark entry in *Jane's World Air Forces*.

Equipment in service

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Surface fleet

Class	Manufacturer	Role	Original total	In service	Commissioned
Iver Huitfeldt	Odense Shipyard	Frigate	3	3	2012
Thetis	Svendborg Værft	Frigate	4	4	1991
Absalon	Odense Shipyard	Command-and support ship	2	2	2004
Knud Rasmussen	Karstensens Skibsværft	Patrol ship – arctic	3	3	2008
Diana (SF MK II)	Faaborg Værft/Kockums	Patrol craft	6	6	2007
MHV 900	Søby Shipyard	Patrol craft – coastal	12	12 ¹	2003
MHV 800	Søby Shipyard	Patrol craft – coastal	18	17 ¹	1992
MHV 850	Søby Shipyard	Patrol craft – coastal	1	1	2001
Storebro 90E (LCP)	Försvarets Materielverk/Storebro	High-speed insertion craft (LCP and SAR)	6	6 ²	2004
Holm	Danish Yachts	Minehunter – drone	6	2 ³	2005

MSF	Danyard	Minehunter – drone	5	4	1998

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Auxiliaries

Class	Manufacturer	Role	Original total	In service	Commissioned
<i>Sleipner</i>	Åbenrå Værft	Torpedo transport ship	1	1	1986
Flyvefisken	Danyard	Diving support vessel	14	1	1989
Mette Miljø	Carl B Hoffmann/Søren Larsen & Sønners Skibsværft	Environmental protection (sea truck type)	2	2	1980
Miljø 101	Ejvind's Plastikbodeværft	Pollution control craft (environmental type)	2	2	1977
Miljø 103	Hvide Sande Skibs og Bådebyggeri	Pollution control craft (environmental type)	1	1	2008
Holm	Danish Yachts	Multirole craft (school and survey)	6	4	2005
SKA 11	Jeros Marine	Survey vessels	6	3	1981
Arvak	Hvide Sande Skibs-og Baadebyggeri	Harbour tug	2	2	2002
Gunnar Thorson	Ørskov Stålskibsværft	Oil pollution craft (supply type)	2	2	1981

<i>Dana</i>	Dannebrog	Research ship	1	1	1982
<i>Lunden</i>	n/a	Training – target towing	6	1	1973
MRD (SAV)	Danyard	Multirole	6	1	1991
Svanen	Hundested Bådebyggeri	Sail training ship – small	2	2	1960
<i>Dannebrog</i>	Naval Dockyard	Royal yacht	1	1	1932

DEFENCE PRODUCTION AND R & D

Date Posted: 22-Nov-2019

Publication: Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Western Europe

UPDATED

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Executive overview

Denmark is a member of NATO and the EU.

Although Copenhagen opted out of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and therefore does not subscribe to the European Defence Agency (EDA), it takes an international approach to defence matters and has been a strong advocate of cross-border co-operation.

An international approach to procurement (Denmark has looked to the rest of Europe and North America for most materiel) has also been apparent. The broad approach to procurement, however, has had as much to do with the limited capabilities of the small defence industrial base as the pursuit of best value in a spirit of openness.

A national defence industrial strategy and revised national offset guidelines were published simultaneously on 1 July 2014. Collectively the documents outline the capabilities the retention of which Denmark considers essential to its national security, and its current approach to industrial participation.

Denmark's most recent statement of intent regarding its strategic direction in terms of defence is outlined in the Danish Defence Agreement 2018 to 2023 which was published in October 2017.

Defence investment

In common with other western economies, the Danish economy suffered the effects of the global economic crisis from 2008.

The downturn necessitated strong spending cuts, which were introduced with support from across the political spectrum. Spending reductions to 2017 with commensurate efficiency savings and military restructuring efforts were enshrined in the Danish Defence Agreement 2013-2017 (published November 2012).

A corner was turned, however, and the Danish Defence Agreement of 2018 to 2023 outlined strong spending growth and the expansion of the armed forces.

A pledge to increase defence spending by 20% (or DKK4.8 billion) by 2023 (from DKK21.7 billion in 2017) was made along with the expression of an objective of increasing the total deployable force of the armed forces to 20,000 regular soldiers.

Defence spending remains around 1% of GDP.

Major programmes

Denmark's procurement aspirations were most recently outlined in detail in the Danish Defence Agreement of 2018 to 2023.

Denmark is proceeding with a number of large scale procurement programmes; notably the fighter aircraft replacement programme (a decision on which was made in 2016 opting for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter), the M113 armoured personnel carrier (APC) replacement programme (for which General Dynamics European Land Systems was selected in April 2015), and a self-propelled howitzer acquisition (Nexter's CAESAR system was selected in 2017).

Defence industry

Denmark has a small defence industry focused on a few key areas. Denmark has only one defence contractor of sufficient critical mass and focus to be considered a genuine European player - Terma A/S - although by international standards it is still a minor company. Membership of the Danish Defence and Security Industries Association (FAD) stands at just 83 companies as of 2018.

Denmark: Market Potential Index (MPI)

Factor/ risk	Score	Rating
Defense investment:	2.21	Lower appeal
Procurement spending - land:	2.41	Lower appeal
Procurement spending - naval:	3.07	Moderate appeal
Procurement spending - air:	2.51	Lower appeal

Def enc e ind ust rial cap abil itie s sco re:	2.00	Lower appeal
Pro cur em ent env iro nm ent sco re:	4.50	High appeal

Supplier relations score: (credit reliance, international embargo status and degree of historical single supplier reliance)	3.60	Moderate appeal
---	------	-----------------

Market status score: (based on political and economic stability, the internal and external security environment, ease of doing business and transparency)	3.97	Moderate appeal
---	------	-----------------

Final market rating:	3.39	Moderate appeal
<p><i>Note:</i> 1 = high risk/low appeal. 5 = very low risk/very high appeal. <i>Source:</i> Jane's Market Potential Index. Full methodology available on request.</p>		

National defence companies

Multi-domain

Terma A/S

Summary: Terma is the principal defence, aerospace and space contractor in Denmark within a variety of defence-related applications, such as army air defence, naval command-and-control, airborne electronic warfare, airborne tactical reconnaissance, aerial surveillance, ground-based communication. Its civil work includes airborne environmental surveillance, as well as systems and services for space and software development. It is also a producer of aerostructures.

Ownership: Terma A/S is a wholly owned subsidiary of Thrige Holding A/S, which is wholly owned by the Thomas B Thrige Foundation.

Web: www.terma.com

Saab Danmark A/S

Summary: The Danish subsidiary of Sweden's Saab group. Specialises in airborne wide area surveillance systems, antennas automated weather observation systems, battlefield management systems, civil aircraft missile protection systems, electronic waste disposal, flight information display systems, helicopter firing and target systems. In 2016 Saab acquired Nordic Defence Systems (see elsewhere in this report).

Ownership: Saab

Web: www.saabgroup.com

Aerospace

Danish Aerospace Company

Summary: A producer of electronic systems for space applications with an emphasis on health monitoring. Products include Pulmonary Function Systems.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.danishaerospace.com

Land systems

Composhield

Summary: A developer of ballistic protection materials.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.composhield.com

Hydrema

Summary: A producer of heavy industrial vehicles, plus the 910 MCV 2 mine-clearance vehicle for defence markets.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.hydrema.dk

Scanfiber

Summary: A developer of light-weight composite armour.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.scanfiber.dk

Sima Innovation

Summary: A developer of gun mounts for land applications.

Ownership: Privately owned by CEO Mikhail Kildevaeld

Web: www.simainnovation.com

Naval Systems

ATLAS Maridan

Summary: Developer and integrator of autonomous underwater vehicles. Specialises in development of the systems for control of underwater vehicles (AUV, ROV, ROTV and Towed Array) as well as integration of payload sensors for naval applications.

Ownership: Part of ATLAS Elektronik which is a subsidiary of ThyssenKrupp

Web: www.maridan.atlas-elektronik.com/companyinfo

EIVA

Summary: A provider of remotely operated towed vehicles for military applications such as mine countermeasures.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.eiva.com

Karstensens Skibsvaerft A/S

Summary: Undertakes naval ship construction and repair. Karstensens Skibsvaerft has capability to construct vessels up to 135 m in length. The Royal Danish Navy operates two Knud Rasmussen-class vessels, both outfitted by Karstensens Skibsvaerft, with a third under contract.

Ownership: Manager owned

Web: www.karstensens.dk

Nordic Defence Industries

Summary: NDI is a producer of naval mine disposal systems. Its principal product is the Damdic mine disposal charge.

Ownership: Acquired by Saab in 2016. Part of Saab's underwater systems business

Web: www.ndi.dk

C4ISR

AM3D

Summary: AM3D is a developer of audio systems. It is behind the ZIRENE 3D positional audio enhancement system in the military domain.

Ownership: Acquired by Goertek in 2016

Web: www.am3d.com

Bruhn NewTech

Summary: A provider of software systems relating to CBRN applications.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.bruhn-newtech.com

Copenhagen Sensor Technology (CST)

Summary: The company designs and develops electro-optical systems for military land vehicles and land-based static installations.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.copst.com

Glaucus Group

Summary: Active in the integration of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems produced by third-party suppliers.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.glaucus.dk

GPV

Summary: An electronics manufacturer, notably as a manufacturer of radar system components in defence domains.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.gpv-group.com

IFAD

Summary: A provider of simulation systems, notably to the naval domain (tactical training, radar training and close air support and observation training).

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.ifad.dk

Radiocom

Summary: A producer of tactical radios, primarily for law enforcement applications.

Ownership: Part of VHF Group of Norway.

Web: www.radiocom.dk

Scandinavian Avionics

Summary: A provider of military and commercial aircraft avionics integration services.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.scanav.com

Sky-Watch

Summary: A developer of very small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Products include the Huginn X1 quadcopter and the Heidrun V1 and Cumulus fixed-wing UAVs.

Ownership: Owned by the Danish equity fund Dangroup ApS & Borean Innovation.

Web: sky-watch.dk

Systematic

Summary: Specialises in defence software for command and control, military messaging (IRIS), EW data management and load planning.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.systematic.com

Teledyne-Reson

Summary: Manufacturer of underwater acoustic equipment, multibeam sonar systems, transducers and hydrophones for sonar systems, echo sounders, side scans, velocity profiles, acoustic telemetry links and seabed penetrating systems.

Ownership: Part of US-based Teledyne since 2013.

Web: www.teledyne-reson.com

Thales Denmark

Summary: Thales employs 120 people at two sites in Denmark. Local activities relate to the development and production of radar systems; the development of ground transportation technologies; and air traffic management solutions.

Ownership: Thales

Web: www.thalesgroup.com/en/countries/europe/denmark

Ticra

Summary: A developer of antenna modelling software.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.ticra.com

Weibel Scientific

Summary: Develops and manufactures high-end doppler radar based velocity and position measuring instruments. It is primarily focused on providing test equipment to public organizations in the aerospace, defence, military, and forensic-science sectors.

Ownership: Privately owned by chief operating office Thomas Øiseth Munkholm

Web: www.weibel.dk

Other

Almexa

Summary: Almexa is a manufacturer of machined metal components for military and industrial applications. It makes boxes to hold radios, transmitted and surveillance cameras.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.almexa.dk

Brüel & Kjær

Summary: Brüel & Kjær supplies systems to the defence and aerospace market to monitor noise and vibration.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.bksv.com

Damasec

Summary: A provider of mine-clearance services and explosive ordnance disposal.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: damasec.com

Dommerby Stal

Summary: A provider of military containers and cabinet systems plus wheel changing tools.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.dommerbystaal.com

Heeds

Summary: A producer of cooling systems for military and industrial applications.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.heeds.dk

Military Equipment Denmark

Summary: A producer of shooting range equipment and a reseller of military products (from riot control equipment to batteries). The MED group includes MED Maskinfabrik (a metal working operation) and United Military Services (a joint venture with Fahrzeugwerk GmbH and Dommerby Stål A/S that provides military vehicle maintenance services).

Ownership: Owned by founder and managing director Leif Braae.

Web: med.dk

Platpack Defence

Summary: A producer of ammunition cases and military storage and transportation cases.

Ownership: Privately owned

Web: www.ppddk.dk

Strategic Weapon Systems

Date Posted: 01-Aug-2019

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UPDATED

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Assessment

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Cyber warfare

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2018-08-10

Assessment

Denmark has no strategic weapons, although it is building a cyber warfare capability and participates in NATO collective ballistic missile defence (BMD) efforts.

2018-08-10

Ballistic missiles

Denmark has no ballistic missile systems.

2018-08-10

Missile defence

Denmark does not hold any BMD capability itself, although the current government has been a supporter of the US-led initiative to develop such capabilities. As part of NATO's 2014 Wales Summit, Denmark pledged to contribute a sensor to NATO's BMD efforts. This commitment was reaffirmed in the 2018-23 Defence Agreement.

Specifically, Denmark is upgrading the SMART-L radar on at least one Iver Huitfeldt-class frigate with an extended long-range mode to enable ballistic missile detection and tracking. A contract with Terma to develop this capability was announced in April 2016. The 2018-23 Defence Agreement will also allow for the procurement of a stock of SM-2 missiles. In addition, Denmark is preparing for the possible follow-on procurement of the longer-range SM-6 missile.

Denmark also hosts a ballistic missile early warning radar system in Thule, Greenland. This radar is a key part of the US missile defence architecture. One liaison officer and two other Danish personnel are based at Thule to facilitate information sharing.

Information warfare

2018-08-10

Cyber warfare

The Centre for Cyber Security was created in 2012 under the Danish Defence Intelligence Service. The centre's mission is to strengthen the protection of information and communication technology infrastructure that supports functions vital to the Danish society and to strengthen Denmark's general ability to resist advanced cyber attacks.

In response to the increasing threat of cyber attacks, Denmark is establishing an offensive cyber warfare unit to take defensive actions and carry out counter-attacks. The unit will be set up by the Danish Defence Intelligence Service. Further information is not available.

The 2018-23 Defence Agreement called for a further strengthening of cyber defence capabilities. Specific initiatives include the establishment of a 24-hour national cyber situational centre and more generally an expansion of capabilities in the Danish Defence Intelligence Service, including in relation to influence operations.

2018-08-10

Space warfare

Denmark has a nanosatellite capable of gathering imagery and signals intelligence (from ships and aircraft) in the Arctic. The satellite was launched in February 2018; it is Denmark's first satellite.

Meanwhile, Denmark procures most of its needed space capabilities through partnerships with other countries and private companies. Most importantly, Denmark is a partner in the US-led Wideband Global Satcom system.

2018-08-10

Nuclear capabilities

Denmark has no offensive nuclear capability. The country signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in July 1968 and ratified it shortly afterwards in January 1969. It also ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty in September 1998.

Danish civilian nuclear research and development began in the late 1950s, based around three reactors at Roskilde. These have all since been decommissioned. It is illegal to produce nuclear energy in Denmark after the Danish parliament passed legislation prohibiting it in 1985.

2018-08-10

Biological capabilities

Denmark has no offensive biological weapons capability. The Danish pharmaceutical industry is among the world's leaders in capability, but there is nothing to suggest it has any capability or intention to produce prohibited stocks of biological toxins for military use.

Denmark signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in April 1972 and ratified it in March 1973.

2018-08-10


Chemical capabilities

Denmark has no offensive chemical weapons capability. The country signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on 14 January 1993 and ratified it on 13 July 1995.

As is the case with most technically advanced countries, Denmark does have a chemical industry that gives it the theoretical possibility of procuring chemical weapons. It also maintains chemical defence capabilities.



DENMARK



GOVERNMENT

Chief of State

Queen Margrethe II

Head of Government

Prime Minister Lars LOKKE RASMUSSEN

Government Type

parliamentary constitutional monarchy

Capital

Copenhagen

Legislature

unicameral People's Assembly or Folketing
(179 seats)

Judiciary

Supreme Court (consists of the court president and 18 judges)

Ambassador to US

Ambassador Lars Gert LOSE

US Ambassador

Ambassador Carla SANDS

GEOGRAPHY

Area

Total: 43,094 sq km

Land: 42,434 sq km

Water: 660 sq km

Climate

temperate; humid and overcast; mild, windy winters and cool summers

Natural Resources

petroleum, natural gas, fish, arable land, salt, limestone, chalk, stone, gravel and sand

ECONOMY

Economic Overview

this thoroughly modern market economy features advanced industry with world-leading firms in pharmaceuticals, maritime shipping, and renewable energy, a high-tech agricultural sector, a high standard of living, extensive government welfare measures, and an equitable distribution of income

GDP (Purchasing Power Parity)

\$287.8 billion (2017 est.)

GDP per capita (Purchasing Power Parity)

\$50,100 (2017 est.)

Exports

\$113.6 billion (2017 est.)

partners: Germany 15.5%, Sweden 11.6%, UK 8.2%, US 7.5%, Norway 6%, China 4.4%, Netherlands 4.4% (2017)

Imports

\$94.93 billion (2017 est.)

partners: Germany 21.3%, Sweden 11.9%, Netherlands 7.8%, China 7.1%, Norway 6.3%, Poland 4% (2017)

PEOPLE & SOCIETY

Population

5.8 million (July 2018 est.)

Population Growth

0.59% (2018 est.)

Ethnicity

Danish (includes Greenlandic (who are predominantly Inuit) and Faroese) 86.3%, Turkish 1.1%, other 12.6% (largest groups are Polish, Syrian, German, Iraqi, and Romanian) (2018 est.)

note: data represent population by ancestry

Language

Danish, Faroese, Greenlandic (an Inuit dialect), German (small minority)


Religion

Evangelical Lutheran (official) 74.8%, Muslim 5.3%, other 19.9%

Urbanization

urban population: 87.9% of total population (2018)

rate of urbanization: 0.51% annual rate of change (2015-20 est.)





Boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative.

BACKGROUND

Land and Climate

Located between the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, Denmark is a flat country with low to gently rolling plains. It consists of more than 400 islands, of which only about 70 are inhabited. Its total area is similar to Switzerland's, or twice the size of the U.S. state of Massachusetts. The largest landmasses include Jylland (Jutland), connected to the European continent, and the islands of Sjælland (Zealand), Fyn (Funen), Lolland, Falster, and Bornholm. Fertile agricultural land dominates the country's landscape of moors, lakes, and woodlands.

Moderated by the warm Gulf Stream, Denmark's temperate maritime climate is usually cool, humid, and overcast. Winters are windy but mild compared to other Scandinavian countries. In January, high temperatures average about 34°F (2°C). Summers are cool; July daily highs average 72°F (22°C).

History

Early Monarchy

Kongeriget Danmark (the Kingdom of Denmark) has been a monarchy since its founding. During the rule of the Vikings (ca. 750–1035), Denmark was a great power. The first known king was Gorm the Old, who ruled in the early 900s. His son Harald Bluetooth united the country under Christianity and ruled in the latter half of the 900s. Gorm's grandson, Canute the Great, commanded a vast empire, which included England until 1035.

Constitutional Monarchy

Queen Margrethe I united Denmark, Norway, and Sweden in the Union of Kalmar in 1397. Sweden left the union in 1523; Norway left in 1814. King Frederik VII signed a liberal constitution in 1849, making the country a constitutional monarchy rather than an autocracy. Some territory was lost to Prussia (Germany) in 1864, but the country remained stable.

20th Century Changes

Denmark was neutral during World War I but was occupied by Nazi Germany during World War II. Denmark became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 and the European Community (now European Union, or EU) in 1973. During the 1970s and 1980s, Denmark concentrated on maintaining its social welfare system, broadening economic opportunities, and increasing the standard of living. During the mid-1980s, Denmark became interested in environmental protection and has since passed some of the world's toughest environmental legislation.

European Union Relations

In 1992, Denmark rejected the Maastricht Treaty, which would have led to a common currency and stronger political ties within the EU. The following year, voters accepted a modified version of the treaty, allowing Denmark to remain exempt from the European single currency (the euro) but still be involved in European citizenship, a unified European military, and the elimination of borders. Danes were somewhat skeptical and fearful that integration would cause small countries like theirs to be overpowered by larger EU nations.

CultureGrams™

Nevertheless, Denmark joined the Schengen agreement in 1996, functionally eliminating its borders with Europe. In 2011, Denmark reimposed border controls in order to better control illegal immigration.

Tensions with Islamic World

Denmark was an original member of the coalition that invaded Iraq in 2003 but withdrew its troops in August 2007 in accordance with waning public support for the conflict. Anti-Danish sentiment broke out across the Muslim world in 2006 following the publication of a series of cartoons satirically depicting the Muslim prophet Muhammad in a Danish newspaper. In 2008, 2010, and 2013, plots to attack the artist and the newspaper responsible for the most controversial cartoon were foiled.

Current Priorities and Concerns

Denmark's current priorities include balancing the national budget, reducing foreign debt, increasing employment, and protecting the environment. Responding to potential threats to its interests in Greenland and the Faroe Islands, Denmark announced its plans in 2009 to expand its military presence in and around the Arctic. Melting ice floes near Greenland and the Faroe Islands has made access to this area's natural resources attractive to nearby nations. Hoping to lead the way in promoting greater international cooperation on climate policy, Denmark hosted a global summit on climate change in late 2009.

Recent Events and Trends

- World's happiest country: In March 2016, Denmark was ranked the world's happiest country in the United Nations' annual World Happiness Report. Other top countries included Switzerland, Iceland, Norway, Finland, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Australia, and Sweden. Researchers found that social factors such as freedom, access to health care, and economic prosperity contributed to happy populations.
- Immigration law: In January 2017, the Danish parliament passed a law allowing border police to seize valuable assets from asylum seekers. The law was aimed at reducing the number of asylum seekers entering the country. Denmark has relatively strict immigration laws compared to other European nations.
- Face veils: In August 2018, a controversial law banning the wearing of face veils such as the *burqa* and *niqab* in public spaces took effect. Supporters of the law claim that the ban upholds Denmark's tradition of promoting secular and democratic values. Critics of the law, however, argue that the ban targets Muslim women by violating their freedoms of expression and religion. In recent years, concerns over the integration of immigrants into Danish culture has been a divisive political issue.

THE PEOPLE

Population

The majority of Denmark's population is Scandinavian, but other ethnic groups include Inuit, Faroese, and German. Due to the rise in immigration over the last few

Denmark

decades, the population also includes Turkish, Iranian, and Somali minorities. A slight increase in births has occurred over the past few years. About one-fifth of Danes live in greater Copenhagen, which has more than a million inhabitants. Other large cities include Aarhus (with over 330,000 people), Aalborg (over 210,000 people), and Odense (over 200,000 people). Excellent access to health care, education, and economic prosperity afford Danish men and women many opportunities.

Language

Dansk (Danish) is the official language. Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian are closely related languages. In fact, Danish was the official language in Norway until the early 20th century, several decades after Norway gained independence from Denmark. Today, Swedes and Norwegians can still understand written Danish. However, spoken Danish is more difficult for them to understand because of differences in pronunciation and intonation. Danes also incorporate more Germanic words than Swedish speakers do. Members of a very small German-speaking minority live along the border with Germany, but they also speak Danish. English is widely understood and spoken; in fact, students start to learn English in the first grade. German is a popular language to study in school.

Common Danish Phrases

English	Danish
Please	

Country and Development Data	
Capital	Copenhagen
Population	5,809,502 (rank=113)
Area (sq. mi.)	16,639 (rank=130)
Area (sq. km.)	43,094
Human Development Index	10 of 188 countries
Gender Inequality Index	2 of 188 countries
GDP (PPP), per capita	\$50,100
Adult Literacy	99%
Infant Mortality	3 per 1,000 births
Life Expectancy	79 (male); 83 (female)
Currency	Danish Krone

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Denmark country profile

28 June 2019



The Kingdom of Denmark has, despite its relatively small size, punched above its weight internationally.

Vikings raiding from Denmark and the other Nordic nations changed the course of 9th- and 10th-century European history; in the Middle Ages, the Union of Kalmar united all of Scandinavia under Danish leadership.

In more recent times, Denmark has developed a highly-competitive service-based economy with high employment levels and a generous social security system.

The Social Democrats led coalition governments for most of the post-war period until the 1980s, consolidating the country's liberal reputation, although concerns at high taxation levels and tension over immigration have put the centre-right in office for several long periods since then.

- Read [more country profiles](#) - Profiles by **BBC Monitoring**

FACTS

Kingdom of Denmark

Capital: Copenhagen

Population 5.6 million

Area 43,098 sq km (16,640 sq miles)

Major language Danish

Major religion Christianity

Life expectancy 77 years (men), 81 years (women)

Currency krone

UN, World Bank

Getty Images

LEADERS

Queen: Margrethe II



AFP/GETTY IMAGES

Queen Margrethe became monarch only because a change in the law in 1953 allowed a woman to ascend to the throne. She succeeded on the death of her father, King Frederick IX, in 1972.

The queen is a skilled artist, clothes designer and translator. She speaks English, French and German, in addition to her native Danish, and her work as an illustrator has been widely published. Prince Henrik died in 2018.

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Prime Minister: Mette Frederiksen

DAVUT COLAK/ANADOLU/GETTY IMAGES

Social Democrat leader Mette Frederiksen led her party back to power in the June 2019 general election, ending four years of centre-right rule.

She campaigned on a combination of traditional centre-left calls for stronger welfare policies, combined with a promise to be tough on immigration.

At 41, she is the country's youngest prime minister, and will head a minority government.

She took over the party leadership in 2015, when her predecessor and Denmark first woman prime minister, Helle Thorning-Schmidt, lost power.

MEDIA



AFP/GETTY IMAGES

Public Danmarks Radio (DR) runs national TV networks and national and regional radio.

TV2 is a government-owned commercial station. The main privately-owned TVs broadcast via digital terrestrial, satellite and cable.

Freedom of expression is provided for in law.

Around 97% of Danes are online. Facebook is the top social media destination.

- Read [full media profile](#)

TIMELINE

Some key dates in Denmark's history:

10th century - Kingdom of Denmark unified and Christianity introduced.

1397 - Union of Kalmar unites Denmark, Sweden and Norway under a single monarch. Denmark is the dominant power.

1729 - Greenland becomes Danish province.



AFP/GETTY IMAGES

1814 - Denmark cedes Norway to Sweden.

1849 - Denmark becomes constitutional monarchy; two-chamber parliament established.

1914-18 - Denmark is neutral during World War I.

1930s - Welfare state established by governments dominated by social democrats.

1939 - Denmark signs 10-year non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany.

1940 - Nazi invasion meets virtually no initial resistance. Government accepts occupation in exchange for measure of control over domestic affairs.

1943 - A determined campaign by the Danish resistance prompts Germany to take over full control of Danish affairs. Thousands of Danish Jews manage to escape to Sweden.

1945 - Germany surrenders and occupation ends. Denmark recognises Iceland's independence.

1949 - Denmark joins Nato.

1952 - Denmark becomes founder member of Nordic Council.

1959 - Denmark joins European Free Trade Association.

1973 - Denmark joins the European Economic Community.

1979 - Greenland is granted home rule. Denmark retains control over Greenland's foreign affairs and defence.

2000 - Danes reject adoption of the euro as their national currency.