This is the Fourth Edition, written by the Deployable Training Division (DTD) of the Joint Staff J7 and published under the auspices of the Joint Staff J7. This edition incorporates Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recent guidance and publications together with emergent insights and best practices observed by the DTD.

Previous editions were written and distributed by the former United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) which was disestablished on 31 August 2011. General Gary E. Luck, USA (Ret) led development of the first two editions of this publication as an employee of Northrop Grumman Corporation supporting the former United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). General Luck subsequently supported development of the third and fourth editions as a Senior Fellow for the National Defense University in support of the Pinnacle, Capstone, and Keystone programs.

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PREFACE

The J7 supports the CJCS and the Joint Warfighter through joint force development in order to advance the operational effectiveness of the current and future joint force. This paper, written by the Deployable Training Division (DTD), provides an umbrella joint insights document that helps inform both the joint warfighters and key functions within the J7, notably lessons learned, doctrine, education, and future joint force development. In addition to this paper, the DTD has also developed more detailed “focus” papers that share insights and best practices for various specific challenges (such as mission command and cross-domain synergy, assessment, CCIR development and reporting, and lethal and nonlethal integration) observed at joint headquarters. All of these papers are unclassified for broad accessibility. See the previous page for access details. I commend these papers for your reading.

The DTD gains insights on operational matters through regular contact and dialogue with combatant and joint task force commanders and their staffs as they plan, prepare for, and conduct operations. The DTD observer/trainers collect and compare practices among the different headquarters, draw out and refine “insights” and “best practices,” publish them, and share them across the operational, training, lessons learned, doctrine, and joint development communities.

This paper incorporates many of the team’s observations over the past years of ongoing operations, particularly in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Haiti, Iraq, the Pacific, and the Horn of Africa, and joint exercises in the Americas, the Pacific, Europe, and Korea.

We are fortunate to have several senior flag officers, active and retired, assist in development and vetting of these insights and best practice papers. Of note, General (Retired) Gary Luck (Senior Fellow at the National Defense University) and Brigadier General Brad Becker, the Deputy Director J7 for Joint Training, both play an active part. They not only help keep the DTD trainers at the theater-strategic and operational level, but also ensure that they retain a commander-centric perspective in these papers.

Please pass on your comments to DTD’s POC Mr. Mike Findlay so that we can improve this paper. Email address is: js.dsc.j7.mbx.joint-training@mail.mil.

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1.0 INTRODUCTION. Our military has significantly evolved over the past 10 years as we have adapted to an increasingly complex environment in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, the Pacific, the Horn of Africa, Haiti, Korea, as well as supporting civil authorities in the United States. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff lays this out in his February 2012 “Strategic Direction to the Joint Force” paper.¹

- Complex and Changing Environment: Globalization, the interconnected information environment, non-traditional adversaries, and our changing military capabilities have significantly changed today’s security environment and the way we operate. We recognize that many of today’s conflicts are rooted in the human dimension, and defy full understanding and scientifically derived solution sets.

- Unified Action: Commanders have experienced the absolute requirement (and challenges) for unified action - working inclusively with our United States Government (USG) and other mission partners to understand and work together in this complex environment. We see the challenges that our joint commanders face in working with the many mission partners as they conduct unified action. We must be able to integrate our military actions as part of a comprehensive, whole of government(s) approach to achieve strategic objectives while accounting for the very real capacity limitations of us and our partners.

- Commander-centricity: Our observations clearly reinforce the absolute importance of commanders’ guidance and intent, applying their experience, instinct and intuition in exercising command. Mission-type orders that lay out the what versus the how are important in today’s environment. Mission-type orders provide subordinates the requisite latitude to adapt to continually changing situations. This broad latitude for subordinates is essential; we must guard against the tendency and lure of technology to entice us to attempt to scientifically model outcomes and centrally control operations. We have seen that successful commanders exercise mission command as described in JP 3-0² and the CICS April 2012 White Paper,³ building personal relationships, inspiring trust and confidence, leveraging the analytical ability of their staffs, prioritizing limited resources, and empowering disciplined initiative of their subordinates. However, we also continue to see a tendency among some commanders to control subordinates to the point where they unintentionally compromise agility and speed.


¹ General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman’s Strategic Direction to the Joint Force, 6 February 2012.
² Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0, (Washington, DC: 11 August 2011).
capstone concepts, but also recognizes that much of the nature of conflict in the world is enduring. War remains a clash between hostile, independent, and irreconcilable wills each trying to dominate the other through violence. Enemies will continue to search for, find, and exploit U.S. vulnerabilities. Even when waged with increasingly sophisticated technologies, the conduct of military operations remains a fundamentally human enterprise. Finally, the concept recognizes that military force is only one element of national power. In many cases strategic success will turn on our ability to operate in concert with the rest of the U.S. government, allied governments and their armed forces, and nongovernmental partners.\textsuperscript{5}

We continue to see two major catalysts for change: globalization and the information revolution. These catalysts have contributed to the complexity, uncertainty, and rate of change within the environment and have changed the way that both the adversary and the United States military operate across the spectrum of conflict.

- Globalization, the world’s open economic system of interdependent global markets, global communication systems, ubiquitous media presence, and competition for scarce resources have all broadened security responsibilities beyond solely a military concern.
- Today’s interconnected information environment allows unprecedented sharing of information both for us and for our adversaries and has contributed to today’s increased rate of change. It has changed the nature and urgency by which we engage the media, influence different audiences, and share information within and between headquarters.
- Our adversaries will continue to counter our conventional military superiority by conducting varying forms of warfare in their struggle for legitimacy, power, and influence over the relevant populations.
- We see the value of an expeditionary mindset and the need to synergize our actions, both within the joint force and also with our partners, to best achieve our common objectives.

The combination of these and other factors has resulted in the recognition that we need to strive for a more integrated approach to national security planning and execution which seeks to integrate military planning and operations with those of other government and non-government agencies and organizations, together with our international partners to achieve objectives.

b. Unified Action. To a greater degree than ever, diplomatic, informational, and economic factors, as well as the military, (our elements of national power) affect and contribute to national security in this complex environment. We continually hear our operational commanders say they cannot achieve strategic objectives solely through military action alone, but must depend on the integrated efforts of a wide range of external organizations to achieve success.

Unified Action - A Comprehensive, Whole of Government(s) Approach. Military operations must be carried out as part of a larger comprehensive, whole of government(s) approach to problem solving. This includes not only our USG agency partners, but also the organizations of other nations and the private and non-governmental sector. We observe several truisms:

- The need for continual dialogue with national leadership in understanding, framing and reframing the environment and the problem, assisting in the clarification of national strategic objectives, policy decisions, messages and development of feasible courses of action consistent with direction and available resources.

\textsuperscript{5} Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020, p 1.
• Recognition of the complex, interconnected nature of the environment and the need to continually work to better understand it and how it is changing.
• The need for inclusion with our mission partners in gaining a better common understanding of the environment, the various perspectives, problem, desired end states, and necessary conditions to promote harmonized action. Then the follow through – working together to get it done while recognizing and working through any potential shortfalls in capacity and policy.
• The ultimate accountability of the commander for success regardless of the challenges in clear direction, resources provided, and the degree of support by others.

Inclusiveness. We have observed numerous best practices in the area of inclusiveness with our interagency and multinational partners – whom the Chairman refers to as mission partners:
• Inclusiveness in understanding the complex environment and the problem: The environment is more than a military battlefield; it’s a human-based network that is beyond a military-only ability to fully understand, visualize, and influence. We need to understand and consider the many perspectives of external stakeholders to perform well in this environment. They can help in defining the problem and visualizing/describing the way ahead.
• Inclusiveness in design, planning, and during execution: The best plans and operations are those fully integrated with the other elements of national and international power – from the very beginning of design.
• Inclusiveness in assessment: External stakeholders have unique perspectives and expertise and together they help build a more enriched overall assessment. Including the perspectives and equities of these stakeholders from the beginning in assessment, estimates, and planning allow for a more complete understanding of the nature of the problem and how to possibly solve it. This needs to occur even when the joint force command is not able to communicate directly with the stakeholder(s).

Synergy and Harmony. We fight as one team with our joint, interagency, and multinational partners. These are not just words or a slogan; we depend on each other to succeed in today’s complex environment. Such interdependence may be viewed by some as a risk, for we are depending on capabilities that we don’t command and control. However, access to others’ unique capabilities is often essential to mission accomplishment. The joint force commander (JFC) achieves synergy and harmony among the various joint force components through building of trust and confidence to mitigate this risk, and deliberately crafts the task organization and command relationships to promote synergy. The challenges of gaining synergy and harmony with other USG agencies and multinational partners are somewhat greater than with our joint partners because there may be no clear authority directing a clear relationship with them to mitigate risks of interdependence. We see commanders mitigating this risk through development of personal relationships to build trust, use of liaison elements, and conscious decisions on the degree of reliance upon those stakeholders for critical tasks. In this manner, influence replaces authorities in mission accomplishment.

Observed best practices continue to reinforce the value of gaining synergy and harmony within this interdependent framework with other USG agencies, international partners, and within the joint force. We’ve observed several best practices for achieving synergy:
• Development of strong personal relationships and the requisite trust and confidence that you and your partners have a broad understanding of each other’s perspectives and objectives. Some leaders use terms like “HANDCON” and “WARCON.”
• The higher commander’s setting of conditions by establishment of clear command relationships, particularly supported/supporting command relationships between components of the joint and coalition force, together with agreed upon coordination and collaboration measures to achieve unity of effort with our interagency partners.
• Recognition that you don’t need to own your partners’ assets to leverage their capabilities if you have developed the requisite personal and command relationships.

c. Commander-Centric Operations. The commander’s role in command - applying the Art of War - in this complex environment is essential. Without exception, we find that commander-centric organizations outperform staff-centric organizations. Clear commander’s guidance and intent, enriched by the commander’s experience, instinct, and intuition are ingredients found in high-performing units. Insights for commanders:
• “The more things change, the more they stay the same” in leadership. “…Military operations… [remain] subject to frequent and often unpredictable change, [are] unforgivingly brutal, and intensely demanding of leaders.”
• Personal relationships are essential and are the foundation for successful operations in a joint, interagency, and multinational world. Build these relationships, and foster trust and confidence with your partners. We will discuss trust building techniques later.
• Stay at the appropriate level, i.e., the theater-strategic level for Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) and operational level for JTFs, to set conditions for subordinates’ success. Set conditions through building trust and confidence, sharing understanding, providing mission type orders and intent, empowering subordinates, prioritizing scarce resources, instilling an inclusive atmosphere, and establishing clear command relationships.
• Commander’s vision, guidance and intent provide clarity in a dynamic, ambiguous environment. Mission-type orders remain the key to success.
• Rely on your instinct and intuition while recognizing and leveraging the value of the staff to assist in understanding a complex environment.
• Focus on unity of effort, not unity of command. Recognize the reality of different capabilities, perspectives and goals of your partners. Strive to arrive at a set of common desired outcomes to promote unity of effort.
• Build a command climate and organizational capability that fosters inclusion with your joint, interagency, and multinational partners in planning and operations.
• Decentralize and empower where appropriate and possible to retain agility and speed of action while recognizing the need to retain centralized control of some operations in some situations. Instill the importance of disciplined initiative by subordinates. Understand how different subordinates may “fight” their capabilities based on their different philosophies and people.
• Too much organizational, personnel, and process structure in a headquarters can impede information sharing and decision-making. Lean headquarters seem to stay in their lane at the operational level and continually assess requirements to retain focus on the important things.
• Commanders working with their staffs, receiving benefit of their analysis, and giving guidance and staying with and guiding them, get to better solutions in a fraction of the time.

2.0 TODAY’S ENVIRONMENT AND THE NEED FOR A UNIFIED ACTION APPROACH.

2.1 The Complex Environment. Globalization, the interconnected information environment, and the changing nature of adversaries continue to make today’s environment complex. World events have always presented militaries with both complexity and unpredictability. Today's environment sustains this norm, but adds the unprecedented speed at which events unfold and information travels. The pace of change is accelerating.

Globalization. Thomas Friedman defines globalization as “the dispersion and ‘democratization’ of technology, information, and finance.” Open economic systems allow for increased trade on a global scale and global brands foster familiarity and interdependence of economies and institutions. Communications, transportation, and information technology, together with this interdependency of economies, connects activity around the world all the time. Events in one region have immediate impacts in other regions.

Globalization has also brought to the forefront other actors such as violent extremists, ethnic groups, transnational, non-state sponsored terrorism, and organized crime organizations. Globalization has precipitated more visible clashes of ideology through much fuller awareness of contrasts and gaps in cultural, religious, and value differences. There is more blurring of internal and external threats, and diminishment of traditional notions and authorities of national sovereignty.

Globalization also has security ramifications. Our world is significantly more interdependent, and more vulnerable to global and regional issues such as oil flow, terrorism, cyber threats, economic crises, and population displacements. Security in the global environment can no longer be guaranteed by military means alone; it must also focus on using all elements of National and International Power – Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic (DIME).

Interconnected Information Environment. The information environment has clearly changed the way our world operates. We have unprecedented ability to transmit and receive data, and it is growing exponentially, both in speed and volume. The media has instantaneous ability to broadcast events around the world, affecting audiences globally. Governments have access to information much more quickly and may unilaterally make national level policy decisions that have an effect on our operations. Our adversaries also have the ability to acquire and share information much more quickly and in some cases surreptitiously. This interconnected information environment has affected us in many ways: our command and control systems have changed; we have unparalleled situational awareness; and we are engaged in a full-fledged, real time fight in the arena of ideas and influence.

Challenges: Together with the benefits of the changing information environment have come many challenges. First, the amount of information often exceeds our ability to manage, fully understand, and leverage. Vital information is often camouflaged or buried in the volume of.

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transmitted data and the human brain has not grown exponentially to keep abreast of the flood of information. Second, not everyone is equal in their ability to send, receive, and understand data. The pipes are different; tactical units are often not able to receive and process what higher headquarters can pump out from their larger headquarters and more sophisticated systems. Third, we recognize our responsibility to better balance the need to share with need to know based on the realities of working with our many partners while needing to protect sensitive material, sources and methods given the potential vulnerability of our networks.

The change in the information environment has also changed expectations. We’re expected to keep up with or beat the virally rapid and often unverified media reports in an effort to be first with the truth. Additionally, there is an almost insatiable demand for information from the media, national leadership, and higher headquarters which has the potential to overwhelm operational and tactical headquarters.

**Adversary.** The CCJO attempts to describe the security environment. It addresses several persistent trends: “the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the rise of modern competitor states, violent extremism, regional instability, transnational criminal activity, and competition for resources. Armed conflicts will be inevitable in such an environment—as will be opportunities for cooperation and peaceful competition.”

The CCJO also anticipates differences going forward. It states, “the diffusion of advanced technology in the global economy means that middleweight militaries and non-state actors can now muster weaponry once available only to superpowers. The proliferation of cyber and space weapons, precision munitions, ballistic missiles, and anti-access and area denial capabilities will grant more adversaries the ability to inflict devastating losses. These threats place our access to the global commons at risk, target our forces as they deploy to the operational area, and can even threaten forces at their points of origin. Meanwhile, adversaries continue to explore asymmetric ways to employ both crude and advanced technology to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities. Consequently, the capability advantage that U.S. forces have had over many potential adversaries may narrow in the future. Adversaries will not only have more advanced capabilities in every domain [but many] will have the ability to simultaneously fight across multiple domains.”

Taken together, these factors give rise to a future security environment likely to be more unpredictable, complex, and dangerous than even today. The accelerating rates of change present in so many aspects of this future security environment will require greater speed in the planning and conduct of

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9 Ibid, p 2.
military operations. Once in a fight, adversary capabilities and tactics will also shift more quickly.

**Visualization.** We are challenged in both understanding and sharing our understanding of an ever-changing complex environment. The more traditional, military-centric, analytical approach that worked so well in the Cold War doesn’t allow us to accurately analyze, describe, and visualize today’s networked, adaptable, asymmetric adversary nor the adversary’s linkages with the environment in which he operates. This adversary may have no single identifiable source of power. Rather, because of globalization, the information environment, and, in some cases, the non-state characteristic of our adversary, this adversary can only be analyzed, described, and holistically attacked in a broader context through a prism of largely non-military variables.¹⁰

**Understanding and Analyzing the Operational Environment.** Successful joint headquarters we’ve observed have taken a broader perspective in understanding and visualizing the environment to assist in campaign and operational level planning. They have all placed more emphasis on an expanded description of the environment beyond that solely of a conventional military battlefield view to a more multi-dimensional view. The need to view the world as complex and interconnected is becoming essential for many disciplines. Thomas Friedman described this well, “For me, adding the financial markets dimension to politics, culture, and national security was like putting on a new pair of glasses and suddenly looking at the world in 4-D. I saw news stories that I would never have recognized as news stories before... causal chains of events that I never could have identified before. I saw invisible hands and handcuffs impeding leaders and nations from doing things that I never imagined before.”¹¹

Successful commanders understand this reality. They recognize the importance of understanding the various aspects of the environment—many use some form of Political, Military, Economic, Social, Informational, and Infrastructure (PMESII) variables to view and describe the broader aspects of the environment.¹² Additionally, they recognize the complexity, unpredictability and changing aspects of the interrelationships between these variables of friendly, adversary, and neutral or unaligned groups.

The use of this broader paradigm enables a shared visualization of the complex environment across both military and non-military audiences. This shared visualization takes into account the many different perspectives of our various mission partners, and is the first key step in promoting some degree of cohesive action among the many mission partners.

In the past, some have argued that our adversary could be precisely defined and modeled through systems analysis and that we could predict their behavior. We, along with many operational warfighters, disagree with this scientifically-based predictability point of view. Today’s environment is far too complex and continually changing in response to ongoing actions for any precise degree of reliable modeling and deterministic prediction of outcomes. That said, we have

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¹⁰ We use the term “variables” in lieu of the former use of the term “systems” to emphasize the changing nature of these variables, and to move away from any preconception that we can fully deconstruct and fully model the environment.


¹² We use these variables and the acronym PMESII simply as one way to illustrate this broader view of the environment. These variables could be described differently and include other aspects.
seen the value in using a systems perspective and some form of systems analysis to better analyze, visualize, and gain a baseline appreciation of the environment, and then organize this information in a form useful to the commander and stakeholders. We have also seen its value in helping to project - not predict - likely enemy courses of action, and identify centers of gravity and possible key nodes and links as decisive points for action. In all cases though, continued feedback and assessment remains critical to deepen our understanding of the changing environment as we continue to adjust our actions to remain on course.

2.2 Unified Action. Every headquarters we visit identifies the need for continuing efforts to maintain effective unity of effort with both our USG agencies and multinational partners as key to achieving success in this complex environment. The military can’t do it alone and they recognize the value of harmonizing and synchronizing military actions with the actions of other instruments of national and international power. As stated in the CCJO; “strategic success will turn on our ability to operate in concert with the rest of the U.S. government, allied governments and their armed forces, and nongovernmental partners.”

We have observed that commanders using an inclusive approach by working closely with stakeholders (both interagency and multinational partners) are most effective in achieving this unified action. These commanders understand the different perspectives and cultures among both our interagency and multinational partners, and focus on gaining unity of effort.

The term Unified Action in military usage is a broad term referring to the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Within this general category of operations, subordinate commanders (CDRs) of assigned or attached forces conduct either single-Service or joint operations to support the overall operation. The joint force commander should set the conditions for success by subordinate commanders to accomplish Unified Action. This includes clear delineation of responsibilities and direct liaison authority for both the higher HQ and subordinate HQ’s coordination with U.S. and multinational agencies, as well as with other external organizations.

Unified action synchronizes, coordinates, and/or integrates joint, single-Service, and multinational operations with the operations of other USG agencies, NGOs and IGOs (e.g., United Nations (UN)), and the private sector to achieve unity of effort. That said, the fact remains that for the most part, the interagency and our multinational partners may not always have the desired capacity. In the absence of this capacity, the joint force sometimes assumes responsibility for tasks that may not be habitually military tasks.

A Comprehensive Whole of Government Approach. Solutions to today’s complex problems require changing our perspective from that of friendly versus enemy military warfare (military

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14 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Pub 1 (Washington, DC: 25 March 2013) pg xiii.
on military thinking) to the use of all elements of national power operating across all facets of the environment to achieve our objectives. Commanders are thinking this way, and are developing and using end states, objectives, and conditions that address the broader environment by using some form of PMESII construct as a means to provide common visualization and better achieve unity of effort with our partners. Combatant commanders, in conjunction with Department of State (DOS), USAID, and other USG agencies determine how to coordinate operations, actions, and activities at the theater strategic and operational level to achieve strategic objectives. We attempt to visually (and simplistically) depict this and some key insights in the adjacent figure recognizing its much greater complexity in the real world.

**Four key insights (see figure):**

1) **Dialogue:** We need continual dialogue with national and international leadership to ascertain the “real” (and often changing) problem, clarify/develop national objectives, desired end states, risks, and feasible policy direction. We see continuing commander and staff dialogue with national and international leaders, and then translating what they see, hear, and feel into solid, clear Combatant Command level objectives. This takes a lot of effort and never really ends. National and international positions and objectives are continually changing and our theater-strategic headquarters recognize this and maintain ongoing dialogue to ensure they remain nested within these national and international objectives. *(The Ends)*

2) **Analysis:** We recognize the complex, interconnected, and largely unpredictable nature of the environment and the need to work to better understand it and the problem we’re tasked to confront. We need to be inclusive in gaining a common understanding of this environment. This combined analysis helps provide a common visualization and better achieves unity of effort with our partners – it bridges the gap between all elements of national and international power. *(The Ways)*

3) **Actions:** We strive to harmonize military actions with those of our stakeholders. The use of mission-type orders, coupled with guidance and intent, empower decentralized military operations that are synergized with those of our partners. We continually see the importance of establishing a command climate and an organizational capability that facilitates inclusion by all members of the joint, interagency, and multinational team. *(The Means)*

4) **Accountability:** We’ve seen over and over again that the combatant and JTF commander will ultimately be held accountable for success in the end regardless of earlier higher direction, lack of resources, or absence of support by others.

**Interorganizational Coordination.** We’ve observed numerous best practices, all centered on an atmosphere of inclusiveness, in how operational commanders and our mission partners work together to achieve objectives, often in coordination with other organizations. Our interaction with other USG agencies (defined as interagency coordination) is different in domestic and foreign operations. We address USG interagency coordination for domestic and foreign operations along with insights and best practices more fully in a separate interorganizational...
coordination focus paper. Interorganizational coordination goes beyond that with only USG agencies to include other mission partners and stakeholders such as multinational, IGO, NGO and private sector organizations.

There are challenges associated with unified action and interorganizational coordination. Our USG interagency partners frequently do not have the budget, the number of personnel, or the capacity of the military. Because of this, the military is often tasked to fill roles it is not habitually accustomed to perform. The development of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan can be seen as one example of leveraging military capacity to support the more traditionally civilian task of reconstruction and development.

USG interagency coordination is not as easy as theory would suggest – the agencies have different authorities, different priorities, different organizations, different cultures and different capabilities. National level direction may not always be sufficiently clear to prevent differences in interpretation of national goals and end states. However, experience continues to reinforce the obvious – that we’re all on the same team and everyone is trying to do the right thing to support national policy within a unity of effort framework.

We’ve observed the following insights and best practices gained from our joint commanders and the interagency, intergovernmental, and non-governmental stakeholders.

- Today’s complex environment demands Unified Action to achieve National Objectives.
- Personal Relationships with stakeholders are the key to generating Unified Action.
- Embrace a “C5” mindset (Command, Control, Cooperation, Collaboration, and Coordination) to facilitate unity of effort.
- Understand partners’ roles, authorities, perspectives, capabilities, and processes in both foreign and domestic operations, and how they differ from U.S. Armed Forces.
- Think inclusion rather than exclusion with stakeholders during planning, execution, and assessment. Recognize that this has significant classification and information sharing implications. Balance need to know with need to share. Whenever possible, write for release.
- Realize that the military is often in the supporting role to other agencies, particularly to the Department of Homeland Security in Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations and the Department of State in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations.

Multinational Operations. We are and will continue operating together with our multinational partners. They have become an inseparable part of our way of operating in both peace and war. We normally think of multinational operations in terms of the United States leading, and focus on working through the necessary command relationships, caveats, and information sharing with our multinational forces. However, we can also be a subordinate part of a coalition force.

Some insights on multinational operations:

- Unity of effort, interoperability and resourcing will always be a challenge.
- Key to multinational operations are personal relationships and trust. Coalitions are built on personal relationships, mutual trust and confidence between partners. Focus on building these at the earliest opportunity, ideally during the pre-deployment training phase. Personal relationships will overcome the bureaucratic impediments that can threaten synergy and harmony with your partners. Your coalition partners can communicate with and influence
their national governments more quickly and effectively than you can through formal channels.

- Keep a “one-team, one-fight” mentality. Don’t allow anything to jeopardize the strength of the coalition. This requires a command climate and organizational design that facilitates inclusion and partnership. Socialize mission tasks before final determination and publishing in formal orders. Also advise partners when work must be done in isolation for interests of national security and understand when they must do the same.

- Caveats will always exist among the forces, including caveats on U.S. forces. These caveats form the conditions for national commitment to a particular operation or to any operation, and normally have their roots in the internal policies and politics of the individual states. Understanding these caveats and finding ways to usefully employ all multinational forces under an operational command is an essential part of multinational command. It is clearly more effective to know the impacts of national caveats early in the planning process.

- Early collaborative planning between partners is essential to successful operations. Leverage the unique skill sets and capabilities of each nation’s force within the coalition. A simple planning reminder is C5: Command, Control, Cooperation, Collaboration, and Coordination.

- When preparing plans, briefs, standard operating procedures (SOPs), tactical directives, or other theater related correspondence, authors should consider how to best “write for release” while also recognizing the need to protect sensitive information. A simple guideline for sharing is to ask who needs to know, who cannot see what I can see, and what is the risk versus gain of sharing this information. By addressing these issues as part of the document drafting process you will assist Foreign Disclosure Officers (FDOs) to move relevant material through the disclosure process more swiftly.

- Interoperability is far less technical than often portrayed. Coalition operations are human-based; don’t allow technical limitations of information sharing networks, tools, and databases fracture the coalition. Similarly, language differences can impose formidable challenges. Words have different meanings to different people. Select words carefully, avoid acronyms, and confirm understanding early rather than risk confusion at a later time.

- The successful conduct of multinational operations requires common understanding and application, wherever possible, of doctrine applicable across all services and levels of military activities. Even for those activities that are conducted regularly, adherence to common doctrine can expedite operational planning and execution, help to ensure that no pertinent factors are overlooked, and enhance interoperability and common understanding among units.

- Training is an important aspect in ensuring success in multinational operations. Think your way through the planning and conduct of combined exercises, particularly for those that involve activities for which a partnered nation may not have broad or in-depth experience, and develop common training objectives and standards.

- Recognize the important role of national command elements (NCE) and national support elements (NSE). “…Forces participating in a multinational operation will always have at least two distinct chains of command: a national chain of command and a multinational chain of command.”\textsuperscript{15} The U.S. national chain of command also includes the ADCON/Title 10 aspects of supporting the force with all of the attendant Theater Service Component responsibility linkages.

3.0 COMMAND.

3.1 Mission Command. The commander’s role employing mission command focusing on the Art of Command in this complex, unified action environment remains critical, regardless of the technological and informational improvements in what many refer to as the Science of Control. See the Chairman’s Mission Command White Paper and our March 2013 Mission Command and Cross-Domain Synergy Focus Paper.16

Command and control includes both the art of command and the science of control. The art of command is the creative and skillful use of authority, instinct, intuition, and experience in decision-making and leadership while the science of control are those systems and procedures that improve a commander’s understanding and support the execution of missions. We find that joint commanders must leverage both the art of command (focused on human interaction) and the science of control (focused on processes and technology) to best operate in today’s complex environment. As the Chairman notes in the White Paper, the burden is on the commander more than ever before due to the complexity and uncertainty of the environment, the tempo of operations, and the number of mission partners.

We’ve always stressed mission command or some similar derivative. Each Service emphasizes empowerment, initiative, agility, and decentralized execution. And they each uniquely apply this philosophy based on their Service culture and experience – just think of the Navy’s nightly intentions messages, the Air Force’s centralized planning – decentralized execution, and the Army and Marine Corps’ emphasis on commander’s intent.

The CCJO notes, “It is important to note that while mission command is the preferred command philosophy, it is not appropriate to all situations. Certain specific activities require more detailed control, such as the employment of nuclear weapons or other national capabilities, air traffic control, or activities that are fundamentally about the efficient synchronization of resources.”17 All commanders exercise varying degrees of control in their application of mission command based on several factors, such as the situation, activity, and capabilities of forces. One example of this is the positive and procedural control measures used within airspace control.18 We recognize that our pure technological and network advantages over the enemy can be eroded overnight especially at lower echelons. In practice, this translates to the need to empower subordinates to act without detailed instructions through the commander’s intent. Clear commander’s guidance and intent, enriched by the commander’s experience and intuition and quality staff analysis, together with shared understanding of the situation and problem, are attributes found in high-performing units. These units develop and implement ways to

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18 See AFDD-1 and JP 3-52 (Joint Airspace Control) for good discussions on the centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower and airspace control. AFDD-1 addresses how decentralized execution allows subordinate commanders to take the initiative and increase airspace control effectiveness through real-time integration during execution. JP 3-52 addresses the concept of positive and procedural control measures that are used in airspace control. Airspace control procedures provide flexibility through an effective combination of positive and procedural control measures.
continually update their understanding of the operational environment, assess their progress in achieving assigned objectives, and guide and set conditions for the success of their subordinates.

This section addresses two aspects of this: first, the importance of the development and maintenance of trust and personal relationships; second, the associated thinking through the desired degree of centralization/decentralization of operations (and authorities) based on the situation to best accomplish the mission.

**Trust and Personal Relationships.** We have spoken a lot about the importance of personal relationship and building trust and confidence, especially with new partners. Building trust with subordinates and partners may be the most important action that a commander will perform. Building this trust is a conscious act; it’s not something that just happens. You’ve got to plan for it, actively build it through your words and actions, and continue reinforcing it.

There’s a great deal of literature on building trust. Stephen M.R. Covey in “The Speed of Trust” addresses how trust affects two outcomes: speed and cost.\(^{19}\) When trust goes down, speed (e.g., speed to make decisions and subsequently act) goes down and cost (e.g., reporting requirements) goes up. Covey notes 13 behaviors that establish trust (talk straight, demonstrate respect, create transparency, right wrongs, show loyalty, deliver results, get better, confront reality, clarify expectations, practice accountability, listen first, keep commitments, and extend trust). These principles have direct applicability in military command.

History also provides us excellent examples of building trust and confidence as well as establishing the dialogue between the military and civilian leaders as discussed earlier in the comprehensive approach. For example, Joseph Glatthaar in “Partners in Command” addresses several key leadership relationships in the Civil War.\(^{20}\) He states, “political and military leaders had to collaborate, to establish effective partnerships that could translate strategic vision into battlefield execution.” The book is about those relationships and partnerships. It focuses on how the two commanders in chief interacted with their top field generals and how those generals worked with critical subordinates. Glatthaar brings out both good and bad relationships and how they directly affected mission success. He addresses the good relationships between Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson; Ulysses Grant and William Sherman; Grant and Abraham Lincoln. He also addresses bad relationships: between Lincoln and George McClellan, and Jefferson Davis and Joseph Johnston.

Trust and confidence are essential prerequisites to achieving synergy and harmony, both within the force, and also with our interagency and multinational partners. We suggest you take time to think through how you gain and maintain trust and confidence with your higher commanders, your subordinates, and your partners.

**Centralization/Decentralization of Operations – A Need for Analysis.** Trust and empowerment remain key to synergy and harmony; combat often forces us to decentralize and empower our subordinates (if we have not already done so). Those who don’t appropriately decentralize may lose agility, impair initiative, and risk mission failure.

Mission command provides the means (through trust, shared understanding, commander’s intent, and decentralized execution) to increase overall agility and effectiveness, and enable better

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synergistic cross-domain operations with our joint, interagency, and multinational mission partners. We find that most commanders consciously tailor their degree of decentralization and empowerment based on the situation, mission, capabilities and operating techniques of the subordinate units, and degree of trust and confidence they may have with their subordinates and partners. We also observe four continuing real world challenges in fully facilitating mission command at the operational level:

- Subordinates’ potential lack of experience and/or understanding of the larger context in which they may be operating.
- Confidence in the subordinate’s ability to accomplish the task successfully.
- Different cultural views on empowerment and acceptance of responsibility – both with coalition partners and to some degree among the Services.
- Ensuring the staff operates within this construct.

As we discuss later, in the counterinsurgency (COIN) fight we have seen the need to decentralize to the lowest appropriate level capable of integrating assets. However, we find that some assets we may decentralize and provide to a tactical commander in a COIN population-centric environment might be retained at a higher level in a different, more traditional fight. We find that a careful assessment of the military situation is critical to determine the appropriate degree of centralization or decentralization of assets. Different situations may drive a different balance, and it may be different for different domains (air, land, sea, cyber...).

The distinction in centralization between planning and execution is also addressed in U.S. military doctrine. Joint Publication 1 states “unity of effort over complex operations is made possible through decentralized execution of centralized, overarching plans or via mission command. Advances in information systems and communications may enhance the situational awareness (SA) and understanding of tactical commanders, subordinate JFCs [joint force commanders], CCDRs [combatant commanders], and even the national leadership. The level of control used will depend on the nature of the operation or task, the risk or priority of its success, and the associated comfort level of the commander.”

Joint doctrine has even incorporated the term Mission Command, defined as the “conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders” (e.g., orders to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished).

A View of Service Perspectives. Each Service views the balance toward centralization or decentralization and degree of empowerment slightly differently due to their different operating environments and application of their combat power. However, all understand the benefits and risks associated with both centralized and decentralized operations in planning and execution. They all recognize the need for agility and speed of operations. Their unique Service-based perspectives are relevant to joint force commanders as they develop their intent, organize the

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21 Joint Pub 1, p IV-14.
22 Joint Pub 3-0, p II-2.
force, and set conditions for the success of their subordinates. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps focus on empowerment and decentralization to provide subordinates the greatest possible freedom of action based on their recognition that ground combat is people centric, chaotic, and unpredictable. The U.S. Air Force concept of centralized control, decentralized execution helps define its view on command. From an air perspective, a campaign employing strategic attack as a line of operation will require a high degree of centralization under an air commander. The air commander must have the authority to direct operations, including attack sequencing, and shift them as operations unfold. In contrast, tactical air operations in direct support of ground commanders, such as close air support and armed overwatch, are most effective when conducted with a high degree of decentralization. JP 3-52, *Joint Airspace Control*, discusses how airspace control procedures provide flexibility through an effective combination of these positive and procedural control measures.²³

When there are limited resources, there must be some degree of centralized prioritization. This is especially true at the strategic and operational levels of warfare. Looking from an air perspective, airpower’s characteristics, including speed and geographical range, mean that its command and control may tend to be more centralized than for other forms. This is especially true when airpower is applied directly to achieve operational and strategic effects. The maritime/ naval commander employs uniquely adapted multi-mission platforms within the highly fluid, multidimensional maritime domain (consisting of undersea, surface, air, land, space and the information environment). Operations within the maritime domain necessitate seamless/coordinated cross boundary execution. The U.S. Navy uses the concepts of mission-type orders and intent, intentions messages, task organization and the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) construct to enable coordinated decentralized execution through multiple levels of command from the numbered fleet to the platform level.

The CWC construct allows the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) to assign some or all of the command functions associated with warfare commander and coordinator duties and supports the execution of a decentralized command philosophy. This construct establishes a hierarchal organization of warfare commanders and functional commanders with established authorities within their warfare area and coordinators to act as asset and resource managers. The construct establishes complex yet flexible support relationships between these warfare area commanders allowing for dynamic, simultaneous use of multi-mission platforms to accomplish various tasks.

Effective execution of this dynamic and flexible task organization and decentralized control construct requires clear higher intent and direction, close coordination between the warfare commanders and high levels of tactical training. Navy tactical-level commanders are expected to exercise initiative without the need for intervention by the JFMCC/numbered fleet commander. As a result, maritime forces operate across the entire maritime domain, able to respond instantaneously to immediate threats and to conduct coordinated dynamic offensive operations without having to establish geographic boundaries.

The U.S. Coast Guard has a similar view. Their operations, for instance, responding to oil spills, searching for and rescuing mariners in distress, or interdicting smugglers are of an emergent, unpredictable nature. History has shown the Coast Guard that situations like these are best handled locally. Thus, they push both authority and responsibility to the lowest possible level.

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Their belief is that the person on scene can be depended upon to assess the situation, seize the initiative, and take the actions necessary for success. This style of operational command is based upon the trust that senior commanders place in their subordinates’ judgment. Decisive action requires unity of effort – getting all parts of a force to work together. Rapid action, on the other hand, requires a large degree of decentralization, giving those closest to the problem the freedom to solve it.

**Decentralized Authorities.** Our commanders have made great strides in delegating authorities to allow disciplined initiative on the part of their subordinates to operate inside the adversaries’ decision cycle while retaining necessary oversight and acceptable risk decisions by the higher headquarters. They recognize the reality that the higher the decision for mission approval needs to go in the chain of command, the longer it will normally take. Thus the ability to rapidly take advantage of chaos in the environment may be lost and initiative can be lost. Additionally, they realize that complicated mission approval processes take both time and effort – taking staffs and commanders away from the operations at hand to work through mission approvals. However, they have also found that some decisions cannot not be delegated (or decentralized) due to political risk, supporting resource limitations, limited capability of the subordinate unit to integrate required assets, or other reasons.

**Mission Approval:** The figure above portrays the means to operate inside the adversary’s decision cycle. The vertical axis addresses the mission approval level – with all the various levels of command culminating with the President at the top. The horizontal axis is time – the time to request and gain mission approval. We see that the higher up one goes on the vertical axis (i.e., centralized/higher approval level), the longer it takes to gain mission approval and execute, and the more likely you may miss targets of opportunity.

At the bottom of the figure we depict two methods that we’ve seen in operational headquarters to shorten the time required to gain mission approval and execute operations. The left side focuses on decentralizing mission approval levels – pushing them down into the lower left quadrant. Here we see the value of mission-type orders, trust and confidence, common situational awareness, common understanding of acceptable risk, and “a priori” decisions. The right side addresses streamlining the processes, especially where mission approval cannot be delegated. Here we see the value of technological and organizational solutions.

**Insights:**
- Delegate authorities to the lowest appropriate level capable of integrating assets to successfully execute inside the adversary’s decision cycle. We must accept becoming uncomfortably decentralized to achieve mission success. However, recognize your responsibilities in providing clear guidance and intent, including your perspective on acceptable risk, as you empower your subordinates to exercise disciplined initiative.
• Gain agility and flexibility through horizontal collaboration in which supporting commanders work directly with supported commanders, providing capabilities and delegating authorities to take advantage of emerging opportunities within the chaos of battle.

**Command-centric Insights.** Leadership remains a key force multiplier. We offer several insights and best practices gleaned from our observations:

• **Insights on Leadership:** “the more things change the more they stay the same…”
  – Commanders’ courage and character remain paramount.
  – Good leadership principles apply at all levels, like giving credit for success to subordinates, and personally accepting responsibility when things go poorly.
  – Rely on your instincts and intuition. Commanders’ vision/guidance and intent enriched by their experience, education, and training provide clarity in today’s dynamic, ambiguous environment. Anticipate and seize opportunity.
  – Mission-type orders remain key to success. Work with and through your subordinate commanders. Continue battlefield circulation to build trust and enrich your situational understanding. Guard against the tendency to over-control operations.
  – Commanders must maintain a broad perspective on the environment, adversary and friendly forces – both military and non-military. It’s more than a military versus military conflict. They understand the broader context in which their operations take place and the implications of those actions on that environment.
  – Ensure planning and operations are Commander-centric versus Staff-centric. Provide guidance to your staff, and help them. You’ll get better solutions in a fraction of the time.
  – Be a learning organization before and during the fight, not after it.

• **Commander Insights in the Interorganizational World:**
  – Personal relationships are essential in the joint, USG interagency, and multinational world. Build these relationships, and foster trust and confidence with your partners to keep this a “one team, one fight.”
  – Be inclusive versus exclusive with your mission partners in how you assess, plan, and make decisions. Establish a command climate and organizational capability to facilitate inclusion.
  – Focus on unity of effort, not unity of command. Recognize the reality of different perspectives and goals of your partners. Strive to arrive at a set of common desired end states and conditions to promote unity of effort.

• **Commander Insights in the Joint World:**
  – Stay at the operational level while maintaining an understanding of the strategic level. Set conditions for operational and tactical success and understand the implications of your actions on both the tactical as well as the strategic level.
  – Prioritize in order that your subordinates can allocate assets appropriately to support each other (more in the next section).
  – Delegate authority to subordinates to fight the tactical fight.
  – Instill a “one team, one fight” mentality. Build and reinforce trust and confidence.
  – Recognize the value of the “horizontal” piece of warfighting (further discussed in next section). Establish supported/supporting command relationships between subordinates. Demand integration and promote synergy.
– Condition/teach subordinates to plan and execute within a framework of *access* to others’ forces versus requiring *ownership* of those forces.
– Establish mission approval processes that allow retention of agility and speed of action at all levels. This will likely entail decentralization; decentralize to the lowest appropriate level capable of integrating assets while providing clear intent to increase agility and take advantage of opportunities in the battlespace.

3.2 Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs). CCIRs support mission command and commander-centric leadership. CCIRs as a related derivative of guidance and intent assist joint commanders in focusing support to their decision-making requirements.\(^2\) We observe that CCIRs at most operational level headquarters are developed to support:

- **Understanding** of the rapidly changing complex environment (e.g., supporting assessments that drive framing and reframing considerations and planning guidance).
- **Specific** branch and sequel decision requirements.

Many of the answers to CCIRs precipitating operational commanders’ major decisions will likely not come off the Joint Operations Center (JOC) floor but rather through interaction with others and from the results of operational level assessment. Much of this information may not be in the precise form of answering a traditional, specifically worded branch or sequel oriented CCIR, but rather as the result of a broader assessment answering whether we’re accomplishing the campaign objectives together with recommendations on the “so what.”

This is a broader role than the more traditional, tactical focus of CCIRs toward supporting well-defined and predicted decision points. Commanders’ direct involvement in guiding CCIRs development provides the focus for the entire range of collection, analysis, and management of information flow supporting understanding and decision-making across the current operations, future operations, and future plans event horizons.

**Understanding the Complex Environment.** Operational commanders spend much of their time attempting to understand the environment, how well they’re doing, and how to better accomplish the mission. As we will address later, this assessment piece is key to effective planning. We’re finding the commanders designating critical measures of effectiveness as CCIRs to ensure appropriate prioritization of resources. This prioritization of both collection and analysis resources enhances the quality of assessments and ultimately results in the commander gaining better situational understanding, leading to better guidance, intent and decisions, resulting in better likelihood of mission success.

CCIRs doctrinally contain two primary components; priority intelligence requirements (PIR) are threat-focused and friendly force information requirements (FFIR) are friendly force based. We’ve seen many commands operating in the population-centric environment of COIN add a third information requirement labeled Host Nation Information Requirements (HNIR), to better

focus on information about the influencers of the population. They define HNIR as information the commander needs about friendly nation institutions or organizations in order to partner effectively, develop plans, make decisions, and to integrate with civilian activities. Depending on the circumstances, information may include the status of provincial, district or local governance, economic development, infrastructure, or security forces.

**Branch and Sequel Execution.** Most operational level commands develop many of their CCIRs during the design and planning process. We normally see decision points transcending all three event horizons. Some decision points in the current operations event horizon may have very specific and time sensitive information requirements, while those supporting branch and sequel execution are normally broader, assessment-based, and may be much more subjective. They will also likely include information requirements on DIME partner actions/capabilities and broader environmental PMESII conditions.

CCIRs can also support agility of action. Decentralization of CCIRs supporting decentralized execution directly support empowerment of subordinates, while retention of CCIRs at the operational level for these type of events slow subordinates’ agility, add undue reporting requirements, and shift operational level focus away from its proper role and responsibilities in setting conditions. The decentralization of both the decisions and the associated CCIRs is key to agility and flexibility.

Commanders drive CCIRs. We have seen very successful use of processes that lay out specific responsibilities for development, validation, dissemination, monitoring, reporting, and maintenance (see figure).

**Insights:**
- CCIRs support commanders’ situational understanding and their decision-making. Information flow is essential to the success of the decision-making process.
- Develop CCIRs during design and planning.
- Use CCIRs to prioritize limited resources – collection, processing, analysis, and management of information flow.
- Provide clear reporting procedures to ensure timely commander notification.

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25 The ISAF Joint Command (IJC) was a major proponent in defining the term HNIR. Now used by other commands.
3.3 Command and Control. As noted up front, the operational commanders are leading the way in the move away from independent, stovepipe operations to synergistic, and where appropriate, interdependent operations. This move toward synergy and harmonization is a mindset change from a “vertical” focus on receiving and unilaterally accomplishing tasks from the higher commander to that of working much more closely - harmoniously - with our horizontal mission partners as depicted by the oval in the figure to the left. This synergy across different domains and capabilities will be discussed even further in a subsequent section on cross-domain synergy. This synergy results from more than interoperability – loosely defined as the technical ability to work together. Rather, it is the recognition that we function best, using a comprehensive approach, as one team of joint, interagency, and multinational partners – and depend on access to each other’s capabilities to succeed. We are interdependent. Achieving synergy and harmony is one of the most important and urgent tasks of a joint commander in setting conditions for subordinates’ success; we have to get it right from the beginning. Interdependence with one’s joint, interagency, and multinational partners can be viewed in some aspects as a risk for we depend on capabilities we don’t own or control for success. However, this is the reality of today’s world. As a general rule, we find that those commanders who accept this interdependence do better in today’s environment than those who do not. We live this interdependence within our joint force daily, in which the joint force commander (JFC) purposely crafts the task organization and command relationships to achieve synergy and harmony among the various joint force components, directing that each support the other in an atmosphere of teamwork to accomplish the mission. The risks associated with “interdependence” with other USG agencies and multinational partners are somewhat greater than with our military services because there is often no clear authority defining a command relationship with them that specifies authorities, fixes responsibility and ensures synergy and harmony. We see commanders mitigating this risk through establishing a climate of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration by developing personal relationships and trust, use of liaison elements, and making conscious decisions on the degree of reliance with those stakeholders for critical tasks. This relationship with our interagency and multinational partners is an area that is very important and must be continually reinforced by the commanders.

This section addresses our observations and insights on how our operational commanders are setting command and control conditions for their subordinates’ success. We find that they focus on several key elements. These elements are interrelated; together they set conditions for success:

- A focus on personal relationships, and building trust and confidence.
- Absolute inclusion with our interagency partners, recognizing that they are an essential part of the team.
- Mission-type orders providing the “what” versus “how” of operations.
• A task organization comprised of both battlespace owners and functional task forces to take best advantage of all of the military force capabilities.
• A battlespace geometry that provides sufficient control measures in terms of boundaries and fire support coordination measures without over-controlling the fight.
• Command relationships that promote synergy among the components, instill a “one team, one fight” mentality, and provide authorities commensurate with responsibilities.
• Clear prioritization and decentralized authorities that empower subordinates to operate within commander’s intent and take advantage of unforeseen opportunities within the chaos of the complex environment.

**Cross Domain Synergy.** We continually observe that the directed combination of individual military (and one could argue interorganizational) capabilities typically dedicated to one domain - or realm of responsibility – produces effects beyond just in that single domain. This is not new. An example is airpower operating within the air domain that has beneficial effect in the land or sea domain. The same could be said for cyber or space. The figure depicts this synergy across more than just a physical domain – it is gaining synergy across the depicted multi-dimensional domain set.

Three attributes help achieve cross domain synergy:

• Focusing on unity of effort: Understand and leverage others’ capabilities across domains, echelons, physical boundaries, and organizations.
• Supported/supporting command relationships coupled with shared situational awareness help mitigate seams and gain synergy.
• Ensuring interoperability. We must continue to recognize the technical aspects to access and leverage these capabilities in planning and execution.

**Task Organization.** We continue to see joint force commanders spending considerable time determining how to best organize their joint force to accomplish missions. They deliberately organize using the traditional Service force (e.g., ARFOR, NAVFOR, etc.), Joint Task Forces (JTFs), air, land, maritime, and SOF-based functional components (e.g., JFACC, JFLCC, JFMCC, JFSOCC), and tailored organizations comprised of both battlespace owners and capability-oriented functional task forces (e.g., Counter-IED (CIED)) to take best...
advantage of all the military force capabilities in accomplishing the mission.

Recently, we’ve seen increased attention at Combatant Command level on the use of standing functional components as an alternative to establishing JTFs in response to a crisis. They are considering these types of organizations to mitigate the time and proficiency challenges associated with standing up, manning, and preparing an ad hoc JTF at the onset of a crisis. These established subordinate HQs already understand the situation, have established relationships, and have some current baseline of organization and processes to immediately take on the C2 responsibility. As Theater functional components they still may retain area of responsibility (AOR)-wide responsibilities that may affect or be affected by any refocus on a specific crisis. Combatant Commanders take this into account in determining the organization and command relationships to resolve a crisis.

Other Insights:

- **Clear Designation of Battlespace Owners.** Our joint commanders still primarily organize to fight along a geographic orientation with battlespace owners being largely empowered as the supported commander within their battlespace. For smaller contingencies, we’re seeing the GCCs establishing subordinate JTFs with focused missions and geographic oriented JOA. For larger GCC-controlled operations, we’re seeing the GCC use of traditional functional components (i.e., JFLCC and JFMCC) being given AOs. We’ve even seen in some cases the JFACC and the JFACC being given AOs. At the JTF level in land-centric operations we have seen geographically-based organizations (e.g., the Regional Commands (RC) in Afghanistan, MNDs in Iraq and Bosnia, and CSGs in the Unified Assistance operation, as depicted in the figure above).

- **Use of Capabilities Oriented, Functional Task Forces** (e.g., special operations, CIED, Medical, Engineer). This is a significant evolution in JTF task organization or usage. In addition to the above use of battlespace commanders, and air, land, and maritime-focused functional commanders, we have seen almost every joint force commander establish more capabilities-based, functional task forces to conduct specific mission sets required throughout the joint operations area. Often, the forces capable of performing these specific missions are high demand/low density forces, and the expertise and C2 capabilities necessary for their employment may not be resident in each of the battlespace headquarters (e.g., an RC HQ). We discuss how the joint force commander promotes harmony and synergy between the battlespace owners and these functional task forces in succeeding sections on battlespace geometry, command relationships, and challenges.

- **Dual-Hatting Service Force Commanders to Increase Efficiency and Effectiveness.** We are seeing very few cases of separate and distinct service force command headquarters within the joint task forces. In almost every case, the joint commander opts to dual-hat either himself or his subordinates as Service force commanders. The joint commanders are also using their
authorities to consolidate selected Service Title 10 responsibilities for more efficient use of resources. We discuss this further in a later part of this section.

**Battlespace Geometry.** As noted to the right, we see joint commanders establishing control measures such as joint operations areas (JOA) and areas of operation (AO) within the battlespace, and identifying battlespace owners (BSO). They then empower these BSOs with the requisite authority commensurate with their responsibilities.

**Insights:**
- Today’s operational environment is very complex. Many non-military stakeholders and other forces operate in the BSOs’ JOAs and AOs. The battlespace owners would optimally like to have the support of these other players, or at least situational awareness of their activities, even though they may not actually “own” them. We have seen a huge evolution in this area in which the BSOs are becoming increasingly more comfortable “harmonizing” with these non-assigned players in their battlespace.
- Delineation of battlespace together with supported/supporting command relationship provides sufficient control measures without overly restricting the commanders. Commanders are increasingly using horizontal linkages such as supported/ing command relationships (discussed below), situational awareness tools, liaison, and commander crosstalk to create synergy.
- Empower BSOs with “coordinating authority” (see figure) over other units that may operate within their battlespace. A continuing challenge in today’s decentralized operations is maintaining situational awareness by the BSO of everything happening in the battlespace with numerous forces all operating in close proximity. We sometimes find that military forces not assigned to the BSO and other interagency players do not always keep the BSO apprised of their planned activities and movements, nor are some of their activities fully supportive of BSO requirements. We have heard several joint commanders and subordinates emphasizing the need for these other players to keep the BSO informed and involved in planning. We find that these other players must
recognize the BSO’s authorities and responsibilities as they all work to accomplish the same mission. This includes working with the BSOs from the very beginning during planning to ensure synergy in execution. BSOs must also understand functional task force responsibilities in accomplishing their respective higher command-directed missions.

- Direct functional task force commanders to understand the BSO’s responsibilities and comply with the BSO’s coordinating authority for activities occurring within their assigned AOs. Direct functional task force commanders and subordinates to conduct the necessary coordination with BSOs during planning, and keep them apprised of all activities within their AO.

Command Relationships. We have seen that getting the command relationships right up front is absolutely critical to success.

Recognizing the Combatant Commander COCOM authorities, we focus on the three remaining authorities in this paper. We see the use of OPCON, TACON, and Supported/ing Command relationships allow for both ownership of habitually organized forces (primarily through OPCON and TACON) and access to the capabilities of other forces (through the Support authority). We often work in a multinational environment, and at times a NATO command structure. NATO has several unique command relationships that will affect how we operate. We’ll discuss those command relationships later in this section.

OPCON provides for “ownership” of the forces. It allows the commander to task both “what to do” and “how to employ.” It requires expertise in planning and employment. It remains the preferred command relationship over forces that the commander will continuously own and employ, and for which he and his staff have the expertise and capability to command and control.

TACON, a subset of OPCON, also provides for “ownership” of the forces. It allows for local direction and control for accomplishment of a specific mission.

We often see supporting commanders providing forces TACON to a supported commander. While most normally attribute this forces-provided TACON to air sorties provided by the Navy or Marines TACON to the JFACC, another very effective use is the supporting commander horizontally providing ground or SOF forces TACON to a supported commander. We often find that it’s the supporting commander opting to directly provide the TACON authority based on his determination that it’s the best way to support integration at the point of action. This TACON is not directed from the higher commander in the form of a FRAGO, but rather provided horizontally between supporting to supported commander. This TACON authority provides for unity of command, and agility, at the tip of the spear – at the point of action. We see this delegation of TACON, or in some cases a direct support relationship, as a best practice.

Support. We have learned in the past decade of war that the support command relationship continues to be the most powerful command relationship in terms of gaining access to additional capabilities. It provides the authority and basis for synergy and harmony, and may be the most appropriate in today’s operational environment. This support relationship in essence makes the supporting commanders responsible for the success of the supported commander. They can’t simply provide some forces
and walk away from the challenge. Rather, it requires them to stay involved with the supported commander and continue to aid and assist him as he conducts operations – thus creating harmony.

This support relationship allows for effective cross domain synergy and the horizontal integration discussed up front in this section. The support command authority is increasingly being used to provide a supported commander access to capabilities that he doesn’t own. The flexibility of this support command relationship is one of its greatest advantages. It supports decentralized execution within mission-type orders and commander’s intent. There will normally be multiple, concurrent supported and supporting commanders – often the commanders will be in mutual support – thus there is a need for clear priorities being established by the establishing authority.

Insights:
- The establishing authority is the higher joint commander – it may be a combatant commander, a JTF commander, or even at the SecDef level in the case of certain activities such as those between combatant commanders (see figure). This higher commander defines the support command relationships among subordinates in terms of who is supported and supporting, the respective degree of authority, and overall priorities – especially where there are limited resources supporting numerous operations. SOF and Air are good examples of some limited resources. The higher commander is also the referee, the tie breaker, when subordinates cannot work out the necessary balance of access to capabilities. Some establishing authority best practices:
  - Give clear direction to subordinates in terms of priorities and intent to allow subordinates to work horizontally with each other in accomplishing tasks. This kind of direction is best provided in OPORDs and FRAGOs.
  - Set conditions for and demand crosstalk among supported and supporting commanders to build and reinforce the necessary horizontal personal relationships, and trust and confidence.
  - Challenge your subordinates to “self-regulate” their apportionment of capabilities to one another through horizontal crosstalk. This crosstalk among your components will allow them to arrive at the optimal apportionment of capabilities to accomplish both their assigned tasks and support the designated supported commanders.
  - Stay involved to arbitrate/resolve when necessary conflicting understanding of priorities – or to revise guidance based on subordinate input.
• **Supported Commander.** The supported commander is given access to supporting capabilities and has the authority to provide general direction, designate and prioritize missions, targets, or objectives, and other actions for coordination and efficiency (to include requesting liaison and directing of reporting requirements). Some supported commander best practices:
  - Identify needs to supporting commanders. This is a continuing, not one time, activity.
  - Request liaison from supporting commanders to help coherently integrate supporting capabilities in the operation.
  - Bring lack of support issues to supporting commanders first, and if necessary to establishing authority for resolution.

• **Supporting Commander.** The supporting commander is responsible to both ascertain and satisfy the needs of the supported commander within the priorities directed by the establishing authorities. Some supporting commander best practices:
  - Recognition of your role in ensuring the success of the supported commander. We see those believing and following through on the “one team, one fight” view set the conditions for success.
  - Understand and respect the authority of supported commander. Recognize that your support to a supported commander may have an even higher priority than a mission for which you have been tasked. That said, address to both the supported commander and/or establishing authority those perceived undue or significant risks that such support may entail to other ongoing operations.
  - Take time in ascertaining supported commanders’ requirements and understanding the overall priorities in apportioning your forces to accomplish both your assigned tasks and those of other supported commanders.
  - Send liaison to supported commanders to assist them in planning and in ascertaining your requirements.
  - Direct appropriate command relationships to your subordinates to ensure you fulfill your supporting responsibilities. You, as the supporting commander, can provide forces or capabilities in a direct support or even TACON relationship to a respective supported commander to ensure success.

**Administrative Control (ADCON).** Defined as “The direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support,”27 ADCON normally includes the organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. ADCON for the numerous Service Title 10 responsibilities remains an important authority and responsibility. This is another area in which we are seeing the combatant commanders, JTF commanders, and Service component commanders focusing on making administration and support as efficient and effective as possible. It is further discussed below and later in the Sustainment section.

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Combatant Command, Functional Component and Multinational C2 Insights:

**Combatant Command Insights.** We have seen all of the Combatant Commands exercising a combination of the use of JTFs in conjunction with Sub-unified Commands, their Service Components and Functional Components coupled with establishment of JOAs to satisfy their AOR-wide and more focused regional responsibilities.

- **Cross AOR Coordination:** We are seeing continued excellent coordination between GCCs and also with functional Combatant Commands such as SOCOM, TRANSCOM, and STRATCOM.²⁸
- **Consider use of standing functional components as an alternative to establishing JTFs in response to a crisis.**
- **Establishment of JTFs:** Establishment directives are generally very clear; delineating roles, authorities and the supported/supporting command relationships with other GCC components (e.g., Theater SOCs, JFACC, and Service Components).
- **Employment of Theater Service Component Commands:** Two aspects – Operational role and Title 10 support. We find that the Service Components remain tasked with much of the GCC Theater engagement activities while also being held responsible for their Title 10, ADCON, and Executive Agent responsibilities. We normally see some form of direction in terms of the respective authorities and responsibilities of the JTF for synchronization of the Service Component Title 10, ADCON, Executive Agent, and Common User Logistics (CUL) activities within the JOA. This synchronization is normally delineated through detailed memorandums of understanding (MOUs) between the JTF and the Theater Service Components Commands.

**Employment of Functional Components.** Two aspects – AOR-wide activities and support to established JTFs. The global nature of challenges and responses coupled with high demand/low density forces have increased the need for agility at the GCC level across an AOR in enabling rapid access to capabilities. This has led to an increased use of supported and supporting command relationships between the combatant command level functional components (e.g., the Theater JFACC) with established JTFs. We find that the GCCs are providing more of the requisite direction, particularly, more clear prioritization for the interaction of these theater-

²⁸ At times, a mutual support command relationship can exist with both forces assisting each other for designated activities. At times, a Functional Combatant Command such as SOCOM or STRATCOM may also be the supported command for a specific operation.
level functional components with established JTFs. We have seen a challenge when functional components and JTFs do not receive this direction and subsequently don’t share the same understanding of the GCC’s concept of operation and priorities. This has sometimes resulted in a lack of responsiveness and agility in support of the JTFs, such as apportionment, allocation, ISR, and targeting challenges.

**Theater JFACC.** We are seeing the use of theater level JFACCs throughout all the GCCs coupled with the use of air component coordination elements (ACCEs) at adjacent functional components and JTFs. The USAF instituted the Theater JFACC concept for several reasons: a requirement to optimize airpower across multiple JTFs in an AOR, a requirement to optimize high demand/low density airpower assets in general, and insufficient Air Force resources to establish additional Air Operations Centers (AOCs) below Theater JFACC level. The Theater JFACC model retains the Geographic Combatant Commander’s (GCC) agility and flexibility of airpower, enabling centralized planning, and allowing for rapid shifting of airpower throughout the AOR. Recognizing that irregular warfare requires much of the air supporting ground force missions, the Theater JFACC model can work when combined with a robust coordination element at the JTF and a robust Theater Air Control System (TACS).

We’ve found that the GCC can set the conditions for success by clearly stating (and emphasizing) the supported command relationship of geographic JTFs and the supporting command relationship of the JFACC. The GCC must make the hard calls on apportionment decisions working with the supported JTFs to provide the Theater JFACC sufficient apportionment direction for their subsequent allocation decisions. The GCC must also establish a robust ISR and targeting oversight capability to ensure theater-wide intelligence collection and targeting is occurring in accordance with GCC priorities. We have seen cases where the GCCs delegated some of their key apportionment, ISR management, and targeting responsibilities to the theater JFACC to the possible detriment of the JTFs.

**Insights:**
- Clarify and enforce the supporting command relationship of Theater JFACC to other GCC organizations, particularly JTFs.
- Ensure sufficient liaison/coordination and C2 capability (e.g., TACS elements) is provided from supporting commands (e.g., JFACC and AFFOR) to supported commands (e.g., JTF) and at relevant tactical echelons to ascertain, provide, and coordinate support. These elements should be capable of fully integrating and coordinating fires and airspace over and within the BSO’s AO.
- Clarify GCC, JTF, and JFACC roles and authorities for targeting and ISR nomination, approval, and dynamic retasking to ensure responsive support in accordance with GCC priorities.
- Clarify airspace control authority (ACA), ROE, and collateral damage estimate (CDE) approval authorities of the JTF and JFACC.
- Ensure establishment of a sufficiently robust Theater Air Control System (TACS) to enable agile, responsive support to ground force decentralized operations.

**SOF.** We have seen continuing increased synergy of US SOF with conventional forces and our coalition and interagency partners. This is due to leadership efforts and experience gained over the past decade of war.
However, there is still the potential for periodic challenges in tactical level coordination and integration. We still see some cases, albeit few, where the brigade or battalion level battlespace owners are not fully aware of rapidly developing SOF operations in their battlespace. But this has become much more the exception than the norm. We found lack of integration in the past was more often a result of limited proactive crosstalk between headquarters, normally due to a physical lack of liaison elements available to maintain full time presence at every tactical headquarters and the rapid pace of some SOF operations. While liaison and planning elements and other coordination means mitigate potential integration shortfalls, we find that the friction of war can still exist in rapidly developing operations.

**Insights:**
- Instill an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence at all levels to mitigate the risks associated with interdependence. This is a command climate issue. Articulate the need for synergy of operations in intent, planning guidance, and orders.
- Take time to understand SOF capabilities, limitations, authorities, and effective means to exercise command and control.
- At GCC level, clarify command relationships between JTFs, Functional Components, and the Theater SOC. Establish at a minimum a support command relationship.
- At JTF level, establish appropriate command relationships (typically mutual support) between SOF and tactical units. Develop horizontal linkages with SOF at all levels to ensure decentralized, tactical level integration with SOF. Direct the exchange of LNOs and delegate coordinating authority down to tactical level battlespace owners.
- At battlespace owner level, request liaison elements from SOF HQs to maintain situation awareness and better integrate their capabilities. Ensure the liaison elements have planning, current operations information sharing, and intelligence liaison capabilities. Additionally, provide liaison elements to those SOF HQs to facilitate information exchange.
- Develop clear staffing processes for coordinating and supporting SOF operations in JOAs and AOs. Articulate the level at which different types of operations (e.g., politically sensitive, high risk...) must be approved, or as directed by the joint commander, coordinated. Include public affairs release, casualty evacuation, site exploitation, intelligence exchange, ISR support, quick reaction force, and detainee handling staffing procedures.
- Be prepared to provide logistical support on a common user logistics basis to SOF. Plan for this up front.
- We have seen both the use of a focused liaison/coordination team, or in some cases, establishment of a short term operational areas such as “OP Boxes” and JSOAs to assist in tactical level integration of SOF operations with a BSO.

**Multinational Command Relationships.** JP 3-16 defines multinational operations as “operations conducted by forces of two or more nations.” Such operations are usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible arrangements include supervision by an International Government Organization (IGO) such as the UN or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Other commonly used terms for multinational operations include allied, bilateral, combined, coalition, or multilateral, as

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29 Joint Pub 3-16, p I-1.
appropriate. The basic structures for multinational operations fall into one of three types: integrated, lead nation, or parallel command.\(^{30}\)

Regardless of how the multinational force (MNF) is organized operationally, each nation furnishing forces normally establishes a national component (often called a national command element) to ensure effective administration of its forces (see figure). The national component provides a means to administer and support the national forces, coordinate communication to the parent nation, tender national military views and recommendations directly to the multinational commander, facilitate the assignment and reassignment of national forces to subordinate operational multinational organizations, and maintain personnel accountability. In an administrative role, these national components are similar to a Service component command at the unified command level in a U.S. joint organization. The logistic support element of this component is referred to as the national support element.

**Insights:**
- Understand the important role and command relationships inherent in the national command element. Forces participating in a multinational operation will always have at least two distinct chains of command: a national chain of command and a multinational chain of command. The U.S. national chain of command includes the “ADCON/Title 10” aspects of supporting the force with all of the attendant Theater Service Component responsibility linkages.
- Understand the differences between U.S. and NATO and CFC/USFK command relationships.

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\(^{30}\) More on the three types can be found in Joint Pub 1 on page VI-3.
4.0 AUTHORITIES. Authority is more than a legal requirement. The legitimacy of a military operation depends on adherence to authority and legitimacy is essential in generating national and international support. In addition, understanding interagency and international partners’ authorities, which define their capabilities and limitations, helps gain unity of effort. In executing military operations, these many disparate authorities create gaps and seams that must be accounted for in planning and execution. This is true whether only U.S. authorities come into play, as depicted in the figure, or when dealing with differing national authorities in multinational operations. Navigating international authorities will require the assistance of the Embassies and Country Teams in a JOA. Operational planning can be further complicated where a JOA encompasses more than one country. The commander needs a plan for the whole JOA that is flexible enough to account for different conditions created by different sovereigns. Establishing and maintaining a common and uniform understanding of authorities becomes especially relevant in operationalizing the mission command leadership philosophy. The decentralized nature of mission command and the driving down of approval levels to subordinate commanders means that lower levels of command must have a shared understanding of the laws, directives, policies, intent, and guidance emanating from higher authority. The ability of higher headquarters to ensure this shared understanding, without resorting to micromanagement of the battlespace, is critical to mission command and relies heavily on trust and confidence as the “glue” holding the concept together. Clear guidance and understanding of authorities vertically and horizontally minimizes the risk of decisions and actions occurring outside of the authorized parameters that can damage the legitimacy of the operation as a whole. Dialogue and translation between echelons and effective information sharing are essential to gaining this shared understanding of authorities. One of the most common and critical issues in planning and executing operations involves the authority to use force. The commander frames a clear and effective use of force policy through robust and flexible ROE, amplified and clarified by commander’s intent and guidance. In developing a clear and effective use of force policy, dialogue between higher and lower headquarters is critical, as is the dialogue with affected stakeholders and policy-makers. This dialogue is key to blending the political, military, and legal influences that drive ROE development and use of force guidance issued in support of mission accomplishment. The intersection between military capability, law, and policy is depicted in the figure on the next page. Among these, the area most subject to rapid and unpredictable change is policy. The
National Command Authority will have a position on use of force dependent on the mission, operating environment, and political and international will that determines the use of military force that best meets the desired political end state. This policy area can be difficult to understand and apply and is subject to continuing change based on domestic and international influences. The commander and staff must continually communicate with higher headquarters to both inform and be informed by the policy discussions. The personal attention of the commander may be required to effectively dialogue with policy-makers.

Successful operational commanders proactively develop ROE as a “security umbrella” (noted by the upper dashed line in the figure below and influenced by those topics in the blue box) under which they are authorized to use force while crafting mission profiles (solid red line in figure and influenced by the topics in the green box) for the actual use of force. The commander and the operational planners, assisted by judge advocates, proactively develop ROE as part of the planning effort to prevent vulnerabilities that would arise if reactive efforts were to allow ROE development and approval to lag behind mission planning. The difficulties with development and management of robust ROE become exponentially more complex when operating within a coalition environment. Each coalition partner (sovereign country or international entity) will inject their interpretations of international laws and unique domestic laws into the planning process to ensure a common agreement to the overall ROE by all partners. Because of differing national priorities and policies, however, some partner nations will maintain exceptions to the final ROE. Collecting these national caveats in a matrix provides clarity to the planners and the commander, fosters better inclusion and employment of coalition forces, and can increase likelihood of overall mission success.

To ensure the approved use of force measures are employed in a manner consistent with overall mission accomplishment, the commander may issue guidance through a Tactical Directive or FRAGO on how force is to be employed. In addition to the commander’s guidance on the use of

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31 Rules of Engagement is defined in JP 1-02 as “directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.” The word “will” in this definition does not clearly describe ROE authority. Substituting the word “may” more clearly depicts the commander’s discretion in use of force in terms of the mission profile.
force for mission accomplishment, Escalation of Force (EOF) measures may be established in order to identify hostile intent and deter potential threats at check points, entry control points, and in convoys. EOF measures remain distinct from other “use of force” guidance such as control measures for indirect fires in support of operations. EOF measures protect the force while minimizing the use of force against civilians. To ensure neither of these two concepts interfere with self-defense, forces must be trained to understand the use of force in self-defense, the commander’s guidance on how force should be employed to accomplish the mission, and effective use of EOF measures to minimize civilian casualties. Sufficient rigor and time should be devoted to this training to prepare the force to instinctively employ reactive vice reflective actions. The adjacent figure addresses restraint together with a concept of “Force Applied in Certainty” in which clear guidance is provided to instill confidence in the use of force. Ensuring all forces understand these concepts becomes even more difficult when operating within a joint operation due to differing service cultures and may be compounded still further within a coalition and interagency operation due to cultural and language barriers. The art of command becomes how the commander blends the related concepts into clear guidance on how force should be employed for mission accomplishment and in self-defense to achieve the unity of effort necessary for mission success. Other authorities that can quickly gain the commander’s attention involve contract support and funding for military operations, as well as the management and conduct of contractors within the commander’s AO. The nuances of the many complex funding statutes alone clearly demonstrate a need for expertise on the JTF staff. Additionally, the detailed terms of each contract and variances in support requirements to and responsibilities of each contractor within the commander’s AO reinforce the need for resident legal expertise. Adequate fiscal and contract law support is crucial to the success of each operation and overall success of the mission. Failure to gain the requisite expertise on the staff in forming the JTF or a lack of staff processes to properly employ such expertise can create larger legal issues for the commander, damage the public’s perception of the mission, and hamper mission success. Timely and thorough investigation into incidents is another key to earning public trust and confidence. Properly conducted investigations, with timely updates and well written reports, can provide the truth before others can craft a false strategic communication. It is also important to remember good investigations are paramount not just for taking disciplinary action, but for protecting those members of the force caught in a public and volatile incident in which they played no culpable role. A thorough investigation provides a record long after those involved have redeployed out of theater and experienced investigators are the key to thorough investigations. Rule of Law (ROL) efforts to strengthen self-governance and justice systems in unstable nations have taken center stage in recent operations. Support for ROL not only provides stability, it
demonstrates our commitment to the international community and is a cornerstone to our international legitimacy. Within the United States government construct ROL is a shared responsibility between elements of DOS and DOD, with DOS as lead agency. Within DOD, support to ROL is primarily a Civil Affairs function, with essential support coming from staff judge advocates, law enforcement, and governance experts. Coordination between agencies and with non-governmental organizations is of paramount importance. Coming full circle, adherence to authority in what actions are taken in support of mission accomplishment, how those actions are executed (including the justified use of force), how actions are funded and supported, and the manner in which the operating environment is reconstituted, all contribute immensely to the legitimacy, both real and perceived, of operations.

Finally, understanding the many authorities and the gaps and seams they create are significant challenges for the planners, and the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), although a key figure in any discussion of authorities, is only one source of expertise among many on the staff. Understanding and developing authorities is a staff-wide responsibility. As depicted in the figure, advisors on authorities are not limited to legal personnel. They can include subject matter experts (SMEs) from all the J-codes and special staff, LNOs from components, and interagency representatives. The authorities required for CONOPS are identified by these SMEs from across the staff as a part of the planning process through membership on battle rhythm events and Operational Planning Teams (OPTs).

**Insights:**

- Adherence to authority fosters legitimacy, which generates support for operations.
- The use of force is operator business, with proactive ROE development led by planners, assisted by judge advocates.
- ROE and amplifying guidance must be clear and disseminated to the force in time to allow thorough training, understanding, and implementation.
- FRAGOs and Tactical Directives are methods to provide the commander’s intent and guidance on how to employ force under approved ROE measures and EOF processes.
- Understanding and operating under coalition ROE is complicated by the fact that multinational forces will retain some or all of their own national ROE.
- The complexity of fiscal law issues and the management of contracts and contractors within the battlespace mandate the inclusion of the appropriate subject matter expertise on the JTF staff.
- Timely and thorough investigations are critical to gain accurate information in resolving incidents, combatting false reports, supporting good order and discipline, and protecting innocent subordinates.
- Rule of Law (ROL) efforts require a mix of expertise and cooperation between agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGO).
- Early inclusion of cross-functional subject matter experts in the planning process identifies authorities critical to successful planning and execution.
5.0 HQ OPERATIONS.

5.1 JTF Headquarters Forming, Manning, and Training Challenges. We are seeing the common practice by GCC commanders to either stand up JTFs or task standing functional commands to respond to crises. Both organizations often have to adapt their organization and processes to accomplish assigned missions.

Joint Task Forces are formed to fill the needs of either an emergent crisis (e.g., HA/DR), or an enduring, standing or rotational requirement (e.g., JTF-N, OIF, OEF). In either case they all have many of the same common challenges. This section addresses some of the common challenges and insights on forming a JTF HQ and maintaining readiness.

Newly Forming JTF HQ. A 2010 RAND study found that 70 percent of JTFs were required to deploy with about 42 days of notice or less as depicted in the figure. These JTFs had significant shortfalls in many of the key specialties needed to man the HQs. Obtaining the personnel needed to augment the deployed headquarters often proved to be more of an issue than was the ability to move an existing headquarters to a contingency.

Insights:

- Think inclusion. The tendency for newly formed JTF HQ is to simply survive the almost overwhelming challenges of forming, deploying, planning, and providing direction to subordinates. We have seen a best practice of early reach-out to partners (particularly our interagency and multinational partners) and the various supporting DOD agencies and commands during the initial formation of these headquarters. This is accomplished through both commander interaction and exchange of liaison elements – all with the intent of inclusion. A positive command climate, logical organizational design, and solid staff procedures are all necessary to achieve unified action.

- At the GCC level, consider all options to employ forces. These may include use of Service or Functional Component Commands, JTFs, and Theater SOCS. The use of standing Functional Components can be a feasible alternative to establishing a JTF in order to mitigate the time and proficiency challenges associated with standing up, manning, and preparing an ad hoc JTF during a crisis. These established HQs already understand the situation, have established relationships in the AOR, and have some current baseline of organization and processes to immediately assume C2 responsibility.

- The preferred option for organizing a JTF HQ is to form it around a combatant command’s Service component HQ, Theater SOC, or existing subordinate HQ (such as a numbered Fleet, numbered Air Force, Marine Expeditionary Force, or Army corps) that includes an established command structure.

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• Not all JTFs are the same. They all have different missions. Operational mission requirements should drive the JTF headquarters’ organization and manning.
• JTF headquarters personnel will work with interagency and multinational mission partners. This has implications for training, required expertise, and organizational structure. Leverage pre-existing relationships to speed inclusion with these partners.
• Manning is a challenge. The joint manning document (JMD) development, validation, and fill process can be tedious and slow. The designated Service (or subordinate HQs) or the Theater SOC HQ will normally provide the core of the JTF headquarters with augmentation in accordance with mission requirements. The commander is critical in shaping this augmentation based on mission requirements and duration. Augmentation will come in the form of both joint plug enablers and individual augmentees from within theater and CONUS.
• The core headquarters must be prepared to “go it alone” initially with key support by individual augmentation from within theater (both GCC HQ and component HQ personnel). The Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC), a USTRANSCOM asset, can also quickly provide trained personnel to augment the JTF HQ staff up to 120 days until individual augmentees arrive. Reduced Manning is a reality for all HQ based on the increased number of JTFs formed over the last nine years with a limited number of personnel to fill all of the requirements.
• Coalition Manning challenges. Some JTF HQ may operate under a coalition construct (e.g., NATO) and be uniquely manned (e.g., in accordance with a NATO Crisis Establishment (CE) manning document). Individual augmentees will join the staff from various contributing nations. Additionally, the length of each Individual Augmentee’s tour may vary based on national direction. The HQs needs to manage both the Manning and Individual Preparation very closely to prevent a gap in capability.
• Key billets. Based on mission analysis the commander will need to pursue getting some key billets filled with the right people. Some of these are: Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff, Political Advisor (POLAD), Command Senior Enlisted Leader, principal staff officers, cultural advisors (seen in some JTFs), Knowledge Management Officer (KMO), and key Coalition embedded staff officers. By-name requests from the commander are not uncommon when considering key individual billets and responsibilities. Existing personal relationships and building trust and confidence quickly can be a factor when developing emergent JTFs. When working with interorganizational partners, consider how to influence the personnel

33 Political Advisors (POLADs) are experienced State Department officers (several of whom are flag-rank equivalent) detailed as personal advisors to leading U.S. military leaders/commanders to provide policy support regarding the diplomatic and political aspects of the commanders’ military responsibilities.
selection process, maintain a current and accurate billet description, and ensure personnel meet the job description qualifications.

- Different Service cultures. Our Military Services have different cultures; therefore the various Service augmentees will come to the JTF HQ with their Service viewpoints and understanding as it relates to expectations of their staff duties and responsibilities. We find that the Services also have unique skill sets in terms of being more suited for filling the different staff principal positions. Successful HQ best align Service augmentee skill sets with specific staff positions.

- Enablers. There are numerous enablers from the Joint Staff, the Services, USSOCOM, USSTRATCOM, USTRANSCOM available to a joint HQ. These enablers may not always be pushed to the JTF HQ; the JTF leadership may need to request their support.

- Training responsibility. Establishing and maintaining a training section (and process) within the staff is essential to orchestrate development of pre-deployment training requirements, and conduct reception and sustainment training.

- Reachback has both benefits and limitations. The JTF HQ needs to balance a forward deployed concept and its challenges in terms of footprint, size, fidelity, and feasibility of support, with that of potential reachback and its limitations in terms of situational understanding and responsiveness.

**Enduring (Standing and Rotational) JTFs.** Standing JTFs provide Combatant Commanders an operational level capability to further long-term objectives. These kinds of JTFs provide a long term, operational means to further theater security cooperation and other USG goals. One example is USNORTHCOM’s JTF North, which has existed for over ten years and supports U.S. law enforcement agencies in counter drug and counter narcoterrorism operations. These standing JTFs implement persistent manning, equipping, and training programs that provide continuity and stability to contribute to the GCC theater objectives.

Rotational JTF HQs such as those in Afghanistan and earlier in Iraq also provide significant capability. However, they have unique challenges. The continuing rotation of personnel, combined with unit rotations, can impact overall HQ proficiency. We normally see a period of decreased proficiency both immediately following core HQ rotations and after periods of high individual augmentee turnovers.

**Insights:**

- One of the best means of minimizing a decrease in proficiency of an incoming rotational core headquarters is through the proactive involvement of the in-place organization. We’re finding that the in-place headquarters are fully sharing and passing on their insights, experiences, and lessons learned to their follow-on headquarters. They are supporting both preparatory academic training and exercises, while also fully supporting pre-deployment site surveys and visits.
Individual staff augmentee training is important to the functioning of the HQ. However, only a small percentage of individual augmentees, and even members of the core staff, take full advantage of the many resources available for increasing their proficiency prior to deployment. Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) is a good resource for individual pre-deployment training. Additionally, the Joint Task Force HQ training guide (available on the Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS)) is a great starting point for basic information. Specific technical training or more general training is also available. JTF leadership can identify these kinds of programs as prerequisites to their GCC headquarters for subsequent dissemination to force providers for necessary preparation of augmentees prior to deployment. Most operational headquarters also institute some form of on-site reception and training programs for augmentees.

Predeployment training of core staff. The ongoing Joint Staff J7 mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) series, and the Chairman’s exercise program coupled with Service programs successfully support the unit commander’s training program in getting the unit to a “high walk – low run” level of readiness prior to deployment. We see a best practice in commanders and key staffs continuing to work to ensure augmentees are identified and participate in predeployment training, and key personnel moves are made prior to an MRX.

5.2 Headquarters Staff Organization, Staff Integration, and Battle Rhythm. This section addresses insights in headquarters staff organization, integration, and battle rhythm. One comment up front; we have seen over time a tendency toward building very large headquarters staffs. However, there is value in keeping the headquarters “right sized.” Large headquarters require more internal coordination, may slow and distort support to commander decision making, and overshadow external coordination and output, reducing effectiveness. Balance the penchant for increasing headquarters size with recognition of the challenges of a large staff.

Staff Organization.

J-Code Structure: We find the J-Code structure is the preferred basic staff structure for a joint headquarters. We find that the J-Code structure allows for common understanding of structure and processes, facilitates infusion of staff augments, employs OPTs efficiently, and enables clear communication internally and with external stakeholders. As a basic organizing structure, the J-Code model provides a common reference point for broad functional expertise, staff oversight and accountability (e.g., logistics, intelligence). Staffs organized around other basic models, for example functionally, by mission set, cross-functionally or by event horizons, tend to struggle with the administrative, control and accountability responsibilities that the “vertical” J-Code structure

\[34\text{http://jko.jten.mil/}.\]
provides. These structures also induce other seams within the HQ that can impede support to decision making. Additionally, and not to be underestimated, the J-Code structure provides staff members an “address” that is readily recognizable across the Services and our coalition and interagency partners, and thus enhances our commonality and reduces barriers to cooperation and collaboration.

- Functional/mission-based/hybrid organizations: Some staffs that we visit organize around “functional” structures other than the J-Code model as a basis. These structures were created to better focus on specific mission areas, such as Theater Security Cooperation, and to improve unity of effort with our partners. We observe that these types of organizations can present significant challenges, both in steady-state interaction with higher, subordinate and lateral headquarters staffs, but especially during crisis operations (see above paragraph).

- Special Staff and Subject Matter Experts: Regardless of the baseline organization of the HQ, the importance of special staff (and often one deep) positions cannot be overstated. These critical positions (e.g., POLAD, Chaplain) are often comprised of one person, but can provide invaluable input to the commander and the staff. Establishing a process to include (and where necessary supplement) these key positions into cross-functional venues is a key element of effectively integrating the staff and providing the best support to commander’s decision-making.

Staff Integration.

- Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, Working Groups (B2C2WGs), and Operational Planning Teams (OPT). We see the extensive but discriminate, tailored use of these integrating elements in every joint headquarters regardless of size or basic organizational structure. These integrating structures provide the forums for bringing together functional expertise from across the staff and from external stakeholders in supporting the commander’s decision cycle. They make staff coordination more routine, facilitate monitoring, assessment and planning, and allow for the management of current and future operations and future plans. We also see many headquarters leverage virtual collaboration tools to facilitate inclusiveness at these venues.

- Boards are created for the purpose of gaining a decision, or guidance. Boards play a central role in organizing staff activities toward an output that furthers the mission - a decision to continue, reprioritize, redirect, reassess, etc. We find the most effective staffs organize their monitoring, assessing, and planning efforts, and supporting B2C2WGs around boards facilitating commander-centric leadership.

- Centers provide a permanent cross-functional integrating structure - the most frequent example is the Joint Operations Center, or JOC, responsible for monitoring, assessing, planning, directing and communicating within the current operations event horizon.
are enduring, with dedicated manning and facilities, and typically contain liaison officers from subordinate and other external organizations. Despite classification challenges, many headquarters are able to include coalition and host nation representation in their JOCs to great advantage.

- **Working groups** provide analysis of a particular purpose or function (such as IO) to multiple users (such as OPTs). These working groups are enduring or ad hoc, and often specific to the mission. Working groups also serve as excellent venues for collaboration with other mission partners.

- **Operational Planning Teams** focus on solving specific problems relating to a specific event horizon. These teams progress through the steps of the Joint Operation Planning Process (or JOPP) receiving expertise and analysis from various working groups, interacting with the J-Codes, in producing decision briefings for the commander. Robust, and structured interaction between the J-Codes, working groups, and planning teams is critical to producing supportable COAs, and thoroughly vetted staff estimates to the commander. Staffs that struggle in producing quality decision material to the commander typically have a breakdown in the interaction between the J-Codes, working groups, planning teams, and decision boards.

**Battle Rhythm.**

- Development and disciplining of the battle rhythm is a continuing focus area in every joint headquarters we visit. It provides the structure for managing our most important resource - time. The headquarters battle rhythm must not only integrate the decision cycle across the three event horizons, but must also account for the battle rhythms of higher and adjacent headquarters and stakeholders, all while supporting subordinate headquarters with timely direction and guidance. We continue to observe the importance of the CoS in developing, managing, and enforcing the battle rhythm.

- Some “battle rhythm events” will likely be directed by higher headquarters. As discussed in the decision cycle section, every Geographic Combatant Commander may be conducting concurrent operations spanning the “deep global operations,” to AOR-wide operations, to focused actions in an established JOA. Many of the challenges faced by the GCC and other higher headquarters have a direct impact on the JTF battle rhythm. Even seemingly mundane things like differences in time zones may significantly affect the battle rhythm when the commander is required to brief in an SVTC that starts at 1600 in Washington but is occurs at 2300 or 0500 local in the JOA.
We find that often the first step in developing a battle rhythm is determining the key anchor points. These are often interaction with higher headquarters such as an SVTC. HQs then backward plan to determine how to support the commander to inform or be informed by these anchor points.

We also find the requirement to determine which touch points a commander deems necessary to support their specific style of decision making. These are commander-centric and based on the decision making style of the commander. Some like big meetings to make decisions; other like to make decisions in smaller meetings (see figure).

The second step in creating the battle rhythm is to arrange the activities of the major supporting B2C2WG and OPT that facilitate commander decision-making in a logical manner (see below figure). This is referred to by many staffs as the “critical path,” that is, the path by which information that supports decision-making is cross-leveled, prioritized, and vetted as it progresses through the staff from concept or task to be presented to the commander for decision or guidance. We find that many staffs invest significant time in determining the specific critical path and linkages that best support decision making.

HQs arrange these above events on a time schedule based on the required frequency, and determine supporting working groups and other venues. The operational commanders and their staffs recognize several related facets of time management: time for staff preparation and coordination of analysis and recommendations, battlefield circulation, sleep, physical fitness and stress relief, and creative thought. They all guard the commanders’ and principals’ time to give them time to circulate and think vice filling their schedule with meeting after meeting. White space on the battle rhythm is also important to allow flexibility when responding to crises or unforeseen taskings and requirements.

We continually see the need to consider constraints of subordinate and lateral headquarters when developing the battle rhythm, particularly in scheduling multiple “all players” VTCS. These other headquarters also have battle rhythm, planning, and mission requirements - we occasionally observe higher headquarters levying excessive meetings that consume components’ time.
• We see many headquarters successfully use a daily Commander’s (or Battle) Update Assessment (CUA/BUA) deconflicted with that of higher headquarters and monitored by the entire staff and components to provide situational awareness and common context, and enable proactive decisions. Effective update assessments also provide an opportunity for components and the staff to bring issues of importance before the commander and receive guidance. They present the “So What” of current events rather than a history brief, and frame information in the context of assessment, usually providing a recommendation for the commander. This venue is often focused on the current operations event horizon.

• We also see the successful use of two planning-related decision venues, the Plans Management Board and Commander’s Plans Meeting (see also section 6.4). The first prioritizes and resources planning efforts, and the second provides the forum to receive guidance or decision on planning problems. We find regular interaction between staff planners and the leadership to be essential in keeping the appropriate planning efforts on track toward decision and execution.

• We observe the successful use by several joint headquarters of a daily Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) to accomplish information sharing, guidance and intent goals. The FRAGO has benefits in reducing meeting time, enhancing coordination, and providing a record of headquarters guidance.

• The battle rhythm is crucial to staff time management, and we observe staffs continue to struggle with balancing the potentially large number of B2C2WGs desired for full staff analysis against the limited number of personnel and competing scheduling requirements. We also observe staffs struggle with differentiating the delineated and planned battle rhythm and the more dynamic application of that battle rhythm on a command calendar / schedule.

• A best practice that we see to discipline the number of events on the battle rhythm is the use of some form of charter such as what many refer to as a “Seven Minute Drill.” We find that this charter, typically vetted by the CoS, has enabled many joint headquarters to ensure that every event on the battle rhythm has a purpose and, just as important, defined inputs and outputs that feed the commander’s decision cycle. A battle rhythm event that has no output, results in generic situational awareness, or an information brief outside the decision-making process, may not belong on the battle rhythm.

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“Seven Minute Drill”

1. Name of board, working group, etc.; Descriptive and unique
2. Lead J code; Who receives, compiles, and delivers information
3. When / where does it meet in Battle Rhythm?; Allocation of Resources (time and facilities); collaborative tool requirements
4. Purpose; Brief description of the requirement
5. Inputs required from; Staff sections and / or BCGTs required to provide products
6. When? Suspect DTG for inputs
7. Output / Process / Product; Products and links to other BCGTs
8. Time of delivery; When outputs are due
9. Membership codes; Who has to attend (task to staff to provide reps)
10. POC for this Seven Minute Drill; Name, phone, and email
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5.3 Information Sharing in the Force. We are also seeing emphasis on how HQs collect, analyze, and vertically and horizontally share information within the force and with other mission partners to support commander's decision-making and conduct operations. They have developed new approaches, processes, and tools to manage information within the force and across the staff to support the commander's decision making.

Information/Knowledge Management (IM/KM) continues to be one of the greatest challenges for our joint forces. We see IM/KM involving people, processes, and technology as depicted below in the “Levels of Responsibility” figure.

Insights and Best Practices:

- Commander’s guidance and CCIRs focus the staff and resources to provide fused information to support decision-making. CCIRs serve as control measures for KM by establishing collecting, processing, analysis, and disseminating priorities. Use CCIRs to prioritize flow of information.

- Take charge of Knowledge Management – the process piece of sharing information and knowledge to make decisions. Gaining and sharing information and knowledge is everyone's business. It is commander and operator business, and more about people than technology even though technology remains an important enabler. Commanders and staff find that they must personally reach out and across to many stakeholders, both within and external to their headquarters, to gain the necessary knowledge on which to make decisions.

- Delineate authority and responsibility for the different aspects of knowledge management, information management, and the associated tools and C4I systems. See “Levels of Responsibility” figure below.

- Task the CoS with the responsibility for KM and designate an operationally-focused Knowledge Management Officer (KMO) to work for the CoS as his surrogate to oversee and manage the KM processes. We've seen the Assistant CoS supervising the KMO in many commands with a focus on oversight on disciplining B2C2WGs and battle rhythm.

- Clearly define the headquarters’ decision-making processes – the KM piece – before determining the information management “means and tools” (see next section on Decision Cycle). Consider both physical and virtual collaboration means to conduct battle rhythm events – these can run the gamut from physical meetings and phone calls to virtual means such as Secure Video Teleconferencing (SVTC), chat rooms, and other collaborative tool suites. Retain the tried and proven use of a scribe to record key information and decisions. Post these summaries on the portal.

- Develop and use an operator-friendly web page/portal as the primary digital means to share information. Combine it with simple “push and pull” information protocols remembering that simply posting information does not guarantee reception of that information. Ensure
information can be easily inserted, found, and retrieved on the web page/portal. Think through how to collaborate with others to enhance assessment, planning, and execution.

- Identify up front the required communications networks based on information sharing requirements (e.g., CENTRIXS, SIPRNet or Unclassified as primary network). Develop processes to share information with interagency and coalition partners not on your communication network.

- Develop an environment that fosters a “responsibility to share” balanced with a “need to know” mentality with non-traditional partners (e.g., interagency and host-nation partners) to better support decision-making while accounting for the risks associated with the potential of compromise on the various networks.

- Develop procedures for RFI management and foreign disclosure within the command. Develop sufficient capacity to enable foreign disclosure and information sharing with your partners. This includes ensuring that you have foreign disclosure officers and training foreign disclosure representatives on the staff. Ensure that key information sharing procedures are understood throughout the staff.

- Carefully select tools that are user friendly. Recognize the impact of continuous personnel turnover and training requirements. An adequate Information Technology (IT) tool well understood and used by your staff is much more effective than a perfect, continually changing IT tool that is too complex to intuitively understand and use.

- Develop and refine KM processes and procedures through an integrated KM working group (KMWG) led by the KMO and comprised of J-code KM representatives that report to a KM Decision Board chaired by the COS. Task the KMWG to maintain currency and relevance of the commander’s and staff’s knowledge assets.

- Disseminate approved KM processes through an authoritative Knowledge Management Plan (KMP). The KMP should define the responsibilities of the KM organization, and provide guidance on how to gain and maintain situational awareness, share information, and collaborate with higher, lower, and adjacent organizations throughout the decision cycle. Periodically revise the KMP to reflect improvements to the command’s processes as they are developed over time. Be prepared for change; do not allow your KM plan to become stagnant and not stay up with your decision-making processes.
6.0 COMMANDER’S DECISION CYCLE.

6.1 Decision Cycle. The decision cycle is a matter-of-fact model that describes how an operational commander makes decisions. It provides a means to focus the staff on how to support the commander’s decision making. We see every command using a cycle similar to the one depicted here. While greatly simplified and only “two-dimensional” these cycles all include: an assessment of how they are doing, design and planning based on this assessment, directing of tasks to subordinates, requesting or recommending actions to mission partners, and monitoring operations and the environment to support subsequent assessment. They communicate throughout this cycle, both within the headquarters and with higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands.

We have observed that inclusion of mission partners and stakeholders in this decision cycle is critical for achieving unity of effort. We will further describe this cycle after touching on event horizons and how the headquarters interact in terms of their decision cycle with its higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters.

Three Event Horizons: 35 We find that the joint headquarters orient on three general event (or planning) horizons – current operations, future operations, and future plans. We find each event horizon moves (spins) at different rates in terms of how it goes through the key aspects of the decision cycle (see figure below). Each event horizon also requires battle rhythm events that support its planning, execution, and assessment.

- The current operations event horizon focuses on the “what is,” and can rapidly progress through the decision cycle – sometimes within minutes for quick breaking events. Current operations produce a large volume of orders including fragmentary orders (FRAGOs). These kinds of activities generally do not require detailed full staff integration involving the full headquarters. They do, however, require some limited planning capability within the Joint Operations Center (JOC). Because there is representation from all the J-codes, the expertise for this planning capability already resides in the JOC.

- The future operations event horizon focuses on branch planning, the what ifs, and normally moves slower with more deliberate assessment and planning activities resulting in products such as major FRAGOs directing major tactical actions (e.g., named operations) and troop

35 We see interchangeable use of the terms event horizon and planning horizon.
movements within theater (e.g., movement of a unit from one area to another). It generally requires full staff integration.

- The future plans event horizon is focused on sequel planning, the what’s next, and interacts heavily with higher headquarters and other mission partner planning efforts. It moves more deliberately through the decision cycle. It focuses on activities such as development of OPLANs and FRAGOs to Campaign Plan and Policy directives or major troop rotations. These types of activity also require full staff integration.

This decision cycle nests with other echelon headquarters’ decision cycles across all three event horizons as depicted in the adjacent figure. It continually interfaces with the higher headquarters’ decision cycle (which is normally more deliberate and slower moving), with adjacent units, and with subordinate unit decision cycles (which will likely be moving more rapidly).

At the Combatant Command level, we observe one additional “complication” to this decision cycle – the numerous concurrent operations. Every GCC is concurrently operating on three “planes,” conducting three concurrent operations, as depicted in the adjacent figure. These three operations are the “deep global operations” sustaining international unity of effort, AOR operations focused on theater strategic objectives, and setting conditions and supporting crisis operations in JOAs. Each of these three operations contains current operations, future operations, and future plans event horizons within them. Many of theater-strategic headquarters can be tempted to over-focus on “JOA” operations even after the appropriate initial crisis focus period at the expense of the other broader, long standing mission areas.

These three concurrent operations across the three event horizons result in nine (3X3) potential planning and monitoring challenges at the Combatant Command level. In the planning section, we’ll discuss means by which we see the GCC manage planning and prioritizing staff resources for these activities.

6.2 Assessment. Assessment drives both design and planning, and assists commanders in prioritizing/allocation resources. It is an important best practice whose need is reinforced time and again in operational headquarters. These headquarters all recognize they need
both quantitative and qualitative analysis to deepen their understanding of the environment and adversary. They recognize they cannot precisely model the behavior of the complex environment nor predict results.

Assessments help to inform how the Force is doing (see the three areas of assessment – task, operational environment, and campaign assessment on the adjacent figure), adjust (following commander’s guidance and intent), and inform the planning process across all three event horizons. A strong assessment framework involves staff wide integration to provide the staff assessment to the commander. The commander then uses that staff assessment to compare his assessment developed through battlefield circulation, key leader engagement, and various boards.

**Over-Engineering and Over-Structuring Assessment.** A balance is needed between a quantitative and qualitative approach to assessment. Assessment, especially assessing the operational environment and the campaign, is tough, and in many cases subjective. We have seen some staffs over-engineer assessment, building massive quantifiable briefings and overwhelming subordinates with information reporting requirements as they attempt to measure and document progress on attainment of operational or strategic objectives. These briefings do not always logically or clearly support a commander’s assessment requirement nor assist him in developing guidance and intent. Some assessments also incorrectly focus on assessing activity versus progress toward achieving the objectives. We find that quantitative indicators should only serve as a potential start point for commanders’ and staffs’ subjective assessments based on their observations and experience.

Commanders balance a possible staff tendency toward providing quantitative input, limit the amount of time and effort their staffs put into quantifying assessments, and recognize their personal role in applying their experience, intuition, and own observations in an art of war approach to assessment. They also recognize that activity does not necessarily equal progress.

**Recommendations Based on Assessment.** Another staff challenge is developing and making recommendations to the commander on “what needs to be done” based on assessments. Often, just developing the “what happened” and the “so what” of assessment consumes the staff and they don’t get to the most important aspect – recommending “what needs to be done.”

**Focus of Assessments.** Different level headquarters have a different assessment focus. Lower level headquarters focus on how well they are performing assigned or implied tasks (“doing things right?” - Task Assessment) so that they may improve future actions (e.g., work on TTPs). They also assess tactical mission accomplishment. Operational level headquarters focus their assessment on whether they are achieving the necessary conditions for the larger mission success (“doing the right things” - Operational Environment Assessment). Theater level headquarters look more broadly at the AOR assessing whether they are achieving theater-strategic or campaign objectives (“accomplishing the mission” - Campaign Assessment).

**Frequency and Venues for Assessment.** Assessment is continuous with numerous venues for informing and being informed by the commander. We have observed that tactical and operational
level headquarters conduct task assessments fairly frequently using friendly measures of performance answering “are we doing things right.” These task level assessments normally occur within the current operations event horizon (think hot washes after an operation). Venues for this type assessment at HQs are both formal (at daily and weekly update assessments) and informal (based on battlefield circulation, crosstalk, and other informal venues such as discussions with stakeholders).

Operational level headquarters (i.e., most of the JTF headquarters we observe) assess the operational environment, specifically the achievement of conditions (or desired outcomes) answering “are we doing the right things” at the frequency (weekly or monthly) to drive future operations and future planning. Venues for this level of assessment also range from formal to informal with formal assessments presented by the staff.

Theater-strategic headquarters normally focus on campaign assessment answering “are we accomplishing the mission” (achieving our objectives). These theater-strategic venues are fairly formal, occur quarterly or semi-annually, and are heavily influenced by other stakeholders.

**Stakeholder Involvement.** Every command we have visited extensively reaches out to stakeholders and other venues in arriving at their assessments. Without exception, these stakeholders’ perspectives enrich the assessments. In many cases, the stakeholders have not traditionally conducted these types of assessments, may not always understand the benefits, and may be leery to commit to a position.

In some cases, it is recognized that assessments efforts support outside stakeholders. For example, in a humanitarian assistance operation, the military’s primary goal may be to serve in support of diplomatic efforts. Therefore, the measure of mission progression may be the minimization of military assistance to aiding the crisis response. That transition back to the other instruments of national power (Diplomatic, Informational, and Economic) gives a holistic approach to the coordination of outside stakeholders with military efforts.

**Periodic Validation of the Basis of Assessments.** We noted earlier that we cannot predict outcomes in the complex environment we operate in today. We also recognize that our actions will change the environment and often require that we relook or reframe the problem and subsequent design and plan.

We have seen joint headquarters periodically reframe their understanding of the problem, relook their paradigm, and revalidate their developed objectives and actions based on this analysis.

This is different from the assessment process discussed earlier. It often necessitates a change to the plan. Like the assessment process, this review/validation is also conducted at different levels and with different frequencies. Obviously, revalidation of the objectives occurs at the level at which they were developed – normally the theater-strategic or above level. Review of the attainment of necessary conditions or desired outcomes occurs at the operational level, while review of our actions occurs at both the operational and tactical levels.

**Insights and Best Practices:**

- Plan for assessment. When developing and managing assessments, it’s key to establish a strong collection plan. This includes data from components, subordinate units, outside stakeholders, and through surveys and polling.
- Balance quantitative and qualitative aspects to assessment to reduce the likelihood of skewed conclusions and decisions with the commander using numerous venues (including battlefield
circulation and discussion with commanders and stakeholders) to gain his personal assessment. Human judgment is key to success.

- Get beyond the “what happened” to the “why,” “so what,” and “what do we need to do.”
- Be cautious of cause and effect conclusions, particularly in human perceptions and behavior.
- Always provide recommendations to the commander during all assessment venues (daily, weekly, monthly, other).
- Consider establishment of an Assessment Cell either as a separate staff directorate or in Plans to oversee the overall assessment process.
- Consider assigning the staff ownership of the various Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) or lines of effort most closely associated with their staff responsibilities rather than restricting the assessment function to one staff section or cell. This will provide a deeper assessment and ensure staff wide inclusion in the assessment process.
- Regardless of the venue or frequency, the operational headquarters should attempt to minimize unnecessary assessment reporting workloads on subordinate headquarters.
- Recognize the value of Interagency and multinational involvement in the assessment process; they share their perspectives and enrich (and influence) the process.
- Reviews and revalidations keep the units on course by taking into account both higher level direction, adversary actions, and other changes in the security environment.

6.3 Design. Design as a concept has grown immensely over the past several years both in the Services as well as in the Joint community. Commanders use “design” as a means to address the complexity of the problems they face as well as the environment in which they operate. We have seen joint force commanders at every level focus on this aspect, leveraging their experience, intuition, instincts along with staff inputs to frame the problem and develop an operational approach. We recognize both the high levels of support together with some criticism for design (particularly too much paralyzing focus on design and fixation on admiring the problem) and believe the best approach is somewhere in the middle. There is clearly a need for a focus on better understanding the environment and on better defining the problem. At the same time there is a concern this focus on understanding and problem framing may be too nebulous and does not directly support planning with deliverables. Additionally, there is often the tendency to “admire the problem” too long and never fully progress toward developing solutions. We suggest that the value of design is improving understanding that can be expressed in better commander’s guidance in support of planning. This comes from the critical analysis and discourse during design.
“Design does not replace planning, but planning is incomplete without design.”

Design is inherently commander-enabled, conceptual in nature, and either establishes or questions assumptions and methods, while attempting to gain a fuller understanding of the nature of the problem to be solved and the context within which subsequent planning and execution will attempt to solve it. JP 5.0 defines Operational Design as, “the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution.”

Design links initial thoughts to the more established joint operation planning process (JOPP) through the design concept, and integrates the operational approach into traditional mission analysis products such as the commander’s intent, and planning guidance. An initial commander’s estimate may also be prudent to crystallize ideas and share them with critical stakeholders in the theater and national strategic level.

We have seen the benefits of the design thought process throughout the joint community over the past decade. We have learned the importance of the continual dialogue with national decision makers to define (and redefine) the problem, determine key assumptions, and develop an operational approach that will provide the basis for planning. Theater-strategic and operational level commanders have focused on this concept of design as one of their key responsibilities. They find that continuous dialogue with stakeholders is key in arriving at better understanding of the environment and problem, and developing the necessary assumptions and approach.

At the Combatant Command level, we have observed some challenges informing national policy makers on the theater level realities and requirements as they continue pursuing peaceful solutions. Gaining necessary authorities and ROE early on in a crisis is an example of the support a potential JTF may need to conduct successful operations. Essential to setting conditions in a potential JOA or for achieving national objectives is the consistent partnering with interagency, intergovernmental, multinational and other stakeholders to maintain harmony in action at both levels; the push for peace and the preparation for war (the “theater-strategic dilemma” depicted in the figure). Balancing and resourcing the planning efforts supporting these two competing requirements requires continuing attention and guidance by the commander.

We see the value of design-thinking in this theater-strategic dilemma challenge as the Combatant Commander continues to support national objectives oriented toward peace, while concurrently ensuring that they are supporting their subordinates’ preparedness to act if necessary. Every combatant command we

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visit experiences this dilemma. Again, we see the CCDR’s dialogue informing and being informed by national level debate as a key factor in achieving the right balance in working through this.

One method of approaching this dilemma is through an artful approach to deterrence. We see many commanders and commands using the depicted generic campaign model in deliberate planning (see figure). We recognize that activities may bridge multiple phases and each phase is labeled with respect to the preponderance of activity in that phase. However, the graphical depictions in the figure and method of writing often suggest the joint force is compelled to execute each phase sequentially, precluding opportunities to skip phases, or return to earlier phases.

This applies particularly to the early phases of a campaign. We note that we never plan for failure, with one exception... if deterrence fails. To further complicate the dilemma, often those actions we take militarily in deterrence may be provocative and work against efforts to de-escalate.

We have seen different commands work through deterrence design with a full appreciation that deterrence normally requires all elements of national power, in which the military can play an important role. They realize that in order for deterrence to be effective, they must fully understand and enable the other elements of national power. Every action must be fully and coherently integrated with the others, particularly on the diplomatic front. These commands work in consonance with the other elements, using some combination of “carrot and stick” language in which a thought-out plan employing both words and actions is critical. Approaches may range from appeasement to intimidation, and also include accommodation.

The adjacent figure depicts the balance over time between design activities and the planning process. We see the relative weight of
the commander’s and staff’s time spent up front in understanding the operating environment and defining the problem, then developing a conceptual idea of how to solve that problem through an operational approach.

Joint headquarters can use the design attributes noted here to more fully inform their joint operation planning process initial steps of planning initiation and mission analysis. This can allow the joint command to shift from a conceptual to the more detailed planning process which occurs in Course Of Action (COA) development, analysis, comparison and approval. Subsequently, during execution of the operation, assessment activities may reveal indicators that demonstrate a significant change within the operating environment or the problem that necessitate revisiting design activities as depicted on the figure.

JP 3-0 discusses operational design in terms of ends, ways, and means to help commanders understand, visualize, and describe complex combinations of combat power and help them formulate their intent and guidance. The elements of operational design are essential to identifying tasks and objectives that link tactical missions to achieve the strategic end states.

**Insights:**

- Spend time up front defining the problem. This requires engaging in dialogue with senior leaders and stakeholders to gain a common understanding of the operating environment and problem. This is a commander-centric activity. The investment of time in understanding the environment is critical to the ability to define the “right problem” that the joint force is being charged to solve. Understanding risk to mission and forces is part of this.

- Understanding the problem and conceiving a solution are complementary and simultaneous cognitive processes. This is particularly true with the problems commanders face in today’s complex environment. Periodic assessment during ongoing operations enables iterative solution updates based on changes in the operating environment or the problem. Understanding the operating environment, defining the problem, then forming this knowledge into a common operational approach serves to enrich the existing planning process.

- Commanders’ actions include both design and planning. It is incumbent on commanders to ensure planners understand where they are in the continuum of design and planning. This guidance drives the kinds of actions the planners take. Design actions generally consist of more brainstorming and creative thinking, where planning actions consist of more detailed and focused analytical thinking and production of plans and orders.

6.4 Planning. Planning is the problem-solving piece of the “design and planning continuum” introduced in the last section. It is procedural, following the joint operation planning process (see the 7 steps in the adjacent figure), and produces the requisite plans and orders to direct action. While not prescriptive, it provides a common framework for joint planning. It also provides interagency and multinational partners an outline for how United States joint forces plan and where to provide their input as stakeholders.

**Insights gained in planning:**

- Commander involvement up front in design, and then subsequently in the planning process enhances and focuses planning efforts. Commander’s guidance and intent, informed by assessment, focus and guide planning efforts.
Recognition of the more complex environment and need to determine desired outcomes and conditions is necessary before attempting to develop solutions to achieve success. Consider using PMESII as a means to gain and maintain a broad perspective and understanding of the environment (more than a military on military conflict). We find that staffs and commanders, together with stakeholders, are continually deepening their understanding of the operational environment through both traditional and non-traditional collection means (e.g., polls), analysis, and both subjective and objective assessment venues to better guide planning and operations.

Aligning words and actions is not an intuitive process. We find that many headquarters use a targeting-like methodology to align words and actions. Though each situation requires a different mix of violence and restraint, words and actions used together complement each other and create dilemmas for opponents.

We find that planning guidance, commander’s intent, and a targeting-like methodology provide the right basis for coherent development of effective lethal and nonlethal efforts at the operational level while leaving detailed synchronization to subordinate tactical units. We have seen the requirement for near term synchronization of certain actions through a targeting-like process at the operational level ensuring certain actions match our words in execution to avoid “effects” fratricide. However, we emphasize that the operational level headquarters cannot fully synchronize every word and action due to the complexity of the environment and the speed of actions – the very reason why mission command is so valuable.

Best Practices:

- Bring stakeholders fully into planning from the very beginning (in design), enriching mission analysis through COA development and analysis to orders development. Commanders have found that extensive consultation with stakeholders in visualizing the environment, developing guidance and intent, determining broader analysis criteria to analyze COAs, and making decisions pay big benefits in arriving at optimal plans and subsequent success in achieving objectives. This requires an important commitment to establishing and maintaining a command climate and organizational capability that actively seeks out and integrates stakeholder input into all phases of planning, operations, and assessment.

- The staff wide planning effort must be managed to ensure limited staff resources are properly focused on the most important tasks. Limited manpower and functional expertise will force
the prioritization of branch and sequel planning and the corresponding Operational Planning Teams (OPT).

- We recommend some form of Plans Management Board (PMB) chaired as necessary by the Chief of Staff (CoS) to provide direction and prioritization, and coordinate, synchronize and resource planning activities staff wide as depicted in the adjacent figure.

- There are activities that need to be executed prior to the execution of the Plans Management Board. These activities include:
  - Planners prioritize planning efforts within their event horizons (CUOPS, FUOPS, FUPLANS).
  - Decide on venue to prioritize planning efforts prior to PMB. TTP: A command group decision-maker (DCOS) gathers representatives from CUOPS, FUOPS, FUPLANS to prioritize planning efforts. This can be an informal weekly huddle to execute this effort.
  - Prioritized planning efforts are briefed to the COS at the PMB. The COS then provides direction and prioritization to planning activities so the staff can coordinate, synchronize and resource planning activities.

- Planning teams are central to integrating staff efforts in planning. Integral to the J3 and J5, these planning teams should be the conduit to both inform and be informed by functional working groups (e.g., Information Operations, ROE, logistics, etc.). The planning team should then provide coherent, fully coordinated staff recommendations to the commander at regular intervals (we use the term “touch points” to denote the various meetings with the commander) during the planning process for guidance and decision. As depicted on the figure, the J-code directors and sections remain important players in this OPT and Working Group (WG) interaction. They monitor planning and working group actions, and provide the functional staff estimate input that provide much of the basis for the OPT and WG analysis and recommendations.

- The composition of these planning teams should be tailored based on the planning task; we normally see a minimum of a maneuver planner, an intelligence planner, and a logistics officer as the core of the planning team.

- Depending on the mission, a “Communication” Line of Effort (LOE) may be appropriate. In relatively nonlethal environments or in a COIN setting when nonlethal influence campaigns
are required, this LOE can serve as the overarching umbrella that supports and is supported by the other LOEs as necessary (e.g., Governance, Security, Development LOEs).

**GCC Planning Challenges.** GCC commanders have a unique challenge in that they have broad theater responsibilities that both shape and define how they respond to crisis within their AOR. With adoption of the Adaptive Planning process we have seen the implications of this DOD-wide attempt to provide longer range guidance, more responsive planning efforts and senior level involvement in development of those plans. The Adaptive Planning process provides the foundation for a constellation of joint and combined operations and living plans designed and resourced to achieve national defense and military strategic objectives in a manner that is both militarily and politically acceptable.

This constellation of planning efforts centers on a strategic-level “Capstone” plan that provides the framework for other plans that address contingencies that could happen in the GCC’s AOR. The adaptive planning process ensures each of the contingency plans take into account national interests so that actions addressing one contingency do not inadvertently impact U.S. national interests in another area. The process also allows for continual update and shared awareness of the plans. Planners have to work through procedures to conduct revisions of these plans. They have to utilize collaborative planning tools and there is a personnel and professional development piece to these plans.

The adaptive planning process incorporates two key planning guidance documents, the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The GEF combines guidance from the SecDef to combatant commanders on theater security cooperation and contingency planning. The JSCP, issued by the CJCS, refines guidance provided in the GEF based on current military capabilities. It apportions limited forces and resources to combatant commanders. For both Combatant Commands and JTFs, these documents provide guidance and establish requirements for:

- Need for “inclusion and a whole of Government” approach
  - Interagency and coalition partners involvement early in planning.
  - Know what Interagency organizations and agencies “bring to the fight.”
- Integration of Phase 0 (current Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) activities) within a campaign plan, and linking these steady state TSC actions to contingency requirements to achieve strategic end states. Linking ongoing campaign planning and phase 0 activities to authorities, approvals, funding and sourcing (contingency and execution sourcing) is key to success.
- Address short term contingency responses within the context of a broader, longer term theater campaign strategy.
- Synchronize theater plans with global plans – requires cross GCC coordination.
- Organization. Avoid internal HQ “stovepipes” (J3 and J5) – a common problem.
6.5 Directing and Monitoring. Every command that we visit has some type of an operations center, usually called a Joint Operations Center (JOC) with dedicated manning focused on developing and maintaining situational awareness for the commander and broader staff within the current operations event horizon. These JOCs typically, have robust communication, information display and management resources. They bring together representation from across the staff, components, and other stakeholders, and assume a great deal of the responsibility for directing and monitoring operations for the commander.

Directing:

- Commanders provide guidance, intent, and direction to subordinates through mission-type orders. We observe the effectiveness of an orders section within the JOC that has the requisite experience and authorities to release orders in a timely manner. Ensuring transmittal via standard message channels to proper addressees, verifying receipt, and standardizing control and dissemination of both incoming and outgoing orders is essential to the performance of this section.
- Verbal Orders of the Commanding Officer (VOCO) are another means of directing operations. We occasionally see staffs and subordinate staffs struggle with verbal orders given by the commander at venues such as the daily update brief without written direction. Uncertainty regarding whether a commander’s comment is guidance, intent, or authoritative direction to take action may arise. A well-functioning orders section within the JOC is used by many staffs to reduce this uncertainty and rapidly provide authoritative direction to subordinates via FRAGOs.
- We have seen the value of having a resident planning capacity in the JOC to solve emergent challenges in the current operations event horizon. Absent such a planning capacity, the future operations section (e.g., J35) is given this task, which pulls its focus away from its important future operations event horizon planning function into current operations. This directly reduces the overall headquarters ability to stay ahead of the fight and appropriately set conditions for subordinate success through proactive planning.
- As discussed earlier, having defined mission approval authorities (who can say yes or no for the commander) in advance is a best practice that is vital to the success of JOCs, especially during crisis or time sensitive operations. Decentralized authorities, defined and rehearsed in advance, allow the commander’s decision cycle to spin quicker and build trust and confidence in the organization.
- Many JOCs have not codified Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), resulting in reduced efficiency, effectiveness, and confusion among watch standers regarding their duties and responsibilities. JOC performance is enhanced when an SOP defining responsibilities by billet, reporting requirements, authorities, order formats, story board templates, and JOC displays, has been produced and is understood across the JOC floor.
- Staff battle drills based on likely contingencies should be developed and rehearsed to minimize confusion, facilitate simultaneous action across JOC sections, and enable the directing function to proceed rapidly during crises. Understanding and rehearsing the flow of information with some sense of urgency (e.g., “What do I know? What do I need to know?"

![Diagram of Joint Operations Center (JOC)](image-url)
Who else needs to know? Did I tell them?”) is critical to successful operations. Battle drill execution is an “All Hands” event for the JOC.

- Within the Current Operations (CUOPs) event horizon, we find it extremely beneficial for the staff to develop and build tools to assist the commander in his decision-making process. These tools can take the form of a decision support matrix or template. A decision support matrix will prioritize and evaluate a list of options for the commander. Further, it will provide the implications of each decision. For example, when the staff brings forward a decision requesting the commander to change the Force Protection Condition (FPCON) level, the commander most likely may not understand each of the measures within a particular FPCON level. By providing an easily understood matrix laying out the options, the commander will be able to make a timely, better informed decision, while at the same time avoiding any unintended impacts. A point to consider is that while some matrices may only require specific functional expertise such as an FPCON change, other decision support matrices, such as those designed for operational decision-making will require a broader staff input to ensure an overall situational understanding by the commander.

- JOC synchronization. Whether as part of a formal shift change brief or as a separate event, we find that synchronization briefings are used by many successful JOCs to rapidly build situational awareness throughout the center. The key elements of successful synchronization include: a review of resources and priorities, an update, by JOC section, of items working and priorities as well as guidance and priorities of the Chief of Operations (CHOPS). This synchronization will identify any potential conflicts in operations and resources that may occur within the current operations event horizon.

- The daily update brief. This event has different names depending on the command (e.g., Commander’s Update Assessment/Battle Update Assessment (CUA/BUA)), however the methodology is the same. The brief is given to the commander. It is an opportunity to brief the commander on what he needs and wants to know, and to receive guidance. Finding out what the commander requires is part of the art in building the daily update brief. The JOC typically has the responsibility for collating the various elements of this brief, ensuring standardization, and ensuring that it remains on track during presentation. We find a best practice to be ensuring that briefers address the “So what?” of their portions of the brief, contributing to situational awareness and facilitating movement of the decision cycle, vice just presenting information.

**Monitoring:**

Joint headquarters monitor the environment consisting of friendly, adversary, and other elements of the operational environment within their AOR. The JOC is often the focal point for monitoring and reporting relevant information to the commander and for sharing it across the broader staff.

- Planners help develop Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) during the planning process. Proactive attention to CCIRs is essential for JOC (and other staff) personnel to focus on the commander's needs and priorities.
limited resources in support of commander’s decision making. To promote awareness and attention to the commander’s information requirements, we recommend prominent display of CCIRs within the JOC. We also recommend posting current CCIRs on the current operations section of the JTF portal to facilitate component awareness of CCIRs.

- The Common Operational Picture (COP) and other JOC displays are also important in building situational awareness. A simple tool to use in assessing the effectiveness of the JOC displays is to ask whether an understanding of the current situation can be gained after only a short time reviewing the JOC displays. The displays should be tailored to the commander’s needs and preferences and, if possible, shared electronically with the broader staff, components, mission partners, and higher HQ. Having standardized COP displays with the correct decision-making products, to include ramifications of making the decision, will enhance the commander’s decision making.

- Liaison elements can assist in situational understanding, but should not be the conduit for subordinate unit reporting. These liaison elements assist in monitoring operations primarily by addressing their commanders’ issues and will likely spend most of their time in the planning area where they can provide their respective components’ perspectives and ideas to enhance planning. Liaison elements should be armed with knowledge of the capabilities of their parent command. Current operations desk officers should be responsible for maintenance of communications and reporting with subordinate and adjacent commands.

- We see JOCs struggle with notification and in determining what constitutes a reportable event, other than CCIR triggers. One very effective tool used by some JOCs is a “notification criteria” matrix that spells out who needs to be notified of various events outside the rhythm of the scheduled update brief. Notification criteria and the reporting chain should be clearly understood to prevent stovepiping of information or inadvertent failures in notification.

- Significant Events (SIGEVENT). SIGEVENTs should be defined, tracked, reported and monitored until all required staff action has been completed. We have seen some JOCs preemptively remove some SIGEVENTs from their “radar” before required follow-on actions have been accomplished. Once a SIGEVENT has been closed, it should be archived for record purposes and to assist the intelligence and assessment functions.

- Plans Hand-Off. We broadly see the need for a more formal hand-off of plans for execution from FUOPS (J35) to CUOPS (J33). A best practice is to have a FUOPS planner brief the entire JOC on plans entering the current operations event horizon. This practice helps mitigate the natural seam between the J35 and J33, and results in improved execution of the plan as monitoring and directing occur in the JOC.

- Requests for Information (RFI). We find excellent results in JTF staffs that have two RFI managers: one in the J2 managing intelligence RFIs, and another on the JOC floor managing other RFIs. By using a SharePoint portal page, the JOC RFI manager provides visibility on the questions, answers, and identification of those providing answers to the broader organization. This information sharing function is more important than merely allowing requestors to get information. RFIs, however, should not take the place of routine staff coordination. A priority should be affixed to each RFI submitted. Many staffs find that tracking the commander’s RFIs through this same system to be effective.

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38 See Section 3.2 for further discussion on CCIRs.
7.0 INFORMATION: BATTLE OF THE NARRATIVE.

Introduction. The words and actions of the joint force, mission partners, neutral parties, strategic competitors, AND potential adversaries intentionally or unintentionally affect many local, regional and global audiences. Commanders and their staffs continually strive to better align what is done and seen with what is said and heard (see figure). As noted in the earlier planning section, many HQs orchestrate (or synchronize) this through some form of targeting methodology as a subset of planning. This section focuses on aligning communication efforts within the information environment recognizing that this alignment is part of a larger planning and targeting synchronization of both words and actions.

Battle of the Narrative. Commanders and staffs we visit often refer to fighting the “information war” by aligning their actions, words, and images to prevent a “say-do” gap (i.e., we don’t do what we say or vice versa). The term “Battle of the Narrative” is often used to describe the continuing nature of this contest between competing nations, entities, and/or ideologies to gain support from key audiences for their competing missions and objectives. The “Battle of the Narrative” is fought in the cognitive dimension of the information environment. It seeks to gain superiority over the adversary’s narrative, to diminish its appeal, make it irrelevant, and supplant it. This fight is commander driven and attempts to align efforts from the strategic to the tactical level. Commanders are faced with adversaries that will rapidly tell their version of the story to local, regional and global audiences. Because these adversaries are often not constrained by the requirement to be truthful and accurate, the commander needs to be proactively disseminate information with accuracy, credibility, and speed to the appropriate audiences to set the conditions in the “Battle of the Narrative.”

The Military Contribution to Strategic Communication. Strategic Communication is an interorganizational effort that spans the full breadth of the U.S. Government. Military leaders and units make an undeniable contribution to the overall United States’ Strategic Communication efforts. The commander’s messaging supports USG Strategic Communication by nesting with higher headquarters’ and overall USG strategy and providing guidance to subordinate units. A unit’s communication strategy is part of the commander’s overall strategy, coordinated across the staff, and synchronized with subordinates. This deliberate and conscious effort help ensure we do what we say we will, strengthens our credibility, and improves our ability to inform and influence selected audiences as appropriate.
**The Environment.** One of the greatest challenges facing commanders is that of understanding the numerous and disparate audiences both in and beyond the operating area. Each audience has their own set of beliefs and perspectives which influence how they may perceive our actions and words, often in a way we may not always anticipate. The perceptions and outlooks of these audiences may also change based on our actions or external influences. Thus, this pursuit of understanding never ends.

As part of the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE), the J2 is tasked with understanding the adversary’s beliefs, perceptions, and likely reactions. While the intelligence community spends a significant amount of time studying the adversary, commanders are challenged with understanding how other non-adversary audiences will perceive our actions. We have found that effective units clarify responsibilities across the staff and subordinates for studying these non-adversary audiences so that they may better plan how to inform and/or influence key audiences.

**Informing and Influencing.** The purposes of inform and influence differ and have different objectives. However, the two activities are closely related and they must be carefully synchronized. Within the operational area and across the global environment, informing and influencing the key foreign audiences’ perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, and actions is critical for successful operations. The commander also has responsibility to inform domestic and other friendly audiences that are watching and listening to every move. With the powerful communication tools available to all actors in the “Battle of the Narrative,” these audiences, foreign and domestic, are critical to mission success regardless of where we operate.

**Engagement.** Engagement is recognized as a key supporting capability to help achieve the commander’s desired goals and objectives. It is also an effective means of gaining insight into key audiences beliefs and perceptions. Interactions with key military, political, and social leaders help to ensure we are developing the right message for the right audience and it is being delivered by the right messenger by the appropriate means. Engagement is ideally an iterative process with each engagement building on previous engagements and setting the conditions for

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39 We use the non-doctrinal terms inform and influence because of their widespread use in the force. An Army definition of inform and influence activities is provided here together with excerpts of inform and influence aims.
the next engagement. Engagements may include: senior leader engagements, soldier engagements, civil-military operations, media operations, and any of the many activities of subordinate commands which interact with key audiences.

With multiple action agents engaging key audiences, it is important to ensure the alignment of engagement efforts. Higher headquarters is often an appropriate coordinator for engagements and ensures proper frequency of engagement and that specific engagement objectives are aligned vertically and horizontally with adjacent, higher and subordinate commands’ actions. Simple matrices may be used as a reference mechanism for leaders to determine alignment and general synchronization of engagement efforts across the operational environment. However, mission command applies here; in today’s fast moving environment, any attempt to fully control or synchronize all engagement efforts will likely fail. A more feasible option may be the use of commander’s intent, with generally defined spheres of influence, and crosstalk.

Engagement cells can help ensure all aspects of an engagement are planned to include background or biographical information of the audience, the results of past engagements (from post-engagement debriefings or summaries), recent activities of concern to the audience, current observations, activities, and intelligence reporting on the audience. Finally, a post-engagement debrief is conducted to ensure results are recorded for the next engagement iteration.

**Assessment.** Effective communication requires quality assessment. Because communication is focused on affecting the cognitive or human aspects of the environment, we may not always see the immediate effects because it is difficult to assess perceptions, thoughts, and feelings. Perceptions and feelings change slowly and establishing a link between specific actions and specific changes in perceptions and beliefs can also be difficult. We find HQs using many non-traditional tools, including social media, polling data, and engagement meetings to help gauge adversary and population reaction to words and actions (in addition to the commander’s personal assessment). This broader assessment of progress towards the campaign objectives enriches our understanding of these different audiences and how to better inform or influence them.

**Insights:**
- Every action taken, or not taken, communicates a message to an audience, whether intended or not. Actions (and inaction) often speak louder than words.
- Commanders see the value in synchronizing every possible means (what we refer to as “action agents”) to disseminate messages in both word and actions. Aligning information related capabilities such as PA, IO, and MISO with force employment, civil affairs, engagements, and other actions helps to prevent the “say-do” gap and to achieve the commander’s desired goals and end states. The figure titled “Complexity of Interactions,” depicts the complexity of these interactions in the environment.
• An effective communication plan is developed through a targeting-like process as part of the overall planning process to align communication related activities with operational actions in support of the overall mission objectives, strategy, and intent. The incorporation of well-conceived commander’s communication objectives and themes as part of the commander’s guidance directly supports mission-type orders by providing the framework for empowered (and distributed) messaging by subordinates to dominate the information domain. Using a targeting-like method allows the commander to focus on his desired goals and objectives, identify priorities, allocate resources, and develop broad communication guidance.

• **Communication synchronization** is the overall alignment of words and images with actions by using a targeting-like process within the HQ and across the components. This process is:
  - Nested with higher actions.
  - Commander driven.
  - Fully integrated from design, through planning and execution, to assessment.
  - Proactive in design.

**Best Practices:**

• Headquarters are forming relatively small focused communication organizations led by a senior staff member. Most of these organizations do not encroach on the normal staff oversight responsibilities for specific functions (e.g., J3 retains responsibility for IO and PA remains responsive to the commander). However, these communication organizations enable a dedicated focus on the communication environment, associated planning efforts, oversight of a communication-related working group (see figure), and can provide direction to quickly coordinate communication-related actions as specifically empowered by the commander. These organizations are directly linked with planning, targeting, and the joint operations center, and are in contact with subordinates and other stakeholders.

• The efficient use of boards, bureaus, centers, cells and working groups within the established battle rhythm facilitates effective crosstalk and coordination with operational planning teams, targeting organizations, and information-related teams. Most joint headquarters utilize a communication-related working group to integrate and guide the functional-level working groups such as the information operations working groups, public affairs working groups, and engagement working groups (see figure). This “communication-related” working group supports planning and targeting across the current operations, future operations, and future plans event horizons, and supports and is supported by higher headquarters, subordinate units and
mission partners. It enables better coordination of messaging to all audiences within the information environment whether they are friendly, neutral, or adversarial.

- Commands generally establish separate cells to coordinate inform and influence activities to guard against the perception of prohibited activities. For example, one cell may focus on supporting inform functions with friendly audiences such as congressional delegation visits, international organizations, and the media. Another cell focuses on operations to inform and influence adversaries and potential adversaries. The separate cells cross-talk to coordinate actions.

- Small units going on tactical assignments benefit from communication awareness training conducted at pre-mission briefings. We have seen some commands develop tactical messages based on feedback from the field and then incorporate these updates into their latest tactical briefings.

- There are cases where the higher headquarters will restrict messaging to either a designated audience or a specific theme due to the sensitivity of the message, in order to prevent information fratricide or target saturation/overload. Too many action agents engaging key audiences may overload the audience and have a negative impact.
8.0 INTELLIGENCE. Despite the fact that an intelligence enterprise’s functional structure, manning, support requirements, and production efforts differ from one organization to another, there are often three common challenges that each organization faced to one degree or another. This section will describe and provide insights to each of these intelligence challenges as well as address the commander’s role in mitigating them. Three common intelligence challenges are:

- Gaining a holistic understanding of the complex environment beyond a military threat-only view.
- Tailoring and balancing intelligence support to the mission.
- Focusing intelligence operations, such as collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, and dissemination through the use of Priority Intelligence Requirements.

Understanding. Operational headquarters have had to expand their analysis beyond a military-centric view to gain the more holistic, greater understanding of the operational environment. We have seen staffs use some form of a broad construct to better understand and frame the environment to support the commander’s decision-making requirements. For example, one very useful model has been the incorporation of political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) data. The entire staff is involved in this broader analysis as it is often outside the J2 staff’s organic ability to provide a comprehensive view by itself. However, we do find that the J2 is still best suited to orchestrate this broader analysis.

Commanders in the field have tasked the J2 with the responsibility of being the focal point and coordinating the staff to bring together this broader understanding. They orchestrate the required cross-staff, cross-functional, interorganizational and multinational approach to gain the respective expertise of this collective group.

Tailoring. Recent operations highlight the need for agile focused intelligence support to tactical level activities. In these cases, operational commanders have decentralized not only collection but also the processing and exploitation assets to support this tactical fight. This decentralization has paid off by improving the agility and flexibility of the force to rapidly collect, process, and share critical information allowing for unprecedented speed of operations.\(^{40}\)

Much of the intelligence architecture is necessarily postured to support national and strategic level requirements, and significant capabilities are at the strategic and operational levels as depicted on the below figure. However we have seen how irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, humanitarian, and even field operations often require additional capability as

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\(^{40}\) This need for agility and flexibility to get inside the adversary’s decision cycle was discussed in Section 3.1 which discusses command in terms of decentralized mission approval levels.
We have observed several commands, for example in CENTCOM, EUCOM, and Korea, decentralizing and increasing federation in order for intelligence support to be more effective and timely. We have seen how the concept of mission command with its attributes of trust, shared understanding and intent can overcome a more traditional centralized mentality. It can lead to more timely and relevant tactical/mission-level support as well as shared understanding within and between staffs. A much increased degree of cross-domain synergy can be achieved between commands. We find that federated agreements with adjacent commands and the national intelligence community may be required to overcome resource limitations. STRATCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM have incorporated federation agreements in order to address complex threats. Embedded liaison and agency representatives are vital to this. Some commands have also implemented overarching, deliberately-written National Intelligence Support Plans (NISP) that synchronize DOD intelligence agencies and Service intelligence centers with the specified Combatant Command and Joint Task Forces priorities and operations.

**Balancing.** In response to missions and limited resources, commands often adjust intelligence structures and functions and then decide where to assume risk when shortfalls exist. Sometimes this can be mitigated through federation amongst subordinate, adjacent, and higher commands, or the integration of non-traditional resources, such as information from outside normal J2 lines of operation (e.g., host nation interaction, field operation debriefs, key leader engagement, NGOs/IGOs, public sector, social media, etc.). Commands have been more effective if they ensure that the intelligence organizational structure retains a balance between the resources that collect the data and the resources required for processing, exploiting, and disseminating (PED) the intelligence. They also ensure that personnel with the appropriate skill sets and authority are properly obtained and placed within the intelligence enterprise to support the architecture. We have seen J2 staffs structure the intelligence enterprise to support decisions at all levels of war in support of the Commander’s planning and decision horizons. This often requires a staff to concurrently understand the complex environment and support or empower tactical action. Combatant Commands and JTF J2s cannot solely focus on supporting tactical operations with their organic staff capabilities. Mission Command has
proven a valuable means to distribute and balance capability between commands. They posture collection and analysis assets in various forward locations to better support lower echelon requirements, and as necessary, employ reach back to better share resources across multiple commands and/or tiers. This can be further extended to the national level, and often, we have seen federation agreements successfully achieve this. In Afghanistan and Korea, collection capacity is pushed down to various commands spread throughout the theater due to tactical-level requirements. SOCOM effectively conducts this worldwide. CENTCOM, PACOM, EUCOM, and STRATCOM carefully distribute collection and analysis across components, theater, and even at the national level. TRANSCOM works very closely with intelligence centers/commands at geographic combatant commands, services, and the interagency to understand the environment and support its operations. SOUTHCOM, NORTHCOM, and AFRICOM go beyond DOD resources and integrate a range of interorganizational capabilities.

Tailoring and Balancing Insights:
- Optimize National Intelligence Support Plans to overcome organic resource limitations.
- Tailor the organization, recognizing that processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) is often the limiting factor in gaining and providing intelligence.
- Leverage forward, decentralized collection, PED, and analysis with federated reach back.
- Ensure communications infrastructure supports the concept of collection and PED.
- Develop and balance the means to concurrently provide operational-level understanding with the need to support tactical action.

Focusing. A deliberate mechanism, such as CCIRs, ensures the commander’s information requirements are transparent to not only his staff, but also with supporting organizations from adjacent, subordinate, and higher commands. Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) are a key component of CCIRs. Commanders have the opportunity to use PIRs as a personal means to drive intelligence to better support decisions, planning, and operations. PIRs shape the entire intelligence enterprise. They extend well beyond collection as they prioritize intelligence reporting, analysis, and production. This involves organizational structure, manning, and C4I. In fact during a major crisis, PIRs can leverage billions of dollars of national assets and thousands of personnel to directly support the commander. They provide priority, clarity, and relevancy to external organizations supporting the commander, especially from the national level. Lastly, we have seen commands dynamically adjust PIRs as the environment changes, and consequently, as planning and operations evolve. Intelligence is only relevant if it maintains pace with the commander’s changing needs. Clear and routine guidance on PIRs from the commander is essential to obtaining this. We have seen commands successfully implement a PIR management process that deliberately obtains a commander’s approval on how and when to
update PIRs. Additionally, we have seen commands aggressively disseminate and clearly post these PIRs to ensure a wide range of visibility and awareness.

In some operations that are deeply involved with another country, especially with aspects of its society, commanders have introduced a third category of unique information requirements in order to better support the affected country, integrate key partners, and to better understand the environment, especially during counterinsurgency, stability, and humanitarian operations. In Afghanistan, the commander developed Host Nation Information Requirements (HNIRs) in order to pursue and obtain requisite information to better interact and support the government and its populace. HNIRs have proven useful in Afghanistan, and they involve the entire headquarters staff, subordinate commands, and interorganizational resources.

**Focusing Intelligence Insights:**
- Use PIRs as a means to focus the entire intelligence enterprise, not just collection requirements.
- Dynamically maintain PIRs to ensure relevancy to changing requirements.
- Personal involvement by the commander has effectively conveyed these critical information needs inside and outside the command.

**Commander’s Role in Shaping Intelligence.** Commanders continue to receive intelligence that has and has not supported decisions, planning, and operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. However, we have seen commanders successfully shape the process through personal involvement with intelligence directors and their staffs. Touch points and clear guidance and intentions have significantly helped the intelligence enterprise provide the right intelligence in the right format, to the right level of detail, and at the required frequency necessary to support a commander’s decision process.

**Command and J2 Leadership Insights:** Leadership can overcome or mitigate intelligence challenges by:
- Requiring analytical perspectives beyond just the military threat in order to understand complex operational environments.
- Optimizing the employment of intelligence resources.
- Tailoring and distributing intelligence operations, and if necessary, implementing a federated structure across multiple command tiers.
- Providing intelligence support across all levels of war and supporting each operational event horizon.
- Supporting both operational environment understanding and tactical-level actions.
- Focusing intelligence operations through the use of PIRs.
9.0 SUSTAINMENT. Sustainment is one of the six joint functions common to joint operations and includes the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. Sustainment is more an art than a science and its definition is not always clearly understood in the joint world.

Sustainment encompasses all of the core logistics capabilities, including supply, maintenance, deployment and distribution, health services support, logistics services, engineering, and operational contract support as well as personnel services, including human resources support, religious ministry support, financial management, and legal support.

Joint Logistics Enterprise. Supporting joint forces in an increasingly complex, uncertain, competitive, rapidly changing, and transparent operating environment will be an increasingly common feature of the 21st century security landscape. The sustainment and logistics demands in complex emergencies require an “enterprise” approach as they often transcend the ability of a single nation, government, or organization to address alone.

There are a multitude of stakeholders, both military and civilian, that make up what is being referred to in the U.S. military as the Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt), a multi-tiered matrix of key global logistics providers working cooperatively to achieve a common purpose without jeopardizing their own mission and goals.

Understanding who all the players are and how they can help you in an operation is vitally important to ensure rapid and precise response for the JFC. These can include other supporting Combatant Commands (e.g., TRANSCOM, STRATCOM), DOD Combat Support Agencies (CSAs) (e.g., DLA, DCMA), other U.S. government (USG) agencies (e.g., DHS, DOS, DOE), Coalition National Support Elements, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and industry partners.

Insights:
- Understand the authorities, goals, and limitations of other JLEnt partners early. This may extend your capabilities or restrict them.
- Capitalize on and leverage other stakeholders capabilities and resources.
- Other U.S. government agencies and NGOs may play a key role in providing logistics support during Foreign Humanitarian Assistance as well as relief and reconstruction operations. Since DOD usually has the lion’s share of assets and resources, be prepared to provide support to these partners during their operations.
- Establish relationships and build trust among JLEnt partners before a crisis occurs. After a crisis occurs, get JLEnt partners involved early in the planning process.

Concept of Support. The essence of joint sustainment is integrating strategic and Service core logistics capabilities and personnel support at the operational level to achieve unity of effort and mission effectiveness at the tactical level. The combatant commander will have a theater logistics support concept with provisions to help set conditions in the theater for subordinate success. The
JFC Concept of Support should capitalize on the resources and capabilities of the theater Service components and other JLEnt partners supporting operations in the theater.

The JFC’s Concept of Support should include the core logistics capabilities previously discussed as well as joint personnel support functions. Identify the timing and sequencing of key sustainment enablers in the force flow to ensure the right mix of combat power and long-term sustainment. The JFC should strive to gain efficiencies and share resources in the theater by capitalizing on established DOD Executive Agency (EA) relationships, existing Inter-Service Support Agreements (ISSAs), and Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreements (ACSAs) with other countries. Consider options such as area support and sea basing where appropriate. The CCDR also has the option of using Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL) to reallocate Service resources within the theater according to operational needs. As always, strategies such as these should not be implemented at the expense of effective support to the force or detriment to the long term objectives of the theater security cooperation plan.

Insights:
- Nest the JFC’s Concept of Support with the CCDR’s Theater Support Concept.
- Integrate and synchronize Service Component and other JLEnt capabilities in support of joint force requirements.
- Access and permissions for staging, basing, overflight, and transit may impact deployment and distribution and require key leader engagement early in an operation.
- Identify known shortfalls for global critical munitions and intra-theater lift.
- Balance the force flow of combat power with sustainment key enablers as a function of risk.
- Identify infrastructure requirements in the early stages of campaign development, particularly for new construction or extensive renovations.
- Link engineering efforts to civil military operations to direct resources to achieve operational objectives.
- Utilize contract support to minimize the JFC’s organic footprint and, where feasible, supplement/replace military support capabilities.
- Leverage medical soft power and health diplomacy to deliver themes and messages that support the commander’s communication strategy.
- Force accountability begins with successful Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI). Accurate force accountability and casualty tracking is essential for the commander to make informed decisions concerning force allocation and capabilities.

Sustainment Team. A Sustainment team approach in an organization can be
beneficial to promote planning and coordination across the various Sustainment staff sections (e.g., J1, J4, J8, Engineer, Surgeon, Legal, Chaplain). Operating as a Sustainment team can promote comprehensive planning and Concept of Support development. During a contingency, Sustainment staff coordination can help synchronize cross-functional/directorate requirements (e.g., personnel rotation, JRSO&I, resourcing, mortuary affairs, casualty tracking and patient evacuation, transportation and lift, and key leader engagement requirements).

At the combatant command level, the engineering and contracting support staffs are often consolidated in the J4. The SJA, Chaplain, and Surgeon are often special staffs to the Commander. At the component and JTF level, these staff sections are even more segregated. The Sustainment team can be organized formally by designating a deputy commanding general for support (DCG-S) (i.e., some JTFs and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Regional Commands) or as informally as ensuring a deliberate internal staff synchronization meeting between the various directorates. How the Sustainment team is organized should be tailored to best support each mission. The key takeaway is that, at some level, the various staff sections are brought together on a regular basis to synchronize Sustainment efforts in support of the mission.

Insights:
- Synchronize and coordinate staff efforts across sustainment functions.
- Foster unity of effort and economy of staff while maximizing information sharing.
- Provide a comprehensive picture of sustainment efforts to the commander.

Best Practices:
- Include representatives from the J1, J8, Engineer and Surgeon’s staff in the Joint Logistics Operations Center (JLOC) to facilitate daily action officer level coordination of sustainment efforts.
- Include the J1, J8, Engineer, Surgeon, and Chaplain in the Joint Logistics Coordination Board (JLCB) and leverage this existing decision board to facilitate senior level synchronization of sustainment efforts.
- Provide effective visualization of the sustainment picture through the use of a dedicated portal, electronic dashboard, or an integrated Common Operating Picture that can be used for both the staff’s situational awareness and to brief the commander.

Supporting the Commander’s Decision Cycle. The Sustainment team must provide advice and recommendations to the commander concerning prioritization and allocation of support in the theater. This demands that the Sustainment team has a clear understanding of the commander’s intent and Concept of Operations and is able to anticipate requirements in an increasingly complex, uncertain, competitive, rapidly changing, and transparent operating environment. The Sustainment team best supports the commander’s decision process through
active integration in the command’s battle rhythm across all three event horizons. The Sustainment team must be able to synchronize the joint logistics integrating functions (i.e., Plan, Execute, Control, and Assess) with the phases of the commander’s decision cycle (i.e., Design and Plan, Direct, Monitor, Assess). Sustainment support, particularly when operating in remote or austere locations, often requires significant lead time. Including the Sustainment team up front and early in the design and planning phase enables them to anticipate requirements and help set conditions for mission success. Sustainment planners and functional subject matter experts (SMEs) must stay engaged as plans and planning products are developed and refined.

As plans transition to orders, the JLOC and Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC) are the fusion centers for logistics execution efforts on the staff and must stay closely connected to the JOC and other external operations centers. A Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center (TPMRC) may be established to manage intra-theater patient movement. The sustainment staff sections will establish functional Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells and Working Groups (B2C2WGs) and participate in other command B2C2WGs with sustainment equities. The primary logistics board for overall theater logistics synchronization is the Joint Logistics Coordination Board (JLCB). Other supporting boards include the Theater-Joint Transportation Board (T-JTB) for theater lift prioritization and allocation, the Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board (JCMEB) for civil-military construction projects and resources, and the Combatant Commander Logistics Procurement Support Board (CLSPB) for theater contract support coordination.

As campaign and operational assessment informs future design and planning, the Sustainment team must be integrated into the command’s assessment process. In order to monitor the progress or effectiveness of plans in execution, sustainment planners and functional SMEs must identify expected outcomes from the Concept of Support that will be used to assess progress.

Insights:
- Synchronize sustainment staff efforts across all three event horizons to inform the Commander’s decision cycle.
- Include the right sustainment SME(s) in appropriate command B2CWGs (e.g., Joint Targeting Working Group/Board, Interagency Working Group, KLE Working Group, Joint Effects or Assessments Working Group/Board, etc.) to ensure staff products and analysis incorporate sustainment considerations up front.
- Logistics assessment should inform the command assessment process to include plan refine, adapt, terminate, execute (R-A-T-E) process.

Best Practices:
- Include a J3 representative in the Theater-Joint Transportation Board (T-JTB) and the Joint Logistics Coordination Board (JLCB) to ensure operational priorities are communicated and understood by the Sustainment team.
- Develop Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) in coordination with the J3/5, components, and subordinates and participate in the assessment process to ensure support adaptation based on assessment of Lines of Operation (LOOs)/Lines of Effort (LOEs).
- Engage the Joint Staff early to facilitate a Joint Materiel Priority Allocation Board (JMPAB) or Joint Transportation Board (JTB) to adjudicate competing demand between Geographic Combatant Commands for global critical munitions or strategic lift.
### Glossary
#### Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACA</td>
<td>Airspace Control Authority</td>
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<td>ACCE</td>
<td>Air Component Coordination Elements</td>
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<td>Assistant Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>ACSA</td>
<td>Acquisition and Cross Service Agreements</td>
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<td>ADCON</td>
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<td>ADRP</td>
<td>Army Doctrine Reference Publication</td>
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<td>United States Africa Command</td>
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<td>Area of Operation</td>
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<td>Air Operations Centers</td>
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<td>B2C2WG</td>
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<td>Battlespace Owners</td>
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<td>C2</td>
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<tr>
<td>C5</td>
<td>Command, Control, Cooperation, Collaboration, and Coordination</td>
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<td>CCDR</td>
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<td>Commander’s Critical Information Requirements</td>
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<td>CCJO</td>
<td>Capstone Concept for Joint Operations</td>
</tr>
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<td>CDR</td>
<td>Commander</td>
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<td>Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System</td>
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<td>Combined Forces Command</td>
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<td>Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command</td>
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<td>CHOPS</td>
<td>Chief of Operations</td>
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<td>CIED</td>
<td>Counter-Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>Course of Action</td>
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<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>Operation Plan in Concept Format</td>
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<td>CONUS</td>
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<td>COP</td>
<td>Common Operational Picture</td>
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<td>Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>CSA</td>
<td>Combat Support Agency</td>
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<td>CSG</td>
<td>Combined Support Groups</td>
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<td>CUA</td>
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<td>Defense Contract Management Agency</td>
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<td>DIME</td>
<td>Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic</td>
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<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>DR</td>
<td>Disaster Relief</td>
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<td>DS</td>
<td>Direct Support</td>
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<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Support to Civil Authorities FFIR - Friendly Force Information Requirement</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTD</td>
<td>Deployable Training Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>EA</td>
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Glossary
Abbreviations and Acronyms

GEF – Guidance for Employment of the Force
HA – Humanitarian Assistance
HA/DR – Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
HANDCON – Handshake Control
HNIR – Host Nation Information Requirement
HQ – Headquarters
IED – Improvised Explosive Device
IGO – International Government Organization
IM – Information Management
IO – Information Operations
IR – Information Requirements
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force
ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
ISSA – Inter-Service Support Agreement
IT – Information Technology
J1 – Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a Joint Staff
J2 – Intelligence Directorate of a Joint Staff
J3 – Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff
J33 – Directorate for Current Operations
J35 – Future Operations
J4 – Logistics Directorate of a Joint Staff
J5 – Plans Directorate of a Joint Staff
J7 – Joint Force Space and Missile Systems Division
J8 – Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate of a Joint Staff
JDDOC – Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center
JDEIS – Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic Information System
JFC – Joint Force Commander
JFACC – Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFC – Joint Force Commander
JFCC – Joint Force Land Component Commander
JFMCC – Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
JFSOCC – Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander
JIPOE – Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
JKO – Joint Knowledge Online
JLEnt – Joint Logistics Enterprise
JLCB – Joint Logistics Coordination Board
JLOC – Joint Logistics Operations Center
JMPAB – Joint Materiel Priority Allocation Board
JOA – Joint Operations Area
JOC – Joint Operating Concept
JOPP – Joint Operation Planning Process
JP – Joint Publication
JRSOI – Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
JSCP – Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSOA – Joint Special Operations Area
JSOTF – Joint Special Operations Task Force
JTB – Joint Transportation Board
JTF – Joint Task Force
KLE – Key Leader Engagement
KM – Knowledge Management
KMO – Knowledge Management Officer
KMP – Knowledge Management Plan
KMWG – Knowledge Management Working Group
LOE – Line of Effort
LNO – Liaison Officer
LOO – Lines of Operation
MISO – Military Information Support to Operations
MND – Multi-National Division
MNF – Multinational Force
MOE – Measures of Effectiveness
MOU – Memorandum of Understanding
MRX – Mission Rehearsal Exercise
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVFOR – Navy Forces
NCE – National Command Element
NGO – Nongovernmental Organization
NISP – National Intelligence Support Plans
NSE – National Support Element
OEF – Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
OIF – Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
OPCON – Operational Control
OPLAN – Operational Plan
### Glossary

**Abbreviations and Acronyms**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>OPORD</td>
<td>Operation Order</td>
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<td>OPT</td>
<td>Operational Planning Teams</td>
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<td>Officer in Tactical Command</td>
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<td>Pacific Command</td>
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<td>Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination</td>
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<td>PIR</td>
<td>Priority Intelligence Requirement</td>
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<td>PMESII</td>
<td>Political, Military, Economic, Social, Informational, and Infrastructure</td>
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<td>RATE</td>
<td>Refine, Adapt, Terminate, Execute</td>
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<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<td>SIPRNet</td>
<td>SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
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<td>Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center</td>
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<td>Working Group</td>
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